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COMMENTARY ON VOIDNESS

by Geshe Rabten, from "Echoes of Voidness," translated by Stephen Batchelor

"Before continuing with the text itself, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the term "voidness." Much of the following discussion will be quite meaningless if we do not know exactly what voidness is: we shall fail to understand the text and may easily develop a confused and misleading conception of what is being taught. Although it is not easy to grasp the significance of voidness, it is most important to consider carefully what it means and not jump to any premature conclusions.

The first misconception about voidness to be overcome is that it is something precious and holy. Often people consider voidness to be an object of devotion and worship, similar to the Buddha. Voidness is netiher holy nor precious; it has no particular value in itself. However, the understanding of voidness is something very precious, meaningful and holy. This understanding is equivalent to the perfection of wisdom: a state of consciousness that is worthy of much devotion and respect.

Furthermore, voidness is not something that exists separately, in a realm of its own, apart from the phenomena of the empirical world. It is a quality present in every existent phenomenon, without exception. As soon as an entity comes into existence, so does its voidness; the very moment that an entity ceases to exist, its voidness also disappears. Voidness is an essential quality of everything that exists. All phenomena have two distinct modes of being: the ultimate and conventional. Voidness is the ultimate mode of being of every phenomenon; it is the way in which phenomena actually exist.

No single phenomenon lacks the quality of being a dependently arising event. Thus every phenomenon is said to be a "dependent arising." Nevertheless, all things instinctively appear to us as though they did exist independently, as though they were endowed with their own autonomous self-existence. Take for example a mountain. From its own side, it seems to have an inherent substantiality and massiveness independent of all conditions. It stands there against us: imposing, independent and concrete. But upon reflection we shall slowly become aware that this mountain depends for its existence upon a variety of causes and conditions as well as innumerable atomic particles that are so small we cannot see them. It is only through the assembly of all these different particles, each one depending on the others, that the mountain comes into being. Only in this dependent manner does the mountain exist; there is no independently existent entity "mountain" somehow subsisting apart from the causes and component parts that constitute the basis for its being.

The same is true for all material phenomena, however large or small they may be. Imagine that one is holding a grape in one's hand. If one considers just this small, relatively insignificant object, one will start to notice the vast number of diverse conditions that were responsible for its present existence. Just think of the field in which it was grown, the vine from which it came, the efforts of the farmer, the sun and the rain that helped it grow. In this way we can understand how every phenomenon is dependent for its existence upon a whole multitude of conditioning factors. There is nothing to be found that lacks such a dependent existence. Even the tiny atomic particles that are the basic constituents of matter are dependent events. They depend upon their directional parts, as well as the causes that produced them and the effects that they in turn produce.

Likewise, less concrete phenomena, such as time, are also dependently arising. Take for example this year 1980. It appears to us as though it were a solid chunk of time bearing its own fixed identity. However, it only comes into being in dependence upon shorter periods of time: months, weeks and days, which in turn are dependent upon hours, minutes, seconds, milli-seconds and so forth. There is no year or other period of time that exists independently of shorter periods of time. If one were to remove any one of the component moments, the whole would be unable to exist.

The mind too has no independent existence. Any one state of mind depends upon numerous moments of consciousness and various mental factors. A mind that has been meditating for an hour appears to have an independent self-identity. But upon analysis it is found to be utterly dependent upon the various individual thoughts, perceptions and feelings that occurred during the hour, as well as upon the objects the mind was contemplating. The individual mental factors--for example, feelings of pleasure and pain--are also dependent upon a variety of conditions that, once assembled, cause a particular feeling to occur. The beginningless and endless stream of consciousness that passes from one life to another and finally reaches buddhahood is not independently existent either. It is in a constant state of momentary change and thus depends upon the infinite number of moments that constitute its continuity.

The person is also dependent. We can talk of a person as having a body and a mind, but we cannot identify the person with either body or mind. We cannot think of someone as being his bones or his flesh, nor can we consider him to be one of his states of perception of consciousness. In reality, the person exists merely in dependence upon the physical and mental components of which he is constituted. Thus he has no inherent independent existence apart from these things, but neither is he identical with them.

Even permanent, unconditioned phenomena such as abstract-space are dependent entities. The abstract-space, i.e. the mere lack of obstructive contact, in this room is dependent upon its directional parts, i.e. the lack of obstructive contact in the different parts of the room.

In addition to being dependent upon causes and parts, phenomena are also dependent upon their being imputed by the mind. This is a much subtler mode of dependence and is more difficult to understand than dependence on causes and parts. However, it is very important to grasp what this means. It is often said that all phenomena are merely imputed by the mind and that nothing whatsoever can exist independently of such imputation. But what does it mean to impute something with the mind? Actually, to impute (btags.pa) means nothing more than to apprehend ('dzin.pa). We may think of a lamp in our room at home. In thinking of it we apprehend it, and in apprehending it we are "imputing" it. Thus imputation is the mind's fundamental quality of apprehending objects.

We can apprehend, or impute, both existent and non-existent entities. If what we apprehend is existent, the mind that apprehends it is a valid mind, whereas if we apprehend something that does not exist, the mind that apprehends it is mistaken. For example, we may walk into the garden and notice a longish, slightly coiled object partially concealed in the high grass. We immediately recognize it as a snake and stand back in fear. However, as we cautiously approach the snake for a closer look, we suddenly realize that it is not a snake at all, but the garden hose. Thus the initial perception imputed a snake, but since its object was not in reality a snake, the perception was mistaken. Nevertheless, on other occasions we may see an object and correctly apprehend it as a snake. In this case the imputation of a snake is in accordance with reality and the mind that apprehends a snake is thereby a valid mind. Therefore, when it is said that all existent phenomena are imputations of the mind, we must understand that "mind" in this sense means a valid mind. It does not mean that an existent phenomenon is something that can just be imagined by any particular state of mind.

All phenomena exist in dependence upon causes and conditions (if they are conditioned phenomena), component parts and mental imputation. This being the case we can conclude that nothing has any autonomous existence independent of causes, parts and imputation. Whatever appears to us as existing inherently and not dependently is called "that which is negated in voidness." Now, that which is negated here, i.e. inherent, independent existence, is utterly non-existent; but the voidness of it is existent. Voidness is the mere absence of what is negated. If what was to be negated--inherent existence--were existent, voidness would then be non-existent. However, as soon as something comes into existence, it is, in its very nature, something merely imputed by the mind and thereby void of any independent existence. Therefore, what we mean by voidness is the sheer lack or absence of any inherent, independent existence within phenomena.

Consider for example a rosary. A rosary is dependent upon its being imputed by the mind. Therefore, it does not exist as an autonomous entity independent of mental imputation. The rosary's mere lack of independent, autonomous existence is the voidness of the rosary. And this voidness is the ultimate mode of being of the rosary. On the other hand, the rosary that is merely an imputation of the mind is the conventionally existent rosary. Thus there are two aspects to the rosary: its ultimate mode of being and its conventional mode of being. But although we think of these two aspects as distinct qualities, in essence they are identical. That is to say, the rosary's being merely a mental imputation and its being void of existing independently of mental imputation can be thought of and spoken of as distinct, but in reality they are one thing.

By positing the existence of phenomena in this twofold way we avoid falling into the two extreme positions of permanence and annihilation. Through denying that all phenomena have any inherent, independent existence, we avoid the extreme view of permanence (which regards things as inherently existent). But in affirming that all phenomena do exist imputedly and dependently, we escape also the extreme view of annihilation (which denies that phenomena exist at all). In their very nature phenomena are free from these two extremes, since they do not inherently exist yet do imputedly exist. Therefore, they are said to abide naturally in the middle way (madhyamaka)."

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