|
MOROCCO, DRIFTING TOWARDS AUTHORITARIANISM |
|
by Aboubakr Jamal DIVERSITY OF
OPINION 'DEFINITIVELY BANNED' Le Monde diplomatique, January 2001 On 2 December, to
general surprise, Abderrahmane Youssoufi, the socialist prime minister of
Morocco, 'definitively' banned three weeklies - Le Journal, Assahifa and
Demain - for publishing a letter sent to him in 1974 by Mohammed "Fquih"
Basri, one of the emblematic figures of the Moroccan left. The letter
apparently proves that several socialist personalities, in opposition at
the time, were involved in General Oufkir's attempt to overthrow King
Hassan II in 1972. The most striking new feature in all this is the understandable community of interests linking this faction of the makhzen (the traditional court hierarchy) (2) and the leadership of certain political parties belonging to the government coalition, specifically Youssoufi's Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP). This "holy alliance" between a regenerated royal administration and political leaders out of touch with their grass roots now forms a real antidemocratic, law-and-order party that cuts across institutions and political organisations. To reduce the influence of this "undercover party", which is well placed to defend its privileges, transparent elections are needed. The parties must be organised along truly democratic lines and a new balance struck between the powers of the monarchy and parliament. The present system is the result of a compromise between Hassan II and the opposition in 1997 and is not in the least democratic. Wracked by contradictions and failures, it has lost the support of a large part of the Moroccan elite, who three years ago believed it could prepare the country for true democracy. The system has clearly failed and Youssoufi's government has little to show for its time in power. On the social and economic front, a number of overly political measures have put an end to any hope of economic recovery. To avoid trouble, the government has yielded to union pressure and raised salaries, resulting in an excessive increase in the public service pay-packet - this despite the unfavourable international economic climate. Worse still, the domineering USFP leaders and their new security-minded allies in high places soon decided they were unassailable, imagining that they were the only political alternative to the supposed perils of Islamic extremism. Their tendency to make categorical statements and obstinately refuse to let civil society provide any form of check or balance is typical of their high-handed attitude. They are also increasingly intolerant of free speech, repressing claims for more freedom. When the left was in opposition, it denounced and proposed to reform habits that it is afraid to change now it is in government. There are any number of examples. The heavy-handed repression of a few demonstrations is part of an obvious attempt to exploit the Islamist threat. The government wants to frighten the middle class elite, concerned by what has happened in Algeria, so that it will stop demanding more democracy. It also wants to worry western allies, just as aware of the rise of Islamism, so as to stifle any outspoken criticism of human rights violations. When Le Journal raised the issue of early elections in October 1999, the "official" fringe of the elite condemned the proposal as a "dangerous heresy". The only argument it could find was that early elections would inevitably lead to a landslide Islamist victory. This limited view of the political arena ignores two basic considerations. First, a good part of the Islamist movement has no quarrel with existing institutions and accepts the democratic process. Second, the possible rise of the Islamists is directly proportional to the diminishing credibility of politicians in general. The decline of party organisations results from a lack of legitimacy, undermined by repeated rigging of elections and denial of the principles that formed the basis of the opposition's political platform. Public life at a standstill This explains why voters are increasingly sceptical and indifferent to politics. Collective ambitions have been watered down to satisfy the demands of the minority on which the head of government depends. Youssoufi's ill-assorted government shamelessly insists that it must remain in power for there to be any chance of a democratic transition. But the government owes its existence to the parliamentary elections on 14 November 1997, which Youssoufi himself, along with other members of the opposition, promptly denounced as rigged. Another example of Youssoufi's dictatorial behaviour is the truncated debate on the constitution. Le Journal attracted a great deal of official criticism with its demands for constitutional reform, designed to enable Morocco to achieve a real democratic transition, rather than just window-dressing. In 1996 the koutla - the coalition of opposition parties that won the 1997 elections - presented a memorandum to Hassan II calling for a new balance of power between the monarchy and parliament. The aim was to break with a system in which parliament, deprived of any real sovereignty, was simply a chamber for registering decisions taken elsewhere. The koutla has back-tracked on this issue, but the Islamists seem more consistent and, in the absence of a credible alternative, this makes them all the more attractive to the population at large. Far from producing a "dynamic partnership", the combination of the makhzen and this government has brought public life to a standstill. Constitutional reform and transparent elections are the only way to give the country democracy and pull it out of a dead end. This in turn would increase stability. Professor Rémy Leveau made this very point: "A measured management of the electoral risks and of the choices of elites at both local and national level will only happen if the monarchy renounces the direct exercise of power when the time comes for the accession of a new king. If the future sovereign were to assume a powerful but more symbolic role, it would create the possibility of a proper political contest between those forces that accept the basic principles of a constitutional monarchy" (3). The part played by the monarchy must change. An end to direct involvement in the running of the country would enable it to assume its role as an arbitrator fully. Thanks to its religious and social dimension, it could counterbalance Islamist trends. It could also foster a new political elite, accountable to society, which would ultimately be more effective. With recurrent rigged elections, Morocco has lived for many years in a permanent "state of exception", enabling the regime to conduct public business as it chooses. With the end of the cold war, globalisation and the gradual construction of a fortress Europe, this approach to government has become less and less workable. And nowhere is this more apparent than with the economy. On taking power, the opposition silenced those within its ranks who demanded reform, highlighting the fact that relations between the monarchy and political parties, and within the parties themselves - particularly the USFP - run along similar lines. For, inside the main leftwing party, the "state of exception" has become almost official: it has not held a party congress since 1989 and Youssoufi was coopted by a politbureau, whose members were elected over 10 years ago. They should pay more attention to the shabiba ittihadia, the party's youth wing, which abides by its statutes and organised its own congress in 1998. Now that it has distanced itself from the government, its publications have been banned and the USFP has stopped funding it. The legal means used to ban the three independent weeklies - an administrative ruling against which there is no recourse - reveals the present government's lack of respect for democracy. But the reasons given to justify the decision are even more worrying. They are the expression of an increasingly dictatorial group of people with no popular support, dolled up with "progressive" concepts and presented to the public as the only available defence against religious extremism. The writer Pierre Rosanvallon (4) has pinpointed the key features of this political system, which gives government discretionary authority over the press, legally, justified by security arguments based on the dictates of events. In this particular case, the statement banning the three newspapers took the form of an indictment and condemned the papers' editorial stance. It listed a series of vague reproaches - "damage to the morale of the armed forces", "questioning the nation's territorial integrity" and "criticism of the constitution" - but no concrete facts. By deliberately attempting to set the army against the free press, the government is taking a serious risk. The army continues to play a central role in Morocco. It is the only force capable of containing possible urban revolt - a recurrent event and increasingly probable as the living conditions of recent arrivals in the cities deteriorate. It also holds several trump cards in the power game, unlike the politicians who lack any real popular support. The likelihood of a solution to the conflict in the Western Sahara means that it will soon be necessary to consider the future of this body of more than 200,000 professional soldiers. The politicians' lack of democratic legitimacy can hardly fail to encourage military involvement in politics. What part is the
monarchy to play in Morocco? Shortly after his accession to the throne in
August 1999, Mohammed VI took a number of decisions on human rights. He
brought Abraham Serfaty, a member of the opposition, back from exile. He
released Sheikh Abdeslam Yassin, the figurehead of the majority of
Islamists, who had been under illegal house arrest for 10 years. He even
authorised a symbolic pilgrimage to the infamous jail at Tazmamart.
Moreover, public opinion sees the king's commitment to the victims of past
oppression and the underprivileged as sincere. He is consequently in an
ideal position to introduce greater political openness. Of all the forces
in politics, the king undoubtedly holds the strongest hand. He could take
advantage of his considerable popularity to break down the walls of the
antiquated makhzen - erected by a "holy" alliance that might tempt Morocco
into the arms of a theocracy or encourage the army to take power - and put
Morocco on the path to democracy once and for all.. The king could end the
current deadlock, if only he would decide to draw on the vast reforming
movement running through society and its institutions. (1) Reporters sans frontières (Reporters without borders) (http://www.rsf.fr) was quick to denounce this ban, asking King Mohammed VI to intervene personally to have it cancelled. (2) See "Is Morocco really changing?", Le Monde diplomatique English edition, February 2000. (3) See "A democratic transition in Morocco?" and "Morocco: the point of change", Le Monde diplomatique English edition, December 1998 and July 2000 respectively. (4) Pierre Rosanvallon, La démocratie inachevée, Gallimard, Paris, 2000. Translated by Harry Forster
|