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by Mark Emerson
Willey

"...everything that the Japanese
were planning to do was known to the United States..." ARMY BOARD, 1944
President Roosevelt (FDR)
provoked the attack, knew about it in advance and covered up his failure
to warn the Hawaiian commanders. FDR needed the attack to sucker Hitler to
declare war, since the public and Congress were overwhelmingly against
entering the war in Europe. It was his backdoor to war.
FDR blinded the commanders at
Pearl Harbor and set them up by --
- denying intelligence to Hawaii
(HI)
- on November 27 and later,
misleading the commanders into thinking negotiations with Japan were
continuing to prevent them from realizing the war was on
- having false information sent
to HI about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet.
BACKGROUND
- 1904 - The Japanese destroyed
the Russian navy in a surprise attack in undeclared war.
- 1932 - In the Grand Joint
Army-Navy Exercises, 152 aircraft carrier planes caught the defenders of
Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
- 1938 - Admiral Ernst King led
a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against
Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
- 1940 - FDR ordered the fleet
transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and
ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by
its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection
from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt
so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and
he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after
replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues
with FDR in June 1941.
- 7 Oct 1940 - Navy IQ analyst
McCollum wrote an 8 point memo on how to force Japan into war with US.
Beginning the next day FDR began to put them into effect and all 8 were
eventually accomplished.
- 11 November 1940 - 21 aged
British planes destroyed the Italian fleet, including 3 battleships, at
their homeport in the harbor of Taranto in Southern Italy by using
technically innovative shallow-draft torpedoes.
- 11 February 1941 - FDR
proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila to get into
war. Navy Chief Stark objected: "I have previously opposed this and you
have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark
in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested (more forces to Manila)
and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from
my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers,
but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6." (Charles
Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424)
- March 1941 - FDR sold
munitions and convoyed them to belligerents in Europe -- both acts of
war and both violations of international law --
the Lend-Lease
Act.
- 23 Jun 1941 - Advisor Harold
Ickes wrote FDR a memo the day after Germany invaded the Soviet Union,
"There might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a
situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this
war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in,
we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of
communistic Russia." FDR was pleased with
Admiral Richmond Turner's report read July 22: "It is generally
believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead
promptly to the invasion of Netherland East Indies...it seems certain
she would also include military action against the Philippine Islands,
which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war." On July 24 FDR
told the Volunteer Participation Committee, "If we had cut off the oil off,
they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago,
and you would have had war." The next day FDR froze all Japanese assets
in US cutting off their main supply of oil and forcing them into war
with the US. Intelligence information was withheld from Hawaii from this
point forward.
- 14 August - At the Atlantic
Conference, Churchill noted the "astonishing depth of Roosevelt's
intense desire for war." Churchill cabled his cabinet "(FDR) obviously
was very determined that they should come in."
- 18 October - diary entry by
Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes: "For a long time I have believed
that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."
CODES
- Purple Code
- the top Japanese diplomatic machine cipher which used automatic
telephone switches to separately and differently encipher each character
sent. It was cracked by the Army Signal Intelligence Service (331 men).
- J-19
was the main Japanese diplomatic code book. This columnar code was
cracked.
- Coral Machine Cipher
or JNA-20 was a simplified version of Purple
used by Naval attaches. Only one message deciphered prior to Pearl
Harbor has been declassified.
- JN-25
- The Japanese Fleet's Cryptographic System, a.k.a. 5 number code
(Sample).
JN stands for Japanese Navy, introduced 1 June 1939. This was a very
simple old-type code book system used by the American Army and Navy in
1898 and abandoned in 1917 because it was insecure. Version A has a
dictionary of 5,600 numbers, words and phrases, each given as a five
figure number. These were super-enciphered by addition to random numbers
contained in a second code book. The dictionary was only changed once
before PH on Dec 1, 1940, to a slightly larger version B but the random
book was changed every 3 to 6 months- last on Aug 1. The Japanese
blundered away the code when they introduced JN25-B by continuing to
use, for 2 months, random books that had been previously solved by the
Allies. That was the equivalent of handing over the JN-25B dictionary.
It was child's play for the Navy group OP-20-G (738 men whose primary
responsibility was Japanese naval codes) to reconstruct the exposed
dictionary. In 1994 the NSA published that JN-25B was completely cracked
in December 1940. In January 1941 the US gave Britain two JN-25B code
books with keys and techniques for deciphering. Churchill wrote "From
the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanese ciphers,
and were decoding large numbers of their military and diplomatic
telegrams."(GRAND ALLIANCE p 598) The official US Navy statement
on JN-25B is the NAVAL SECURITY GROUP HISTORY TO WORLD WAR II
prepared by Captain J. Holtwick in June 1971, page 398: "By 1 December
1941 we had the code solved to a readable extent." Chief of Navy
codebreaking Safford reported that during 1941 "The Navy COMINT team did
a thorough job on the Japanese Navy with no help from the
Army."(SRH-149) The first paragraph of the Congressional Report Exhibit
151 says the US was "currently" (instantly) reading JN-25B and
exchanging the "translations" with the British prior to Pearl
Harbor.
The top Navy codebreaker
wrote in Cryptologia, July 1982: "So far as inherent security
was concerned, JN-25B was little better than the ciphers used by
Julius Caesar and Augustus Caesar. The vocabulary was in Japanese -
supplemented by Chinese characters - and the difficulties of written
Japanese afforded more security and occasioned more difficulty than
the crypto-system."
The entire Pearl Harbor scheme was laid out in this code.
In 1979 the NSA released 2,413 JN-25 orders of the 26,581
intercepted by US between Sept 1 and Dec 4, 1941. The NSA says "We know
now that they contained important details concerning the existence,
organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor
Strike Force." (Parker, PH Revisited p 21) Of the over thousand
radio messages sent by Tokyo to the attack fleet, only 20 are in the
National Archives. All messages to the attack fleet were sent several
times, at least one message was sent every odd hour of the day and each
had a special serial number. Starting in early November 1941 when the
attack fleet assembled and started receiving radio messages, OP-20-G
stayed open 24 hours a day and the "First Team" of codebreakers worked
on JN-25. In November and early December 1941, OP-20-G spent 85 percent
of its effort reading Japanese Navy traffic, 12 percent on Japanese
diplomatic traffic and 3 percent on German naval codes. FDR was
personally briefed twice a day on JN-25 traffic by his aide, Captain
John Beardell, and demanded to see the original raw messages in English.
The US Government refuses to identify or declassify any pre-Dec 7, 1941
decrypts of JN-25 on the basis of national security, a half-century
after the war.
- AD or Administrative
Code wrongly called Admiralty Code was an old
four character transposition code used for personnel matters. No
important messages were sent in this weak code. Introduced Nov 1938, it
was seldom used after Dec 1940.
- Magic
- the security designation given to all
decoded
Japanese diplomatic messages. It's hard not to conclude with
historians like Charles Bateson that "Magic standing alone points so
irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is inconceivable anybody
could have failed to forecast the Japanese move." The NSA reached the
same conclusion in 1955.
- Ultra
- the security designation for decoded military messages.
WARNINGS
Warnings do no harm and might do
inexpressible good
- 27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo
Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary
of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources
that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
- 31 March 1941 - A Navy report
by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan made war on the US, they
would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft from a
maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had assumed that Japan,
on the outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet wherever it was
- it was the greatest danger from Japan. The fleet was the only threat
to Japan's plans. The fleet at Pearl Harbor was the only High Value
Target. Logically, Japan couldn't engage in any major operation with the
American fleet on its flank. Initial seriously crippling attacks on the
US fleet in Hawaii would be the only chance the Japanese military would
have for eventual victory. The strategic options for the Japanese were
not unlimited.
- 10 July - US Military Attache
Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing
aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay
closely resembles Pearl Harbor.
- July - The US Military Attache
in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special
small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and
that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan
to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing
and submerging.
- 10 August 1941, the top
British agent, code named "Tricycle", Dusko Popov, told the FBI of the
planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The FBI told
him that his information was "too precise, too complete to be believed.
The questionnaire plus the other information you brought spell out in
detail exactly where, when, how, and by whom we are to be attacked. If
anything, it sounds like a trap." He also reported that a senior
Japanese naval person had gone to Taranto to collect all secret data on
the attack there and that it was of utmost importance to them. The info
was given to Naval IQ.
- Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan,
an agent for the Sino-Korean People's League, told Eric Severeid of CBS
that the Korean underground in Korea and Japan had positive proof that
the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among
other things, one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late October,
Haan finally convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were
planning to attack. Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy
Intelligence and FDR personally.
- 24 September 1941, the "bomb
plot" message in J-19 code from Japan Naval Intelligence to Japan' s
consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of exact locations of ships
pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was
deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT location of ships in
harbor, unless to attack them - it was a dead giveaway. Chief of War
Plans Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and
warnings based on it prepared by Safford and others from being passed to
Hawaii. The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced
because he insisted on warning HI. It was lack of information like this
that lead to the exoneration of the Hawaii commanders and the blaming of
Washington for unpreparedness for the attack by the Army Board and Navy
Court. At no time did the Japanese ever ask for a similar bomb plot for
any other American military installation. Why the Roosevelt
administration allowed flagrant Japanese spying on PH has never been
explained, but they blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall
of 1941 to allow it to continue. The bomb plots were addressed to "Chief
of 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff", marked Secret Intelligence
message, and given special serial numbers, so their significance
couldn't be missed. There were about 95 ships in port. The text was:
"Strictly secret.
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible:
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you
like.)
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"
- Simple traffic analysis of the
accelerated frequency of messages from various Japanese consuls gave a
another identification of war preparations, from Aug-Dec there were 6
messages from Seattle, 18 from Panama, 55 from Manila and 68 from
Hawaii.
- Oct. - Soviet top spy Richard
Sorge, the greatest spy in history, informed the Kremlin that Pearl
Harbor would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him that this
was passed to the US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in
the War Department's copy of Sorge's 32,000 word confession to the
Japanese were deleted. NY Daily News, 17 May 1951.
- 16 Oct. - FDR grossly
humiliated Japan's Ambassador and refused to meet with Premier Konoye to
engineer the war party, lead by General Tojo, into power in Japan.
- 1 Nov. - JN-25 Order to
continue drills against anchored capital ships to prepare to "ambush and
completely destroy the US enemy." The message included references to
armor-piercing bombs and 'near surface torpedoes.'
- 13 Nov. - The German
Ambassador to US Dr. Thomsen told US IQ that Pearl Harbor would be
attacked.
- 14 Nov. - Japanese Merchant
Marine was alerted that wartime recognition signals would be in effect
Dec 1.
- 22 Nov. - Tokyo said to
Ambassador Nomura in Washington about extending the deadline for
negotiations to November 29: "...this time we mean it, that the deadline
absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going
to happen."
- CIA Director Allen Dulles told
people after the war that US was warned in mid-November 1941 that the
Japanese Fleet had sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was going to attack
Pearl Harbor. CIA FOIA
- 23 Nov. - JN25 order - "The
first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-day." (Tokyo time or 8
A.M. Honolulu time)
- 25 Nov. - British decrypted
the Winds setup message sent Nov. 19. The US decoded it Nov. 28. It was
a J-19 Code message that there would be an attack and that the signal
would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report - rain meaning war, east
(Higashi) meaning US.
- 25 Nov. - Secretary of War
Stimson noted in his diary "FDR stated that we were likely to be
attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked: "the question was
how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot
without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved,
however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that
in order to have the full support of the American people it was
desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that
there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the
aggressors."
- 25 Nov. - Navy Department
ordered all US trans-Pacific shipping to take the southern route. PHH
12:317 (PHH = 1946 Congressional Report, vol. 12, page 317) ADM Turner
testified "We sent the traffic down to the Torres Straight, so that the
track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic." PHH
4:1942
- 25 Nov. - Yamamoto radioed
this order in JN-25: " (a) The task force, keeping its movements
strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and
aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening
of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet
in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The raid is planned for dawn on
X-day -- exact date to be given by later order. (b) Should the
negotiations with the US prove successful, the task force shall hold
itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble. (c) The task
force will move out of Hitokappu Wan on the morning of 26 November and
advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon of 4 December and
speedily complete refueling." (Order to sail
- scan from the PHA Congressional Hearings Report, vol 1 p 180,
transcript p 437-8) This was decoded by the British on November 25 and
the Dutch on November 27. When it was decoded by the US is a national
secret, however, on November 26 Naval Intelligence reported the
concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready
for offensive action.
- 26 Nov. 3 A.M. - Churchill
sent an urgent secret message to FDR, probably containing above message.
This message caused the greatest agitation in DC. Stark testified under
oath that "On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the
Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the
United States." C.I.A. Director William Casey, who was in the OSS in
1941, in his book The Secret War Against Hitler, p 7, wrote
"The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east
toward Hawaii." Washington, in an order of Nov 26 as a result of the
"first shot" meeting the day before, ordered both US aircraft carriers,
the Enterprise and the Lexington out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as
practicable." This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40
percent of its already inadequate fighter protection. In response to
Churchill's message, FDR secretly cabled him that afternoon -
"Negotiations off. Services expect action within two weeks." Note that
the only way FDR could have linked negotiations with service action, let
alone have known the timing of the action, was if he had the message to
sail. In other words, the only service action contingent on negotiations
was Pearl Harbor.
- 26 Nov. - the "most fateful
document " was Hull's
ultimatum that Japan must withdraw from Indochina and all China.
FDR's Ambassador to Japan called this "The document that touched the
button that started the war."
- 27 Nov. - Secretary of War
Stimson sent a confused and confusing
hostile
action possible or DO-DON'T warning. The Navy Court found this
message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward
it. One purpose of the message was to mislead HI into believing
negotiations were continuing. The Army which could not do reconnaissance
was ordered to and the Navy which could was ordered not to. The Army was
ordered on sabotage alert, which specifically precluded attention to
outside threat. Navy attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC
repeated, no less than three times as a direct instruction of the
President, "The US desires that Japan commit the first overt act
Period." It was unusual that FDR directed this warning, a routine
matter, to Hawaii which is proof that he knew other warnings were not
sent. A simple question--what Japanese "overt act" was FDR expecting at
Pearl Harbor? He ordered sabotage prevented and subs couldn't enter,
that leaves air attack. The words "overt act" disclose FDR's intent -
not just that Japan be allowed to attack but that they inflict damage on
the fleet. This FDR order to allow a Japanese attack was aid to the
enemy - explicit treason.
- 29 Nov.- Hull sat in
Layfayette Park across from the White House with ace United Press
reporter Joe Leib and showed him a message stating that Pearl Harbor
would be attacked on December 7. This could well have been the Nov. 26
message from Churchill. The New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH
report on page 13 under the headline "Attack Was Expected" stated the US
had known a week before that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked.
Perhaps Leib wasn't the only reporter Hull told.
- 29 Nov. - The FBI embassy
wiretap made an intercept of an uncoded plain-text Japanese
international telephone conversation between Ambassador Kurusu in
Washington and the Chief Foreign Officer in Tokyo K. Yamamoto in which
an Embassy functionary asked
'Tell me, what zero hour is. Otherwise, I won't be able to carry on
diplomacy.' The voice from Tokyo said softly, 'Well then, I will tell
you. Zero hour is December 8 at Pearl Harbor.' (US Navy translation 29
Nov 41 - remember Dec 8 Tokyo time is December 7 US time)
- 30 Nov. US Time (or 1 Dec.
Tokyo time) - The Japanese fleet was radioed this Imperial Naval Order
(JN-25): "JAPAN, UNDER THE NECESSITY OF HER SELF-PRESERVATION AND
SELF-DEFENSE, HAS REACHED A POSITION TO DECLARE
WAR ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." (Congress
Appendix D, p 415). US ally China also recovered it in plain text from a
shot-down Japanese Army plane near Canton that evening. This caused an
emergency Imperial Conference because they knew the Chinese would give
the information to GB and US. In a related J-19 message the next day,
the US translated elaborate instructions from Japan dealing in precise
detail with the method of internment of American nationals in Asia "on
the outbreak of war with England and the United States"
- 1 Dec. - Office of Naval
Intelligence, ONI, Twelfth Naval District in San Francisco found the
missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports from the four wireless
news services and several shipping companies that they were getting
strange signals west of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew the exact
location of the Japanese fleet because they asked the Japanese in
advance to let one of their ships pass (Layton, And I Was There p
261). This info was most likely given to them by US because Sorge's spy
ring was rolled up November 14. All long-range PBY patrols from the
Aleutians were ordered stopped on Dec 6 to prevent contact.
- 1 Dec. - Foreign Minister Togo
cabled Washington Ambassador Nomura to continue negotiations "to prevent
the U.S. from becoming unduly suspicious."
- 1 Dec. - The tanker
Shiriya, which had been added to the Striking Force in an order
intercepted Nov 14, radioed "proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E.
Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December." (near HI) The fact that
this message is in the National Archives destroys the myth that the
attack fleet maintained radio silence. "Striking Force Operations Order
Number One" (SF serial # 820 dated November 19) were that all 31 ships
were to use longwave radio and the Battleship Hiei was ordered to
communicate with Tokyo and other fleets by shortwave. FDR apologists
always lie about this order. When they have to lie to make their case,
that is an admission their case is weak. Serial numbers prove that the
Striking Force sent over 663 radio messages between Nov 16 and Dec 7 or
about 1 per hour. The NSA has not released 25 percent of raw intercepts
because the headers would prove that the Striking Force did not maintain
radio silence nor have they released all Direction Finding reports for
the same reason. They must be hiding this for a reason. The reason must
be to deceive the public. On Nov 29 the Hiei sent one message to
the Commander of the 3rd fleet; on Nov 30 the Akagi sent several
messages to its tankers - see page 474 of the
Hewitt Report. Stinnett in DAY OF DECEIT (p 209) found evidence of
over 100 messages from the Striking Force in the National Archives. All
Direction Finding reports from HI have been crudely cut out. Reports
from Dec 5 show messages sent from the Striking Force picked up by
Station Cast, P.I.
-
From traffic analysis, HI reported that the carrier force
was at sea and in the North. THE MOST AMAZING FACT is that in reply to
that report, MacArthur's command sent a series of three messages, Nov
26, 29, Dec 2, to HI lying about the location of the carrier fleet -
saying it was in the South China Sea west of the Philippines. This false
information, which the NSA calls inexplicable, was the true reason that
HI was caught unawares. Duane Whitlock, who is
still alive in Iowa, sent those messages.
- There were a large number of
other messages that gave the location of the Striking Force by alluding
to the Aleutians, the North Pacific and various weather systems near HI.
- 1 Dec. - FDR cut short his
scheduled ten day vacation after 1 day to meet with Hull and Stark. The
result of this meeting was reported on 2 Dec. by the Washington Post:
"President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and
military moves relating to Japan." This politically damaging move was
necessary to prevent the mutiny of conspirators.
- 1 Dec. 3:30 P.M. FDR read
Foreign Minister Togo's message to his ambassador to Germany: "Say very
secretly to them that there is extreme danger between Japan &
Anglo-Saxon nations through some clash of arms, add that the time of
this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This was in response to
extreme German pressure on November 29 for Japan to strike the US and
promises to join with Japan in war against the US. The second of its
three parts has never been released. The message says the 2nd part
contains the plan of campaign. This is 1 of only 3 known DIPLOMATIC
intercepts that specified PH as target. It was so interesting, FDR kept
a copy.
- 2 Dec. 2200 Tokyo time- Here
is a typical JN-25 ships-in-harbor report sent to attack fleet, words in
parenthesis were in the original: "Striking Force telegram No. 994. Two
battleships (Oklahoma, Nevada), 1 aircraft carrier (Enterprise) 2 heavy
cruisers, 12 destroyers sailed. The force that sailed on 22 November
returned to port. Ships at anchor Pearl Harbor p.m. 28 November were 6
battleships (2 Maryland class, 2 California class, 2 Pennsylvania
class), 1 aircraft carrier (Lexington), 9 heavy cruisers (5 San
Francisco class, 3 Chicago class, 1 Salt Lake class), 5 light cruisers
(4 Honolulu class, 1 Omaha class)"
- 2 Dec. - Commander of the
Combined Imperial Fleet Yamamoto radioed the attack fleet in plain (uncoded)
Japanese "Climb Niitakayama 1208" (Dec 8 Japanese time, Dec 7 our time). Thus
the US knew EXACTLY when the war would start. Mount Niitaka was the
highest mountain in the Japanese Empire.
- 2 Dec. - General Hein Ter
Poorten, the commander of the Netherlands East Indies Army gave the
Winds setup message to the US War Department. The Australians had a
center in Melbourne and the Chinese also broke JN-25. A Dutch sub had
visually tracked the attack fleet to the Kurile Islands in early
November and this info was passed to DC, but DC did not give it to HI.
The intercepts the Dutch gave the US are still classified.
- 2 Dec - Japanese order No. 902
specified that old JN-25 additive tables version 7 would continue to be
used alongside version 8 when the latter was introduced on December 4.
This means the US read all messages to the Striking Force through the
attack.
- 4 Dec. - In the early hours,
Ralph Briggs at the Navy's East Coast Intercept station, received the
"East Winds, Rain" message, the Winds Execute, which meant war. He put
it on the TWX circuit immediately and called his commander. This
message, Japanese Dispatch # 7001, was deleted from the files. One of
the main coverups of Pearl Harbor was to make this message disappear
because why would Roosevelt not warn Hawaii when he knew war was
certain? The Winds message makes treason too easily proved. In response
to the Winds Execute, the Office of US Naval IQ had all Far Eastern
stations (Hawaii not informed) destroy their codes and classified
documents including the Tokyo Embassy.
- 4 Dec. - The Dutch invoked the
ADB joint defense agreement when the Japanese crossed the magic line of
100 East and 10 North. The U.S. was at war with Japan 3 days before they
were at war with us.
- 4 Dec. - General Ter Poorten
sent all the details of the Winds Execute command to Colonel Weijerman,
the Dutch military attache' in Washington to pass on to the highest
military circles. Weijerman personally gave it to Marshall, Chief of
Staff of the War Department.
- 4 Dec - US General Thorpe at
Java sent four messages warning of the PH attack. DC ordered him to stop
sending warnings.
- 5 Dec. - All Japanese
international shipping had returned to home port.
- 5 Dec. - At a Cabinet meeting,
Secretary of the Navy Knox said, "Well, you know Mr. President, we know
where the Japanese fleet is?" "Yes, I know" said FDR. " I think we ought
to tell everybody just how ticklish the situation is. We have
information as Knox just mentioned...Well, you tell them what it is,
Frank." Knox became very excited and said, "Well, we have very secret
information that the Japanese fleet is out at sea. Our information
is..." and then a scowling FDR cut him off. (Infamy, Toland,
1982, ch 14 sec 5)
- 5 Dec. - Washington Star
reporter Constantine Brown quotes a friend in his book The Coming of
the Whirlwind p 291, "This is it! The Japs are ready to attack.
We've broken their code, and we've read their ORDERS."
- 6 December - This 18 November
J19 message was translated by the Army:
"1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you
in my No.219 on that day. Area A -- A battleship of the Oklahoma class
entered and one tanker left port. Area C -- 3 warships of the heavy
cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in harbor. The carrier Enterprise,
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago
class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS'. 4 merchant
vessels were at anchor in area D.
3. At 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed
entering the Harbor..." Of course this information was not passed to HI.
- 6 Dec. - A Dec 2 request from
Tokyo to HI for information about the absence of barrage balloons,
anti-torpedo nets and air recon was translated by the Army.
- 6 Dec. - at 9:30 P.M FDR read
the first 13 parts of the decoded Japanese diplomatic declaration of war
and said "This means war." What kind of President would do nothing? When
he returned to his 34 dinner guests he said, "The war starts tomorrow."
- 6 Dec. - the war cabinet: FDR,
top advisor Hopkins, Stimson, Marshall, Secretary of the Navy Knox, with
aides John McCrea and Frank Beatty "deliberately sat through the night
of 6 December 1941 waiting for the Japs to strike." (Infamy ch
16 sec 2)
- 7 December - A message from
the Japanese Consul in Budapest to Tokyo:
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this
country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of
war would break out on the 7th." The communique was the Dec 5th
War Alert from
the British Admiralty. It has disappeared. This triple priority
alert was delivered to FDR personally Dec 5. The Mid-East British Air
Marshall told Col. Bonner Fellers on Saturday that he had received a
secret signal that America was coming into the war in 24 hours.
Churchill summarized the message in GRAND ALLIANCE page 601 as
listing the two fleets attacking British targets and "Other Japanese
fleets...also at sea on other tasks." There only were three other
fleets- for Guam, the Philippines and HI. 2 paragraphs of the alert,
British targets only, are printed in At Dawn We Slept, Prange, p
464. There is no innocent purpose for our government to hide this
document.
- 7 December 1941 very early
Washington time, there were two Marines, an emergency special detail,
stationed outside the Japanese Naval Attache's door. 9:30 AM Aides
begged Stark to send a warning to Hawaii. He did not. 10 AM FDR read the
14th part of the Declaration of War, 11 A.M. FDR read the accompanying
15th part setting the time for the declaration of war to be delivered to
the State Department at 1 PM, about dawn Pearl Harbor time, and did
nothing. Navy Secretary Knox was given the 15th part at 11:15 A.M. with
this note from the Office of Naval IQ: "This means a sunrise attack on
Pearl Harbor today." Naval IQ also transmitted this prediction to Hull
and about 8 others, including the White House (PHH 36:532). At 10:30 AM
Bratton informed Marshall that he had a most important message (the 15th
part) and would bring it to Marshall's quarters but Marshall said he
would take it at his office. At 11:25 Marshall reached his office
according to Bratton. Marshall testified that he had been riding horses
that morning but he was contradicted by Harrison, McCollum, and Deane.
Marshall who had read the first 13 parts by 10 PM the prior night, later
perjured himself by denying that he had even received them. Marshall, in
the face of his aides' urgent supplications that he warn Hawaii, made
strange delays including reading and re-reading all of the 10 minute
long 14 Part Message (and some parts several times) which took an hour
and refused to use the scrambler phone on his desk, refused to send a
warning by the fast, more secure Navy system but sent Bratton three
times to inquire how long it would take to send his watered down warning
- when informed it would take 30 or 40 minutes by Army radio, he was
satisfied (that meant he had delayed enough so the warning wouldn't
reach Pearl Harbor until after the 1 PM Washington time deadline). The
warning was in fact sent commercial without priority identification and
arrived 6 hours late. This message reached all other addressees, like
the Philippines and Canal Zone, in a timely manner.
- 7 December - 7:55 A.M. Hawaii
time AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL.
- 7 December - 1:50 P.M.
Washington time. Harry Hopkins, who was the only person with FDR when he
received the news of the attack by telephone from Knox, wrote that FDR
was unsurprised and expressed "great relief." Eleanor Roosevelt wrote
about December 7th in This I Remember p 233, that FDR became
"in a way more serene." In the NY Times Magazine of October 8, 1944 she
wrote: "December 7 was...far from the shock it proved to the country in
general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time."
- 7 December - 3:00 PM "The (war
cabinet) conference met in not too tense an atmosphere because I think
that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was
Hitler...and that Japan had given us an opportunity." Harry Hopkins (top
KGB agent and FDR's alter ego), Dec. 7 Memo (Roosevelt and Hopkins
R Sherwood, p. 431)
- 7 December - 9 hours later,
MacArthur's entire air force was caught by surprise and wiped out in the
Philippines. His reaction to the news of Pearl Harbor was quite unusual
- he locked himself in his room all morning and refused to meet with his
air commander General Brereton, and refused to attack Japanese forces on
Formosa even under orders from the War Department. MacArthur gave three
conflicting orders that ensured the planes were on the ground most of
the morning. MacArthur used radar tracking of the Japanese planes at
140, 100, 80, 60, down to 20 miles to time his final order and ensure
his planes were on the ground. Strategically, the destruction of half of
all US heavy bombers in the world was more important than naval damage
in Pearl Harbor. Either MacArthur had committed the greatest blunder in
military history or he was under orders to allow his forces to be
destroyed. If it were the greatest blunder in history, it is remarkable
how he escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his fourth star
and Congressional Medal of Honor shortly later. Prange argued, "How
could the President ensure a successful Japanese attack unless he
confided in the commanders and persuaded them to allow the enemy to
proceed unhindered?"
- 7 December - 8:30 PM, FDR said
to his cabinet, "We have reason to believe that the Germans have told
the Japanese that if Japan declares war, they will too. In other words,
a declaration of war by Japan automatically brings..." at which point he
was interrupted, but his expectation and focus is clear. Mrs. Frances
Perkins, Secretary of Labor, observed later about FDR: "I had a deep
emotional feeling that something was wrong, that this situation was not
all it appeared to be." Mrs. Perkins was obsessed by Roosevelt's strange
reactions that night and remarked particularly on the expression he
had:" In other words, there have been times when I associated that
expression with a kind of evasiveness."
- FDR met with CBS newsman
Edward R. Murrow at midnight. Murrow, who had seen many statesmen in
crises, was surprised at FDR's calm reaction. After chatting about
London, they reviewed the latest news from PH and then FDR tested
Murrow's news instincts with these 2 bizarre giveaway questions: "Did
this surprise you?" Murrow said yes. FDR: "Maybe you think it didn't
surprise us?" FDR gave the impression that the attack itself was not
unwelcome. This is the same high-strung FDR that got polio when
convicted of perjury; the same FDR that was bedridden for a month when
he learned Russia was to be attacked; the same FDR who couldn't eat or
drink when he got the Japanese order to sail.
- 8 December - In a conversation
with his speech writer Rosenman, FDR "emphasized that Hitler was still
the first target, but he feared that a great many Americans would insist
that we make the war in the Pacific at least equally important with the
war against Hitler."
- Later, Jonathan Daniels,
administrative assistant and press secretary to FDR said, "The blow was
heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be...But the risks paid
off; even the loss was worth the price..."
- FDR reminisced with Stalin at
Tehran on November 30, 1943, saying "if the Japanese had not attacked
the US he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send any
American forces to Europe." Compare this statement with what FDR said at
the Atlantic Conference 4 months before Pearl: "Everything was to be
done to force an 'incident' to justify hostilities." Given that a
Japanese attack was the only possible incident, then FDR had promised he
would do it.
Information Known in Washington and Hawaii
October 9-December 7, 1941
Date Item Washington Kimmel Short
Oct. 9 "Bombplot" message X
Nov. 26-28 "Winds" setup message X X [1]
Nov. 26 Location of carriers X
Dec. 1 Japanese declaration of war X
Dec. 2-6 Code destruction X [2] X X
Dec. 4 "Winds execute" message X X[3]
Dec. 4 US at war with Japan via ADB X
Dec. 5 British Admiralty War Alert X
Dec. 6-7 "14 Part" message X
Dec. 7 "One o'clock" message X
[1] Admiral Kimmel learned of the "winds" code in a Nov. 28th
dispatch to him from the US Asiatic Fleet. JCC, p. 470.
[2] DC informed HI that codes were being burned world-wide so when they
learned the local consulate burned codes they would not go on alert.
[3] General Short was given the Winds Execute by British IQ.
Note that none of the 3 diplomatic messages or the many naval messages
identifying Pearl as the target were forwarded to HI (not to mention human intelligence).
Only 5 of the 74 Navy IQ packets delivered to FDR in the 2 weeks before
Dec 7 can be found.
COMMISSIONS AND COVERUP
Two and only two courts of law
have decided the issue of whether FDR and Washington or the commanders in
Hawaii were responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. Both the Navy Court
and the Army Board found Washington guilty. It is the official position of
the US Government and its courts that the conspiracy is true. Courts
determine ultimate truth.
-
NAVY Court of Inquiry
-
!!!Top Secret ARMY Board
Report!!!,
Oct, 1944, "Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27
and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came
to our State, War, and Navy Departments in all of their Top ranks
indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the
probable exact hour and date of the attack. " In response to this
report, Marshall offered his resignation - the sign of a guilty
conscience. Marshall testified at the MacArthur hearings that he
considered loyalty to his chief superior to loyalty to his country.
-
JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Nov 15, 1945 to May 31,
1946, proved that there had been so much reversion of testimony, coverup
and outright lies that the truth would have to wait until all Pearl
Harbor records were declassified.
Most of the conspirators were
military men, all men of FDR's own choice, men who only followed orders
and FDR never delegated authority. Stark, in answer to charges that he
denied IQ to Hawaii, publicly offered a Nuremberg defense in August 1945
that everything he did pre-Dec 7, 1941 was on FDR's orders. The handful
of military men in DC responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor were
directly under the control of FDR and were later promoted and protected
from investigation; promoted with FDR's full knowledge that they were
responsible for not warning Hawaii. On the record, Intelligence tried to
warn HI scores of times but were prevented by FDR's men.
STATISTICS - ROOSEVELT WAS
DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING:
American
Deaths: 2403; Wounded 1,178.
Eighteen ships were sunk or
seriously damaged including 5 battleships (USS Arizona
photo).
188 planes were destroyed and 162
were damaged.
Japanese
Out of an attack force of 31
ships and 353 raiding planes the Japanese lost:
64 deaths,
29 planes,
5 midget submarines.
CONCLUSION - ROOSEVELT WAS A TRAITOR
The US was warned by, at least,
the governments of Britain, Netherlands, Australia, Peru, Korea and the
Soviet Union that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was coming. All
important Japanese codes were broken. FDR and Marshall and others knew the
attack was coming, allowed it and covered up their knowledge. It's
significant that both the the chief of OP-20-G Safford and Friedman of
Army SIS, the two people in the world that knew what we decoded, said that
FDR knew Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked.

Pearl Harbor was not about war with Japan
-
It was about war with GERMANY
Most important was the promise
FDR had made to the American people - solemnly given and repeated--not to
send their sons into foreign war unless attacked (audio).
He did not mind violating that pledge. He merely feared the political
effect of the violation. Alsop and Kintner, White House columnist pets,
had written a short time before that "He (Roosevelt) does not feel he can
openly violate them (his pledges). But he can get around them the smart
way." They explained this meant getting the Germans to shoot first. Then
he could shoot back. But it was clear to him by November that the Germans
were not going to shoot first. But FDR knew that he could force the
Japanese to do so.
HITLER WOULD NOT DECLARE WAR IF
U.S. UNBEATABLE
- OBJECTIVE: War with Germany.
How do you bait Hitler to declare war on you? You don't get it by
looking unbeatable!
- Direct provocation in Atlantic
had failed - Hitler didn't bite.
- FDR knew from magic
that if Japan attacked, Germany would declare war.
- Therefore: the problem was how
to maneuver Japan into firing the first shot or make the first overt
act.
- Japan must succeed or Hitler
would renege.
Roosevelt "lied us into
a war because he didn't have the courage to lead us into it."
--Clare Booth Luce
War with Japan was a given
because they had to attack the Philippines. If Japan's fleet were
destroyed, it would defeat the purpose. It would have been obvious suicide
for Hitler to declare war if Japan were crippled - it would allow the US
to attack him without even the possibility of a two-front war. That was
what he had just been avoiding for months. The plan could only work if
Japan's attack succeeded. The lure of a weakened US in a two-front war
focused on Japan seemed to make a German war declaration cost-free. But it
was all a trap - FDR was always going to ignore Japan and go after Hitler,
for his ultimate goal was to save his beloved Soviet Communism.

In November FDR ordered the Red
Cross Disaster Relief director to secretly prepare for massive casualties
at Pearl Harbor because he was going to let it be attacked. When he
protested to the President, President Roosevelt told him that "the
American people would never agree to enter the war in Europe unless they
were attack [sic] within their own borders." See
U.S. Naval Institute - Naval History - Advance Warning? The Red Cross
Connection by Daryl S. Borgquist
CHURCHILL wrote FDR KNEW. Did FDR
know that Pearl Harbor was a Japanese target? Answer: FDR
planned Pearl Harbor to be their target. He ordered the ships in and
the carriers out. Co-conspirator Churchill wrote about the Pearl Harbor
attack that FDR and his top advisers "knew the
full and immediate purpose of their enemy." (GRAND
ALLIANCE p 603) Churchill's entire discussion of Pearl Harbor was
a justification of treason, e.g.: "A Japanese attack upon the U.S. was a
vast simplification of (FDR's and advisors') problems and their duty. How
can we wonder that they regarded the actual form of the attack, or even
its scale, as incomparably less important than the fact that the whole
American nation would be united...?" Now why would Churchill bother to
defend treason unless it happened?
J. Edgar Hoover told his friends
in early 1942 that FDR had known about the Pearl Harbor plan since the
early fall. It was totally in character for FDR to concoct such a plan.
Not only had the US Senate already censured FDR for utterly lacking moral
perspective, but as Walter Lippmann wrote: "his purposes are not simple
and his methods are not direct."
WHY SACRIFICE OLD, SLOW SHIPS?
- FDR had to do it to get into
the war, as he himself later told Stalin. He needed massive public
outrage and that required big sacrifice.
- Would he do it? Did he "love
the Navy too much?" He was sacrificing ships in the Atlantic for the
same purpose. Of course he would do it - he was doing it.
- He saved all the important
elements of the fleet. In the spring he had sent many ships to the
Atlantic. He kept the aircraft carrier Saratoga on the West
Coast. And his sending of the two carrier groups out of harbor meant
that not only they but also their fast escort ships would be saved - all
the new ships stationed at Pearl Harbor were saved. Only WWI junk was
left in harbor. Here is a list of all the ships saved -
Ships saved
at Pearl December 7
- FDR's attitude is best summed
up by co-conspirator Admiral Bloch's testimony to Congress, "The
Japanese only destroyed a lot of old hardware. In a sense they did us a
favor."
- This was obviously FDR's view
as well, because on 7 December at 2:15 PM, minutes after hearing of the
attack and before any damage reports were in, FDR called Lord Halifax at
the British Embassy and told him "Most of the fleet was at sea...none of
their newer ships were in harbour." He had protected the new ships, the
important elements of the fleet, and that fact was at the forefront of
his mind in relation to the attack. First, it means FDR didn't care
about the old ships. Secondly, it means he knew before the attack that
only old ships were in harbor for the attack. Therefore, Pearl Harbor
was "the first shot without too much danger to ourselves" he sought. FDR
was the architect of the attack plot from the oil embargo to the
ultimatum to the final touches of deciding who would live and who would
die.
COVERUP BY SECRECY. Why does the
government refuse to release all the messages to the attack fleet, or any
JN-25 messages decoded before Dec 7? There is absolutely nothing about
national security to hide in JN-25B. It is a trivial and worthless 19th
century code. The techniques for cracking it had been published world-wide
in 1931. The US government has proudly showed how they used JN-25B
decrypts after December 8 to win the Battle of Midway which occurred 7
months after Pearl Harbor. Therefore, there is nothing intrinsic about the
code itself, the means of cracking it, or the fact that we cracked it,
that has any national security implications of any nature. What is the
difference between decrypts from the Purple machine and decrypts from
JN-25? The answer is simply that the JN-25 messages contained the final
operational details of the Pearl Harbor attack, whereas the Purple did
not.
WHAT ARE THEY HIDING? Why won't
they let the truth out? Such secrecy breeds mistrust in government. The
only thing that is left to hide are JN-25 decrypts and worksheets showing
that the US and Britain monitored the Japanese attack fleet all the way to
Pearl Harbor. That is the scandal. That is the big secret. It raises the
issue of whether the NSA is accessory after the fact to treason. However,
the secrecy and misdirection by the NSA about our capabilities with JN-25B
and pre-war messages proves there is something very wrong. The NSA has
systematically lied about the size of the JN25 books by a factor of 4 and
about how many codebreakers worked on the code in 1941 by a factor of 22.
More than one quarter of even the encrypted JN-25 messages sent in
November and early December 1941 are still classified! The NSA refuses to
release Registered Intelligence Publication 79, the complete JN-25B
codebook the US Navy published 11 July 1941 because it would destroy their
lies. The NSA is an evil Gestapo that is committed neither to truth nor
open government nor the rule of law. We live an Orwellian history in which
treason is honored, in which FDR's murder of thousands of young innocent
men is good. In a word, we are no different from the tyranny we decry. A
self-governing people must have truth to make proper decisions. By
subverting the truth, the National Security Agency is subverting our
Democracy.
He who controls the
past, controls the future. He who controls the present, controls the
past. - Orwell
Tokyo had to send the
daily bomb-plots, cabled from its Honolulu consulate, to the attack fleet
by JN-25 radio messages. The pilots had to get their target information.
"The news of the position of enemy ships in Pearl Harbor comes again and
again." - Lt. Cmdr. Chigusa, executive officer of the attack fleet's
Akigumo in his diary, December 4, 1941 (At Dawn We Slept, G.
Prange, page 453). FDR got it, too. FDR knew the Japanese pilots' targets
as well as they did, because he got their bomb-plots when they did. He had
their specific targets, ship by ship, in his hands at the White House.
These messages would prove absolutely that FDR knew that the attack
fleet's target was Pearl Harbor and therefore are not released. The
unnecessary and illogical secrecy about pre-December 7, 1941, JN-25
decoding is conclusive evidence that there was wrongdoing at the highest
levels.
FDR was a traitor for maneuvering
Japan into war with US - and that is known and admitted - FDR was a
traitor for sacrificing American lives, for putting America in danger, for
usurping the Constitutional power of Congress to make war. Day of infamy,
indeed; he chose his words precisely with a hidden double-meaning. Four
days before the attack, FDR could have sent telegrams of condolence to the
families of the sailors he was going to allow to be killed. Even today
there is a coverup, based on a transparently bogus excuse of national
security, that shows that our government cannot face the truth about what
happened a half-century ago. Truth we owe the men of Pearl Harbor. Until
we tell the full truth, we dishonor them and every soldier and sailor who
gave their life for their country. Should their lives have been sacrificed
for treason and no one know, they had died in vain. If their honor cover
treason - we are not a nation of law. The Air Corps in the Philippines and
the Navy at Pearl were FDR's bait, the oil embargo was his stick, the end
of negotiations was the tripwire in FDR's game of shame - a game of death
for so many. Roosevelt aided and abetted the murder of thousands of
Americans.
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