In his autobiography,
In the Midst of Wars, Lansdale gives an example
of the counterterror tactics he employed in the Philippines. He tells
how one psychological warfare operation "played upon the popular dread of an
or vampire, to solve a difficult problem." The problem was that Lansdale wanted government troops to move out of a village and hunt Communist guerrillas in the hills, but the local politicians were afraid that if
they did, the guerrillas would "swoop down on the village and the bigwigs would be victims." So, writes Lansdale:
A combat psywar [psychological warfare] team was brought in. It
planted stories among town residents of a vampire living on the hill where the Huks were based. Two nights later, after giving the stories time to circulate among Huk sympathizers in the town and make their way up to the hill camp, the psywar squad set up an ambush along a trail used by the Huks. When a Huk patrol came along the trail, the ambushers silently snatched the last man of the patrol, their move unseen in the dark night. They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire fashion, held the body up by the heels, drained it of blood, and put the corpse back on the trail.
When the Huks returned to look for the missing man and found their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed that the vampire had got him and that one of them would be next if they remained on the hill. When daylight came, the whole Huk squadron moved out of the vicinity.
the incident as "low humor" and "an appropriate response ... to the glum and deadly practices of communists and other authoritarians."
Counterterror was one way of co-opting
uncommitted civilians. To facilitate their political awakening, according to Manzione, "We left our calling card nailed to the forehead of the corpses we left
behind. They were playing card size with a light green skull with red eyes and
red teeth dripping blood, set against a black background. We hammered them into the third eye, the pituitary gland, with our pistol butts. The
third eye is the seat of consciousness for Buddhists, and this was a form of
mutilation that had a powerful psychological effect."
tactics often involve mutilating the third eye (the seat of
insight and secret thoughts) and playing on fears of an
"all-seeing" cosmic eye of God. Used by morale officers in World
War I, the eye of God trick called for pilots in small aircraft
to fly over enemy camps and call out the names of individual
soldiers. Ed Lansdale applied the technique in the Philippines.
"At night, when the town was asleep, a psywar team would creep
into town and paint an eye (copied from the Egyptian eye that
appears atop the pyramid in the Great Seal of the United States)
on a wall facing the house of each suspect," Lansdale writes.
"The mysterious presence of these malevolent eyes the next
morning had a sharply sobering effect."
To appreciate the
"sobering effects" of the "malevolent" and "mysterious" eye of
God, it helps to know something of the archetype's mythological
origins. In ancient Egypt, the eye of God was plucked from
Horus, an anthropomorphic sun-god with a falcon's head. Pictured
as the morning sun cresting a pyramid, the eye of God represents
the dawn of self-awareness, when the ego emerged from the id and
no longer required human sacrifice to overcome its primeval
anxiety. Awed by the falcon's superlative sight, talons, and
flight, the Egyptians endowed Horus with the bird's predatory
prowess, so he could avenge the murder his father, Osiris, whose
name means "seat of the eye." Set on high, scanning the earth
for the forces of darkness, the falcon as sun-god -- as the
manifestation of enlightenment -- carries out the work of
organization and pacification, imposing moral order on earth.
The eye of God assumes
its mysterious "counterespionage" qualities through this myth of
the eternal cycle -- the battle between good and evil -- in
which, if the perfidious gods of darkness can guess the
sun-god's secret name, they can rob him of his powers and trap
him forever in the underworld. Thus a falcon emblem was placed
above the gates of all Egyptian temples, scanning for the
sun-god's enemies, while the sun-god relied on code names to
conceal his identity.
Oddly enough, the eye
of God was the symbol of the Cao Dai sect, whose gallery of
saints include Confucius, Buddha, Joan of Arc, Jesus, and Victor
Hugo. Inside the Cao Dai cathedral in Tay Ninh City, the Cao Dai
pope divined upon his planchette the secrets of the Great
pyramid; over the temple door loomed a huge blue "all-seeing"
eye surrounded by snakes and trees. For this reason, some people
suggest that the Cao Dai eye of God endowed Phoenix, the
all-seeing bird of prey that selectively snatched its prey, with
In South Vietnam the
eye of God trick took a ghastly twist. CIA officer Pat McGarvey
recalled to Seymour Hersh that "some psychological warfare guy
in Washington thought of a way to scare the hell out of
villagers. When we killed a VC there, they wanted us to
spread-eagle the guy, put out his eye, cut a hole in the back
[of his head] and put his eye in there. The idea was that fear
was a good weapon." Likewise, ears were cut off corpses and
nailed to houses to let the people know that Big Brother was
listening as well.
"Now everyone knows
about the airborne interrogation -- taking three people up in a
chopper, taking one guy and saying, 'Talk,' then throwing him
out before he even gets the chance to open his mouth. Well, we
wrapped det [detonator] cord around their necks and wired them
to the detonator box. And basically what it did was blow their
heads off. The interrogator would tell the translator, usually a
South Vietnamese intelligence officer, 'Ask him this.' He'd ask
him, 'Who gave you the gun?' And the guy would start to answer,
or maybe he wouldn't -- maybe he'd resist -- but the general
idea was to waste the first two. They planned the snatches that
way. Pick up this guy because we're pretty sure he's VC cadre --
these other two guys just run errands for him. Or maybe they're
nobody; Tran, the farmer, and his brother Nguyen. But bring in
two. Put them in a row. By the time you get to your man, he's
talking so fast you got to pop the weasel just to shut him up."
After a moment's silence he added, "I guess you could say that
we wrote the book on terror."
The most valuable quality possessed by defectors, deserters, and criminals serving in "sensitive" CIA projects was their expendability. Take,
for example, Project 24, which employed NVA officers and senior enlisted
men. Candidates for Project 24 were vetted and, if selected, taken out for
dinner and drinks, to a brothel, where they were photographed, then blackmailed into joining special reconnaissance teams. Trained in Saigon, outfitted
with captured NVA or VC equipment, then given a "one-way ticket to Cambodia," they were sent to locate enemy sanctuaries. When they radioed back their position and that of the sanctuary, the CIA would "arc-light" (bomb with B52's) them along with the target. No Project 24 special reconnaissance
team ever returned to South Vietnam.
capable of creating Project 24 were not averse to exploiting deviants within their own community, and
occasionally recruited American soldiers who had committed war crimes. Rather than
time in prison or as a way of getting released from stockades in Vietnam
or elsewhere, people with defective personalities were likely to volunteer
for dangerous and reprehensible jobs.
On the forbidden subject of torture, according to Muldoon, the Special
Branch had "the old French methods," interrogation that included
torture. "All this had to be stopped by the agency," he said. "They had to be retaught with more sophisticated techniques."
In Ralph Johnson's opinion, "the Vietnamese, both Communist and
GVN, looked upon torture as a normal and valid method of obtaining intelligence." But of course, the Vietnamese did not conceive the PICs;
they were the stepchildren of Robert Thompson, whose aristocratic English ancestors perfected torture in dingy castle dungeons, on the rack and in the
iron lady, with thumbscrews and branding irons.
As for the
American role, according to Muldoon, "you can't have an American there
all the time watching these things." "These things" included: rape, gang
rape, rape using eels, snakes, or hard objects, and rape followed by
murder; electrical shock ("the Bell Telephone Hour") rendered by attaching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body, like
the tongue; "the water treatment"; "the airplane," in which a prisoner's
arms were tied behind the back and the rope looped over a hook on the
ceiling, suspending the prisoner in midair, afterwhich he or she was beaten;
beatings with rubber hoses and whips; and the use of police dogs to maul
prisoners. All this and more occurred in PICs.
"I have described
the intelligence service as a socially acceptable way of expressing
criminal tendencies," [Nelson Brickham] said. "A guy who has strong
criminal tendencies -- but is too much of a coward to be one -- would
wind up in a place like the CIA if he had the education."
teams'] unofficial emblem was the Jolly Roger skull and crossbones.
When working, CTs dispensed with the regalia, donned black pajamas, and
plundered nationalist as well as Communist villages. In October 1965,
upon returning from a fact-finding mission to Vietnam, Ohio Senator
Stephen Young charged that the CIA hired mercenaries to disguise
themselves as Vietcong and discredit Communists by committing
atrocities. Indeed, CT teams disguised as the enemy, killing and
otherwise abusing nationalist Vietnamese, were the ultimate form of
psywar. It reinforced negative stereotypes of the Vietcong, while at the
same time supplying Special Branch with recruits for its informant
autobiography, Soldier, Anthony Herbert tells how he reported for duty
with SOG in Saigon in November 1965 and was asked to join a top-secret
psywar program. "What they wanted me to do was to take charge of
execution teams that wiped out entire families and tried to make it look
as though the VC themselves had done the killing.
I remember one
evening on an LST, right after an operation, sensing there was nothing
but anarchy bordering on idiocy in how we were conducting the war ...
It was just absolute chaos out there ... It was absolutely insane.
biggest grapple was the demand to go out and capture VC cadre," Wilbur
continued. "Word would come down from Saigon: 'We want a province-level
cadre,'" Wilbur said. "Well, very rarely did we even hear of one of
those. Then Colby would say, 'We're out here to get the infrastructure!
Who have you got in the infrastructure?' 'Well, we don't have anyone in
the infrastructure. We got a village guy and a hamlet chief.' So Colby
would say, 'I want some district people, goddammit! Get district
people!' But operationally there's nothing more difficult to do than to
capture somebody who's got a gun and doesn't want to be captured. It's a
nightmare out there, and you don't just say, 'Put up your hands, you're
"First of all,"
Wilbur explained, "the targets in many cases were illusionary and
elusive. Illusionary in that we never really knew who the VC district
chief was. In some cases there wasn't any district there. And even if
there was someone there, to find out where he was going to be tomorrow
and get the machinery there before him -- that's the elusive part.
Operationally, in order to do that, you have to work very
comprehensively on a target to the exclusion of all other demands. To
get a district chief, you may have to isolate an agent out there and set
in motion an operation that may not culminate for six months. It was
much easier to go out and shoot people -- to set up an ambush.
The problem with the PRU, writes Warren Milberg, was that "the idea of going out after one particular individual was generally not very
appealing, since even if the individual was captured, the headlines would not be
very great in terms of body counts, weapons captured, or some other measure
of success." As Milberg observes, "careers were at stake ... and impressive results were expected."
As a SEAL in Quang Tri Province in 1964 Elton Manzione dressed like the enemy, worked with CTs who committed atrocities as standard procedure, and was told to ignore the rules of engagement. "But there was no sense of our role in the war," he said to me forlornly. He resented the fact that he was
trained to kill. "In psychology it's called cognitive dissonance -- the notion that once you make a commitment, it's impossible to go back. It's something about the human psyche that makes a person
reluctant to admit a mistake. This is what training is all about. You've already
killed the gook. So what if it isn't a dummy in the bed this time? So what if
it's a living, breathing human being? This is what you're supposed to do. And once the first time comes and goes, it's not as hard the second time.
You say to yourself, 'Well, hey, I've killed people before. Why should I have
any compunctions about doing it now?'"
"Training is brainwashing. They destroy your identity and supply you with a new one -- a uniform identity that every soldier has. That's the
reason for the uniform, for everyone having the same haircut and going to
dinner together and eating the same thing .... They destroyed the street kid
from Newark and created the sailor. They destroyed the sailor and created the SEAL. But people aren't robots, and despite their training, eventually
they react; they turn on their trainers and confront the outside forces that
have used them. That's what happened to me.
"I was a guinea pig," Manzione insisted. "There is no doubt in my mind today, and there was very little doubt then, even after five months
in Vietnam. All the training and all the 'special' programs -- it eventually
began to backfire on them. I thought, 'Oh, yeah, great program you got here;
you're using me to see how I react. I'm expendable. I'm a pawn.' And that's
kind of a heavy realization when you're an eighteen-year-old kid.
"It's a paradox. You know," Manzione continued, "they would send a guy over there to be a replacement for a specific person who was being
pulled out. So what consciously came across to you was 'I'm functioning as a
part of a machine. And if I fail as a part or break down as a part ... then
another part will come along to replace me.' Then you find yourself thinking,
'The last time I looked at somebody as not a part of the machine, and I
thought he was a really great guy, and he's a friend of mine, he stepped on a
land mine and came down dust, hair, teeth, and eyeballs.'
"Then you realize, 'I can't afford to do that. Because I feel terrible
for a month afterwards.' And you can't function when you feel terrible. The only thing we could deal with at any particular time was survival. 'What
do I want to do today? I want to eat, sleep, and stay alive.' And you did
it. And you related to those kinds of things. Suddenly you looked around and
said, 'Wait a minute! That's what those little guys in black pajamas are
too!" You get to a point where you begin to see these people just want
to be left alone to grow their rice.
"I'll give you one last example of what I'm talking about. I'm sure you've heard about the laser-guided smart bombs we had. Well, they would drop these laser-guided smart bombs, and what the VC would do was take a bunch of old rags and tires and stuff and start a bonfire with lots of
smoke. And the laser beam would hit the smoke particles, and it would scatter,
and the bombs would go crazy. They'd go up, down, sideways, all over the
place. And people would smile and say, 'There goes another smart bomb!' So
smart a gook with a match and an old tire can fuck it up!
"The whole perverse idea of putting this technological, semiantiseptic sort of warfare against these people -- who didn't have much more than a stick -- was absurd. The sticks won!"
"In the Delta,"
Willson told me, "the villages were very small, like a mound in a swamp.
There were no names for some of them. The people in these villages had
been told to go to relocation camps, because this was all a free fire
zone, and technically anyone there could be killed. But they wouldn't
leave their animals or burial grounds. At the same time, the U.S. Air
Force had spotters looking for muzzle flashes, and if that flash came
from that dot, they'd wipe out the village. It was that simple.
"It was the
epitome of immorality," Willson suggested. "One of the times I counted
bodies after an air strike -- which always ended with two napalm bombs
which would just fry everything that was left -- I counted sixty-two
bodies. In my report I described them as so many women between fifteen
and twenty-five and so many children -- usually in their mothers' arms
or very close to them -- and so many old people. When I went to Tan Son
Nhut a few days later, I happened to see an after-action report from
this village. A guy I knew showed me where to look. The report said one
hundred-thirty VC dead.
"It was part of
the regime's ideology that anyone who opposed them must be a Communist.
They could not accept the fact that there might be people who hated them
for the travesty they had made of the country's life, for their
intolerance and corruption and cold indifference to the lot of their
Ralph McGehee found the CIA squaring statistical facts with ideological preconceptions in Vietnam, just as it had in Thailand. "The station's intelligence briefings on the situation in South Vietnam
confirmed all my fears," he writes. The briefers "talked only about the numbers of armed Viet Cong, the slowly increasing North Vietnamese regular army,
and the occasional member of the Communist infrastructure. They made no mention of the mass-based
Farmer's Liberation Association, or the Communist youth organization, all of which in some areas certainly included entire populations."
The reason for this deception, McGehee contends, was that "U.S. policymakers
had to sell the idea that the war in the South was being fought by a
small minority of Communists opposed to the majority-supported democratic government of Nguyen Van Thieu. The situation, however, was the opposite .... The U.S. was supporting Thieu's tiny oligarchy against a
population largely organized, committed, and dedicated to a communist victory."
McGehee blames the
American defeat in Vietnam on "policy being decided from the top in
advance, then intelligence being selected or created to support it
afterwards." In particular, he singles out William Colby as the
principal apostle of the Big Lie. A veteran of the Far East Division,
McGehee at one point served as Colby's acolyte at Langley headquarters
and bases his accusations on firsthand observations of Colby in action
-- of watching Colby deliver briefings which were "a complete hoax
contrived to deceive Congress." Writes McGehee of Colby: "I have watched
him when I knew he was lying, and not the least flicker of emotion ever
crosses his face." But what made Colby even more dangerous, in McGehee's
opinion, was his manipulation of language. "Colby emphasized the
importance of selecting just the right words and charts to convey the
desired impression to Congress. He regarded word usage as an art form,
and he was a master at it."
"Here the U.S. was
trying to fight an enemy it only slightly acknowledged. Why? What had
happened to all the idealism, all the rules of getting and reporting
intelligence? Why did the agency blind itself while pretending to look
for intelligence? Why did we insist on killing people instead of talking
to them? How long would this insanity go on?"
Murphy] said, "was a bounty-hunting program -- an attempt to eliminate
the opposition. By which I mean the opposition to us, the Americans,
getting what we wanted. Which was to control the Vietnamese through our
clients -- the Diems, the Kys, the Thieus." For Murphy, all other
definitions of Phoenix are merely "intellectual jargon."
"In order to get
into military intelligence school," Murphy continued, "I and the other
candidates had to write an essay on the debate about the Vietnam War.
And the thrust of my paper was 'What we do in Vietnam will come back to
us.' It was a one world thesis. Well, I go to Vietnam and I see the
bullshit going down. Then I come back to the United States and see the
exact same thing going on here. I'm at the Hundred Sixteenth MI unit,
and as you leave the room, they have nine slots for pictures, eight of
them filled: Rennie Davis, Abbie Hoffman, Ben Spock, Jerry Rubin. And
I'm being sent out to spot and identify these people. This is Phoenix.
This is Phoenix," he repeated, then added for emphasis, "This is
Phoenix!" ... and it still is used in the United
How the Senate hearings came to address Phoenix is unusual. It concerns Francis Reitemeyer, a Seton Hall Divinity School dropout who was drafted and attended officer candidate school in late 1968. Along with forty
other air defense artillery officers, Reitemeyer was trained at Fort Holabird for
duty as a Phoenix coordinator in Vietnam. He was appalled by the instruction
he received from veteran Phoenix advisers. Loath to participate in what he considered a program that targeted civilians for assassination, Reitemeyer approached American Civil Liberties Union lawyer William Zinman
in November 1968. On behalf of Reitemeyer, Zinman filed a petition for conscientious objector status in U.S. District Court on February 14, 1969,
while the rest of Reitemeyer's class was departing for Vietnam.
In the petition Reitemeyer said that he was told that he would supervise and fund eighteen mercenaries "who would be explicitly directed by him" to "find, capture and/or kill" as many VCI as possible within a given
area. The VCI were defined as "any male or female of any age in a position of authority or influence in the village who were politically loyal or
simply in agreement with the VC or their objectives." Reitemeyer was told that he would be required to maintain a "kill quota" of fifty bodies per month
and that for him to locate VCI, "resort to the most extreme forms of torture
was necessary." As an example of what was expected of him, Reitemeyer was
told of one VCI suspect being killed by "said mercenaries and thereafter decapitated and dismembered so that the eyes, head, ears and other parts
of the decedent's body were displayed on his front lawn as a warning and an inducement to other VC sympathizers, to disclose their identity and turn themselves in to the Advisor and the mercenaries."
told that Phoenix "sought to accomplish through capture, intimidation, elimination and assassination what the U.S., up to
this time, was unable to accomplish through the ... use of military power."
The Vietnamese were characterized in racist terms, so that the cruelties perpetrated upon them might be more easily rationalized. Reitemeyer was told that if captured, he could be tried for war crimes under "precedents
established by the Nuremberg Trials as well as ... the Geneva Convention."
On the basis of this account of his Phoenix instruction, Reitemeyer was granted conscientious objector status on July 14, 1969. The Army filed
an appeal but, for public relations purposes, withdrew it in October, just
as the March Against Death was getting under way.
The press tended to characterize Phoenix as an absurdity. In a February
18, 1970, article in The New York Times, James Sterba said that "the
program appears more notorious for inefficiency, corruption and bungling
than for terror .... If someone decided to make a movie about Phoenix
... the lead would be more a Gomer Pyle than a John Wayne." Playing on
the notion that the Vietnamese, too, were too corrupt and too stupid to
be evil, Tom Buckley wrote that the PRU "were quicker to take the money,
get drunk, and go off on their own extortion and robbery operations than
they were to sweep out into the dangerous boondocks." There was no
motive behind the madness. Phoenix was a comedy of errors, dopey
disguises, and mistaken identities. There was nothing tragic in their
depictions; even the people directing the show were caricatures subject
to ridicule. Twenty years later the facts speak for themselves.
What is important
to remember is that in order to achieve internal security in South
Vietnam, America's war managers had to create and prolong an "emergency"
which justified rule by secret decree and the imposition of a military
dictatorship. And in order to gain the support of the American public in
this venture, it was necessary for America's information managers to
disguise the military dictatorship -- which supported itself through
corruption and political repression -- as a bastion of Christian and
democratic values besieged by demonic Communists.
Immediately following the Cambodian invasion, massive antiwar demonstrations erupted across the country. In Ohio Governor James Rhodes reacted violently, vowing to "eradicate" the protesters. On May 4, 1970,
the Ohio National Guard responded to his exhortations, firing into a crowd
of demonstrators at Kent State College, killing four people.
The spectacle of
American soldiers killing American citizens had a chilling effect on
many people, many of whom suddenly realized that dissent was as
dangerous in the United States as it was in South Vietnam. To many
Americans, the underlying tragedy of the Vietnam War, symbolized by
Phoenix, was finally felt at home. Nixon himself articulated those
murderous impulses when he told his staff, "Don't worry about decisiveness. Having drawn the sword, stick it in hard. Hit 'em in the gut. No defensiveness." 
Colston Westbrook, according to Mae Brussell in a July 1974 article in The Realist, was a CIA psywar expert. An adviser to the Korean CIA and Lon Nol in Cambodia, Westbrook from 1966 until 1969 reportedly worked (undercover as an employee of Pacific Architects and Engineers) as an
adviser to the Vietnamese Police Special Branch. In 1970 Westbrook allegedly returned to the United States and was gotten a job at the University of
California at Berkeley. According to Brussell, Westbrook's control officer was
William Herrmann, who was connected to the Stanford Research Institute, RAND Corporation, and Hoover Center on Violence. In his capacity as an
adviser to Governor Ronald Reagan, Herrmann put together a pacification plan for California at the UCLA Center for Study and Prevention of Violence. As part of this pacification plan Westbrook, a black man, was assigned the
task of forming a black cultural association at the Vacaville Medical
Facility. Although ostensibly fostering black pride, Westbrook was in truth
conducting an experimental behavior modification program. Westbrook's job, claims Brussell,
was to program unstable persons, drawn from California prisons, to
assassinate black community leaders. His most successful client was Donald DeFreeze, chief of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). It was
Westbrook who designed the SLA's logo (a seven-headed cobra), who gave DeFreeze his
African name (Cinque), and who set Cinque and his gang on their Phoenix flight to cremation, care of the Los Angeles SWAT Team,
the FBI, and U.S. Treasury agents.
Offensive counterintelligence operations directed against the antiwar movement were mounted by the Plumbers; the CIA through its Operation Chaos; the FBI through its COINTELPROS under William C. Sullivan, whose favorite trick was issuing Kafkaesque "secret" subpoenas; the
National Security Agency, which used satellites to spy on dissenters; and the
Defense Intelligence Agency, servicing the Joint Chiefs and working with the
Army chief of staff for intelligence, General William Yarborough, through Operation Shamrock, headquartered at Fort Holabird.
Shamrock's main targets were former military intelligence personnel like
Ed Murphy and special operations veterans like Elton Manzione, both of whom, by then, were
members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Allegedly as part of Shamrock, the 111th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) in Memphis kept Martin
Luther King, Jr., under twenty-four-hour-a-day surveillance and reportedly
watched and took photos while King's assassin moved into position, took aim,
fired, and walked away. As a result, some VVAW members contend that the murders of King, and other less notable victims, were the work of a
domestic-variety Phoenix hit team. Some say it still exists.
the complicity of the media, the government could not have implemented
Phoenix, in either Vietnam or America. A full disclosure of the Province
Interrogation Centers and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units would have
resulted in its demise. But the relationship between the media and the
government is symbiotic, not adversarial. The extent to which this
practice existed was revealed in 1975, when William Colby informed a
congressional committee that more than five hundred CIA officers were operating under cover as corporate executives and that forty CIA officers
were posing as journalists. Case in point: reactionary columnist and TV
talk-show host William Buckley, Jr., the millionaire creator of the Young
Americans for Freedom and cohort of Howard Hunt's in Mexico in the 1950's.
"I think it's common knowledge what goes on at the interrogation center," Stein writes. "It was common knowledge that when someone was picked up their lives were about at an end because the Americans most
likely felt that, if they were to turn someone like that back into the
countryside it would just be multiplying NLF followers." 
Bart Osborn (whose agent net Stein inherited) is more specific. "I never knew in the course of all those operations any detainee to live through
his interrogation," Osborn testified before Congress in 1971. "They all
died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any
one of those individuals was, in fact, cooperating with the VC, but they
all died and the majority were either tortured to death or things like
thrown out of helicopters."
It was not until
April 1970, when ten Vietnamese students put themselves on display in a
room in the Saigon College of Agriculture, that treatment of political
prisoners gained the attention of the press. The students had been tried
and convicted by a military field court. Some were in shock and being
fed intravenously. Some had had bamboo splinters shoved under their fingernails. One was deaf from having had soapy water poured in his ears
and his ears pounded. The women students had been raped as well as tortured. The culprits, claims Don Luce in his book Hostages of War, were Saigon's First District police, who used false documents and signatures to prove
guilt, and used torture and drugs to extract confessions.
The case of the students prompted two congressmen to investigate conditions at Con Son Prison in July 1970. Initially, Rod Landreth advised station chief Shackley not to allow the congressmen to visit, but
Shackley saw denial as a tacit admission of CIA responsibility. So Landreth
passed the buck to Buzz Johnson at the Central Pacification and Development council. Thinking there was nothing to hide, Johnson got the green light
from General Khiem. He then arranged for Congressmen Augustus Hawkins
and William Anderson and their aide Tom Harkins to fly to Con Son
accompanied by Public Safety adviser Frank Walton. Acting as interpreter
for the delegation was Don Luce, a former director of the International Volunteer
Service who had been living in Vietnam since 1959. Prison reform advocate Luce had gained the trust of many Vietnamese nationalists, one of whom told
him where the notorious tiger cages (tiny cells reserved for hard-core VCI
under the supervision of Nguyen Minh Chau, "the Reformer") were located at Con Son Prison.
Upon arriving at Con Son, Luce and his entourage were greeted by the prison warden, Colonel Nguyen Van Ve. Harkins presented Ve with a list of six prisoners the congressmen wished to visit in Camp Four. While
inside this section of the prison, Luce located the door to the tiger cages
hidden behind a woodpile at the edge of a vegetable garden. Ve and Walton
protested this departure from the guided tour, their exclamations prompting a
guard inside the tiger cage section to open the door, revealing its contents.
The congressmen entered and saw stone compartments five feet wide, nine feet long, and six feet high. Access to the tiger cages was gained by
climbing steps to a catwalk, then looking down between iron grates. From three to five men were shackled to the floor in each cage. All were beaten, some mutilated. Their legs were withered, and they scuttled like crabs across
the floor, begging for food, water, and mercy. Some cried. Others told of
having lime buckets, which sat ready above each cage, emptied upon them.
Taylor began to feel uncomfortable. Thinking there was an informer in
Rivers's office, he began mailing copies of his reports and photographs
friend in Florida, who concealed the evidence in his house. What the
evidence suggested was that Phoenix murders in Da Nang were directed not at the
VCI but at private businessmen on the wrong side of contractual
disputes. In one case documented by Taylor, Pepsi was trying to move in on Coke,
so the Coke distributor used his influence to have his rival's name put
the Phoenix hit list.
Taylor's investigation climaxed that Sunday morning outside the White
Elephant restaurant. He followed the Phoenix adviser and his Korean accomplice as they drove in smaller and smaller circles around the
section of Da Nang. Satisfied they weren't being tailed, the two parked
jeep, then proceeded on foot down a series of back alleys until they
reached an open-air cafe packed with upper-middle-class Vietnamese, including
women and children. Taylor arrived on the scene as the two assassins
hand grenades from a briefcase, hiked up the bamboo skirting around the
cafe, rolled the grenades inside, turned, and briskly walked away.
Taylor watched in horror as the cafe exploded. "I saw nothing but body
parts come blasting out. I drove around the burning building and the
hoping to cut them off before they reached their jeep. But they got to
before I did, and they started to drive away. They passed directly in
of me," Taylor recalled, "so I rammed my jeep into theirs, knocking it
"After the initial shock," he continued, "they reached for their
but I got to them first. I wanted to blow them away, but instead I used
airweight Smith and Wesson to disable them. Then I took their weapons
handcuffed them to the roll bar in the back of my jeep. I drove them
to the CID building and proceeded to drag them into Koslowski's office.
got them down on the floor and told Ski they'd killed several people. I
that I'd watched the whole thing and that there were witnesses. In fact,
crowd would have torn them apart if I hadn't brought them back fast.
American was screaming, so I stepped on him. I'd taken the cuffs off the
Korean, who was trying to karate-chop everything in sight, so I cuffed
him again. Then Ski told me to go back to my office to write up my
report. Ski said he'd handle it. He was mad at me."
It was soon apparent why Koslowski was upset.
"While I was in my office across the courtyard, in another wing of the
CID building," Taylor said, "one of the other CID agents came in and
me if I had a death wish. 'No,' I replied, 'I have a sense of duty.'
"'Well,'" he said, "'nothing's gonna get done.'" By this time
describing the incident as an act of Vietcong terrorism were streaming
the office. Fourteen people had been killed; about thirty had been
said, "a second CID agent came in and said, 'Ski's letting them go!' I
charged back to the main building and saw the American Phoenix agent
walking down the hall, so I started bouncing him off the walls. At this
point Koslowski started screaming at me to let him go. A Vietnamese
guard came running inside, frantic, because there was a lynch mob of
Koreans from the Phoenix task force forming outside. One of the CID guys
grabbed me, and the Phoenix agent screamed that I was a dead man. Then
he took his bloody head and left.
"I really didn't care." Taylor sighed. "Sanctioning of enemy spies is
one thing, but mass murder ... I told Ski, 'If it's the last thing I do,
going to get those guys.'"
Shortly thereafter Koslowski received a phone call and informed Taylor
that "for his own safety" he was being restricted to his room in the
Hotel. Two marines were posted outside his door and stood guard over him through the night. The following morning Taylor was taken under custody
to the Third MP Battalion and put in a room in the prisoner of war camp. Now a captive himself, he sat there for two days in utter isolation.
the Koreans learned of his whereabouts, and word got out that they were
planning an attack, he was choppered to a Marine base on Hill 37 near Dai
Loc on Route 14. Taylor stayed there for two more days, while
were made for his transfer back to the States. Eventually he was flown
to Da Nang and from there to Cam Ranh, Yokohama, Anchorage, and Seattle. In Seattle he was relieved of his gun and escorted by civilians posing
as personal security -- one was disguised as a Navy chaplain -- to Orlando, Florida.
The son of an Air Force officer, Stan Fulcher was brought
up in various military posts around the world, but he brands as "hypocritical" the
closed society into which he was born. "The military sees itself as the
conqueror of the world" -- Fulcher sighed, "but the military is socialism in its
purest form. People in the military lead a life of privilege in which the state
meets each and every one of their needs." 
Having served in the special security unit at Can Tho Air Base in 1968
-- where he led a unit of forty riflemen against the VCI -- Fulcher fully
understood the realities of Vietnam. He told me of the Military Security
Service killing a Jesuit priest who advocated land reform, of GVN officials
trading with the National Liberation Front while trying to destroy religious
sects, and of the tremendous U.S. cartels -- RMK-BRI, Sealand, Holiday Inns, Pan Am, Bechtel, and Vinnell -- that prospered from the war.
"The military has the political power and the means of production," Fulcher explained, "and so it enjoys all the benefits of society .... Well, it was the same thing in Vietnam, where the U.S. military and a small
number of politicians supported the Vietnamese Catholic establishment against
the masses .... Greedy Americans," Fulcher contended, "were the cause of the war. The supply side economists -- these are the emergent groups during Vietnam."
During a tour in
London from 1968 to 1971, in which he saw British businessmen trading
with the North Vietnamese, Fulcher learned there are "no permanent
allies." During his tour in Phoenix, he became totally disenchanted.
"When I arrived in Saigon," he recalled, "an Air America plane was
waiting and took me to Nha Trang. That night I talked with Millett. The
next day I got in a chopper and went to Qui Nhon, the capital city of
Binh Dinh Province, where I met the S-two, Gary Hacker, who took me to
my quarters in a hotel by the ocean." Hacker then took Fulcher to meet
the province senior adviser, "a young political appointee who lived in a
beautiful house on the ocean. When I walked into the room, he was
standing there with his arms around two Vietnamese girls. The tops of
their ao dais were down, and he was cupping their breasts."
Next, Fulcher met
Larry Jackson, the CIA province officer in Binh Dinh. Jackson had "about
twenty contract workers, USIS types who thought they were Special
Forces. They all had Vietnamese girlfriends and important dads. They
were all somewhat deranged and did nothing but play volleyball all day."
Fulcher described the CORDS advisory team as "a sieve."
What finally convinced Fulcher to work against Phoenix was the "disappearing" of thirty thousand civilians in the aftermath of the spring offensive. Rocking back and forth in his chair, his head buried in his
hands, sobbing, Fulcher described what happened: "Two NVA regiments hit Binh Dinh in the north, mainly at Hoi An. We went through a pass in the
valley to meet them, but a whole ARVN regiment was destroyed. Four hundred were killed and sixteen hundred escaped down Highway Thirty-one. I could see the ARVN soldiers running away and the NVA soldiers running after them, shooting them in the back of their heads with pistols so as not to
waste ammunition .... I could see our helicopters being shot down ....We called in close air support and long-range artillery and stopped them at Phu
Mi. There were pitched battles. The NVA attacked on two ridges. Then [II
Corps Commander John] Vann was killed up in Kontum, and [Special Forces Colonel Michael] Healy took over. Healy came in with his Shermanesque tactics in August. "
The disappearance of the thirty thousand occurred over a two-month period beginning in June, Fulcher said, "mainly through roundups like in the Ukraine. The MSS was putting people in camps around Lane Field outside Qui Nhon, or in the PIC. Everyone was turning against the GVN, and anyone born in Binh Dinh was considered VC. There were My Lais by the score -- from aerial bombardments and artillery Phoenix coordinated it. Me and Jackson and four or five of his contractors. The National
Police had lists of people. Out of the thirty thousand, the Special Branch was interested in particular in about a hundred. The MSS put everyone else
camps, and the Vietnamese Air Force loaded them up, flew away, and came back empty. They dumped whole families into the Gulf of Tonkin. This was not happening elsewhere."
Despite its ability to regenerate and survive, the CIA was taking its lumps in 1974, too. Richard Helms was accused and later convicted on
perjury charges after William Colby admitted that the agency had spent eight
million dollars to "destabilize" Allende's regime in Chile. Colby himself was
under attack, not only for alleged Phoenix-related war crimes but for having censored John Marks's book The Cult of Intelligence and for trying to block publication of Philip Agee's CIA Diary.
Agee in particular was despised by his CIA colleagues for saying, in an interview with Playboy magazine, that there was "a strong possibility
that the CIA station in Chile helped supply the assassination lists." Agee
asserted that the CIA "trains and equips saboteurs and bomb squads" and that the CIA had "assassinated thousands of people .... When the history of the
CIA's support of torturers gets written," Agee predicted, "it'll be the
all-time horror story. 
"Thousands of policemen all over the world," Agee said, "are shadowing people for the CIA without knowing it. They think they're working for
their own police departments when, in fact, their chief may be a CIA agent
who's sending them out on CIA jobs and turning the information over to his CIA control."