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by Geshe Rabten, from "Echoes of Voidness,"
translated by Stephen Batchelor

"Before continuing
with the text itself, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the term
"voidness." Much of the following discussion will be quite meaningless if
we do not know exactly what voidness is: we shall fail to understand the
text and may easily develop a confused and misleading conception of what
is being taught. Although it is not easy to grasp the significance of
voidness, it is most important to consider carefully what it means and not
jump to any premature conclusions.
The first
misconception about voidness to be overcome is that it is something
precious and holy. Often people consider voidness to be an object of
devotion and worship, similar to the Buddha. Voidness is netiher holy nor
precious; it has no particular value in itself. However, the understanding
of voidness is something very precious, meaningful and holy. This
understanding is equivalent to the perfection of wisdom: a state of
consciousness that is worthy of much devotion and respect.
Furthermore,
voidness is not something that exists separately, in a realm of its own,
apart from the phenomena of the empirical world. It is a quality present
in every existent phenomenon, without exception. As soon as an entity
comes into existence, so does its voidness; the very moment that an entity
ceases to exist, its voidness also disappears. Voidness is an essential
quality of everything that exists. All phenomena have two distinct modes
of being: the ultimate and conventional. Voidness is the ultimate mode of
being of every phenomenon; it is the way in which phenomena actually
exist.
No single phenomenon
lacks the quality of being a dependently arising event. Thus every
phenomenon is said to be a "dependent arising." Nevertheless, all things
instinctively appear to us as though they did exist independently, as
though they were endowed with their own autonomous self-existence. Take
for example a mountain. From its own side, it seems to have an inherent
substantiality and massiveness independent of all conditions. It stands
there against us: imposing, independent and concrete. But upon reflection
we shall slowly become aware that this mountain depends for its existence
upon a variety of causes and conditions as well as innumerable atomic
particles that are so small we cannot see them. It is only through the
assembly of all these different particles, each one depending on the
others, that the mountain comes into being. Only in this dependent manner
does the mountain exist; there is no independently existent entity
"mountain" somehow subsisting apart from the causes and component parts
that constitute the basis for its being.
The same is true for
all material phenomena, however large or small they may be. Imagine that
one is holding a grape in one's hand. If one considers just this small,
relatively insignificant object, one will start to notice the vast number
of diverse conditions that were responsible for its present existence.
Just think of the field in which it was grown, the vine from which it
came, the efforts of the farmer, the sun and the rain that helped it grow.
In this way we can understand how every phenomenon is dependent for its
existence upon a whole multitude of conditioning factors. There is nothing
to be found that lacks such a dependent existence. Even the tiny atomic
particles that are the basic constituents of matter are dependent events.
They depend upon their directional parts, as well as the causes that
produced them and the effects that they in turn produce.
Likewise, less
concrete phenomena, such as time, are also dependently arising. Take for
example this year 1980. It appears to us as though it were a solid chunk
of time bearing its own fixed identity. However, it only comes into being
in dependence upon shorter periods of time: months, weeks and days, which
in turn are dependent upon hours, minutes, seconds, milli-seconds and so
forth. There is no year or other period of time that exists independently
of shorter periods of time. If one were to remove any one of the component
moments, the whole would be unable to exist.
The mind too has no
independent existence. Any one state of mind depends upon numerous moments
of consciousness and various mental factors. A mind that has been
meditating for an hour appears to have an independent self-identity. But
upon analysis it is found to be utterly dependent upon the various
individual thoughts, perceptions and feelings that occurred during the
hour, as well as upon the objects the mind was contemplating. The
individual mental factors--for example, feelings of pleasure and pain--are
also dependent upon a variety of conditions that, once assembled, cause a
particular feeling to occur. The beginningless and endless stream of
consciousness that passes from one life to another and finally reaches
buddhahood is not independently existent either. It is in a constant state
of momentary change and thus depends upon the infinite number of moments
that constitute its continuity.
The person is also
dependent. We can talk of a person as having a body and a mind, but we
cannot identify the person with either body or mind. We cannot think of
someone as being his bones or his flesh, nor can we consider him to be one
of his states of perception of consciousness. In reality, the person
exists merely in dependence upon the physical and mental components of
which he is constituted. Thus he has no inherent independent existence
apart from these things, but neither is he identical with them.
Even permanent,
unconditioned phenomena such as abstract-space are dependent entities. The
abstract-space, i.e. the mere lack of obstructive contact, in this room is
dependent upon its directional parts, i.e. the lack of obstructive contact
in the different parts of the room.
In addition to being
dependent upon causes and parts, phenomena are also dependent upon their
being imputed by the mind. This is a much subtler mode of dependence and
is more difficult to understand than dependence on causes and parts.
However, it is very important to grasp what this means. It is often said
that all phenomena are merely imputed by the mind and that nothing
whatsoever can exist independently of such imputation. But what does it
mean to impute something with the mind? Actually, to impute (btags.pa)
means nothing more than to apprehend ('dzin.pa). We may think of a lamp in
our room at home. In thinking of it we apprehend it, and in apprehending
it we are "imputing" it. Thus imputation is the mind's fundamental quality
of apprehending objects.
We can apprehend, or
impute, both existent and non-existent entities. If what we apprehend is
existent, the mind that apprehends it is a valid mind, whereas if we
apprehend something that does not exist, the mind that apprehends it is
mistaken. For example, we may walk into the garden and notice a longish,
slightly coiled object partially concealed in the high grass. We
immediately recognize it as a snake and stand back in fear. However, as we
cautiously approach the snake for a closer look, we suddenly realize that
it is not a snake at all, but the garden hose. Thus the initial perception
imputed a snake, but since its object was not in reality a snake, the
perception was mistaken. Nevertheless, on other occasions we may see an
object and correctly apprehend it as a snake. In this case the imputation
of a snake is in accordance with reality and the mind that apprehends a
snake is thereby a valid mind. Therefore, when it is said that all
existent phenomena are imputations of the mind, we must understand that
"mind" in this sense means a valid mind. It does not mean that an existent
phenomenon is something that can just be imagined by any particular state
of mind.
All phenomena exist
in dependence upon causes and conditions (if they are conditioned
phenomena), component parts and mental imputation. This being the case we
can conclude that nothing has any autonomous existence independent of
causes, parts and imputation. Whatever appears to us as existing
inherently and not dependently is called "that which is negated in
voidness." Now, that which is negated here, i.e. inherent, independent
existence, is utterly non-existent; but the voidness of it is existent.
Voidness is the mere absence of what is negated. If what was to be
negated--inherent existence--were existent, voidness would then be
non-existent. However, as soon as something comes into existence, it is,
in its very nature, something merely imputed by the mind and thereby void
of any independent existence. Therefore, what we mean by voidness is the
sheer lack or absence of any inherent, independent existence within
phenomena.
Consider for example
a rosary. A rosary is dependent upon its being imputed by the mind.
Therefore, it does not exist as an autonomous entity independent of mental
imputation. The rosary's mere lack of independent, autonomous existence is
the voidness of the rosary. And this voidness is the ultimate mode of
being of the rosary. On the other hand, the rosary that is merely an
imputation of the mind is the conventionally existent rosary. Thus there
are two aspects to the rosary: its ultimate mode of being and its
conventional mode of being. But although we think of these two aspects as
distinct qualities, in essence they are identical. That is to say, the
rosary's being merely a mental imputation and its being void of existing
independently of mental imputation can be thought of and spoken of as
distinct, but in reality they are one thing.
By positing the
existence of phenomena in this twofold way we avoid falling into the two
extreme positions of permanence and annihilation. Through denying that all
phenomena have any inherent, independent existence, we avoid the extreme
view of permanence (which regards things as inherently existent). But in
affirming that all phenomena do exist imputedly and dependently, we escape
also the extreme view of annihilation (which denies that phenomena exist
at all). In their very nature phenomena are free from these two extremes,
since they do not inherently exist yet do imputedly exist. Therefore, they
are said to abide naturally in the middle way (madhyamaka)."
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