THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MEDITATION

by Ronald J. Pekala

Meditation is the process of turning consciousness upon itself to develop attentional control of the processes and contents of consciousness. Given that the focus in meditation involves training the mind to become attuned to specific processes or contents of consciousness, the subjective effects associated with meditation assume primary importance. Yet, despite the last two decades of meditation research, the research involving the phenomenological effects of meditation is still in its infancy.

A primary reason for the lack of research into the subjective effects of meditation is the role that subjective data has played in the history of psychology. At the turn of the century structuralists like Wundt (1897) and Titchener (1898) were investigating the structures of subjective experience, while functionalists like James (1890/1950) and Angell (l907) were trying to decipher the operations and functions of consciousness. Introspection was a common psychological tool. But within 20 years classical introspectionism had vanished from psychology textbooks, and was replaced by Watson’s (1913) ‘behavioural’ approach. According to Boring (1953), a historian of psychology, classical introspection became obsolete due to its failure to demonstrate adequate reliability and validity. Classical introspection ‘went out of style after Titchener’s death in 1927, because it had demonstrated no functional use, and also because it was unreliable’ (my italics) (p. 174).
The emergence of cognitive psychology in the 1960s and 70s and a simultaneous renewed interest in consciousness have brought a return of introspection as a quasi-acceptable methodology. However, introspection as currently used in cognitive-behavioural and consciousness research is unlike the self-reflection practised by the turn-of-the-century introspectionists. The new introspection is of the phenomenological variety in that it is ‘a free commentary on whatever cognitive material the subject is aware of’ (Hilgard 1980, p. 10). Subjects do not have to be extensively trained in the practice of introspection, and neither do they need to be restricted to the rigid criteria used by the classical introspectionists to define and report internal experience. As with descriptive phenomenology (Husserl 1913/77), the new introspection involves a ‘detailed description of [the phenomena of] consciousness as they appear in consciousness’ (Ashworth 1976, p.364). As such, it has been labelled phenomenological observation or phenomenological assessment.

As in the past, there is currently much controversy over introspective or phenomenological reports. Nisbett and Wilson have indicated that introspective access of cognitive processes ‘is not sufficient to produce generally correct or reliable reports’. Smith and Miller (1978), on the other hand, suggest that cognitive processes may not be as inaccessible as Nisbett and Wilson indicate. Lieberman (1979) has argued for a limited return of introspection, citing the classical and modern literature which has shown that introspective ‘data can be highly reliable and useful, helping not only to predict specific behavior, but to discover fundamental principles of learning and performance’. From a somewhat different perspective, Ericsson and Simon have argued that verbal reports (involving introspection) are data just as behavioural observations are data and inaccurate phenomenological reports appear to ‘result from requesting information that was never directly heeded, thus forcing subjects to infer rather than remember (my italics) their mental processes’.

The question of reliability suggests that validity may be difficult to confirm. Although the data presented by Ericsson and Simon (1980), Klinger, and Lieberman (1979) indicate that introspective data can be both useful and valid, Rachlin (1974) and Skinner (1974) have strongly questioned the value and validity of introspective reports and have gone so far as to proclaim them superfluous. In relation to this controversy, Klinger’s (1978) advice is apropos:

In the observation of inner experience, as in such other procedures, the validation process resides in ruling out artifacts, in replications, and ultimately, in the usefulness of data and theory for making possible other forms of prediction and perhaps, control.

Given the various phenomenological processes and contents of consciousness available for self-report (Battista 1978), any significant phenomenological assessment should also attempt to be comprehensive including such contents and processes of consciousness as imagery, internal dialogue, positive and negative affect, memory, volition, attention, rationality, etc.

One artefact that may be detrimental to a comprehensive assessment of the phenomenological effects of meditation is the effect of demand characteristics. First given succinct definition by Orne (1962), demand characteristics refer to the ‘totality of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject’ (p.779). The determination of demand characteristics allows for the isolation of the effects of the experimental setting from the effects of the experimental variables. The study of demand characteristics first assumed prominence in hypnosis research.  Given that meditation may be similar to hypnosis (Barmark and Gaunitz 1979),  similar attempts to control for demand characteristics in research on meditation should be made.

Another artefact that may be of crucial important in meditation research involving subjective reports is introspective sensitization. Introspective sensitization, is, to my knowledge, a term that was first used by Hunt and Chefurka (1976) to describe the unusual nature of subjective reports that may occur when a person is asked to introspect into his or her subjective experience. Hunt and Chefurka’s thesis is that: ‘describing the bare features of momentary awareness without any reference to the consensual world of objects, persons, and meanings, should itself elicit patterns of anomalous awareness typical of standard altered state settings’.

Hence the phenomenological effects of meditation need to be assessed and compared with the phenomenological effects of introspection, possibly by comparing meditation (with eyes closed) with a baseline condition such as introspection during eyes-closed-sitting-quietly.
 ... we do not know the extent to which reported differences between meditation, hypnosis, and imagining or even meditation and sitting quietly may be due to differences inherent in the nature of these procedures, and how much may be due to demand characteristics. In any event, the data suggest that meditation and hypnosis may be much more similar than different in terms of reported phenomenological characteristics.

Conclusions

A critical evaluation of research on the phenomenology of meditation suggests that definitive knowledge is sparse. None of the studies reviewed in this chapter met the five criteria: adequate reliability and validity, a comprehensive phenomenological assessment, and control for introspective sensitization and demand characteristics.

Failure of studies to meet the above criteria is also compounded by the fact that different meditation techniques may produce or be associated with different phenomenological effects, and the studies reviewed here have assessed meditation techniques ranging from concentrative to insight-oriented approaches. Meditation studies involving naïve to ‘enlightened’ practitioners, and utilizing formats from several minutes to many hours per day over periods from 1 day to several months would also be expected to produce very different subjective effects.

In summary, the data to date, when controlling for expectancy, introspective sensitization, demand characteristics, and related variables do not support the statement that meditation induces or is associated with a unique altered state of consciousness significantly different from hypnosis or even sitting quietly with eyes closed. That that may indeed be the case, at least for some people, is suggested by the evidence, but tighter and more comprehensive research is needed to definitively assess and document that. The data, however, do suggest specific issues that will need to be addressed if the phenomenological effects of meditation are to be understood by behavioural scientists.

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