A COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF AUTHORITARIANISM:  THE CASE OF SINGAPORE

by Daniel A. Bell

Daniel A. Bell taught political philosophy for three years at the National University of Singapore.
Political Theory v25, n1 (Feb, 1997)

The task of extending democratic institutions to the non-Western world is less straightforward than optimists had supposed in the heady days after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. Brutal ethnic warfare, crippling poverty, environmental degradation, and pervasive corruption, to name some of the more obvious troubles afflicting the Third World, pose serious obstacles to the successful establishment and consolidation of democratic political arrangements. Ultimately more challenging to democrats with a belief in the universalizability of that form of government, however, is the view that nondemocratic political regimes in modern East Asian societies can deliver social peace, economic success, and political stability. Perhaps most tempting of all, such regimes also promise to secure rich and fulfilling communal attachments instead of no-holds-barred individualism, rootlessness, alienation from the political process, and other phenomena related to the erosion of communal life in Western democracies.

Elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew has been the most prominent spokesman of an East Asian alternative to Western democracy, with prosperous and peaceful Singapore, the country Lee founded and ruled for over three decades as prime minister, held up as the ideal Asian regime. Singapore under Lee has developed a model for a "soft" form of authoritarianism ably described by Ralf Dahrendorf: "Law-abiding citizens who assiduously attend to their own affairs and otherwise live inoffensive private lives need not fear the wrath of their leaders.... But those who criticize government for its unaccountable power, those who use their freedom of speech to expose nepotism, those who dare put up alternative candidates in elections--these people are in trouble."(1)

Lee Kuan Yew and other Singaporean government spokesmen argue that restrictions on democratic freedoms are necessary to maintain Singapore's communitarian traditions. As Lee puts it, Singaporeans have "little doubt that a society with communitarian values where the interests of society take precedence over that of the individual suits them better than the individualism of America."(2) If Singapore became a Western-style democracy, Lee adds, "we'd go down the drain; we'd have more drugs, more crime, more single mothers with delinquent children, and a poor economy."(3) Whereas Americans may prefer more democracy and less community, Singaporeans are said to prefer less democracy and more community.

This essay will not question the premise that as a matter of moral aspiration Singaporeans are typically inclined to place special emphasis on the value of community (4) (compared, say, to the "American" view that the protection of individual liberties is the final justification for political power (5)). Instead, I ask the question whether or not the safeguarding of democratic rights is in fact likely to undermine valued forms of communal life in a Singaporean context. If, contrary to Lee's assertion, more democracy need not lead to communal breakdown--or, even better, if political liberalization may actually increase people’s commitment to their political community--this would seem to be a particularly promising justification for democracy in a context in which political argument often takes the form of appeal to the value of community.

I evaluate Lee's communitarian argument against democracy by imagining a dialogue on the pros and cons of democracy in Singapore between Lee and a Western democrat named "Demo" (after Robert Dahl’s character in chapter 4 of Democracy and Its Critics, a dialogue between a democrat and a defender of rule by paternalistic guardians)(6) who has a good understanding and sincere respect for Singaporean society. "Demo" will thus make his case for democracy not by relying on the abstract and unhistorical universalism that often disables contemporary Western democrats but, rather, "from the inside, from the specific examples and argumentative strategies that the culture itself uses in everyday moral debate."(7) The hope is that such "culturally sensitive" proposals for political reform are both more respectful of "decent" non-Western societies (8) and more likely to be effective. (9)

The "Lee" character is based on the real Lee Kuan Yew, and I do rely to a great extent on Lee's actual speeches to make my points. However, my aim is to present Lee's influential (in a Singaporean context) communitarian arguments against democracy in a relatively plausible light (as opposed, say, to muckraking or trying to accurately depict his personality), and for this purpose I occasionally invoke speeches made by government ministers and "regime voices" in Singapore that buttress what I can only assume also represents Lee's position.

It is important to posit two stipulations and to keep these in mind during the course of the dialogue. By "democracy" I mean "open, competitive elections under universal franchise for occupants of these posts where actual policy decisions are made, together with the enjoyment of the freedoms of organization and speech (including publication) needed to enable self-generated political groups to compete effectively in these elections."(10) Many political thinkers prefer a more "substantive" definition, one that includes such goods as economic equality and forums for public deliberation, but for purposes of this dialogue it is sufficient to operate with a widely accepted "procedural" definition of democracy. Singapore is not democratic even in this "minimal" sense, and "Demo" will argue that adopting such democratic rights as the freedom to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation and the freedom to associate for political purposes is likely to have positive communitarian effects.

The term "communitarian" in this dialogue refers to the idea that individuals in society generally value commitments to certain forms of community over the claims of individual freedom, with the political implication that citizens tend to support first and foremost a government that provides the social conditions that allow them to lead fulfilling communal lives. I limit my discussion to one type of community: the national political community. Thus from a communitarian standpoint democratic political practices will be justified to the extent that democracy protects and promotes a commitment to the nation.

Let me end this introduction with two reasons justifying my choice of the dialogue form. Firstly, the dialogue form allows for a relatively systematic treatment of two contrasting positions. Thus while I myself tend to side with "Demo" it is not inconceivable that the reader will side with Lee on occasion. Secondly, this form vividly illustrates the need for cross-cultural social critics concerned with practical effect to actually understand and engage in dialogue with members of other cultures on the basis of local needs, habits, and traditions, as opposed to blanket condemnation on the basis of abstract and unhistorical political ideals.

Demo: I'd like to go right into our main topic--namely, your worry that democracy may undermine communal solidarity in Singapore. In your view, I presume, the whole idea of a country that can command people’s emotional attachment is a fragile construct in Singapore. You basically had to create a nation from scratch after Singapore was expelled from the Malaysian Federation in 1965 and hence reluctantly pushed into independence.

Lee: Yes. We tried to foster "the growth of a Singaporean national identity among the population, which [would] surmount all the chauvinistic and particularistic pulls of the Chinese, Malay, or Indian identities of the various ethnic groups on the island. The objective of the political leaders [was] to build a nation of Singaporeans out of e."(11) The ethnic groups were literally at war with each other in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and we were determined to combat ethnic parochialism by forging a new Singaporean identity that would underpin security and prosperity.

But things were more complicated than I suspected at the time. "Although we knew it was going to be a difficult task to create a better life for all, it was as well that we did not realize how daunting were the problems of building a nation out of peoples of totally different races, languages, religions and cultures. I would be appalled if I am asked to start off all over again on 21 November 1954 with the heavy knowledge of the almost irreconcilable divisions which were to open up."(12) By now we've just about given up on the aim of replacing ethnic identity with a new Singaporean identity; instead, we seek to accommodate the fact of ethnic pluralism in various ways, such as guaranteeing a seat for minority candidates in our multiseat constituencies. (13)

Demo: But the failure of your radon-building project is more profound than you suggest. It's not just that Singaporeans by and large have failed to develop an overriding attachment to the nation, the problem is that most Singaporeans seem to lack any sense of patriotism, as measured by the degree to which one is prepared to face harm on the nation's behalf. (14) The state is regarded with cynicism, (15) few are even aware of national issues, and many are deeply alienated from the political system. (16) The large majority have simply withdrawn into the "private realm," devoting their time and energy first and foremost to the accumulation of material goods, or the "five C's," as Singaporeans put it: cash, credit card, car, condo, and country club. (17) Singaporeans, in short, have become apathetic, economically based "citizens," staying there because the economic benefits are good but feeling little attachment to the country or its people. One of your proteges, Health Minister and Minister for Information and the Arts George Yeo, recently lamented the fact that Singapore is like a "five-star hotel," where residents might like to spend a vacation because the economic benefits are good but never a lifetime. (18)

HOW AUTHORITARIANISM UNDERMINES PATRIOTISM

Lee: I wouldn't use the words "alienated," "apathetic," and so on. Yes, Singaporeans are materialistic, but they are committed first and foremost to the material well-being of family members, and there are good historical reasons for that. Most of us are the descendants of economic migrants from China, and "history in China is of dynasties which have risen and fallen, of the waxing and waning of societies. And through all that turbulence, the family, the clan, has provided a kind of survival raft for the individual. Civilisations have collapsed, dynasties have been swept away by conquering hordes, but this life raft enables the civilisation to carry on and get on to its next phase."(19) Perhaps this can help to explain the importance of the family in Singaporean culture, along with the concomitant distrust of nonfamily members, an indifference to public affairs, and a reluctance to organize without government prompting and support.

Demo: But you can't put all the blame on "History" and "Culture." As you know, Singapore in the early 1960s was a vibrant, politically active society. A leading member of the opposition plausibly argues that it’s the People's Action Party's (PAP's) decades of interference and control that has made Singaporean society the way it is today. (20) Another local intellectual draws on Tocqueville's description of "good despotism" to lament what has happened to Singapore . . . [Demo pulls out a magazine from his briefcase and proceeds to read from an essay. (21)] Under such a regime, Tocqueville wrote, citizens are ruled by "an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone their gratifications, and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent, if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks on the contrary to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labours, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness: it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances--what remains but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living?"(22) Not surprisingly, the consequences of "good despotism" are exactly as critics predicted. (23) Tocqueville is once more invoked by this local intellectual to make the point that "subjects" of such a regime would lack trust in their fellows, have no interest in public affairs, and certainly have no inclination to sacrifice their own "private" interests for the sake of the public good; instead, "citizens" would turn their main attention to the material aspects of their private lives, once again to the benefit of the government itself: "everybody is feverishly intent on making money or, already rich, on keeping his wealth intact. Love of gain, a fondness for business careers, the desire to get rich at all costs, a craving for material comfort and easy living quickly become ruling passions under a despotic government. They affect all classes, even those who hitherto have seemed allergic to them, and tend to lower the moral standards of the nation as a whole if no effort is made to check their growth. It is in the nature of despotism that it should foster such desires and propagate their havoc. Lowering as they do the national morale, they are despotism’s safeguard since they divert men's attention from public affairs."(24) The author of this essay does not explicitly draw a comparison with contemporary Singapore, (25) but the reader cannot fail to get the message . . .

Lee (interrupting): I am not a "despot" . . . [takes the magazine from Demo and writes down the reference]. The government is not running the whole show. In fact, contrary to the dominant view in Western welfare states, my own belief is that the family, as opposed to the government, ought to be primarily responsible for an individual's welfare. The Western way is the road to economic ruin. In Singapore, "the ruler or the government does not try to provide for a person what the family best provides."(26)

Demo: Your government may not provide certain welfare services such as free health care and unemployment insurance, but that wasn't quite my point. I do not have to rehearse with you the familiar complaint about excessive governmental paternalism in Singapore, ranging from forced savings and public housing policies that cover 85 percent of the population to small-scale regulations governing aspects of people’s everyday lives such as stiff fines for littering and a ban on the sale of chewing gum. Nor do I have to mention the many government-funded campaigns, such as the annual Courtesy Campaign to promote punctuality at wedding ceremonies and to warn people not to overstuff their plates at buffet tables. Perhaps these regulations and campaigns are meant to foster a sense of public responsibility and concern for the fate of others in the political community, as opposed to Tocqueville's cynical suggestion that paternalistic guardians actually seek to keep their subjects in a state of "perpetual childhood." But whatever the government's motivation, extensive social control has the effect of installing in the people overwhelming dependence on, and conformity to, officially sanctioned directions and policies in civil, political, economic, and personal life, while justifying antisocial here, I can confirm one Singaporean’s observation that in those few areas of human behavior not covered by rules in this society, Singaporeans’ behavior is often found wanting: ruthlessly rushing to board buses, entering subway trains before passengers wishing to get out, stampeding to obtain free tickets to a movie, becoming disorderly in a frenzy to buy shares, and so on.(27)

Lee: But things were even worse before our campaigns, regulations, and policies. Perhaps people haven’t become as socially responsible and public-spirited as we had hoped, but it's not the government's fault that many are selfish toward nonfamily members. Look at Hong Kong, a society with few if any regulations instructing people how to lead their lives, and yet people are just as withdrawn from public affairs and focused on the material welfare of the family as they are in Singapore. (28) I skill think it has more to do with traditional Chinese culture than anything else . . . [short pause] . . . or it could be that most humans have finite amounts of love to give to others, and the Chinese give nearly all of it to the family.

Demo: Whatever the impact of culture on people's behavior, politics has a greater effect than you say. At the very least, paternalistic guardians serve to reinforce traditional cultural patterns and to prevent change that may otherwise occur. In Hong Kong, the problem is that people know that things may change drastically when their colony reverts back to China in 1997 no matter what they do now, so most sensibly conclude it's a waste of time to become involved in public affairs. In Singapore, however, I'd put more of the blame on your government's political behavior. Consider the vindictive way that your regime deals with political opponents: promising opposition candidates are publicly humiliated, bankrupted, imprisoned, sacked from their jobs on dubious grounds, among other forms of retaliation . . .

Lee (interrupting): A government needs "big sticks" in order to govern. We "don't have to use it often. Use it once, twice, against big people. The rest will take notice."(29)

Demo (gasps): That's precisely the problem. By such actions, you send an "unpatriotic" message to the community at large. I recall the words of the Singaporean journalist Cherian George: "in Singapore, better to mind your own business, make money, and leave politics to the politicians."(30) He was alluding to the fact that in most people's minds it's simply too dangerous to become involved in public affairs. One can predict that if there really were free and fair competitive elections, including the right to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation, this would do more to promote a sense of attachment to the community at large than ineffectual "courtesy campaigns."(31)

Lee: If you're looking for a good electoral fight, you won't get it." [I]n the nature of Singapore a good opposition has not turned up because good men in Singapore do not go into politics."(32)

Demo: How can you know that, if you haven't given the opposition a real chance? Besides, my point is that a free and fair electoral process contributes to patriotism; it's not my role to favor a particular electoral style or outcome.

Lee: I'm not convinced that elections per se would make that much difference. Only a tiny minority of professional politicians will run for Parliament even in the best of times. The large majority will stick to their own affairs, just as they do in the "democratic" West--50 percent or so of American citizens don’t even bother to cast their votes during presidential elections.

Demo: But democracy also contributes to patriotism in a more indirect way, by providing the conditions for a vibrant associational life, the real "secret of patriotism."(33) Even the most minimal definition of democracy as free and fair competitive elections includes the right to freely associate as groups and participate in public affairs, whether this be political parties competing in elections or interest groups and neighborhood clubs airing their opinions on political matters in various ways. The point here is that "intermediary associations" between the family and the state, which emerge as a by-product of the freedom of association, are absolutely essential for patriotism, because they break down social isolation and allow people to cooperate and to discover common interests that may otherwise have gone unnoticed. As Tocqueville put it, they are "large free schools," in which citizens "take a look at something other than themselves,"(34) political interests are stimulated, and organizational skills are enhanced. Such associations counter the disposition to give precedence to personal ends over the public interest and lead to a broader sense of public spiritedness.

Lee: Well, that's the theory. But when I look at "intermediary associations" in the United States, I see interest groups such as gun lobbies and insurance companies fighting tooth and nail to block change that’s obviously in the public interest, I see ethnic groups and cultural associations preaching the virtues of separation and disengagement from "mainstream" American life, I see suburban NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) campaigns fighting hard to protect property values, I see the Ku Klux Klan and the "Michigan militia" . . .

Demo (interrupting): So what do we conclude? The way I see it, not all groups foster wider forms of cooperation and encourage their members (directly or indirectly) to give precedence to public over personal ends, and it may be an important (but neglected) task for the government to identify groups more likely to do so and to promote them by such means as tax exemptions and matching grants. In other words, the freedom of association may not be sufficient to foster the kind of intermediary association most likely to stimulate concern with public affairs and train members in the use of their energies for the sake of common enterprises, but this freedom is nonetheless necessary. (35)

Coming back to Singapore, it's most worrisome that even greater constraints have been placed on civil associations since the 1980s. (36) Concerned citizens who attempt to organize discussion groups on public issues are subjected to intimidating visits and interrogation by the widely feared Internal Security Department; (37) public gatherings of more than five people must apply for a government permit; legislation was passed in the late 1980s to erode the power and status of the Law Society after it had engaged in public criticism of the government's policies regarding control of the media; The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act was passed in 1990 to prohibit religious groups from engaging in political activity such as providing legal aid and shelter to foreign domestics facing problems with their employers or the Labour Ministry; and even political parties are prevented in various ways from debating and criticizing domestic politics in Singapore. In fact, just about all the independent forces in civil society have been co-opted into official organizations or expunged from the political scene, with the possible exceptions of the relatively autonomous women's group "AWARE" and the Nature Society of Singapore. (38)

Lee: "It is my job as Prime Minister in charge of the Government to put a stop to politicking in professional bodies… You want to politick, you form your own party or you join Mr. Jeyaratnam."(39)

Demo: But how can you expect people who are not professional politicians to develop a sense of belonging and concern for the national political community when they're not supposed to have anything to do with public affairs, when they're barred from "taking a look at something other than themselves"? And I don’t mean to be controversial when I say this--your own Minister George Yeo also argues that intermediary organizations give individuals their sense of place and t should try to make more room for civil society in Singapore. (40)

Lee: Well, George is a bit of a softie. (41) And besides, the argument itself seems faulty--a lively associational life may well promote attachment to the national community, but there are many other paths to patriotism. Consider the Japanese in World War II, a most patriotic people (as I found out to my detriment when the Japanese occupied Singapore from 1942 to 1945), more than willing to sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of "the nation," yet they didn't get that way by being "schooled" in intermediary associations.

Demo: It's difficult to judge the extent of genuine patriotism in authoritarian contexts (how much patriotism stems from fear?). More important, even if the Japanese were genuine patriots, the particular social and historical factors that made them so are not reproducible in modern conditions--the whole country was closed off to outsiders for two and a half centuries during the Tokugawa Shogunate, and people were made to believe that they were "one people" united by the figure of a divine emperor at the top. (42) How feasible is this strategy in contemporary Singapore, a small city-state intimately linked with the worldwide capitalist system? As I see it, only the right to join freely organized intermediary associations, combined with the right to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation, can possibly make Singaporeans more concerned with and committed to public affairs.

Lee: Well, even if you're right that democracy is the best means to increase public-spiritedness now, things may change in the future. Look at what happened in China after the May Fourth 1919 Movement, the first student-led uprising for democracy in Chinese history. Chinese intellectuals were convinced that democracy was necessary to save the nation from extinction, (43) but most of them changed their minds in the 1930s and 1940s when they became persuaded that a Stalinist brand of Marxism was an even better means for building a stronger nation and promoting widespread commitment to the political community.

Demo: As you know, Marxism is thoroughly discredited by now, and I do not expect you to be convinced by any argument in favor of Marxism. I stick to my point that democracy is the best means for promoting patriotism in a Singaporean context, now and in the foreseeable future . . . [short pause] . . . I’m glad, however, that you bring up the example of the May Fourth 1919 Movement for democracy. The demand for democracy as a means for nation-building is a recurring theme in twentieth-century Chinese history; perhaps it's a way of thinking that resonates well with Chinese cultural traditions. This is yet another reason for you to consider my argument.

Lee: I'm not sure why I should be inspired by the example of student protesters for democracy in twentieth-century Chinese history, even if the end goal of the protesters was to increase commitment to the public good. In such cases demands for democracy came from the bottom, not from the top. Remember who you're talking to. I'm pretty pleased as things are now, so why should I care about democratizing in order to make my people more patriotic?

Demo: You wouldn't have to do much to achieve this goal. All you need to do is loosen up a bit on the paternalism and allow people to associate freely in civil society and to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation. Patriotism may then emerge as a happy by-product of political reform.

ON THE END FOR PATRIOTISM IN SINGAPORE

Lee: You're not answering my question. I'm still not persuaded that Singapore has a problem we need to address. I understand your argument thus far. You assert that few Singaporeans are genuinely patriotic in the sense that they're willing to sacrifice their own personal interests for the sake of the political community. This phenomenon, you say, can be explained by excessive governmental paternalism that fosters a sense of dependence on the state and implicitly condones a free-for-all when rules do not apply, by stern measures against opposition candidates that make people reluctant to involve themselves in public affairs and by the absence of independent groups in civil society in which Singaporeans could learn to cooperate, develop a taste for collective benefits, and forge a sense of common purpose in the wider political community. You then pointed out that twentieth-century Chinese social critics have often appealed to the idea that democracy is a means for nation building, an argument that seems to resonate well with traditional political argumentation in East Asia.

But now I'm saying that I can agree with your description of the status quo--a notable absence of public-spiritedness in Singapore--and yet not regard the situation as a particularly desperate state of affairs in need of political remedy. It may well be true, as I said earlier, that we haven't succeeded in our nation-building project to the extent we had hoped when we started off, but from my current perspective I think that we may have done enough. At least we've created the semblance of a nation, and we haven't had any racial rioting in a quarter of a century, so why do we need more patriotism now, why should Singaporeans manifest a greater willingness to set aside their personal interests for the sake of the nation?

Demo (pause): Well, it may seem peculiar to have a foreigner urging another country's political ruler to adopt measures that would lead to greater patriotism, (44) but…

Lee (interrupting): No need to feel embarrassed. There's a long tradition in Chinese history of intellectuals roaming from state to state offering advice to "foreign rulers," and some were pushing similar ideas. Confucius left his native state of Lu hoping to find a ruler more receptive to his social and political teachings, but he failed elsewhere as well. Also toward the end of the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.), the legalist Han Fei Tzu left his own political community when he failed to influence its incompetent ruler, and fortunately he did have more luck outside--he managed to gain access to the young ruler of Ch’in, the utterly ruthless Ch'in Shih Huang-ti who drew on Han Fei's ideas to found the first Chinese empire. (45) Of course, Han Fei taught the First Emperor about the need for harsh punishments and bureau-cratic organization as necessary means to enhance state power, as opposed to the Confucian stress on political practices designed to serve the common good, and it may well be that most rulers prefer to hear the kind of advice Han Fei had to offer.

Demo (smiles): You may have a point there . . . [pause] . . . Quite seriously though, I offer my advice after prolonged study of Singaporean society and a sincere desire to benefit your country. I try to offer practical advice, although I'm not motivated solely by strategic concerns.

Lee (looking at his watch): Perhaps we can get on to what you have to say.

Demo: Fine. My understanding of the situation has led me to the conclusion that Singapore would be better off with more patriotism, and I do hope that you'll be persuaded by at least some of my reasons. Let me begin with the point that governments ought to try to live up to the standards that they honor. (46) It’s relevant to remind you that on January 9, 1989, four core values were identified in the presidential address to Parliament, one of which was "communitarianism," defined as "community over self." These values are meant to capture the "essence" of what it means to be a Singaporean, and your government’s view is that they should be taught in schools, workplaces, and homes. (47)

Lee: That's right. Singaporeans have "little doubt that a society with communitarian values where the interests of society take precedence over that of the individual suits them better than the individualism of America"(48)

Demo: But the practice is a long way from the ideal. You know very well that a genuine sense of caring for the community is rare in Singapore, even compared with supposedly individualistic Americans. Why is it that 40 percent of the population in the United States is involved in volunteer work compared with only 6 percent in Singapore? (49) If you want to close the gap between the individualistic reality and the communitarian rhetoric, this is a reason to consider my suggestion that democratic change in the form of competitive elections, including the freedom of association allowing groups to organize and to participate in public affairs, is the most feasible means of making people really believe in and act on the "society over self" principle. Either that, or you change the rhetoric.

Lee: Well, I don't think that the need for a government to live up to its professed standards on this particular matter outweighs the defects of democracy. Besides, I may have been exaggerating a little. To my mind, what matters most is to have a talented and public-spirited political elite. I'm less worried about the psychological characteristics of the masses. As you know, "Singapore is a society based on effort and merit, not wealth and privilege depending on birth." Our tiny country simply cannot afford to squander human capital. So we aim to identify the most intelligent members of society who can provide "the direction, planning and control of [state] power in the people's interest.... It is on this group that we must expend our limited and slender resources in order that they will provide the yeast, that ferment, that catalyst in our society which alone will ensure that Singapore shall maintain . . . the social organisation which enables us, with almost no natural resources, to provide the second highest standard of living in Asia." We do this by means of an educational system "in which Singapore's brightest students [are] groomed for future command.... The ideal product is the student, the university graduate, who is strong, robust, rugged, with tremendous qualities of stamina, endurance and at the same time with great intellectual discipline and most important of all, humility and love of community."(50) And when it comes to the stage of actually selecting PAP candidates, we administer an IQ test and other psychological tests with the goal of eliminating candidates who are self-interested. (51)

Demo: But surely it matters what ordinary citizens think as well. Even if you successfully identify "the best and brightest" in society for purposes of political rule, most people must still "buy into the system," so to speak; they must be willing to forsake their own interests on occasion for the sake of the common good (as defined by the elite). Otherwise the social system won't be stable. That, in any case, was Plato's view: he suggested that a "Golden Lie" be disseminated to help secure legitimacy for rule by philosopher-kings in his ideal Republic.

Lee: No need to lie. We're open about our meritocratic system in Singapore. But you're right: we do have to get the masses on our side as well, though I'm not very hopeful. "Our community lacks in-built reflexes--loyalty, patriotism, history or tradition.... [O]ur society and its education system was never designed to produce a people capable of cohesive action, identifying their collective interests and then acting in furtherance of them.... The reflexes of group thinking must be built to ensure the survival of the community, not the survival of the individual, this means a reorientation of emphasis and a reshufffling of values.... We must have qualities of leadership at the top, and qualities of cohesion on the ground."(52)

Demo: So you agree that ordinary citizens should be patriotic as well, at least to the extent of being willing on occasion to go along with the decisions of the political elite, which may entail a certain degree of self-sacrifice. Let me then return to the question of why Singapore would benefit from more patriotism. I try to offer highly specific reasons, remaining sensitive to the realities of the Singaporean context. Given the great pride you take in "clean government," you may be persuaded by the "republican" point about the connection between civic virtue and corruption. Republicans prescribe civic virtue as the requisite antidote to corruption. That is, in contrast to traditional "liberals," republicans believe that institutional protections against the abuse of power by public and private authorities will not suffice--the best long-term bulwark against corruption is widespread civic virtue, for only individuals with the character that disposes them to support the common good above their own interests will be sufficiently motivated to resist corruption when it occurs. (53) In the absence of citizens habituated to act from public or semipublic motives, a polity will eventually succumb to corruption.

Lee: You say you want to remain sensitive to the realities of the Singaporean context, but the facts in Singapore tell a different story. Colonial Singapore, especially after World War II, was infected by corruption from top to bottom, and even our critics will concede that we've made Singapore into one of the least corrupt countries in the world. Our administration "is absolutely corruption-free.... Every member knows that there is no easy money on the take. That's the way we are. Nobody believes that we spent money to get into this House.... How do [we] ensure that a fortuitous, purely accidental group of men who came in power in 1959 and after 26 years of office . . . have remained stainless?" Luckily, we don't have to depend on transforming the character of our citizens. Our anticorruption strategy includes stiff penalties for corrupt behavior if one is caught, and we reduce the incentive for corruption among civil servants [and ministers] by constantly improving their salaries and working conditions. "I'm one of the best paid and probably one of the poorest of the Third World prime ministers."(54)

Demo: But will that strategy work indefinitely? Who can guarantee that political leaders one or two generations from now won't be an especially greedy bunch clever enough not to get caught? And who will enforce the anticorruption laws if political leaders decide to plunder the country's wealth? The only long-term check against corruption, let me repeat, is the presence of a large number of public-spirited citizens willing to take some personal risks for the sake of exposing and challenging corrupt rulers. And this is a problem, if I can quote the concluding sentences of Mill's On Liberty, in a "State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes.... the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish."(55)

Lee: Such dramatic language! Back in the real world, I think that it's much more feasible to work on the political leadership than to transform the whole population into a virtuous community of public-spirited citizens. As you may know the Singaporean government has recently adopted my proposal for an "elected president" who's to serve as a check against a future government intent on plundering Singapore’s reserves. (56) As a condition of eligibility the "elected president" must prove himself a man worthy of character, and who knows, it may not always be easy to find the right person, but it's certainly easier than trying to change the motivation of the general public. I'm still not convinced of the need for patriotism in the community at large.

Demo: Well, let me turn to what I see as an even more compelling reason for patriotism. If you care about the interests of the worst-off in society . . .

Lee (interrupting): Of course I care, and I think that the "better-off" should care as well. "If we are to remain a socially mobile society, with no class distinctions or class hatreds, those who have risen up through meritocracy must take an active interest in the welfare and well-being of the less fortunate. Not to do so is to risk a gradual stratification of Singapore society. Then, the less successful will begin to resent those who are successful."(57)

Demo: But if Singaporeans lack a strong sense of patriotism, if they're unwilling at least on occasion to put the interests of "fellow citizens" before their own, how can you expect to implement a national welfare system that benefits the worst-off? Any effective scheme of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world of people deeply committed to each other's fate, for most people will not agree to enshrine generous actions in law, and to live by those laws, if they can't identify in some way with the recipients of those generous actions. (58)

Lee (sighs): Yes, that's true. Singaporeans care more about their own ethnic community than about the nation as a whole--"until such a time when history has made Singapore a nation of one people, no amount of rational analysis can defeat the biological instinct to care, when pressed to prioritise, for one's own [ethnic] community first."(59) So what can we do? In 1992 we reluctantly scrapped the idea of a national organization for the underachievers of all ethnic groups in favor of an ethnic-based welfare scheme.

Demo: But a good number of Singaporeans are profoundly worried by this development. Many fear that this scheme will rekindle latent ethnic tensions, and some argue that the scheme is unfair because it may favor the disproportionately well-off Chinese group. (60) So if you can avoid these drawbacks by means of a national system of distributive justice, and if more patriotism will serve to provide the psychological underpinnings for such a system, this is a good reason to consider the need for more patriotism.

Lee: I still don't think you can do away with the ethnicity so easily. "[Y]ou know there are innate prejudices. And I don't pretend that I don't share those prejudices. I do. If one of my sons had come back and said, `I've got this American lady whom I met in America,' my first question is, what colour is she?"(61)

Demo: I'd say prejudices are social constructions like everything else, and I do not have to inform you that ethnicity is often manipulated by political forces for dubious purposes. This is not the place, however, to try to understand why your government has recently moved toward explicit recognition and accommodation of ethnicity.(62) Let me turn to yet another argument for patriotism in Singapore. As you know, Singapore suffers from a high level of emigration, and things seem to be getting worse: 2,000 families left in 1980, and 4,707 families emigrated in 1988 alone, (63) a high attrition rate for a tiny country. More worrisome, the most skilled and educated sections of the population show the greatest propensity to leave: (64) more than 10,000 skilled workers left the country between 1988 and 1990, mostly to Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand, and a survey by a government think tank found that "the young, singles, the better educated, those with high incomes, those educated in the English stream and the politically alienated,"(65) amounting to 15 percent of the respondents, have considered leaving Singapore for good.

Lee: Yes, that's a problem: "Singaporeans must have conviction that this is their country and their life.... [An emigrant is] a washout."(66) But meanwhile we have to deal with the facts, so we're replacing emigrants with wealthy and skilled migrants from Hong-Kong, mainland China, India, and elsewhere. (67)

Demo: Things are not so simple. At least some of those who leave do so because of the undemocratic and overregulated political system that provides few opportunities for creative and innovative endeavors (68)--I'll call them "talented and creative minorities," for lack of a better term--and they cannot be replaced by economic migrants who come because the economic benefits are good. Why is that a problem? As you know, Singapore is often referred to as a "cultural desert," and part of the explanation has to do with the fact that your "talented and creative minorities" have by and large left for "greener pastures." Had these people stayed, they may have created artistic and cultural products of value.

Lee: The cultural scene will improve in the future. "You're going to see world-class concerts and plays in Singapore because we're going to put up the facilities for it, and we're on the main trunk route. And whether you're Pavarotti or Placido Domingo or whoever, they have to travel, because Europe has heard enough of them and everybody's watched them on television. So we are no longer isolated."(69)

Demo: But what about local culture? It's a depressing local cultural scene, not expected to improve in the foreseeable future, and as I said, part of the explanation is that many talented people have left.

Lee: I wonder about this assumption that emigre Singaporeans are a particularly talented lot. Remember, we’re working with a tiny talent pool here ... [pause] ... Name me one Singaporean who has achieved great artistic success abroad.

Demo: First of all, many cultural products are often recognized as such only by fellow members of one’s native land; they may not make any sense to "outsiders" unfamiliar with the smells, sights, and sounds that give meaning to the product. Second, and more seriously, deracinated persons often lack the inspiration necessary for them to exercise their talents; had they stayed, they may have led more fulfilling creative lives. You can never really tell how many budding artists you may have killed off by means of a stifling social and political system that so alienated them they had to go abroad, but I think it's something to be concerned about.

Lee: This is pure speculation, not the sort of argument that I find compelling. And I still don't see why it’s so important to have more local culture, if we succeed in our aim to turn Singapore into an international center for the arts.

Demo: Well, consider the fact that a sense of community as well as achievement can often be gained even by mere spectators of those activities that bring glory to their participants: (70) Brazilians bask in the glory of the World Cup-winning soccer team, Americans take pride in the writings of Mark Twain, and so on. Only local participants, it's important to note, contribute to those activities that lead to a sense of communal pride (people do not normally take pride in the achievements of "foreigners"), so this is a reason to foster the sort of environment that would allow the home-bred "creative few" to develop their talents. Singapore, as a member of the opposition put it, lacks a cultural element "that forges an identity with the people living in it, ... which makes the members feel that they are one people, one nation,"(71) and reducing emigration by the "creative few" most likely to create products of communal pride would thus have the effect of forging a nation, of increasing people's commitment to Singapore.

Lee: So what you're saying, if I understand you correctly, is that the government should promote local culture, which can be accomplished by adopting democratic practices and hence making people sufficiently patriotic to want to stay in Singapore, because Singaporean "creative minorities" may produce goods that will further increase patriotism in Singapore. But I thought you were supposed to be offering reasons for why I should care about patriotism in Singapore--your reasoning is circular, because now you’re saying that I should care about patriotism because doing this or that will have the ultimate effect of promoting patriotism! This argument doesn't tell me why I should care about patriotism in the first place.

Demo: I'd say that it's a virtuous circle, but in any case let's move on to my last reason for patriotism. This argument begins with the premise that some countries can get by with professional, quasi-mercenary armies, but that Singapore, a small country surrounded by large, potentially hostile neighbors, may require much more for purposes of common defense--namely, a policy of military conscription for all adult males, a need recognized even by some of the most radical opponents of the regime (though some argue for a shorter period of national service and the inclusion of women). Needless to say, any community that relies on its own citizens to provide for common defense must be concerned with the issue of instilling a strong sense of patriotism, as measured by the degree to which one is prepared to face harm and danger on the nation’s behalf. A good citizen-based fighting force, in short, requires patriotism.

But here we encounter a problem. Many Singaporeans, I'm told, would flee to Australia given the opportunity rather than risk their lives in combat, and some say they'd stay, but on account of their family (living in Singapore), not "for the sake of the nation."(72)

Lee: Yes, that's a problem. When we first implemented national service, we thought naively that "nothing creates loyalty and national consciousness more speedily and more thoroughly than participation in defense and membership of the armed forces.... The nation-building aspect of the armed aspect of defense will be more significant if its participation is spread over all strata of society. This is possible only with some kind of national service."(73) Nearly thirty years later, however, I wonder whether "Singaporeans will prove patriotic enough when it comes to the crunch.... There is, quite clearly, still some cynicism about the whole business of defending a country.... The way some people react when others talk about National Service duty shows that military service is not something they look up to and appreciate readily.... anyone who speaks well of National Service is sometimes accused of mouthing official propaganda Anyone who comes across as patriotic risks being tagged pro-government.... I have seen some, from bosses to observers without vested interests, not only being dismissive of the sacrifice involved in National Service, but also apparently devoid of any patriotic feeling."(74)

Demo: So it appears that we can agree at least on this issue--there's an urgent need to increase patriotism if Singapore is to survive as a political entity in the event that, God forbid, your country is attacked by hostile neighbors.

Lee: Not so quick. We also see the strategic value of an American military presence in the region. That’s why we offered to host U.S. facilities after you guys were booted out of Subic Bay in the Philippines ... [short pause] ... But still, I agree that we have to depend on ourselves at the end of the day: unlike, say, oil-rich Kuwait, Singapore cannot count on international support in the event of a war. So we have to put up a credible local defense force, at least to let the enemy know that an invasion would be very costly. "We intend to fight for our stake in this part of the world, and [to] anybody who thinks they can push us around, I say: over my dead body.... We opted for the Israeli fashion, for in our situation we think it might be necessary not only to train every boy but also every girl to be a disciplined and effective digit in defence of their own country."(75)

Demo: Then you do depend on loyal and patriotic soldiers. And since you invoke Israel, how can you not notice the link between democracy and patriotism? Israel simply cannot afford the political alienation that normally accompanies authoritarian practices. The same goes for Switzedand, another small country that’s both democratic and intensely patriotic. So if democracy, including the right to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation and the right of self-generated groups to participate in public affairs, is the most feasible way of increasing patriotism in Singapore, then perhaps it's time to think seriously about democratizing.

Lee (pause): Well, thank you for your advice. Perhaps we can begin one step at a time, say by increasing the possibilities of free association in civil society and feedback to the government. I'm less convinced about the need to provide the right to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation, however.

Demo: It would be most imprudent to provide for the freedom of association without allowing the opposition to freely compete for political power. Consider what happened in Taiwan's burgeoning civil society in the ten years prior to the lifting of martial law in late 1986. Long before the political process had opened up for opposition forces, people organized into social movements and developed a taste for public affairs. (76) But since they were all but excluded from the political process, they formed their own conceptions of national identity (a patriotic attachment to Taiwan) instead of the conception of national identity as stipulated by the Kuamintang rulers (Taiwan including mainland China). Thus I do not recommend beginning with the freedom of association alone, as the final result may be competing conceptions of national identity and state boundaries, and a lot of blood may be shed in the process of determining the issue of who counts as "we the people" ... [pause] ... In the Singaporean context, the freedom of association alone may strengthen ethnic ties and decrease people's attachment to Singapore. If the aim is to increase people's patriotic attachments to Singapore, then the right to freely associate and the right to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation must come together.

CONCLUSION

Lee (glancing at his watch): Well, I guess our time is nearly up. Let me just conclude with the point that I do agree with your observation that genuine patriotism is uncommon in Singapore, and I also think that you may be on to something when you suggest that more democracy may be a "cure" for the lack of public-spiritedness in Singapore. But do we really need more patriotism in Singapore? To be sure, our government may not live up to its communitarian rhetoric, but few governments meet all their promises. You say that public-spiritedness in the community at large is the best bulwark against corruption, but our anticorruption measures seem to be working quite well. Similarly, what's wrong with successful ethnic-based welfare schemes? It is no less arbitrary to favor one's own ethnic group than to favor conationals against the interests of "foreigners" who may live only a few kilometers away in Malaysia or Indonesia And if "talented minorities" want to leave, let them go; they can be easily replaced by productive immigrants less likely to create trouble ... [pause] ... I am, I admit, slightly more troubled by your last point that more patriotism may be necessary for purposes of common defense. There's nothing I care more about than the survival of Singapore, (77) and I'll think about your advice.

Demo (flattered): Well, thank you for this wonderful opportunity to share my ideas--it's not often that political leaders will welcome free-flowing discussions on local politics with outsiders.

Lee: You're different from most of them. There's nothing that tires me more than self-righteous Westerners preaching the virtues of democracy in places they neither understand nor respect. But your arguments are factually detailed and historically specific, grounded in a good understanding of Singaporean society and a sincere respect for our moral aspirations.(78) So thank you for this discussion, and have a safe trip home.

Demo: I'm sticking around for a little bit longer. I have meetings with several local intellectuals and members of the opposition. You see, culturally sensitive arguments for political reform need not only be addressed to rulers--they can also have political effect if they are suggested to local critics of the ruling regimes, who may need more ammunition in their fight for democracy. In Singapore, for example, opposition forces brave enough to withstand "big sticks"(79) can use whatever limited space they have to advance the kinds of arguments I've been suggesting. So that's why I was pleased to notice that Dr. Chee Soon Juan, secretary general of the Singapore Democratic Party (the largest opposition party grouping in Singapore, with three out of the four opposition MPs in Parliament), opens his 1994 political manifesto Dare to Change: An Alternative Vision for Singapore with a chapter exposing the gap between the official rhetoric of communitarianism and the more individualistic reality in Singapore, arguing for measures that would lead to greater national cohesion. The solution he proposes boils down to one word--democracy! (80)

Lee (face turning red): That's enough! This meeting is over.

[Demo exits, ushered out by Lee's bodyguards. Lee then calls in Internal Security Department officers for his weekly briefing.]

Lee: Do me a favor and let me know what that guy is up to.

NOTES

(1.) Ralf Dahrendorf, "Can We Combine Economic Opportunity with Civil Society and Political Liberty?" The Responsive Community 5, no. 3 (summer 1995): 29-30.

(2.) Quoted in The International Herald Tribune, November 9-10, 1991.

(3.) Quoted in Melanie Chew, "Human Rights in Singapore," Asian Survey, November 1994, 935.

(4.) See Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayarusiya, and David Martin Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), esp. chap. 2.

(5.) To be more precise, my claim is that communitarian values constitute the persistent and dominant social and political understandings in East Asia (whereas they are secondary to understandings that prioritize individual freedom in an American context), hence East Asians are more likely to endorse an argument that democracy can help to promote national solidarity.

(6.) Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).

(7.) Samuel Fleischacker, The Ethics of Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 162.

(8.) John Rawls describes a "decent, well-ordered hierarchical society" that liberal societies must tolerate if not respect and learn from in his latest work "The Law of Peoples" (presented in three sessions at Princeton University's Center for Human Values, April 1995). Such a society, he argues, need not be democratic, but it most be nonaggressive towards other communities, and internally it must have a "common good conception of justice" and a "reasonable consultation hierarchy" and it must secure basic human rights. As a nondemocratic society that does secure many important civil freedoms (e.g., the rights to emigrate and to make money), Singapore arguably approximates these conditions to a significant extent. In this essay I ask me further question of how a well-informed and respectful foreign social critic might seek to promote democracy in such a context.

(9.) The reader may want to consult two excellent recent (nonrelativist) arguments for an approach to cross-cultural judgment sensitive to local values and traditions: Fleischacker, The Ethics of Culture, chap. 6; and Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1994), chaps. 2 and 3.

(10.) Andrew Nathan, "Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure," Journal of Contemporary China no. 4 (fall 1993): 3.

(11.) This statement was actually made by Jon Quah, "Government Policies and Nation Building," in In Search of Singapore's National Values, ed. Jon Quah (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1990), 45.

(12.) Quoted in ibid., 83.

(13.) Opposition groups, however, view this system as a transparent attempt at gerrymandering.

(14.) See Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), 40.

(15.) Chew, "Human Rights in Singapore," 946.

(16.) Chiew Seen Kong, "National Identity, Ethnicity, and National Issues," in In Search of Singapore’s National Values, ed. Jon Quah (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1990), 71-3. On the lack of genuine patriotism in Singapore, see also Chee Soon Juan, Singapore: My Home Too (Singapore: Singapore Democratic Party, 1995), 14.

(17.) See Kong, "National Identity, Ethnicity, and National Issues," 83.

(18.) Quoted in Chew, "Human Rights in Singapore," 947.

(19.) See "A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, 115.

(20.) Chee Soon Juan, Dare to Change: An Alternative Vision for Singapore (Singapore: The Singapore Democratic Party, 1994), 29.

(21.) Kwok Kian Woon, "The Moral Condition of Democratic Society," Commentary: The Journal of the National University of Singapore Society 11, no. 1 (1993).

(22.) Ibid., 23.

(23.) I have in mind Tocqueville, Kant (esp. "An Answer to the Question: `What Is Enlightenment?'" in Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991], 54-60), and Mill (esp. "On Liberty," in Three Essays [Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1975], 1-141).

(24.) Quoted in Woon, "The Moral Condition of Democratic Society," 25.

(25.) Those familiar with the plight of social critics in China and the ex-Soviet Empire will understand the need to camouflage one's purposes in an authoritarian context that does not offer any protection to social critics. A recent issue of Commentary: The Journal of the National University of Singapore Society on "Cultural Freedom" was subjected to a cruder form of censorship--the alumni association that publishes the magazine cancelled publication, and in response the four editors of Commentary resigned in protest (see The New York Times, November 7, 1994, A9).

(26.) Quoted in "A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," 113.

(27.) Chee, Dare to Change, 12-3. Singaporeans have a word for such behavior--kiasuism, a Chinese dialect word literally meaning "fear of losing" but referring to all kinds of petty, selfish, and overly self-protective behavior. The local branches of MacDonald's, presumably as part of the chain's interesting worldwide policy to adapt their food to local habits and culinary practices, recently launched the "kiasuburger," a spicy chicken sandwich promoted with a humorous advertising campaign that pokes fun at kiasu behavior. Some Singaporeans subsequently criticized MacDonald's in the letters page of The Straits Times, arguing that the campaign may have the unintended effect of glorifying such undesirable behavior and projecting a bad image of Singapore abroad, and perhaps in response to such attacks MacDonald’s has since withdrawn the "kiasuburger" (it could also be that the "kiasuburger" was not selling well--I personally thought it was inedible). For an amusing account of the kiasu traveller overseas, see Rav Dhaliwal, The Kiasu Traveller: True Stories of the Ugly Singaporean Overseas (Singapore: Brit Aspen Publishing, 1994).

(28.) For Lee Kuan Yew's views on Hong Kong-style individualism, see "China and Hong Kong Devoid of Liberal Democratic Tradition," in Lee Kuan Yew on China and Hong Kong after Tiananmen, ed. by Lianhe Zaobeo (Singapore: Lianhe Zacbeo, 1991).

(29.) Quoted in The Straits Times, December 12, 1992 (interview with Philippino television). For one victim’s story, see Francis Seow, To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison (New Haven, CT: Yale University, Southeast Area Studies, 1994), and for a more general overview of the "big sticks" that have been meted out against opponents of the regime, see Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (London: Macmillan/St. Antony's College, 1994), chap. 6. It should be noted, however, the PAP also punishes "litHe people" on occasion, for example, by withdrawing governmental services from constituencies that vote for the opposition (as Lee stated in Parliament in 1985, "I make no apologies for it. As a PAP government we must look after PAP constituencies first because the majority of people supported us" [quoted in ibid., 63]).

(30.) George argues that one could hardly blame people for ignoring their political obligations "when they hear so many cautionary tales: Of Singaporeans whose careers came to a premature end after they voiced dissent; of critics who found themselves under investigations; of individuals who were detained without trial or even though they seemed not to pose any real threat; of tapped phones and opened letters.... The moral of these stories: In Singapore, better to mind your own business, make money, and leave politics to the politicians" (The Straits Times, July 11, 1993).

(31.) It would be interesting to find out whether patriotism has increased in Taiwan, South Korea, and South Africa, some of the countries that have recently adopted some of the procedures of "minimal democracy."

(32.) Quoted in The Straits Times, June 8, 1996.

(33.) Hegel, quoted in A. Buchwalter, "Hegel's Theory of Virtue," Political Theory 21 (1992): 572.

(34.) Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 510.

(35.) Why is it necessary? If people join associations because the government tells them to do so, as opposed to being self-motivated, they are likely to do only what is "required" of them, with personal (or family) interests dominant the rest of the time.

(36.) See Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), 38, and Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), 245.

(37.) A founder of a small group known as the "Socratic Circle" that meets to discuss domestic politics in Singapore was recently paid a late-night visit by a member of the Internal Security Department and subjected to hostile interrogation. He was umderstandably quite shaken after the experience.

(38.) Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and Its Political Significance," in Singapore Changes Guard, ed. Garry Rodan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 65. Rodan attributes the success of these two nongovernmental organizations to their strategy of deliberately avoiding public debate and open contestation of government policy

(39.) Quoted in Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 197. (Jeyaratnam is the head of the opposition Workers' Party in Singapore, and he has been the unfortunate recipient of several "big sticks" meted out by Mr. Lee; see ibid., 164-6) See also Hill and Lian, The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore, chap 9.

(40.) See Hill and Lian, The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore, 225-6.

(41.) Once touted as a future prime minister, Yeo has apparently fallen out of favor for failing to take a sufficiently hard line on certain issues.

(42.) See, e. g., Harumi Befu, ed., Cultural Nationalism in East Asia (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993).

(43.) See Su Shaozhi, "Problems of Democratic Reform in China," in The Politics of Democratization, ed. E. Friedman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 222.

(44.) Jean-Jacques Rousseau's advice to the Poles in his commissioned work The Government of Poland (trans. Willmoore Kendall [Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972]) was even more peculiar he urged the Poles to become more patriotic in the xenophobic sense--that is, more hostile to foreigners like himself. Demo in contrast recognizes that Singapore is necessarily bound up with the worldwide capitalist economy and does not advocate an insular and xenophobic type of patriotism for Singapore.

(45.) Han Fei, however, was eventually executed by Ch'in Shih Huang ti. Benjamin Schwartz notes chat Han Fei may have paid the ultimate price because "his advice to the First Emperor concerning the treatment of his own native state of Han led the latter to suspect that his view reflected partiality for his native land rather than an unreserved loyalty to the interests of the Emperor himself" (The World of Thought in Ancient China [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985], 345).

(46.) See Walzer, Thick and Thin, 41-2.

(47.) See Jon Quah, "National Values and Nation-Building Defining the Problem," in In Search of Singapore’s National Values, ed. Jon Quah (Singapore Institute of Policy Studies, 1990), 1-2, end Hill and Lian, The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore, 212 The government's agenda was buttressed by visiting Western academics such as Harvard Business School professor George Lodge, who was invited to Singapore as a Lee Kuan Yew Distinguished Visitor to deliver a laudatory lecture on Singapore-style "communitarianism" that was subsequently reprinted in The Straits Times (January 27, 1991).

(48.) Quoted in The International Herald Tribune, November 9-10, 1991

(49.) M. Ramesh, "Social Security in Singapore: Redrawing the Public-Private Boundary," Asian Survey, December 1992, 1105

(50.) Quoted in Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 100-2. It is worth noting that the value of rule by an educated elite is generally accepted by members of the opposition in Singapore as well. A recent speech by opposition leader Dr. Chee Soon Juan at the National University of Singapore was explicit about the need to attract "credible" candidates from the professional class to his side. Given the risks of opposition politics in Singapore, however, few professionals actually join opposition parties (see also Seow's account of the difficulties recruiting a "cohesive group of professionals" in To Catch a Tartar, 168, 170).

(51.) See Hill and Lian, The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore, 192.

(52.) Quoted in Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 100.

(53.) See Shelley Burtt, "Children and the Claims of Community" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994).

(54.) Quoted in Jon Quah, "Searching for Singapore's National Values," in In Search of Singapore’s National Values, ed. Jon Quah (Singapore Institute of Policy Studies, 1990), 100, 99. Demo could have questioned the definition of corruption as taking bribes for political or business favors, pointing out that the Singapore government would not fare so well on a worldwide corruption index if the definition of corruption is expanded to include government officials using their power to vote themselves the world’s highest salaries (nearly U.S. $1.3 million for Lee last year and nearly $1 million for his son Deputy PM Lee Hsien Loong) in an authoritarian context without the freedom of the press, the freedom of association, and the democratic right to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation. Had Demo raised this point, however, he may well have been thrown out of Lee's office.

(55). Mill, "On Liberty," 141.

(56.) See, e.g., Hussin Mutalib, "Singapore's Elected Presidency and the Quest for Regime Dominance," Department of Political Science working paper, National University of Singapore, 1994.

(57.) Quoted in The Straits Times, June 26, 1993.

(58.) See, e.g., David Miller, "The Ethical Significance of Nationality," Ethics (July 1988): 647-62; Yael Tamir, Liberalism Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 117-21.

(59.) Straits Times editorial, September 23, 1992.

(60.) See, e.g., Lily Zubaidah Rahim Ishak, "The Paradox of Ethnic-Based Self-Help Groups," in Debating Singapore, ed. Derek da Cunha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994).

(61.) Quoted in Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 131.

(62.) See ibid., 138-44.

(63.) Chee, Dare to Change, 31.

(64.) Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and Its Political Significance," 59.

(65.) Quoted in Kong, "National Identity, Ethnicity, and National Issues," 73, 74.

(66.) Quoted in Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 123.

(67.) See Cheah Hock Beng, "Responding to Global Challenges: The Changing Nature of Singapore’s Incorporation into the International Economy," in Singapore Changes Guard, ed. Garry Rodan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 111.

(68.) See Chee, Dare to Change, 31.

(69.) Quoted in The Straits Times, July 30, 1994. On the plan to make Singapore into a center for the arts, partly with the aim of curbing emigration, see also Hill and Lian, The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore, 236-41.

(70.) See Quentin Skinner, "The Italian City-Republics," in Democracy, ed. John Dunn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 65. For a Singaporean view on how a lively local culture can contribute to "a genuine sense of national community," see Philip Jeyaratnam, "What Sort of Culture Should Singapore Have?" in Debating Singapore, ed. Derek da Cunha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 92-4.

(71.) Chee, Dare to Change, 9.

(72.) Here, I am relying on a source from within the military establishment as well as on anecdotal evidence from university students in Singapore (in response to the question "Would you willingly fight for your country in the event of a war?").

(73.) This statement was made by the then Minister of Defense Dr. Goh Keng Swee in 1967 (quoted in Quah, "Government Policies and Nation Building," 52). Dr. Goh, by the way, is a brilliant economist commonly referred to in Singapore as "the architect of Singapore's economic miracle." If and when Singaporeans begin to write honest accounts of local history (i.e., when they can write without fear of retaliation--a member of the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore, Bilveer Singh, was forced to take out twenty-five pages from his book on the 1991 general election Whither the PAP? after Lee threatened him with a lawsuit), l predict that Goh's star will rise just as fast as Lee’s will fall.

(74.) I am actually quoting the words of Straits Times columnist Koh Buck Sing (July 11, 1994). Koh’s response to what he sees as the lack of patriotism in Singapore is to call for more governmental propaganda.

(75.) Quoted in Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 107-8.

(76.) See Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, "Political Liberalization and the Farmer's Movement in Taiwan," in The Politics of Democratization, ed. E. Friedman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 208.

(77.) Note, however, that Lee teas recently taken Singaporeans by surprise by floating the idea of reunification with Malaysia if the latter country becomes "meritocratic" (see The Straits Times, June 8, 1996). Several days later an alarmed letter writer to The Straits Times commented, "I'd rather die a Singaporean clan a semi-Malaysian.... The last thing I want to see, and I believe most Singaporeans would agree, is for Singapore to become part of Malaysia, and cease existing as a sovereign state.... Does that mean I will stop calling myself a Singaporean, we will have to stop celebrating National Day and pledge our unswerving loyalty to Malaysia?" (June 13, 1996). But in any case Lee's offer was spumed by Malaysian PM Dr. Mahathir, who said, "We do practice meritocracy, but one which is based on race" (quoted in The Hong Kong Standard, June 16, 1996).

(78.) In the same vein, Bilahari Kausikan (Singapore's Permanent Representative to the United Nations) urges Western democrats to refrain from judging Singapore's political system prior to detailed understanding of local complexities ("The Real World of Democracy in Asia (and Elsewhere)," The Journal of Democracy forthcoming). Lee himself, however, on occasion does not fully respect the principle of refraining from political judgments prior to a detailed understanding of local complexities: Lee delivers the same antidemocratic message to audiences in China, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, regardless of differences in history and stages of economic development. In the latest example, he told foreign reporters in Singapore that only the army could rule Burma and that Aung San Suu Kyi should stay "behind a fence, and be a symbol" (quoted in The Hong Kong Standard, June 9, 1996).

(79.) In the latest case Dr. Chee Soon Juan was dismissed from his post as lecturer in neuropsychology in the Department of Social Work and Psychology at the National University of Singapore two months after he ran (unsuccessfully) for the opposition Social Democratic Party in a December 1992 by-election, allegedly for misusing 226 Singapore dollars (U.S. $137) of a $27,000 research grant and for trying to mislead his department head, Dr. S. Vasoo, MP for the ruling People's Action Party (Dr. Vasoo dismissed allegations of conflict of interest with the declaration that "I separate my duties as head of department from my role as PAP MP"). Dr. Chee then embarked on a hunger strike to demand that the university retract its accusation of dishonesty, called off ten days later following a debate in Parliament on "the Dr. Chee Soon Juan affair." Several weeks later Dr. Chee was slapped with a defamation suit by university officials, including Dr. Vasoo and dean of the National University of Singapore Arts Faculty, Ernest Chew. Dr. Vasoo’s solicitors, Lee and Lee (the Lee family law firm, successful in a previous libel at extracting large sums from opposition MP Jeyaratnam for having "defamed" Lee in Parliament), argued d at Dr. Chee had made defamatory remarks when be said among other things that there was "a lot of fear in the university," thus implying that Dr. Vasoo had intimidated his staff. In view of recent governmental actions against opposition figures alit had undermined the integrity of the legal process in politically related cases (see the 1989 Asia Watch report on Singapore) and aware that former colleagues would be too fearful to testify on his behalf, Dr. Chee decided to cut costs by pleading no contest, but Singapore's High Court nonetheless awarded Dr. Vasoo $210,000 and a further $75,000 to Dean Chew Dr. Chee sold his house to pay off his debt and avoid bankruptcy, which would have disqualified him from running in d e next general elections.

(80.) Dr. Chee's conviction that democracy is an essential means to increase public-spiritedness and to build a strong and cohesive Singaporean nation is even more evident in his second book, Singapore: My Home Too.

In the same vein, Chua Beng-Huat argues that a more open political process is necessary to establish "communitarian democracy" in Singapore (see Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, esp. chap. 9) Chua's book, however, is carefully crafted to avoid direct criticism of PAP leaders, perhaps because Chua believes d at the current set of PAP leaders will be sufficiently persuaded by "communitarian" arguments for democracy to undertake political reform (it may also be worth noting d at Chua, a professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore who has been personally singled out for criticism by Lee Kuan Yew, has good reason to fear political retaliation). A more serious concern is that Chua defines communitarianism as "consensus" rather clan as public-spiritedness, and he advances the empirically dubious argument that freedom of the press and the right to interest group formation will likely produce a true consensus regarding national interests (though Chua seems to take it all back in a peculiar footnote on p. 202) My own view is that democratic rights may increase commitment to the common good in Singapore, not that Singaporeans are more likely to converge on the same interpretation of the common good .

Daniel A. Bell taught political philosophy for three years at the National University of Singapore. In 1994-95, he was a Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellow at Princeton University's Center for Human Values. In January 1996, he joined the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong to teach political philosophy. He is the author of Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford, 1993) and the coauthor of Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (St. Martin's Press, NY, and Macmillan/St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 1995). He is currently working on a book (in dialogue form) tentatively entitled The East Asian Challenge to Liberal Democracy, of which this essay is a part.

COPYRIGHT 1997 Sage Publications Inc.

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