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by Noam Chomsky

8/97
This essay will appear in a
collection assembled by Tony Evans, dealing with the 50th anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.
The adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948 constituted a step
forward in the slow progress towards protection of human rights. The
overarching principle of the UD is universality. Its provisions have equal
standing. There are no moral grounds for self-serving "relativism," which
selects for convenience; still less for the particularly ugly form of
relativism that converts the UD into a weapon to wield selectively against
designated enemies.
The 50th anniversary of the UD
provides a welcome occasion for reflection on such matters, and for steps
to advance the principles that have been endorsed, at least rhetorically,
by the nations of the world. The chasm that separates words from actions
requires no comment; the annual reports of the major human rights
organizations provide more than ample testimony. And there is no shortage
of impressive rhetoric. One would have to search far to find a place where
leadership and intellectuals do not issue ringing endorsements of the
principles and bitter condemnation of those who violate them -- notably
excluding themselves and their associates and clients.
I will limit attention here to a
single case: the world's most powerful state, which also has the most
stable and longstanding democratic institutions and unparalleled
advantages in every sphere, including the economy and security concerns.
Its global influence has been unmatched during the half century when the
UD has been in force (in theory). It has long been as good a model as one
can find of a sociopolitical order in which basic rights are upheld. And
it is commonly lauded, at home and abroad, as the leader in the struggle
for human rights, democracy, freedom and justice. There remains a range of
disagreement over policy: at one extreme, "Wilson idealists" urge
continued dedication to the traditional mission of upholding human rights
and freedom worldwide, while "realists" counter that America may lack the
means to conduct these crusades of "global meliorism" and should not
neglect its own interests in the service of others. By "granting idealism
a near exclusive hold on our foreign policy," we go too far, high
government officials warn, with the agreement of many scholars and policy
analysts. Within this range lies the path to a better world.
To discover the true meaning of
principles that are proclaimed, it is of course necessary to go beyond
rhetorical flourishes and public pronouncements, and to investigate actual
practice. Examples must be chosen carefully to give a fair picture. One
useful approach is to take the examples chosen as the "strongest case,"
and to see how well they withstand scrutiny. Another is to investigate the
record where influence is greatest and interference least, so that we see
the operative principles in their purest form. If we want to determine
what the Kremlin meant by human rights and democracy, we pay little heed
to Pravda’s denunciations of racism in the United States or state terror
in its client regimes, even less to protestation of noble motives. Far
more instructive is the state of affairs in the "people's democracies" of
Eastern Europe. The point is elementary, and applies generally. For the
U.S., the Western hemisphere is the obvious testing ground, particularly
the Central America-Caribbean region, where Washington has faced few
external challenges for almost a century. It is of some interest that the
exercise is rarely undertaken, and when it is, castigated as extremist or
worse.
Before examining the operative
meaning of the UD, it might be useful to recall some observations of
George Orwell's. In his preface to Animal Farm, Orwell turned his
attention to societies that are relatively free from state controls,
unlike the totalitarian monster he was satirizing. "The sinister fact
about literary censorship in England," he wrote, "is that it is largely
voluntary. Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept
dark, without any need for any official ban." He did not explore the
reasons in any depth, merely noting the control of the press by "wealthy
men who have every motive to be dishonest on certain important topics,"
reinforced by the "general tacit agreement," instilled by a good
education, "that `it wouldn't do' to mention that particular fact." As a
result, "Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself
silenced with surprising effectiveness."
As if to illustrate his words,
the preface remained unpublished for 30 years.
In the case under discussion
here, the "prevailing orthodoxy" is well summarized by the distinguished
Oxford-Yale historian Michael Howard: "For 200 years the United States has
preserved almost unsullied the original ideals of the Enlightenment...,
and, above all, the universality of these values," though it "does not
enjoy the place in the world that it should have earned through its
achievements, its generosity, and its goodwill since World War II." The
record is unsullied by the treatment of "that hapless race of native
Americans, which we are exterminating with such merciless and perfidious
cruelty" (John Quincy Adams) or the fate of the slaves who provided cheap
cotton to allow the industrial revolution to take off -- not exactly
through market forces; by the terrible atrocities the U.S. was once again
conducting in its "backyard" as the praises were being delivered; or by
the fate of Filipinos, Haitians, Vietnamese, and a few others who might
have somewhat different perceptions.
The favored illustration of
"generosity and goodwill" is the Marshall Plan. That merits examination,
on the "strongest case" principle. The inquiry again quickly yields facts
"that `it wouldn't do' to mention." For example, the fact that "as the
Marshall Plan went into full gear the amount of American dollars being
pumped into France and the Netherlands was approximately equaled by the
funds being siphoned from their treasuries to finance their expeditionary
forces in Southeast Asia," to carry out terrible crimes. And that the tied
aid provisions help explain why the U.S. share in world trade in grains
increased from less than 10% before the war to more than half by 1950,
while Argentine exports reduced by two-thirds. And that under U.S.
influence Europe was reconstructed in a particular mode, not quite that
sought by the anti-fascist resistance, though fascist and Nazi
collaborators were generally satisfied. And that the generosity was
overwhelmingly bestowed by American taxpayers upon the corporate sector,
which was duly appreciative, recognizing years later that the Marshall
Plan "set the stage for large amounts of private U.S. direct investment in
Europe," establishing the basis for the modern Transnational Corporations,
which "prospered and expanded on overseas orders,...fueled initially by
the dollars of the Marshall Plan" and protected from "negative
developments" by "the umbrella of American power."
It is, again, of some interest
that thoughts of that nature were "silenced with surprising effectiveness"
during the 50th anniversary celebration of this unprecedented act of
generosity and goodwill, the strongest case put forth by admirers of the
"global meliorism" of the world's most powerful state, hence of direct
relevance to the question being addressed here.
The "prevailing orthodoxy" has
occasionally been submitted to tests beyond the record of history. Lars
Schoultz, the leading academic specialist on human rights in Latin
America, found that U.S. aid "has tended to flow disproportionately to
Latin American governments which torture their citizens,... to the
hemisphere's relatively egregious violators of fundamental human rights."
That includes military aid, is independent of need, and runs through the
Carter period. More wide-ranging studies by economist Edward Herman found
a similar correlation world-wide, also suggesting a plausible reason: aid
is correlated with improvement in the investment climate, often achieved
by murdering priests and union leaders, massacring peasants trying to
organize, blowing up the independent press, and so on. The result is a
secondary correlation between aid and egregious violation of human rights.
It is not that U.S. leaders prefer torture; rather, it has little weight
in comparison with more important values. These studies precede the Reagan
years, when the questions are not worth posing.
By "general tacit agreement,"
such matters too are "kept dark," with memories purged of "inconvenient
facts."
The natural starting point for an
inquiry into Washington's defense of "the universality of [Enlightenment]
values" is the UD. It is accepted generally as a human rights standard.
U.S. courts have, furthermore, based judicial decisions on "customary
international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights."
The UD became the focus of great
attention in June 1993 at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.
A lead headline in the New York Times read: "At Vienna Talks, U.S. Insists
Rights Must be Universal." Washington warned "that it would oppose any
attempt to use religious and cultural traditions to weaken the concept of
universal human rights," Elaine Sciolino reported. The U.S. delegation was
headed by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "who promoted human
rights as Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter Administration." A "key
purpose" of his speech, "viewed as the Clinton Administration's first
major policy statement on human rights," was "to defend the universality
of human rights," rejecting the claims of those who plead "cultural
relativism." Christopher said that "the worst violators are the world's
aggressors and those who encourage the spread of arms," stressing that
"the universality of human rights set[s] a single standard of acceptable
behavior around the world, a standard Washington would apply to all
countries." In his own words, "The United States will never join those who
would undermine the Universal Declaration" and will defend its
universality against those who hold "that human rights should be
interpreted differently in regions with non-Western cultures," notably the
"dirty dozen" who reject elements of the UD that do not suit them.
Washington's decisiveness
prevailed. Western countries "were relieved that their worst fears were
not realized -- a retreat from the basic tenets of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights..." The "Challenge of Relativity" was beaten
back, and the conference declared that "The universal nature of these
rights and freedoms is beyond question."
A few questions remained unasked.
Thus, if "the worst violators are the world's aggressors and those who
encourage the spread of arms," what are we to conclude about the world's
leading arms merchant, then boasting well over half the sales of arms to
the third world, mostly to brutal dictatorships, policies accelerated
under Christopher's tenure at the State Department with vigorous efforts
to enhance the publicly-subsidized sales, opposed by 96% of the population
but strongly supported by high tech industry? Or its colleagues Britain
and France, who had distinguished themselves by supplying Indonesian and
Rwandan mass murderers, among others? The subsidies are not only for
"merchants of death." Revelling in the new prospects for arms sales with
NATO expansion, a spokesman for the Aerospace Industries Association
observes that the new markets ($10 billion for fighter jets alone, he
estimates) include electronics, communications systems, etc., amounting to
"real money" for advanced industry generally. The exports are promoted by
the U.S. government with grants, discount loans and other devices to
facilitate the transfer of public funds to private profit in the U.S.
while diverting the economies of the "transition economies" of the former
Soviet empire to increased military spending rather than the social
spending that is favored by their populations (the U.S. Information Agency
reports). The situation is quite the same elsewhere.
And if aggressors are "the worst
violators" of human rights, what of the country that stands accused before
the International Court of Justice for the "unlawful use of force" in its
terrorist war against Nicaragua, contemptuously vetoing a Security Council
resolution calling on all states to observe international law and
rejecting repeated General Assembly pleas to the same effect? Do these
stern judgments hold of the country that opened the post-Cold War era by
invading Panama, where, four years later, the client government's Human
Rights Commission declared that the right to self-determination and
sovereignty was still being violated by the "state of occupation by a
foreign army," condemning its continuing human rights abuses?
Further questions are raised by
Washington's (unreported) reservations concerning the Declaration of the
Vienna Conference. The U.S. was disturbed that the Declaration "implied
that any foreign occupation is a human rights violation." That principle
the U.S. rejects, just as, alone with its Israeli client, the U.S. rejects
the right of peoples "forcibly deprived of [self-determination, freedom
and independence]..., particularly peoples under colonial and racist
regimes and foreign occupation or other forms of colonial domination,...to
struggle to [gain these rights] and to seek and receive support [in
accordance with the Charter and other principles of international law]" --
facts that also remain unreported, though they might help clarify the
sense in which human rights are advocated.
Also unexamined was just how
Christopher had "promoted human rights under the Carter Administration."
One case was in 1978, when the spokesman for the "dirty dozen" at Vienna,
Indonesia, was running out of arms in its attack against East Timor, then
approaching genocidal levels, so that the Carter Administration had to
rush even more military supplies to its bloodthirsty friend. Another arose
a year later, when the Administration sought desperately to keep Somoza's
National Guard in power after it had slaughtered some 40,000 civilians,
finally evacuating commanders in planes disguised with Red Cross markings
(a war crime), to Honduras, where they were reconstituted as a terrorist
force under the direction of Argentine neo-Nazis. Such matters too fall
among the facts "that it `wouldn't do' to mention."
The high-minded rhetoric at and
about the Vienna conference was not besmirched by inquiry into the
observance of the UD by its leading defenders. These matters were,
however, raised in Vienna in a Public Hearing organized by NGOs in an
attempt to break through the wall of silence erected to protect Western
power from "inconvenient facts." The contributions by activists, scholars,
lawyers, and others from many countries provided a detailed review of
"Alarming evidence of massive human rights violations in every part of the
world as a result of the policies of the international financial
institutions," the "Washington Consensus" among the leaders of the free
world. This "neoliberal" consensus is based on what might be called
"really existing free market doctrine": market discipline is of great
benefit to the weak and defenseless, though the rich and powerful must
shelter under the wings of the nanny state. They must be allowed to
persist in "the sustained assault on [free trade] principle" that is
deplored in a scholarly review of the post-1970 period by GATT secretariat
economist Patrick Low, who estimates the restrictive effects of Reaganite
measures at about three times those of other leading industrial countries,
as they "presided over the greatest swing toward protectionism since the
1930s," shifting the U.S. from "being the world's champion of multilateral
free trade to one of its leading challengers," the journal of the Council
on Foreign Relations commented in a review of the decade.
It should be added that such
analyses omit the major forms of market interference for the benefit of
the rich: the transfer of public funds to advanced industry that underlies
virtually every dynamic sector of the U.S. economy, often under the guise
of "defense." These measures were escalated again by the Reaganites, who
were second to none in extolling the glories of the free market -- for the
poor at home and abroad. The general practices were pioneered by the
British in the 18th century and have been a dominant feature of economic
history ever since, and a good part of the reason for the contemporary gap
between the first and the third world (growing for the past 30 years along
with the growing gap between rich and poor sectors of the population
worldwide).
The Public Hearing at Vienna
received no mention in mainstream U.S. journals, to my knowledge, but
citizens of the free world could learn about the human rights concerns of
the vast majority of the world's people from its report, published in an
edition of 2000 copies in Nepal.
The provisions of the UD are not
well-known in the United States, but some are familiar. The most famous is
Article 13 (2), which states that "Everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own." This principle was invoked with much passion
every year on Human Rights Day, December 10, with demonstrations and
indignant condemnations of the Soviet Union for its refusal to allow Jews
to leave. To be exact, the words just quoted were invoked, but not the
phrase that follows: "and to return to his country." The significance of
the omitted words was spelled out on Dec. 11, 1948, the day after the UD
was ratified, when the General Assembly unanimously passed Resolution 194,
which affirms the right of Palestinians to return to their homes or
receive compensation, if they chose not to return, reaffirmed regularly
since. But there was a "general tacit agreement" that it "wouldn't do" to
mention the omitted words, let alone the glaringly obvious fact that those
exhorting the Soviet tyrants to observe Article 13, to much acclaim, were
its most dedicated opponents.
It is only fair to add that the
cynicism has finally been overcome. At the December 1993 U.N. session, the
Clinton Administration changed U.S. official policy, joining with Israel
in opposing U.N. 194, which was reaffirmed by a vote of 127-2. As is the
norm, there was no report or comment. But at least the inconsistency is
behind us: the first half of Article 13 (2) has lost its relevance, and
Washington now officially rejects its second half.
Let us move on to Article 14,
which declares that "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution." Haitians, for example, including the
87 new victims captured by Clinton's blockade and returned to their
charnel house, with scant notice, as the Vienna conference opened. The
official reason was that they were fleeing poverty, not the rampant terror
of the military junta, as they claimed. The basis for this discovery was
not explained.
In her report on the Vienna
conference a few days earlier, Sciolino had noted that "some human rights
organizations have sharply criticized the Administration for failing to
fulfill Mr. Clinton's campaign promises on human rights," the "most
dramatic case" being "Washington's decision to forcibly return Haitian
boat people seeking political asylum." Looking at the matter differently,
the events illustrate Washington's commitment to its uplifting rhetoric on
"the universality of human rights."
The U.S. has upheld Article 14 in
this manner since Carter (and Christopher) "promoted human rights" by
shipping miserable boat people back to torment under the Duvalier
dictatorship, a respected ally helping to convert Haiti to an export
platform for U.S. corporations seeking supercheap and brutalized labor --
or to adopt the terms preferred by USAID, to convert Haiti into the
"Taiwan of the Caribbean." The violations of Article 14 were ratified
formally in a Reagan-Duvalier agreement. When a military coup overthrew
Haiti's first democratically elected President in September 1991, renewing
the terror after a brief lapse, the Bush Administration imposed a blockade
to drive back the flood of refugees to the torture chamber where they were
to be imprisoned.
Bush's "appalling" refugee policy
was bitterly condemned by candidate Bill Clinton, whose first act as
President was to make the illegal blockade still harsher, along with other
measures to sustain the junta, to which we return.
Again, fairness requires that we
recognize that Washington did briefly depart from its rejection of Article
14 in the case of Haiti. During the few months of democracy (Feb.-Sept.
1991), the Bush Administration gained a sudden and short-lived sensitivity
to Article 14 as the flow of refugees declined to a trickle -- in fact,
reversed, as Haitians returned to their country in its moment of hope. Of
the more than 24,000 Haitians intercepted by U.S. forces from 1981 through
1990, 11 were granted asylum as victims of political persecution (in
comparison with 75,000 out of 75,000 Cubans). In these years of terror and
repression, Washington allowed 28 asylum claims. During Aristide's 7-month
tenure, with violence and repression radically reduced, 20 were allowed
from a refugee pool 1/50th the scale. Practice returned to normal after
the military coup and the renewed terror.
Concerned that protests might
make it difficult to maintain the blockade, the Clinton Administration
pleaded with other countries to relieve the U.S. of the burden of
accommodating the refugees. Fear of a refugee flow was the major reason
offered as the "national security" interest that might justify military
intervention, eliciting much controversy. The debate overlooked the
obvious candidate: Tanzania, which had been able to accommodate hundreds
of thousands of Rwandans, and would surely have been able to come to the
rescue of the beleaguered United States by accepting a few more Black
faces.
The contempt for Article 14 is by
no means concealed. A front-page story in the Newspaper of Record on harsh
new immigration laws casually records the fact and explains the reasons:
Because the United States armed
and financed the army whose brutality sent them into exile, few
Salvadorans were able to obtain the refugee status granted to Cubans,
Vietnamese, Kuwaitis and other nationalities at various times. The new law
regards many of them simply as targets for deportation [though they were
fleeing] a conflict that lasted from 1979 until 1992, [when] more than
70,000 people were killed in El Salvador, most of them by the
American-backed army and the death squads it in turn supported, [forcing]
many people here to flee to the United States.
The same reasoning extends to
those who fled Washington's other terrorist wars in the region.
The interpretation of Article 14
is therefore quite principled: "worthy victims" fall under Article 14,
"unworthy victims" do not. The categories are determined by the agency of
terror and prevailing power interests. But the facts have no bearing on
Washington's role as the crusader defending the universality of the UD
from the relativist challenge. The case is among the many that illustrate
an omission in Orwell's analysis: the easy tolerance of inconsistency,
when convenient.
Articles 13 and 14 fall under the
category of Civil and Political Rights. The UD also recognizes a second
category: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. These are largely
dismissed in the West. U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick described these
provisions of the UD as "a letter to Santa Claus... Neither nature,
experience, nor probability informs these lists of `entitlements,' which
are subject to no constraints except those of the mind and appetite of
their authors." They were dismissed in more temperate tones by the U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Ambassador Morris
Abram, who emphasized in 1990 that Civil and Political Rights must have
"priority," contrary to the principle of universality of the UD.
Abram elaborated while explaining
Washington's rejection of the Report of the Global Consultations on the
Right to Development, defined as "the right of individuals, groups, and
peoples to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy continuous economic,
social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized." "Development is not a right,"
Abram informed the Commission. Indeed, the proposals of the Report yield
conclusions that "seem preposterous," for example, that the World Bank
might be obliged "to forgive a loan or to give money to build a tunnel, a
railroad, or a school." Such ideas are "little more than an empty vessel
into which vague hopes and inchoate expectations can be poured," Abram
continued, and even a "dangerous incitement." The fundamental error of the
alleged "right to development" is that it presupposes that:
Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
If there is no right to
development, as defined, then this statement too is an "empty vessel" and
perhaps even "dangerous incitement." Accordingly this principle too has no
status: there are no such rights as those affirmed in Article 25 of the UD,
just quoted.
The U.S. alone vetoed the
Declaration on the Right to Development, thus implicitly vetoing Article
25 of the UD as well.
It is unnecessary to dwell on the
status of Article 25 in the world's richest country, with a poverty level
twice that of any other industrial society, particularly severe among
children. Almost one in four children under six fell below the poverty
line by 1995, far more than other industrial societies, though Britain is
gaining ground, with "One in three British babies born in poverty," the
press now reports, as "child poverty has increased as much as three-fold
since Margaret Thatcher was elected" and "up to 2 million British children
are suffering ill-health and stunted growth because of malnutrition."
Thatcherite programs reversed the trend to improved child health and led
to an upswing of childhood diseases that had been controlled, while public
funds are used for such purposes as illegal projects in Turkey and
Malaysia to foster arms sales by state-subsidized industry. In accord with
"really existing free market doctrine," public spending after 17 years of
Thatcherite gospel is the same 42 1/4% of GDP that it was when she took
over.
In the U.S., subjected to similar
policies, 30 million people suffered from hunger by 1990, an increase of
50% from 1985, including 12 million children lacking sufficient food to
maintain growth and development (before the 1991 recession). 40% of
children in the world's richest city fell below the poverty line. In terms
of such basic social indicators as child mortality, the U.S. ranks well
below any other industrial country, right alongside of Cuba, which has
less than 5% the GNP per capita of the United States and has undergone
many years of terrorist attack and increasingly severe economic warfare at
the hands of the hemispheric superpower.
Given its extraordinary
advantages, the U.S. is in the leading ranks of relativists who reject the
universality of the UD by virtue of Article 25 alone.
The same values guide the
international financial institutions that the U.S. largely controls. The
World Bank and the IMF "have been extraordinarily human rights averse,"
the chairperson of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Philip Alston, observed with polite understatement in his
submission to the Vienna counter-session. "As we have heard so
dramatically at this Public Hearing," Nouri Abdul Razzak of the Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Organization added, "the policies of the international
financial institutions are contributing to the impoverishment of the
world's people, the degradation of the global environment, and the
violation of the most fundamental human rights," on a mind-numbing scale.
In the face of such direct
violations of the principles of the UD, it is perhaps superfluous to
mention the refusal to take even small steps towards upholding them.
UNICEF estimates that every hour, 1000 children die from easily
preventable disease, and almost twice that many women die or suffer
serious disability in pregnancy or childbirth for lack of simple remedies
and care. To ensure universal access to basic social services, UNICEF
estimates, would require a quarter of the annual military expenditures of
the "developing countries," about 10% of U.S. military spending noted, the
U.S. actively promotes military expenditures of the "developing
countries"; its own remain at Cold War levels, increasing today while
social spending is being severely cut. Also sharply declining in the 1990s
is U.S. foreign aid, already the most miserly among the developed
countries, and virtually non-existent if we exclude the rich country that
is the primary recipient (Washington's Israeli client).
In his "Final Report" to the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur Leandro Despouy cites the
World Health Organization's characterization of "extreme poverty" as "the
world's most ruthless killer and the greatest cause of suffering on
earth": "No other disaster compared to the devastation of hunger which had
caused more deaths in the past two years than were killed in the two World
Wars together." The right to a standard of living adequate for health and
well-being is affirmed in Article 25 of the UD, he notes, and in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, "which
places emphasis more particularly on `the fundamental right of everyone to
be free from hunger'." But from the highly relativist perspective of the
West, these principles of human rights agreements have no status.
Article 23 of the UD declares
that "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment," along with "remuneration ensuring for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if
necessary, by other means of social protection." We need not tarry on the
respect for this principle. Furthermore, "Everyone has the right to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests."
The latter right is technically
upheld in the United States, though legal and administrative mechanisms
ensure that it is largely observed in the breach. By the time the
Reaganites had completed their work, the U.S. was far enough off the
spectrum so that the International Labor Organization, which rarely
criticizes the powerful, issued a recommendation that the U.S. conform to
international standards, in response to an AFL-CIO complaint about
strikebreaking by resort to "permanent replacement workers." Apart from
South Africa, no other industrial country tolerated these methods to
ensure that Article 23 remains empty words; and with subsequent
developments in South Africa, the U.S. may stand in splendid isolation in
this particular respect, though it has yet to achieve British standards,
such as allowing employers to use selective pay increases to induce
workers to reject union and collective bargaining rights.
Reviewing some of mechanisms used
to render Article 23 inoperative, Business Week reported that from the
early 1980s, "U.S. industry has conducted one of the most successful
antiunion wars ever, illegally firing thousands of workers for exercising
their rights to organize." "Unlawful firings occurred in one-third of all
representation elections in the late '80s, vs. 8% in the late '60s."
Workers have no recourse, as the Reagan Administration converted the
powerful state they nurtured to an expansive welfare state for the rich,
defying U.S. law as well as the customary international law enshrined in
the UD. Management's basic goal, the journal explains, has been to cancel
the rights "guaranteed by the 1935 Wagner Act," which brought the U.S.
into the mainstream of the industrial world. That has been a basic goal
since the New Deal provisions were enacted, and although the project of
reversing the victory for democracy and working people was put on hold
during the war, it was taken up again when peace arrived, with great vigor
and considerable success. One index of the success is provided by the
record of ratification of ILO conventions guaranteeing labor rights. The
U.S. has by far the worst record in the Western hemisphere and Europe,
with the exception of El Salvador and Lithuania. It does not recognize
even standard conventions on child labor and the right to organize.
"The United States is in arrears
to the ILO in the amount of $92.6 million," the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights notes, part of the huge debt that Washington refuses to pay
(in violation of treaty obligations). This withholding of funds "seriously
jeopardizes the ILO's operations"; current U.S. plans for larger cuts in
ILO funding "would primarily affect the ILO's ability to deliver technical
assistance in the field," thus undermining Article 23 still further,
worldwide.
Contempt for the socioeconomic
provisions of the UD is so deeply engrained that no departure from
objectivity is sensed when a front-page story lauds Britain's incoming
Labor government for shifting the tax burden from "large businesses" to
working people and the "middle class," steps that "set Britain further
apart from countries like Germany and France that are still struggling
with pugnacious unions, restrictive investment climates, and expensive
welfare benefits." Industrial "countries" never "struggle with" huge
profits, starving children, or rapid increase in CEO pay (under Thatcher,
double that of second-place U.S.); a reasonable stand, under the "general
tacit agreement" that the "country" equals "large businesses," along with
doctrinal conventions about the health of the economy -- the latter a
technical concept, only weakly correlated with the health of the
population (economic, social, or even medical).
The attack on unions has many
effects. The U.S. Labor Department estimates that these violations of
Article 23 account for a large part of the stagnation or decline in real
wages under the Reaganites, "a welcome development of transcendent
importance," as the Wall street Journal described the fall in labor costs
from the 1985 high to the lowest in the industrial world (U.K. aside). The
violations also contribute to undermining benefits guaranteed by the UD,
including health and safety standards in the workplace, which the
government chooses not to enforce, leading to a sharp rise in industrial
accidents. Elimination of unions also helps to weaken democracy, as
ordinary people lose some of the few methods by which they can enter the
political arena. And it contributes further to the privatization of
aspirations, dissolving the sense of solidarity and sympathy, and other
human values that were at the heart of classical liberal thought but are
inconsistent with the reigning ideology of privilege and power.
The "free trade agreements," as
they are common mislabelled (they include significant protectionist
features and are "agreements" only if we discount popular opinion), make
further contributions to these ends. Testifying before the Senate Banking
Committee in February 1997, Federal Reserve Board Chair Alan Greenspan was
highly optimistic about "sustainable economic expansion" thanks to
"atypical restraint on compensation increases [which] appears to be mainly
the consequence of greater worker insecurity," plainly a desideratum for a
good society and yet another reason for Western relativists to reject
Article 25 of the UD, with its "right to security." The February 1997
Economic Report of the President, taking pride in the Clinton
Administration's achievements, refers more obliquely to "changes in labor
market institutions and practices" as a factor in the "significant wage
restraint" that bolsters the health of the economy.
Some of the causes of these
benign changes are spelled out in a study commissioned by the Labor
Secretariat of the North American Free Agreement "on the effects of the
sudden closing of the plant on the principle of freedom of association and
the right of workers to organize in the three countries." The study was
carried out under NAFTA rules in response to a complaint by
telecommunications workers on illegal labor practices by Sprint. The
complaint was upheld by the U.S. National Labor Relations Board, which
ordered trivial penalties after years of delay, the standard procedure.
The NAFTA study, by Cornell University Labor economist Kate Bronfenbrenner,
has been authorized for release by Canada and Mexico, but not by the
Clinton Administration. It reveals a significant impact of NAFTA on
strike-breaking. About half of union organizing efforts are disrupted by
employer threats to transfer production abroad, for example, by placing
signs reading "Mexico Transfer Job" in front of a plant where there is an
organizing drive. The threats are not idle. When such organizing drives
nevertheless succeed, employers close the plant in whole or in part at
triple the pre-NAFTA rate (about 15% of the time). Plant-closing threats
are almost twice as high in more mobile industries (e.g., manufacturing
vs. construction).
These and other practices
reported in the study are illegal, but that is a technicality, as the
Reagan Administration had made clear, outweighed by the contribution to
undermining the right to organize that is formally guaranteed by Article
23 -- or in more polite words, bringing about "changes in labor market
institutions and practices" that contribute to "significant wage
restraint" within an economic model offered with great pride to a backward
world.
A number of other devices have
been employed to nullify the pledge "never [to] join those who would
undermine the Universal Declaration" (Christopher) in the case of Article
23. The elimination of the welfare system, which had been sharply reduced
from the '70s, drives many poor women to the labor market, where they will
work at or below minimum wage and with limited benefits, and an array of
government subsidies. The obvious (hence surely intended) effect is to
drive down wages at the lower end, with indirect effects elsewhere. A
related device is the increasing use of prison labor in the vastly
expanding system of social control. Thus Boeing, which monopolizes U.S.
civilian aircraft production (thanks to massive state subsidy for 60
years), not only transfers production facilities to China, but also to
prisons a few miles from its Seattle offices, one of many examples. Prison
labor offers many advantages. It is disciplined, publicly subsidized,
deprived of benefits, and "flexible" -- available when needed, left to
government support when not.
Reliance on prison labor also
draws from a rich tradition. The rapid industrial development in the
southeastern region a century ago was based heavily on convict labor
(Black of course), leased to the highest bidder. These measures maintained
the basic structure of the plantation system after the abolition of
slavery, but now for industrial development. The practices continued until
the 1920s, until World War II in Mississippi. Southern industrialists
pointed out that convict labor is "more reliable and productive than free
labor" and overcomes the problem of labor turnover and instability. It
also "remove[s] all danger and cost of strikes," a serious problem at the
time, resolved by state violence that virtually destroyed the labor
movement. Convict labor also lowers wages for "free labor," much as in the
case of "welfare reform." The U.S. Bureau of Labor reported that "mine
owners [in Alabama] say they could not work at a profit without the
lowering effect in wages of convict-labor competition." The resurgence of
these mechanisms is quite natural as the superfluous population is driven
to prisons.
The attack on Article 23 is not
limited to the U.S. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
reports that "unions are being repressed across the world in more
countries than ever before," while "Poverty and inequality have increased
in the developing countries, which globalisation has drawn into a downward
spiral of ever-lower labour standards to attract investment and meet the
demands of enterprises seeking a fast profit" as governments "bow to
pressure from the financial markets rather than from their own
electorates," in accord with the "Washington consensus." These are not the
consequences of "economic laws" or what "the free market has decided, in
its infinite but mysterious wisdom," as commonly alleged. Rather, they are
the results of deliberate policy choices under really existing free market
doctrine, undertaken during a period of "capital's clear subjugation of
labor," in the words of the business press.
The ability to nullify unwanted
human rights guaranteed by the UD should be considerably enhanced by the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that is now being forged by the
OECD and the WTO (where it is the MIA). If the plans outlined in draft
texts are implemented, the world should be "locked into" treaty
arrangements that provide still more powerful weapons to undermine social
programs and to restrict the arena of democratic politics, leaving policy
decisions largely in the hands of private tyrannies that have ample means
of market interference as well. The efforts may be blocked at the WTO
because of protests of "developing countries" that are not eager to become
wholly-owned subsidiaries of great foreign enterprises. But the OECD
version may fare better, to be presented to the rest of the world as a
fait accompli, with the obvious consequences. All of this proceeds in
impressive secrecy, so far.
Washington's rejection of the
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights guaranteed by the UD does receive
occasional mention, but the issue is generally ignored in the torrent of
self-praise, and if raised, elicits mostly incomprehension.
To take some typical examples,
Times correspondent Barbara Crossette reports that "The world held a human
rights conference in Vienna in 1993 and dared to enshrine universal
concepts," but progress was blocked by "panicked nations of the third
world." American diplomats are "frustrated at the unwillingness of many
countries to take tough public stands on human rights," even though
"Diplomats say it is now easier to deal objectively with human rights
abusers, case by case," now that the Cold War is over and "developing
nations, with support from the Soviet bloc," no longer "routinely pass
resolutions condemning the United States, the West in general or targets
like Israel and apartheid South Africa." Nonetheless, progress is
difficult, "with a lot of people paying lip service to the whole concept
of human rights in the Charter, in the Universal Declaration and all
that," but no more, U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright (now Secretary of
State) observed. On Human Rights day, Times editors condemned the Asian
countries that reject the UD and call instead for "addressing the more
basic needs for people for food and shelter, medical care and schooling"
-- in accord with the UD.
The reasoning is straightforward.
The U.S. rejects these principles of the UD, so they are inoperative. By
calling for such rights the Asian countries are therefore rejecting the UD.
Puzzling over the contention that
"`human rights' extend to food and shelter," Seth Faison reviews a
"perennial sticking point in United States-China diplomacy, highlighting
the contrast between the American emphasis on individual freedom and the
Chinese insistence that the common good transcends personal rights." China
calls for a right to "food, clothing, shelter, education, the right to
work, rest, and reasonable payment," and criticizes the U.S. for not
upholding these rights -- which are affirmed in the UD, and are not a
matter of "the common good" but are "personal rights" that the U.S.
rejects. Again, the reasoning is straightforward enough, once the guiding
ideas are internalized.
As an outgrowth of the popular
movements of the 1960s, Congress imposed human rights conditions on
military aid and trade privileges, compelling the White House to find
various modes of evasion. These became farcical during the Reagan years,
with regular solemn pronouncements about the "improvements" in the
behavior of client murderers and torturers that elicited much derision
from human rights organizations, but no policy change. The most extreme
examples, hardly worth discussing, involved U.S. clients in Central
America. There are other less egregious cases, beginning with the top
recipient of U.S. aid (Israel) and running down the list. Israel's
"systematic torture and ill-treatment of Palestinians under interrogation"
has repeatedly been condemned by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International (along with apparent extrajudicial execution; legalization
of torture; imprisonment without charge, for as long as nine years for
some of those kidnapped in Lebanon; and other abuses). U.S. aid to Israel
is therefore illegal under U.S. law, HRW and AI have insistently pointed
out (as is aid to Egypt, Turkey, Colombia and other high-ranking
recipients). In the most recent of its annual reports on U.S. military aid
and human rights, AI observes -- once again -- that "Throughout the world,
on any given day, a man, woman or child is likely to be displaced,
tortured, killed or `disappeared,' at the hands of governments or armed
political groups. More often than not, the United States shares the
blame," a "practice that "makes a mockery of [congressional legislation]
linking the granting of US security assistance to a country's human rights
record." Such contentions elicit no interest or response in view of the
"general tacit agreement" that laws are binding only when power interests
so dictate.
The strongest popular support for
sanctions was with regard to South Africa. After much delay and evasion,
sanctions were finally imposed in 1985 and (over Reagan's veto) in 1986,
but the Administration "created glaring loopholes" that permitted U.S.
exports to increase by 40% between 1985 and 1988 while U.S. imports
increased 14% in 1988 after an initial decline. "The major economic impact
was reduced investment capital and fewer foreign firms."
The role of sanctions is perhaps
most dramatically illustrated in the case of the voice of the "dirty
dozen," Indonesia. After the failure of a CIA operation to foment a
rebellion in 1958, the U.S. turned to other methods of overthrowing the
Sukarno government. Aid was cut off, apart from military aid and training.
That is standard operating procedure for instigating a military coup,
which took place in 1965, with mounting U.S. assistance as the new Suharto
regime slaughtered perhaps 1/2 million or more people in a few months,
mostly landless peasants. There was no condemnation on the floor of
Congress, and no aid to the victims from any major U.S. relief agency. On
the contrary, the slaughter (which the CIA compared to those of Stalin,
Hitler, and Mao) aroused undisguised euphoria in a very revealing episode,
best forgotten.The World Bank quickly made Indonesia its third largest
borrower. The U.S. and other Western governments and corporations followed
along.
There was no thought of sanctions
as the new government proceeded to compile one of the worst human rights
records in the world, or in the course of its near-genocidal aggression in
East Timor, which, incidentally, has somehow not entered the growing
literature on "humanitarian intervention" -- rightly, because there is no
need for intervention to terminate the decisive diplomatic and military
contribution of the U.S. and its allies. Congress did however ban U.S.
military training after the Dili massacre in 1991. The aftermath followed
the familiar pattern. Delicately selecting the anniversary of the
Indonesian invasion, Clinton's State Department announced that "Congress's
action did not ban Indonesia's purchase of training with its own funds,"
so it can proceed despite the ban, with Washington perhaps paying from
some other pocket. The announcement received scant notice, though Congress
did express its "outrage," reiterating that "it was and is the intent of
Congress to prohibit U.S. military training for Indonesia" (House
Appropriations Committee): "we don't want employees of the US Government
training Indonesians," a staff member reiterated forcefully, but without
effect. Rather than impose sanctions, or even limit military aid, the
U.S., U.K., and other powers have sought to enrich themselves by
participating in Indonesia's crimes.
Indonesian terror and aggression
continue unhampered, along with harsh repression of labor in a country
with wages half those of China. With the support of Senate Democrats,
Clinton was able to block labor and other human rights conditions on aid
to Indonesia. Announcing the suspension of review of Indonesian labor
practices, Trade Representative Mickey Kantor commended Indonesia for
"bringing its labor law and practice into closer conformity with
international standards," a witticism that is in particularly poor taste.
Also revealing is the record of
sanctions against Haiti after the military coup of September 1991 that
ended the seven-month period of democracy. The U.S. had reacted to
Aristide's election with alarm, having confidently expected the election
of its own candidate, World Bank official Mark Bazin, who received 14% of
the vote. Washington's reaction was to shift aid to anti-Aristide
elements, and as noted, to honor asylum claims for the first time,
restoring the norm after the military junta let loose a reign of terror,
killing thousands. The OAS declared an embargo, which the Bush
Administration at once violated by exempting U.S. firms -- "fine tuning"
the sanctions, the press explained, in its "latest move" to find "more
effective ways to hasten the collapse of what the Administration calls an
illegal Government in Haiti." Trade with Haiti remained high in 1992,
increasing by almost half as Clinton extended the violations of the
embargo, including purchases by the U.S. government, which maintained
close connections with the coup regime; just how close we do not know,
since the Clinton Administration refuses to turn over to Haiti 160,000
pages of documents seized by U.S. military forces -- "to avoid
embarrassing revelations" about U.S. government involvement with the
terrorist regime, according to Human Rights Watch. President Aristide was
allowed to return after the popular organizations had been subjected to
three years of terror and he had pledged to accept the extreme neoliberal
program of Washington's defeated candidate.
The U.S. Justice Department
revealed that the Bush and Clinton Administrations had rendered the
embargo virtually meaningless by authorizing illegal shipments of oil to
the military junta and its wealthy supporters, informing Texaco Oil
Company that it would not be penalized for violating the Presidential
directive of October 1991 banning such shipments. The information,
prominently released the day before U.S. troops landed to "restore
democracy" in 1994, has yet to reach the general public, and is an
unlikely candidate for the historical record. These were among the many
devices adopted to ensure that the popular forces that swept President
Aristide to power would have no voice in any future "democracy." None of
this should surprise people who have failed to immunize themselves from
"inconvenient facts." With general agreement, the Clinton Administration
advertises this as a grand exercise in "restoring democracy," the prize
example of the Clinton Doctrine.
The operative significance of
sanctions is articulated honestly by the Wall Street Journal, reporting
the call for economic sanctions against Nigeria. "Most Agree, Nigeria
Sanctions Won't Fly," the headline reads: "Unlike in South Africa, Embargo
Could Hurt West." In brief, the commitment to human rights is
instrumental. Where some interest is served, they are important, even
grand ideals; otherwise the pragmatic criterion prevails. That too should
come as no surprise. States are not moral agents; people are, and can
impose moral standards on powerful institutions. If they do not, the fine
words will remain weapons.
Furthermore, lethal weapons. U.S.
economic warfare against Cuba for 35 years is a striking illustration. The
unilateral U.S. embargo against Cuba, the longest in history, is also
unique in barring food and medicine. When the collapse of the USSR removed
the traditional security pretext and eliminated aid from the Soviet bloc,
the U.S. responded by making the embargo far harsher, under new pretexts
that would have made Orwell wince: The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, initiated
by liberal Democrats, and strongly backed by President Clinton at the same
time he was undermining the sanctions against the mass murderers in Haiti.
A year-long investigation by the American Association of World Health
found that this escalation of U.S. economic warfare had taken a "tragic
human toll," causing "serious nutritional deficits" and "a devastating
outbreak of neuropathy numbering in the tens of thousands." It also
brought about a sharp reduction in medicines, medical supplies and medical
information, leaving children to suffer "in excruciating pain" because of
lack of medicines. The embargo reversed Cuba's progress in bringing water
services to the population and undermined its advanced biotechnology
industry, among other consequences. These effects became far worse after
the imposition of the Cuban Democracy Act, which cut back licensed sales
and donations of food and medical supplies by 90% within a year. A
"humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban
government has maintained" a health system that "is uniformly considered
the preeminent model in the Third World."
The embargo has repeatedly been
condemned by the United Nations. The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights of the Organization of American States condemned U.S. restrictions
on shipments of food and medicine to Cuba as a violation of international
law. Recent extensions of the embargo (the Helms-Burton Act) were
unanimously condemned by the OAS. In August 1996, its judicial body ruled
unanimously that the Act violated international law.
The Clinton Administration's
response is that shipments of medicine are not literally barred, only
prevented by conditions so onerous and threatening that even the largest
corporations are unwilling to face the prospects (huge financial penalties
and imprisonment for what Washington determines to be violations of
"proper distribution," banning of ships and aircraft, mobilization of
media campaigns, etc.). And while food shipments are indeed barred, the
Administration argues that there are "ample suppliers" elsewhere (at far
higher cost), so that the direct violation of international law is not a
violation. Supply of medicines to Cuba would be "detrimental to U.S.
foreign policy interests," the Administration declared. When the European
Union complained to the World Trade Organization that the Helms-Burton
Act, with its wide-ranging punishment of third parties, violates the WTO
agreements, the Clinton Administration rejected WTO jurisdiction, as its
predecessors had done when the World Court addressed Nicaragua's complaint
about U.S. international terrorism and illegal economic warfare (upheld by
the Court, irrelevantly). In a reaction that surpasses cynicism, Clinton
condemned Cuba for ingratitude "in return for the Cuban Democracy Act," a
forthcoming gesture to improve U.S.-Cuba relations.
The U.S. officially recognizes
that "deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies" to
civilian populations constitutes "violations of international humanitarian
law," and "reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such
acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts." The
reference is to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The President of the United States is
plainly "individually responsible" for such "violations of international
humanitarian law." Or would be, were it not for the "general tacit
agreements" about selective enforcement, which reign with such absolute
power among Western relativists that the simple facts are virtually
unmentionable.
Unlike such crimes as these, the
regular contortions on human rights in China are a topic of debate. It is
worth noting, however, that many critical issues are scarcely even raised:
crucially, the horrifying conditions of working people, with hundreds,
mostly women, burned to death locked into factories, over 18,000 deaths
from industrial accidents in 1995 according to Chinese government figures,
and other gross violations of international conventions. China's labor
practices have been condemned, but narrowly: the use of prison labor for
exports to the U.S. At the peak of the U.S.-China confrontation over human
rights, front-page stories reported that Washington's human rights
campaign had met with some success: China had "agreed to a demand to allow
more visits by American customs inspectors to Chinese prison factories to
make sure they are not producing goods for export to the United States,"
and also accepted U.S. demands for "liberalization" and laws that are
"critical elements of a market economy," all welcome steps towards a
"virtuous circle."
The conditions of "free labor" do
not arise in this context. They are, however, causing other problems:
"Chinese officials and analysts" say that the doubling of industrial
deaths in 1992 and "abysmal working conditions," "combined with long
hours, inadequate pay, and even physical beatings, are stirring
unprecedented labor unrest among China's booming foreign joint ventures."
These "tensions reveal the great gap between competitive foreign
capitalists lured by cheap Chinese labor and workers weaned on socialist
job security and the safety net of cradle-to-grave benefits." Workers do
not yet understand that as they enter the free world, they are to be
"beaten for producing poor quality goods, fired for dozing on the job
during long work hours" and other such misdeeds, and locked into their
factories to be burned to death. But apparently the West understands, so
China is not called to account for violations of labor rights; only for
exporting prison products to the United States.
The distinction is easy to
explain. Prison factories are state-owned industry, and exports to the
U.S. interfere with profits, unlike beating and murder of working people
and other means to improve the balance sheet. The operative principles are
clarified by the fact that the rules allow the United States to export
prison goods. As China was submitting to U.S. discipline on export of
prison-made goods to the U.S., California and Oregon were exporting
prison-made clothing to Asia, including specialty jeans, shirts, and a
line of shorts quaintly called "Prison Blues." The prisoners earn far less
than the minimum wage, and work under "slave labor" conditions, prison
rights activists allege. But their production does not interfere with the
rights that count (in fact, enhances them in many ways, as noted). So it
passes unnoticed.
As the most powerful state, the
U.S. makes its own laws, using force and conducting economic warfare at
will. It also threatens sanctions against countries that do not abide by
its conveniently flexible notions of "free trade." In one important case,
Washington has employed such threats with great effectiveness (and GATT
approval) to force open Asian markets for U.S. tobacco exports and
advertising, aimed primarily at the growing markets of women and children.
The U.S. Agriculture Department has provided grants to tobacco firms to
promote smoking overseas. Asian countries have attempted to conduct
educational anti-smoking campaigns, but they are overwhelmed by the
miracles of the market, reinforced by U.S. state power through the
sanctions threat. Philip Morris, with an advertising and promotion budget
of close to $9 billion in 1992, became China's largest advertiser. The
effect of Reaganite sanction threats was to increase advertising and
promotion of cigarette smoking (particularly U.S. brands) quite sharply in
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, along with the use of these lethal
substances. In South Korea, for example, the rate of growth in smoking
more than tripled when markets for U.S. lethal drugs were opened in 1988.
The Bush Administration extended the threats to Thailand, at exactly the
same time that the "war on drugs" was declared; the media were kind enough
to overlook the coincidence, even suppressing the outraged denunciations
by the very conservative Surgeon-General. Oxford University epidemiologist
Richard Peto estimates that among Chinese children under 20 today, 50
million will die of cigarette-related diseases, an achievement that ranks
high even by 20th century standards.
While state power energetically
promotes the most lethal known form of substance abuse in the interests of
agribusiness, it adopts highly selective measures in other cases. On the
pretext of the war against drugs, the U.S. has been able to play an active
role in the vast atrocities conducted by the security forces and their
paramilitary associates in Colombia, the leading human rights violator in
Latin America, and the leading recipient of U.S. aid and training,
increasing under Clinton, consistent with traditional practice, noted
earlier. The war against drugs is "a myth," Amnesty International reports,
agreeing with other investigators. Security forces work closely with
narcotraffickers and landlords while targeting the usual victims,
including community leaders, human rights and health workers, union
activists, students, the political opposition, but primarily peasants, in
a country where protest has been criminalized. Military support for the
killers is rising to "a record level," HRW reports, up 50% over the 1996
high. AI reports that "almost every Colombian military unit that Amnesty
implicated in murdering civilians two years ago was doing so with
U.S.-supplied weapons," which they continue to receive, along with
training.
The UD calls on all states to
promote the rights and freedoms proclaimed and to act "to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance" by various means,
including ratification of treaties and enabling legislation. There are
several such International Covenants, respected in much the manner of the
UD. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the U.N. in Dec.
1989, has been ratified (as of September 1996) "by all countries except
the Cook Islands, Oman, Somalia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates,
and the United States," UNICEF reports. After long delay, the U.S. did
endorse the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "the
leading treaty for the protection" of the subcategory of rights that the
West claims to uphold, Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties
Union observe in their report on continued U.S. noncompliance with its
provisions. The Bush Administration ensured that the treaty would be
inoperative, first, "through a series of reservations, declarations and
understandings" to eliminate provisions that might expand rights, and
second, by declaring the U.S. in full compliance with the remaining
provisions. The treaty is "non self-executing" and accompanied by no
enabling legislation, so it cannot be invoked in U.S. courts. Ratification
was "an empty act for Americans," the HRW/ACLU report concludes.
The exceptions are crucial,
because the U.S. violates the treaty "in important respects," the report
observes. To cite one example, the U.S. entered a specific reservation to
Article 7 of the ICCPR, which states that "No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." The
reason is that conditions in U.S. prisons violate these conditions as
generally understood, just as they seriously violate the provisions of
Article 10 on humane treatment of prisoners and on the right to
"reformation and social rehabilitation," which the U.S. flatly rejects.
Another U.S. reservation concerns the death penalty, which is not only
employed far more freely than the norm but also "applied in a manner that
is racially discriminatory," the HRW/ACLU report concludes, as have other
studies. Furthermore, "more juvenile offenders sit on death row in the
United States than in any other country in the world," HRW reports. In the
case of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Senate imposed
restrictions, in part to protect a Supreme Court ruling allowing corporal
punishment in schools.
HRW also regards
"disproportionate" and "cruelly excessive" sentencing procedures as a
violation of Article 5 of the UD, which proscribes "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." The specific reference is to laws that
treat "possession of an ounce of cocaine or a $20 `street sale' [as] a
more dangerous or serious offense than the rape of a ten-year-old, the
burning of a building occupied by people, or the killing of another human
being while intending to cause him serious injury" (quoting a federal
judge). From the onset of Reaganite "neoliberalism," the rate of
incarceration, which had been fairly stable through the postwar period,
has skyrocketed, almost tripling during the Reagan years and continuing
the sharp rise since, long ago leaving other industrial societies far
behind. 84% of the increase of admissions is for nonviolent offenders,
mostly drug-related (including possession). Drug offenders constituted 22%
of admissions in federal prisons in 1980, 42% in 1990, 58% in 1992. The
U.S. apparently leads the world in imprisoning its population (perhaps
sharing the distinction with Russia or China, where data are uncertain).
By the end of 1996, the prison population had reached a record 1.2
million, increasing 5% over the preceding year, with the federal prison
system 25% over capacity and state prisons almost the same. Meanwhile
crime rates continued to decline.
U.S. crime rates, while high, are
not out of the range of industrial societies, apart from homicides with
guns, a reflection of U.S. gun laws. Fear of crime, however, is very high
and increasing, in large part a "product of a variety of factors that have
little or nothing to do with crime itself," the National Criminal Justice
Commission concludes (as do other studies). The factors include media
practices and "the role of government and private industry in stoking
citizen fear." The focus is very specific: for example, drug users in the
ghetto but not criminals in executive suites, though the Justice
Department estimates the cost of corporate crime as 7 to 25 times as high
as street crime. Work-related deaths are six times has high as homicides,
and pollution also takes a far higher toll than homicide.
High-level studies have regularly
concluded that "there is no direct relation between the level of crime and
the number of imprisonments" (European Council expert commission). Many
criminologists have pointed out further that while "crime control" has
limited relation to crime, it has a great deal to do with control of the
"dangerous classes;" today, those cast aside by the socioeconomic model
designed to globalize the sharply two-tiered structural model of third
world societies. As noted at once, the "war on drugs" was timed and
designed to target mostly Black males. By adopting these measures, Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed, "we are choosing to have an intense
crime problem concentrated among minorities." "The war's planners knew
exactly what they were doing," criminologist Michael Tonry comments,
spelling out the details, including the racist procedures that run through
the system from arrest to sentencing, in part attributable to the close
race-class correlation, but not completely.
As widely recognized, the largely
fraudulent "war on drugs" has no significant effect on use of drugs or
street price, and is far less effective than educational and remedial
programs. But it does not follow that it serves no purpose. It is a
counterpart to the "social cleansing" -- the removal or elimination of
"disposable people" -- conducted by the state terrorist forces in Colombia
and other terror states. It also frightens the rest of the population, the
standard device to induce obedience. Such policies make good sense as part
of a program that has radically concentrated wealth while for the majority
of the population, living conditions and income stagnate or decline. On
similar assumptions, Congress required that sentencing guidelines and
policy reject as "inappropriate" any consideration of such factors as
poverty and deprivation, social ties, etc. These requirements are
precisely counter to European crime policy, criminologist Nils Christie
observes, but sensible on the assumption that "under the rhetoric of
equality," Congress "envisions the criminal process as a vast engine of
social control" (quoting former Chief Judge Bazelon).
The vast scale of the expanding
"crime control industry" has attracted the attention of finance and
industry, who welcome it as another form of state intervention in the
economy, a Keynesian stimulus that may soon approach the Pentagon system
in scale, some estimate. "Businesses Cash In," the Wall Street Journal
reports, including the construction industry, law firms, the booming
private prison complex, and "the loftiest names in finance" such as
Goldman Sachs, Prudential, and others, "competing to underwrite prison
construction with private, tax-exempt bonds." Also standing in line is the
"defense establishment,... scenting a new line of business" in high-tech
surveillance and control systems of a sort that Big Brother would have
admired. The industry also offers new opportunities for corporate use of
prison labor, as discussed earlier.
Other International Covenants
submitted to Congress have also been restricted as "non self-executing,"
meaning that they are of largely symbolic significance. The fact that
Covenants, if even ratified, are declared non-enforceable in U.S. courts
has been a "major concern" of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, along with
the Human Rights organizations. The Committee also expressed concern that
"poverty and lack of access to education adversely affect persons
belonging to these groups in their ability to enjoy rights under the
Covenant on the basis of equality," even the Civil and Political Rights
that the U.S. professes to uphold. And while (rightly) praising the U.S.
commitment to freedom of speech, the Committee also questioned
Washington's announced principle that "money is a form of speech," as the
courts had upheld, with wide-ranging effects.
The U.S. is a world leader in
defense of freedom of speech, perhaps uniquely so since the 1960s. With
regard to civil-political rights, the U.S. record at home ranks quite well
by comparative standards, though a serious evaluation would have to take
into account the capacity to uphold such rights, and also the "accelerated
erosion of basic due process and human rights protections in the United
States" as "U.S. authorities at federal and state levels undermined the
rights of vulnerable groups, making the year [1996] a disturbing one for
human rights," with the President not only failing to "preserve rights
under attack" but sometimes taking "the lead in eliminating human rights
protections." The social and economic provisions of the UD and other
conventions are operative only insofar as popular struggle over many years
has given them substance. The earlier record within the national territory
is shameful, and the human rights record abroad is a scandal. The charge
of "relativism" levelled against others, while fully accurate, reeks of
hypocrisy.
But the realities are for the
most part "kept dark, without any need for any official ban."
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