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Transcript of Meeting Between Iraqi
President, Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, July
25, 1990 (eight days before the August 2, 1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait)
July 25, 1990 - Presidential Palace
- Baghdad
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - I have
direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations with
Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices,
the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you
know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to
rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our
opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country.
(pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the
south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens
in the context of your threat s against Kuwait, then it would be
reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an
instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship - not confrontation -
regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to
Kuwait's borders?
Saddam Hussein - As you know, for
years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute
with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give
negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis)
meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will
happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural
that Iraq will not accept death.
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - What
solutions would be acceptable?
Saddam Hussein - If we could keep
the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in our war with Iran -
we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to
choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in
Saddam s view, including Kuwait ) then we will give up all of the Shatt to
defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish
it to be. (pause) What is the United States' opinion on this?
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - We have
no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with
Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the
instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960's, that the Kuwait issue is
not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)
On August 2, 1990 four days later,
Saddam's massed troops invade and occupy Kuwait.
Baghdad, September 2, 1990, U.S.
Embassy
One month later, British
journalists obtain the above tape and transcript of the Saddam - Glaspie
meeting of July 29, 1990. Astounded, they confront Ms. Glaspie as she
leaves the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
Journalist 1 - Are the transcripts
(holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador? (Ambassador Glaspie does not
respond)
Journalist 2 - You knew Saddam was
going to invade (Kuwait ) but you didn't warn him not to. You didn't tell
him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the opposite - that America
was not associated with Kuwait.
Journalist 1 - You encouraged this
aggression - his invasion. What were you thinking?
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going
to take all of Kuwait.
Journalist 1 - You thought he was
just going to take some of it? But, how could you? Saddam told you that,
if negotiations failed, he would give up his Iran (Shatt al Arab waterway)
goal for the Whole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be. You know that
includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as an historic part
of their country!
Journalist 1 - American
green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signaling Saddam that
some aggression was okay - that the U.S. would not oppose a grab of the
al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands
(including Bubiyan) - the territories claimed by Iraq?
(Ambassador Glaspie says nothing as
a limousine door closed behind her and the car drives off.)
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