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CHAPTER 1: ON THE ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF
GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL, WITH CONCISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION
Some writers have so confounded
society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between
them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins.
Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the
former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the
latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages
intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the
last a punisher.
Society in every state is a
blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil in
its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to
the same miseries by a government, which we might expect in a country
without government, our calamities is heightened by reflecting that we
furnish the means by which we suffer! Government, like dress, is the badge
of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built on the ruins of the
bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform,
and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver; but that not
being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his
property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is
induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him
out of two evils to choose the least. Wherefore, security being the true
design and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form
thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expense and
greatest benefit, is preferable to all others.
In order to gain a clear and just
idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a small number of
persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with
the rest, they will then represent the first peopling of any country, or
of the world. In this state of natural liberty, society will be their
first thought. A thousand motives will excite them thereto, the strength
of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for
perpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistance and relief
of another, who in his turn requires the same. Four or five united would
be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of a wilderness, but
one man might labor out the common period of life without accomplishing
any thing; when he had felled his timber he could not remove it, nor erect
it after it was removed; hunger in the mean time would urge him from his
work, and every different want call him a different way. Disease, nay even
misfortune would be death, for though neither might be mortal, yet either
would disable him from living, and reduce him to a state in which he might
rather be said to perish than to die.
Thus necessity, like a
gravitating power, would soon form our newly arrived emigrants into
society, the reciprocal blessings of which, would supersede, and render
the obligations of law and government unnecessary while they remained
perfectly just to each other; but as nothing but heaven is impregnable to
vice, it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they surmount the
first difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common
cause, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each
other; and this remissness, will point out the necessity, of establishing
some form of government to supply the defect of moral virtue.
Some convenient tree will afford
them a State-House, under the branches of which, the whole colony may
assemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more than probable that
their first laws will have the title only of Regulations, and be enforced
by no other penalty than public disesteem. In this first parliament every
man, by natural right will have a seat.
But as the colony increases, the
public concerns will increase likewise, and the distance at which the
members may be separated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them
to meet on every occasion as at first, when their number was small, their
habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling. This will
point out the convenience of their consenting to leave the legislative
part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are
supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who appointed
them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act were
they present. If the colony continue increasing, it will become necessary
to augment the number of the representatives, and that the interest of
every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found best to
divide the whole into convenient parts, each part sending its proper
number; and that the elected might never form to themselves an interest
separate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety of
having elections often; because as the elected might by that means return
and mix again with the general body of the electors in a few months, their
fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent reflection of not
making a rod for themselves. And as this frequent interchange will
establish a common interest with every part of the community, they will
mutually and naturally support each other, and on this (not on the
unmeaning name of king) depends the strength of government, and the
happiness of the governed.
Here then is the origin and rise
of government; namely, a mode rendered necessary by the inability of moral
virtue to govern the world; here too is the design and end of government,
viz., freedom and security. And however our eyes may be dazzled with snow,
or our ears deceived by sound; however prejudice may warp our wills, or
interest darken our understanding, the simple voice of nature and of
reason will say, it is right.
I draw my idea of the form of
government from a principle in nature, which no art can overturn, viz.,
that the more simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered,
and the easier repaired when disordered; and with this maxim in view, I
offer a few remarks on the so much boasted constitution of England. That
it was noble for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected is
granted. When the world was overrun with tyranny the least therefrom was a
glorious rescue. But that it is imperfect, subject to convulsions, and
incapable of producing what it seems to promise, is easily demonstrated.
Absolute governments (though the
disgrace of human nature) have this advantage with them, that they are
simple; if the people suffer, they know the head from which their
suffering springs, know likewise the remedy, and are not bewildered by a
variety of causes and cures. But the constitution of England is so
exceedingly complex, that the nation may suffer for years together without
being able to discover in which part the fault lies, some will say in one
and some in another, and every political physician will advise a different
medicine.
I know it is difficult to get
over local or long standing prejudices, yet if we will suffer ourselves to
examine the component parts of the English constitution, we shall find
them to be the base remains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with some
new republican materials.
First. -- The remains of
monarchical tyranny in the person of the king.
Secondly. -- The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers.
Thirdly. -- The new republican
materials, in the persons of the commons, on whose virtue depends the
freedom of England.
The two first, by being
hereditary, are independent of the people; wherefore in a constitutional
sense they contribute nothing towards the freedom of the state.
To say that the constitution of
England is a union of three powers reciprocally checking each other, is
farcical, either the words have no meaning, or they are flat
contradictions.
To say that the commons is a
check upon the king, presupposes two things.
First. -- That the king is not to
be trusted without being looked after, or in other words, that a thirst
for absolute power is the natural disease of monarchy.
Secondly. -- That the commons, by
being appointed for that purpose, are either wiser or more worthy of
confidence than the crown.
But as the same constitution
which gives the commons a power to check the king by withholding the
supplies, gives afterwards the king a power to check the commons, by
empowering him to reject their other bills; it again supposes that the
king is wiser than those whom it has already supposed to be wiser than
him. A mere absurdity!
There is something exceedingly
ridiculous in the composition of monarchy; it first excludes a man from
the means of information, yet empowers him to act in cases where the
highest judgment is required. The state of a king shuts him from the
world, yet the business of a king requires him to know it thoroughly;
wherefore the different parts, unnaturally opposing and destroying each
other, prove the whole character to be absurd and useless.
Some writers have explained the
English constitution thus; the king, say they, is one, the people another;
the peers are an house in behalf of the king; the commons in behalf of the
people; but this hath all the distinctions of an house divided against
itself; and though the expressions be pleasantly arranged, yet when
examined they appear idle and ambiguous; and it will always happen, that
the nicest construction that words are capable of, when applied to the
description of something which either cannot exist, or is too
incomprehensible to be within the compass of description, will be words of
sound only, and though they may amuse the ear, they cannot inform the
mind, for this explanation includes a previous question, viz. How came the
king by a power which the people are afraid to trust, and always obliged
to check? Such a power could not be the gift of a wise people, neither can
any power, which needs checking, be from God; yet the provision, which the
constitution makes, supposes such a power to exist.
But the provision is unequal to
the task; the means either cannot or will not accomplish the end, and the
whole affair is a felo de se; for as the greater weight will always carry
up the less, and as all the wheels of a machine are put in motion by one,
it only remains to know which power in the constitution has the most
weight, for that will govern; and though the others, or a part of them,
may clog, or, as the phrase is, check the rapidity of its motion, yet so
long as they cannot stop it, their endeavors will be ineffectual; the
first moving power will at last have its way, and what it wants in speed
is supplied by time.
That the crown is this
overbearing part in the English constitution needs not be mentioned, and
that it derives its whole consequence merely from being the giver of
places pensions is self evident, wherefore, though we have and wise enough
to shut and lock a door against absolute monarchy, we at the same time
have been foolish enough to put the crown in possession of the key.
The prejudice of Englishmen, in
favor of their own government by king, lords, and commons, arises as much
or more from national pride than reason. Individuals are undoubtedly safer
in England than in some other countries, but the will of the king is as
much the law of the land in Britain as in France, with this difference,
that instead of proceeding directly from his mouth, it is handed to the
people under the most formidable shape of an act of parliament. For the
fate of Charles the First, hath only made kings more subtle -- not more
just.
Wherefore, laying aside all
national pride and prejudice in favor of modes and forms, the plain truth
is, that it is wholly owing to the constitution of the people, and not to
the constitution of the government that the crown is not as oppressive in
England as in Turkey.
An inquiry into the
constitutional errors in the English form of government is at this time
highly necessary; for as we are never in a proper condition of doing
justice to others, while we continue under the influence of some leading
partiality, so neither are we capable of doing it to ourselves while we
remain fettered by any obstinate prejudice. And as a man, who is attached
to a prostitute, is unfitted to choose or judge of a wife, so any
prepossession in favor of a rotten constitution of government will disable
us from discerning a good one.
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