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POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND THE C.I.A. |
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by John Playford Australian Left Review, April-May 1968. pp. 14-28 A senior lecturer in politics at Monash University gives a fully documented exposure of the activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency among a section of US academics.
The role of US trade unions and student bodies in Cold War, projects inspired and financed by the huge, international agency of subversion known as the Central Intelligence Agency, is now widely known in Australia. Far less publicity has been given to the ties that were shown to exist between the CIA and the US Information Agency (USIA), the propaganda arm of the US government, while nothing at all has appeared in the press on the links revealed between the USIA and Dr. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director of the prestigious American Political Science Association (APSA), which has a membership of about 16,000. 4 Before being appointed the first full-time Executive Director of APSA in 1954, Kirkpatrick held a succession of senior posts in the State Department: Chief of the External Research Staff 1948-52, Chief of the Psychological Intelligence and Research Staff 1952-54, and Deputy Director of the Office of Intelligence Research 1954. In 1956 he edited Target: The World Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955, which was published by the Macmillan Co. of New York. In the Preface, he drew attention to the fact that the US Government had devoted systematic attention to research on Communist propaganda: “Many social scientists are aware of the work the government is doing and have seen some of its results; many have participated in it. The present volume has been made possible only by drawing upon this government research, and it is the product, therefore, of the work of many people.” In the following year, Kirkpatrick edited and Macmillan published a companion volume entitled Year of Crisis — Communist Propaganda Activities in 1956. Both works bear all the earmarks of a USIA operation. More recently, he has become a member of the Education Advisory Committee of the Freedom Studies Centre, the latest and one of the largest private Cold War institutes, which has a grandiose $US 11m. development program including a campus to accommodate 400 students a year. The Administrative Director of the Centre is Air Force Major-General Edward G. Lonsdale, who played a key role in introducing “counter-insurgency operations” in South Vietnam. The public figures connected with the Centre are a mixed bag, ranging from Governors Romney and Hatfield to a large collection of extremely conservative figures including Patrick J. Frawley, Jr., supporter of Fred C. Schwarz’s Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, and former Congressman Walter H. Judd. The crucial Planning and Development Committee of the Centre is dominated by members of the rightwing American Security Council, including Professor Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institute and Professors Lev E. Dobriansky and James D. Atkinson, both of Georgetown University.5 Poisoning the Academic Wells Kirkpatrick has also been President of Operations and Policy Research, Inc. (OPR) since its formation in 1955. A non-profit research organisation set up by a group of social Scientists, lawyers and businessmen to help the USIA distribute more persuasive and polished literature both in the US and abroad, OPR reads and gives expert opinion on books which USIA then plants with publishers, without the sponsorship being publicized. It employed on a part-time basis, according to Kirkpatrick, more than a hundred social scientists, many of them members of APSA. Sol Stern has correctly summed up OPR as “a Cold War-oriented strategy organization.” 6 During February, 1967, and later, it was revealed that OPR had been receiving subsidies from two CIA foundations. Via these “conduit” foundations, it was given grants in 1963, 1964, and 1965, “principally,” Kirkpatrick has admitted, for studies of Latin American elections. The grant in 1965 amounted to $US 68,000. 7 Sol Stern has reported that one of the CIA’s best-known “conduits,” the Sidney and Esther Rabb Charitable Foundation of Boston, made two large contributions in 1963 one for $US 25,000 to OPR, and $US 15,000 to the Farfield Foundation. The Rabb Foundation also acted as a conduit for CIA funds to feed the National Student Association, but it gave four times as much to OPR as it gave to the students. The Farfield Foundation, it is interesting to recall, was a frequent contributor to the Congress for Cultural Freedom. 8 Another foundation helping to pay for OPR’s work is the Pappas Charitable Trust of Boston, whose grants during 1965 and 1966 came to $US 120,000. The Pappas Trust also supports the International Development Foundation Inc., a CIA front interested in Latin American affairs — and launched with a grant of $US 187,685 from the CIA-connected Radio Free Europe and $US 30,000 from the Beacon Fund, identified by Congressional investigators as having put money into another CIA “conduit” foundation, the J. M. Kaplan Foundation. (The Congress for Cultural Freedom was funded for years by the Kaplan Foundation) . In 1964 alone, the Pappas Trust gave the International Development Foundation $US 102,000. In the same year, the International Development Foundation received $US 25,000 from the Rabb Foundation.9 OPR was supported solely by USIA in the early years of its existence and it still accepts $US60,000 a year from this source. Today it also receives money from the Pentagon, the State Department and other government agencies. However, whether the money comes from the CIA or the State Department, the consequences of the grants are identical: “to expedite America’s foreign penetrations, and to render them legitimate; to decorate the gendarmerie of the world with ribbons of rationality and liberalism.” 10 Despite the CIA revelations of 1967, it is most unlikely that OPR will ever lack for funds. Kirkpatrick is one of the closest friends of Hubert Humphrey, Vice-President of APSA 1954-55 and now US Vice-President, having served him for a long time as adviser as well as campaigning for him in elections. Another close friend of Humphrey’s is Dr. Max M. Kampelman, Vice-President of OPR since its formation, Treasurer and General Counsel of APSA since 1956, and one of Washington’s leading “Establishment” liberals. When Humphrey was chosen as Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate for the 1964 election, Kampelman was described as “his closest political adviser.” 11 Previously, he had played an important role in having the Democratic Convention choose John F. Kennedy as Presidential candidate.12 An editorial essay in a recent issue of Ramparts skillfully summed up Humphrey’s political position:
The commitment of the Cold War liberals to the hard line hardened in inverse proportion to the liberalizing trends within the Communist world. “In the process, Cold War liberalism lost even the pretence of vitality in the pursuit of truth and change, and instead came to acquire the stench of decay.” For the genuine liberals, Humphrey “represents the most perfect embodiment of this decay, and he is the symbol of perverse accommodation ...” 13 While Humphrey was Senator for Minnesota, Kampelman served as his legislative counsel from 1948 to 1955. In 1957 the New York publishing firm of Frederick A. Praeger brought out Kampelman’s best-known book, The Communist Party vs. the CIO: A Study in Power Politics, which covered the history of the Congress of Industrial Organisations from 1936 to 1955, when it merged with the American Federation of Labor. Describing the unsuccessful efforts of the Communists to win control of the CIO, and how the Communist-controlled unions were expelled in 1949-50, he wrote in the Introduction:
The Preface was written by Humphrey who noted that Kampelman “has made a valuable contribution to the understanding of one of our democracy’s great modern problems, that of Communism within our society.” It is also interesting to note in passing that Kirkpatrick, Kampelman and Humphrey all had close associations with the University of Minnesota. Kirkpatrick had been on the staff from 1935 to 1948, working up from the position of Instructor in Political Science to that of full Professor in his final year. Kampelman had been an Instructor in Political Science 1946-48 and had also gained from the university the degrees, of M.A. and Ph.D. in 1946 and 1952 respectively. Humphrey had graduated A.B. in 1939 and had been a Teaching Assistant in Political Science 1940-41. Caesar’s Wife Kirkpatrick’s wife, Mrs. Jean J. Kirkpatrick, is a staff member of Trinity College in Washington DC, a Catholic women’s college conducted by the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur. From 1951 to 1953 she had been an intelligence research analyst in the State Department, and since 1956 she has been a consultant to OPR. Mrs. Kirkpatrick has also had close connections with the USIA. She edited and wrote the introductory essay for The Strategy of Deception: A Study in World-Wide Communist Tactics, which was published in 1963 by Farrar, Straus and Co. of New York, and made a “special alternate selection” by the Book-of-the-Month Club. At no time was it mentioned that the USIA subsidised the book’s creation. The USIA described its venture into covert publishing as the “book development program,” of which the USIA official then in charge of it, Reed Harris, stated in testimony before the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee in March 1964:
Subsequently, the Director of the USIA, Leonard Marks, appeared before the same body in September 1966 and was asked why it was wrong “to let the American people know when they buy and read the book that it was developed under government sponsorship?” His reply was straight to the point: “It minimises their value.” The USIA did not pay Farrar, Straus; it paid $US 16,500 to The New Leader, whose editor, the late S. M. Levitas, conceived of the book and sold the idea to the USIA. A liberal militantly anti-Communist journal, The New Leader was for more than thirty years under the editorship of Levitas, “a bitter anti-Communist out of the East European Socialist tradition” who died in 1961. In recent years, The New Leader has lost much of the blind anti-Communism which allowed it to accept too readily the positions of the “China Lobby” and the “Vietnam Lobby.” Paul Jacobs has observed:
The New Leader school of anti-Communism, shared in the 1950s by the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the United States, was extremely important in helping to shape the Cold War. Instrumental in helping the State Department and the Pentagon formulate their “sophisticated” and “tough” anti-Communist policies were the circles of disillusioned ex-radicals and social democrats such as Levitas. “Where a State Department career man might be insensitive to the crimes of the Third International against the intellectuals, old Bolsheviks and the Jews, a former East European Socialist like Levitas would speak with passion about who were the good guys and who were the bad guys and which side the United States should support in the name of anti-communism.” 14 Mrs. Kirkpatrick dedicated The Strategy of Deception to “the memory of S. M. Levitas with affection, admiration and respect.” She pointed out in her Foreword that work on the collection of essays had been begun by Levitas, but the pressures of ill health prevented him carrying the volume to completion. Not surprisingly in a book planned by Levitas, all the essays share in the deficiency of not mentioning the Sino-Soviet dispute, and its effect on the Communist movement which is no longer rnonolithic but speaks with dissonant voices. These disclosures regarding USIA money have led observers to view in a new light the brochure distributed by the Book-of-the-Month Club. Among the endorsements by Allen W. Dulles, former CIA Chief, Senators Thomas J. Dodd and Paul H. Douglas, and Hubert Humphrey, there was a note from the Club editors:
Mrs. Kirkpatrick said in 1967 that she had no idea that the USIA was subsidizing her book — a statement hard to accept in view of the fact that one of its chapters (“ Communists in the C.I.O.”) was written by Kampelman, her husband’s close associate in dealings with the USIA. Kampelman’s conclusion was that the Communists, despite their skill and dedication, had failed to make even greater headway than they did because of their inability to adjust to “the prevailing philosophy of humanism within the American labor movement.” In testimony before the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee, a USIA official subsequently stated that 25,000 copies of The Strategy of Deception were printed for sale in the United States. Moreover, the work was sold in bookshops without any indication that the government had paid for it. Although the public records now show that the money came from USIA, the administrators of the USIA’s “book development program” were under the definite impression that funds passed on to The New Leader originated in the CIA or, as it was delicately known, “the other Agency.” 15 The full extent of the cooperation between the USIA and the CIA will probably never be completely uncovered. They cooperated not only to indoctrinate people living outside the US but also American students and unionists. They secretly used publishers, foundations, institutes and universities for their own purposes. “When Congress begins its investigation”, wrote Robert G. Sherrill last year, “it might like to talk with Dr. Kirkpatrick about the extent to which he has induced the nation’s political scientists to cooperate.” Suspicions had been aroused before the CIA revelations of last year. As long ago as 1965, at least two speakers at the APSA annual convention stated that too many political scientists were taking on full-time intelligence services, and they also warned that the part-time activities of others could influence their judgments and injure their reputations. 16 The Three Wise Men Before turning to the repercussions within APSA caused by these disclosures, it is interesting to note that three election experts having close connections with the political science “Establishment” accompanied President Johnson’s 22-member observer team to South Vietnam during the “election” in early September 1967. They were Professor Richard M. Scammon, Director of the Elections Research Centre at the Governmental Affairs Institute in Washington DC since 1955 who was on leave as Director of the US Bureau of the Census 1961-65, Professor Donald G. Herzberg, Executive Director of The Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University, and Professor Howard R. Penniman, Chairman of the Department of Government at Georgetown University. There have been close ties for many years between APSA and the Governmental Affairs Institute: research programmes, for example, were frequently jointly sponsored. Kirkpatrick’s predecessor as (part-time) Executive Director of APSA, Edward H. Litchfield, was President of the Institute 1950-55 and since then has been Chairman of its Board of Directors. During the early fifties the Institute was in effect an affiliate or operational adjunct of APSA, but after Litchfield’s departure as Executive Director of the latter, there were moves to sever the organizational ties between the two bodies. 17 Kirkpatrick has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute since 1954, while his wife was Assistant to the Director of its Economic Cooperation Project in 1953-54. The Institute is said to have received grants of $US 286,000 from the Departments of State and Defence. Another point of interest is that it owns the real estate on which APSA has its headquarters. It is also reported that the three political scientists who visited South Vietnam have done work for OPR. Penniman, moreover, was on the staff of the CIA from 1948 to 1949. Like so many of the actors already mentioned, he is a graduate of the University of Minnesota where he obtained his Ph.D. in 1941. Penniman was also a former employee of the State Department where he served under and later succeeded Kirkpatrick. He was Assistant Chief of the External Research Staff 1949-52, a member of the Psychological Strategy Board 1952-53, and Chief of the External Research Staff 1953-55. Between 1955 and 1957, when he assumed the position of Professor of Government at Georgetown University, he held the post of Chief of the Publications Division of the USIA. Scammon, it should also be noted, is yet another graduate of the University of Minnesota (A.B., 1935). Before moving across to the Governmental Affairs Institute he was Chief of the Division of Research for Western Europe at the State Department 1948-55. After four days in South Vietnam, the three political scientists, flanked by the American Ambassador, held a press conference in Saigon. The “election” was pronounced by Scammon to be “reasonably efficient, reasonably free and reasonably honest.” He added: “I would use exactly the same words to describe elections in the US.” 18 The press subjected them to some sharp questioning, inquiring how they had reached such a firm conclusion after visits to only a handful of polling places in a strange land. Scammon replied: “You can, I think, develop a certain appreciation of competence.” The Wall Street Journal (6/9/1966) interviewed a senior South Vietnamese “government” General who called the despatch of the US observer team “ridiculous”. He noted that the observers never got far from their Vietnamese “government” guides. “If the election were not fair”, the General asked, “how would they find out?" An interesting question — for Professors Scammon, Penniman and Herzberg. In fact, the “election” itself was originally conceived as a public relations gimmick to counteract the Buddhist demonstrations which, at their peak, threatened to topple the “government”. The plan was to give an appearance of legitimacy to the “government” and to convince the American public that “freedom-loving people” were being defended against “Communist aggression.” The observer team, with its appendage of three political scientists, was a part of this massive public relations effort. No one was fooled in South Vietnam. Nor were independent American observers in Vietnam at the time, whose special field of research is Southeast Asia. It was clear to them that the “election” was neither free nor democratic. Official figures were seriously misleading because they left so much unsaid. Only one-third of the adults of voting age in South Vietnam were eligible to vote; the “eligible” voters by definition excluded more than 67 per cent who were classified as “neutralists”, or Communists, or who were neither but lived in districts controlled by the NLF. 83 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls and of these less than 33 per cent voted Thieu-Ky. Professor David Wurfel, Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri, estimated that some 300,000 to 500,000 fraudulent votes were cast. He claimed that in an election free of fraud and pressures, the winning military ticket would not have received more than 10 per cent of the vote. Wurfel reported numerous cases of fraudulent voting techniques. The issue of multiple voting cards to the military was widespread. “Every family I talked to in Vietnam who had a relation in the military reported that he had more than one voting card,” he said. Ballot box stuffing and the alteration of returns was also mentioned by Wurfel whose conclusions were backed up by Professor Michael Novak, the brilliant young Catholic writer and philosopher at Stanford University, who reported the “election” for the National Catholic Reporter. In a random sampling of Saigon students, for example, he found that three out of eight families had been refused registration as voters.19 Professor Jonathan Mirsky, Co-Director of the East Asia Centre at Dartmouth College, summed up the Vietnamese reaction:
One interesting sidelight to the official visit of the US observers and election experts was the fact that no sooner had they stepped back on American soil than Governor George Romney confessed that when he had visited South Vietnam in late 1965, he had been brainwashed “by the generals [and] by the diplomatic corps over there, and they do a very thorough job.” The observers present during the September 1967 “election” were briefed by US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, General Westmoreland and other high-ranking civilians and army officers. 21 The Big Whitewash The fact that Kirkpatrick and Kampelman held positions in both APSA and OPR prompted Professor Robert A. Dahl of Yale, President of APSA, to appoint a special committee in February 1967 to determine whether the independence and integrity of the organisation had been compromised. Four past Presidents of APSA served on the committee which was also asked to inquire into the broader and complex problem of standards of behaviour for all political scientists in their relationship with government agencies. The ad hoc committee issued its report towards the end of March. It was found that: 1 APSA had received no funds directly from any intelligence agency of the government, nor had it carried on any activities for any intelligence agency; 2. APSA had received no funds indirectly from any intelligence agency of government, with one exception — the Asia Foundation; and 3. OPR is completely separate from APSA both organizationally and in physical location. The grants to OPR from CIA “conduit” foundations supported “unclassified research completely under OPR control”. The ad hoc committee summed up its findings in these words:
This typical piece of “Establishment” whitewashing did not satisfy all the members of APSA. At its annual convention in Chicago in early September 1967, an outspoken minority of the 2,500 political scientists present expressed clear dissent. During the usually routine business session, a motion was put forward to prohibit Kirkpatrick and Kampelman from continuing to hold office in OPR. The challenging motion, submitted by Professor Robert H. Clarke of Cornell College did not succeed, but a vote on the voices indicated that he had plenty of friends. Despite the failure of the motion, it is clear that APSA is definitely not finished with the repercussions of the CIA affair and the broader questions it raised. The special committee set up by Dahl in February submitted a preliminary report to the convention on more general problems of professional standards and responsibilities. To begin with, they argued that further, discussion of APSA-OPR should be deferred for another year until they had made their final recommendations. The committee emphasized the “complexity” of ethical issues and the abundance of “dilemmas and paradoxes” in establishing professional standards. The radical critics of the APSA “Establishment” argued that the issue of CIA involvement with OPR and the Kirkpatrick-Kampelman ties with OPR could be divorced from the grander ethical questions raised by the committee. The day after the business meeting, 50 members met informally to discuss the possibilities of a “radical political science”. Although the notice announcing the discussion was posted some time before the business section, the defeats of the previous day undoubtedly helped to stimulate interest. The first meeting led to two others, and by the time the convention closed on 9 September there was an independent “Caucus for a New Political Science” in existence with a 13-member steering committee and a membership of about 250. Chairman of the steering committee was H. Mark Roeloff, Associate Professor of Political Science at New York University, whose new book The Language of Modern Politics: An Introduction to the Study of Government had been published by the Dorsey Press several weeks beforehand. Of interest to Australians is the fact that a member of the four-member executive committee and the 13-mernber steering committee is Charles A. McCoy, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, who was Fulbright Professor of American Politics at Monash University during 1966. The “Caucus” has decided to stay within APSA as a radical ginger group rather than try to become a separate, rival organisation. So far, a majority of its members are graduate students, mainly from such prestige institutions as Harvard, Yale, and Berkley. Roelof told one of the “Caucus” meetings that American political scientists are too preoccupied with “teaching the values and virtues of American democracy.” Their failure to look critically at the American political system has led to “indifference or ignorance of fundamental or organic weaknesses ... Vietnam is no mistake.” The 1967 APSA convention had no formal discussion on Vietnam. However, the “Caucus” passed a resolution not only calling for discussion of fundamental social issues in America but also urging that a full day of panels and a plenary session be devoted to the war at the next convention. Yet another dissatisfaction which led to the formation of the “Caucus” was the sterility of the APSA journal, the American Political Science Review, regarding social issues. It has, in the words of a “Caucus” resolution, “consistently failed to study, in a radically critical spirit, either the great crises of the day or the inherent weaknesses of the American political science.” Two recent letters to the editor of the journal make the same point. C. W. Harrington complained that the September 1966 issue contained only one article
He went on to suggest that future issues of the journal come out in two editions:
Professor Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College was equally candid about the failure to communicate, the irrelevance of evidence to conclusions — and computers. Referring to a recent article on “Transaction Flows in the International System”, containing 15 pages of neologisms, nonsense terms such as “decomposition of coincidentally salient linkages”, and impressive equations, graphs, and charts, he pointed out that its author finally reached a startling conclusion. In English translation: States have closer relations with some States than with other States. 23 The narrow perspectives of political science is reflected in the absence of discussion of socio-economic issues in politics in most of the literature. The Great Issues are avoided and instead we find the accumulation of trivia and the ponderous elaboration of platitudes. A major reason why triviality and irrelevancy plagues the work of most political scientists is their commitment to valuefree “scientism” which has led to pseudopolitics rather than real politics being the major focus of research. As William J. Newman has written: “Scientism — the OK word for neutrality in the academic profession — leads straight into the waiting arms of the conservative.” 24 The great majority of political scientists would describe themselves as liberals but the lack of value commitment in their writing over the past couple of decades has given aid and comfort to conservative assumptions. The Cold War and the rise of repressive institutions in the United States did the rest and the number of radical political scientists rapidly fell away. Most political scientists became affluent members of a self-satisfied society, very much in demand by business and government. The result, as Jay A. Sigler of Rutgers University pointed out, was that they “frequently abdicated their role as social critics”. Consequently they
If political science is to make a contribution to the attainment of a just society, there will have to be a considerable shift away from the current satisfaction with the status quo, under which apathy is praised and thinly disguised hymns are sung to “stability” and “legitimacy”. Fortunately, radicalism has recently reappeared among the graduate students and the younger faculty members. It is pleasing to report that the new spirit and the new enthusiasm which the “Caucus” has begun to bring into American political science is also emerging in closely related disciplines. At the annual convention of the American Sociological Association (ASA) in San Francisco in September 1967, 200 delegates staged a Peace Vigil outside the convention hotel. Spearheaded by Professor David Colfax of the University of Connecticut, it was designed to effect an official statement by ASA in opposition to the war in Vietnam. After 300 members signed the petition circulated by the group, ASA agreed to put it to a vote of members in mid-November. 26 Subsequently, an open letter was sent to President Johnson, signed by 1,300 members of ASA, which strongly condemned the war and its effects on American society, since resources were being diverted from the attempt to deal with the most serious social problems — poverty, racial discrimination, urban development “which will not yield to fragmentary token efforts but must be the focus of massive concerted action.” 27 The spirit of the new radicals among the sociologists was captured in the following piece of committed verse placed on the bulletin board during the San Francisco convention:
These promising developments in the United States highlight the absence of intellectual Robin Hoods in Australia. The Australasian Political Studies Association is a rather bland organisation with few committed activists of any kind — whether Marxist or Behavioralist. There is a general lack of attack and controversy, and little in the nature of conflict within the profession except personal bitching. Perhaps, one day, we may witness the emergence of the Free Radical Australasian Political Studies Association (FRAPSA), a title which should satisfy the radical’s desire for “hammering” or “striking”. Notes An outspoken opponent of US intervention in Vietnam, Professor Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, has pointed out that political science at its best, when true to its moral commitment, cannot help being a subversive and revolutionary force with regard to intellectual, political, economic and social vested interests. Unfortunately, many political scientists have sacrificed their commitment to the truth, whatever it may be, to ephemeral social advantage. Morgenthau highlights the pervasive and subtle influence which the government exerts upon political science in the process of corruption, the end result of which can be seen in the public silence of many prominent political scientists on administration policy in Vietnam despite their private criticisms and doubts. The government dispenses of a whole gamut of professional and social rewards from appointments and consultantships to foreign travel and to invitations to social functions at the White House. The political scientist, by accepting one or other of these rewards, enters into a subtle and insidious relationship with the government, which imperceptibly transforms his position of independent observer to that of client. In consequence, his intellectual function is also transformed and he becomes “a political ideologue, justifying morally and rationalizing intellectually what the government is doing.” However, he performs this ideological function while drawing upon his prestige as a scholar. “Thus, his reputation as an independent searcher after the truth is put at the service of the government, and what is nothing more than the ideological defense of a partisan position is made to appear as the objective truth.” (Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Purpose of Political Science”, in James C. Charlesworth ed., A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objective, and Methods (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1966), pp. 71-72. 5. Richard Dudman, “The Mongers Return”, The Nation, 23 Jan. 1967, p. 103. 6. Sol Stern, “NSA and the CIA”, Ramparts, March 1967, p. 32. 7. The New York Times, 20 Feb. 1967. 9. The Australian, 20 Feb. 1967. 13. “The Redress of Their Grievances”, Ramparts, Dec. 1967, p. 33 16. The New York Times, 27 April 1966. 21. The New Republic, 16 Sept. 1967, p.6. 22. American Political Science Review, Dec. 1966, p. 998. 23. Ibid., March 1967, p. 149. 25. Science and Society, Winter 1967, p. 88. 26. Berkeley Barb, 1-7 Sept. 1967. 27. “The Protest Spreads” (editorial), The Nation, 27 Nov. 1967, p. 549. |