INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the  freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United  States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to  remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American  assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain  subject to the respective export control measures which each country may   have in effect for reasons of national defense (ex. 18)."

During the 5 days from November 22 to November 26, inclusive, the State  Department was the focal point of great activity. After the preparation  of the November 22 draft of the *modus vivendi* and in accordance with  his conversations with the British Minister on November 18 and the  Netherlands and Australian Ministers on November 19, on Saturday,  November 22 (Washington time), Secretary Hull arranged a meeting at the  State Department with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador; Dr. Hu Shih,  the Chinese Ambassador; Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Minister; and Mr.  Richard G. Casey, the Australian Minister. His report of that meeting   follows in full:

"The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and the Netherlands  Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later  on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been  carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this  year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during  that time and need not be repeated here.

"I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a *modus  vivendi*, I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese  Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my  proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal.  There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute was more  desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for  section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the  present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese.  Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this  preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was  somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China  arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is  very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision  in our proposed *modus vivendi* which would block a Japanese attack on  China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would  commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three  months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a  question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving  attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would  accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed  temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations  looking toward a general agreement on the basic  questions (ex. 18)."

Secretary Hull's memoranda of his subsequent conversations with those  who attended this meeting show that each of them immediately reported to  their respective Governments, for comment, the terms of the Japanese  note of November 20 to the United States and of the November 22 draft of  the proposed *modus vivendi* (ex. 18)."

Later that day, November 22, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called on  Secretary Hull. The Secretary told them that he had

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talked with the representatives of the other Governments mentioned  above, and

"that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things  (meaning Japanese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in  such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing.  The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the  suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be  settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory evidences that  their intentions were peaceful.

"The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the  representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen  in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the  course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to  the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador   and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move  last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases  by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in progress, to the  fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments  because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the  conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal  civilian consumption.

"The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting  a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese  statesmen are talking about a peaceful course whereas in the American  press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked  why was there not some Japanese statesmen backing the two Ambassadors by  preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and  other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there  would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she  desired, that the Japanese Government knows that.

"The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard  to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan  out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese  Government could assert control of the situation in Japan as it relates  to the policy of force and conquest. He said that if the Ambassador  could give him any further assurances in regard to Japan's peaceful  intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators and  other persons in this country (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 757-758)."

Later, Secretary Hull commented that Japan made it very difficult by leaving troops in Indochina. Ambassador Kurusu replied-

"that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indo-China in order to  bring about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement  of the China affair Japan promised to bring the troops out of Indo-China  altogether.

"The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that  also uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indo- China, and commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the  pushing toward bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should  get out of Indo-China.

"Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told  Ambassador Grew that we seemed to expect that all the concessions should  be made by the Japanese side (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 760)."

After further discussion of the troop situation in Indochina. Ambassador  Nomura pressed Secretary Hull for an answer to the Japanese proposal of  November 20. In reply, the Secretary said

"that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday before having his  answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to  confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned  after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He  repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the  Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 761)."

Ambassador Nomura "disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard  for an answer * * * and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to  wait until Monday" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 761). Ambassador Nomura sent two  reports of this meeting to Tokyo (ex. 1, pp. 167-169,170-171), in one of  which he observed:

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"We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk,  and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the  same (ex. 1, p. 171)."

The two Ambassadors did not meet with Secretary Hull again until  Wednesday afternoon, November 26 (Washington time), when the Secretary  gave them the United States reply (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-770) .

There is no evidence before the Committee of any meetings or conferences  outside the State Department regarding the *modus vivendi* the next day,  Sunday, November 23 (Washington time).  However, Monday, November 24  (Washington time), like the preceding Saturday, was a day of great  activity. A new draft of the entire counterproposal was completed in the Department over the weekend (ex. 18). During the early part of the   afternoon Secretary Hull had telephone conversations with Secretary  Stimson and Secretary Knox, as well as a conference with Admiral  Schuirmann (tr. 1166). At 3:30 p. M., Secretary Hull had a conference at  the State Department with General Marshall and Admiral Stark, at which  the new draft was discussed in detail (tr. 1166; ex. 18). During this  conference General Marshall expressed the opinion that 25,000 Japanese  troops in French Indo-China, the maximum permitted under the current  draft of the *modus vivendi*, would not be a menace (ex. 18). Following  his conference with General Marshall and Admiral Stark at the State  Department, Lord Halifax, Dr. Hu Shih, Dr. Loudon, and Mr. Casey called  on Secretary Hull at his request, and to each of them he handed copies  of the latest draft of the *modus vivendi*. The Secretary's memorandum  of that meeting records that they spent an hour reading the draft and  taking notes to send back to their Governments. The memorandum  continues:

"The Chinese Ambassador objected to more than a maximum of 5,000  Japanese troops being left in Indochina. I again stated that General  Marshall had a few minutes before expressed to me his opinion that  25,000 troops would be no menace and that, while this Government did not  recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we  were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily  because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time  is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be  more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the  Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the  point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are  not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that  such an outbreak may soon occur any day after this week unless a  temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of  public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more  practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general  agreement.

"The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed  figure of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000. I pointed out  and each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would  be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course  for three months and set forth the advantages to each of having  additional time in which to make further preparations, et ectera, et  ectera. They seemed to be very much gratified. They seemed to be  thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought  of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered  that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to  this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands  Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested  in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the  same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to  be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the  entire area. And yet I said their Governments, through some sort of  preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about  these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I  was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the  lack of interest and

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lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the  Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his  Government and that it would support the *modus vivendi* proposal. I  then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the  Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and  attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion (ex.  18)."

Later that day Secretary Hull sent to President Roosevelt a draft of a  proposed message from the President to Prime Minister Churchill.  The  proposed message summarized the Japanese note of November 20, saying  that the Japanese Ambassador had "represented" that the conclusion of  such a "modus vivendi" might give the Japanese Government opportunity to  develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and  comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that "the  domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent  some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal."  The message pointed  out that the Japanese proposal "would apparently not exclude advancement  into China from Indo-China " It went on to say that the United States  Government proposed to inform the Japanese Government that in its  opinion the Japanese proposals contained features "not in harmony with  the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general  settlement" to which each Government had declared that it was committed,  and then summarized the terms of the *modus vivendi* which was being  considered by the United States Government as an alternative proposal.  The message advised the Prime Minister that the British Ambassador in  Washington had been informed and was informing the British Foreign  Minister (ex. 18). President Roosevelt returned the draft message to  Secretary Hull with the notation "O. K., see addition. F. D. R." (Ex.  18). The "addition" referred to by the President was the following  sentence which he had written in longhand for insertion at the end of  the message:

"This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance  or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not  very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon  (ex. 18)."

The message, with the sentence added by the President, was sent to the  Prime Minister at 11 p. m. That evening, November 24 (Washington time),  through Ambassador Winant in London (ex. 18).

The next day, Tuesday, November 25 (Washington time), the draft  counterproposal was once more revised in the State Department. This was  the final revision of the section containing the *modus vivendi*. At  9:30 a. M. Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox met with Secretary Hull  at the State Department for their "usual Tuesday morning meeting" (tr.  14,390), which Secretary Stimson described in his notes:

"Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce, which he was  going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately  safeguarded all our interests, I thought as we read it, but I don't  think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was  so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do;  namely, to at once evacuate and at once to stop all preparations or  threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her  neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient  quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was  particularly applicable to oil.  We had a long talk over the general  situation (tr. 14,417-14,418)."

It is clear that Secretary Stimson's description of the *modus vivendi*  as "so drastic" refers to the limited nature of the trade concessions to  be made by the United States under it.

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At noon that day the so-called "War Council" composed of President  Roosevelt, Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, and General Marshall and  Admiral Stark met at the White House. The discussion centered on the  Japanese situation. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the  President

"brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as  soon as) next .Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an  attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The  question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the  first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. [1] It was a  difficult proposition. Hull laid out his general broad propositions on  which the thing should be rested the freedom of the seas and the fact  that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy  of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such  expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an  encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our  vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President  that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in  notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into  Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to  point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation  of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing  that (tr. 14,418-14,419)."

In addition to Secretary Hull's testimony regarding this meeting (tr.  1144), the record before the Committee contains a copy of a letter  written by the Secretary to the Roberts Commission a little over a month  after the meeting. In that letter, after stating that at the meeting of  the War Council on November 25, as well as the meeting on November 28,  he had "emphasized the critical nature" of the relations between the  United States and Japan, the Secretary continued:

"I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of  an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese  were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force;  and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the  hands of the Army and the Navy.  At the conclusion I with due deference  expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should  include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of  surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at  various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of  defense and of coordination for purposes thereof (ex. 174)."

General Marshall testified that he had "a very distinct recollection of  Mr. Hull's saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, 'These  fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared" (tr. 3079).

Admiral Stark, who attended the War Council meeting on November 25,  added a postscript concerning it to a letter of that date which he sent  to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. In the postscript, he described the  comments of the President and the Secretary of State:

"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.  I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long  talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as  did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise  attack (ex. 100)."

After the meeting at the White House, Secretary Hull returned to the  State Department and Secretary Stimson to the War Department.  Secretary  Stimson recorded in his notes:

[1] With reference to this sentence in Secretary Stimson's notes,  General Marshall testified: "* * * they were trying to arrange a  diplomatic procedure, rather than firing of a gun, that would not only  protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese  couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also anything they  did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we  were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not  a military order. It was not a military arrangement" (tr. 13801).

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"When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (a  Japanese) expedition had started. Five Divisions have come down from  Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships 30,  40, or 50 ships-and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called  up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the  President of the menace from G-2 (tr. 14419)."

Secretary Hull's record of telephone calls shows a call on that day from  Secretary Stimson at 4:30 p. m. (tr. 1166), and the record of outside  telephone calls through the White House switchboard shows such a call at  4:25 p. m. and that the call was completed (tr. 5545.  The latter  record also shows that Postmaster General Walker telephoned Secretary  Hull four times that afternoon (tr. 5545-5546). The first call was at  12:27 p. M., while the meeting at the White House was in progress, and  was not completed. The other calls, which were completed, were at  3:30,4:05, and 5:30 p. m.

In the meantime reports were reaching Washington of the reactions of the  Chinese, Dutch, and British Governments to the terms of the proposed  *modus vivendi*. As noted above, the Netherlands Minister informed  Secretary Hull at the conference on the afternoon of November 24  (Washington time) that his Government would support the *modus vivendi*  proposal. The next day the Minister formally transmitted to Secretary  Hull his Government's comments on the Japanese note of November 20 and  the proposed *modus vivendi* (tr. 4471-4474).  The comments of the  British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, were contained in a  memorandum handed to Secretary Hull on the same day by Lord Halifax, the  British Ambassador (ex. 18). That memorandum expressed the willingness  of the British Foreign Office to leave to Secretary Hull the decision  whether to reject the Japanese proposals or make a counterproposal. It  took the position that the Japanese proposals should be regarded " as  the opening movement in a process of bargaining," and suggested that if  a counterproposal should be made, "our demands should be pitched high  and our price low." On this basis it was suggested "for the  consideration of the United States Government" that any counterproposal

"should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo-China not merely of  the Japanese "troops" as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval,  military and air forces with their equipment and for the *suspension of  further military* advances in China in addition to satisfactory  assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Southern  Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate relaxation of  existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited  quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian  population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war  potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no  shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course  only become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces  took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a similar  nature from Japan if we required them.

"Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any  interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which  must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United  States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have  to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and  is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on  more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned (ex. 18).  (Italics in original.)"

Prime Minister Churchill's reply to President Roosevelt's message of  November 24 reached the State Department early on the morning of  November 26 (ex. 23). In it the Prime Minister said:

"Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord  Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which  Foreign"

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Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle  this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is  only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not  having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse  our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard  of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We  feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves (ex. 23)."

The views of the Chinese Government had already been made known to the  United States Government. The Chinese Foreign Minister, to whom on  November 22 the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had cabled the  substance of the Japanese note of November 20 and the proposed *modus  vivendi*, sent the following message to the Chinese Ambassador on  November 24:

"After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed strong reaction.  He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside  the Chinese question in its conversations with Japan instead of seeking  a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of  China. * * * We are * * * firmly opposed to any measure which may have  the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or  of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China. Please  inform the Secretary of State (ex. 18)."

On November 25, Owen Lattimore, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's American  advisor, cabled Lauchlin Currie, one of President Roosevelt's  administrative assistants:

"After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's  conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have  never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or  unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in  China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in  China would dismay the Chinese. Any 'Modus Vivendi' now arrived at with  Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to  the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British  prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the  resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against  occidental treachery.  It is doubtful whether either past assistance or  increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at  this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's  fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the  Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if  the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of  Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory (ex. 18)."

The same day, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek cabled Mr. T. V. Soong in  Washington the following message, which the latter promptly delivered to  Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox:

"I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram  yesterday.  Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox  and Stimson immediately.

"Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should  relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if  reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency,  the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two  months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November  an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They  have even come to a silent but nonetheless definite understanding with  the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any  relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of  that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has  been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the  entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith,  and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most  tragic epoch in the world will be opened.  The Chinese army will  collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans,  so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the  situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China  alone.

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"We could therefore only request the United States Government to be  uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies  from China, is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or  freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American  attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its  fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the  break-down of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with  the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our  resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do  not indeed know how history in future will record this episode (ex.  18)."

The evening of November 25 (Washington time), Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese  Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull and delivered to him a copy of the  Chinese Foreign Minister's telegram quoted above. According to Secretary  Hull's memorandum of the conversation, the Ambassador endeavored to  explain Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's opposition to the *modus  vivendi* on the ground that the Generalissimo was not thoroughly  acquainted with the over-all international aspects of the Japanese  situation, and viewed it only from his own situation in Chungking (ex.  18). The Secretary's memorandum continued:

"I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and  Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into  war with Japan until they have had an opportunity to increase further  their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the  second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for  conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful  settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on  conversations and making some progress thus far, and the Japanese are  urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of  a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the  proposed *modus vivendi* is really a part and parcel of the efforts to  carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been  fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador  and to others.

"I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek  almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how  extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the  first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to  require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to  protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent  danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that situation which we  have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly about another matter  relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan corresponding to  the progress made with our conversations concerning a general peace  agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve  the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area,  including Singapore the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and also the  United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes.  All of this relief from menace to each of the countries would continue  for ninety days. One of our leading admirals stated to me recently that  the limited amount of more or less inferior oil products that we might  let Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable extent  increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said that, of course, we  can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding that we  are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near  Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a  military drive southward.

"The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back  to his Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the  situation more or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly  spirit (ex. 18)."

The same evening, whether before or after his talk with Secretary Hull  is not clear from the record before the Committee, Dr. Hu Shih called on  Dr. Stanley E. Hornbeck, political advisor to the Secretary. After  expressing to Dr. Hornbeck his complete confidence that the United  States "would yield nothing in the field of principles and pursue no  course of 'appeasement' ", the Chinese Ambassador repeated what

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he had said at the conference the preceding day regarding the second and  third points of the *modus vivendi*, evidencing the concern of his  Government that point 2 would leave Japan free to continue operations  against China and that point 3 would not sufficiently limit the number  of Japanese troops in Indo-China to dispel the Japanese threat to the  Burma Road. He expressed the hope that the *modusvivendi* would be made  more restrictive (ex. 18).

In the meantime, other intercepted Japanese messages available to  Secretary Hull before delivery of the United States reply on November 26 (Washington time), in addition to the messages (ex. 1, pp. 155, 160) in  which the Japanese Foreign Minister told Ambassador Nomura that a return  to the status prior to the freezing orders was not enough and that it  would be necessary to have a solution that would "come up to the B  proposal," had indicated that the Japanese Government would accept  nothing less than the terms of that proposal. Thus, on November 24  (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura:

"Our expectations, as I told you in my #798, go beyond the restoration  of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation of the freezing  legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with  the exception of clauses 6 and 7. (*Note*. Clauses 6 and 7 were not  included in the Japanese proposal of November 20.) Therefore, our demand  for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies  goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as  well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p. 172)."

Again on November 26 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Togo cabled  Ambassador Nomura that "our final proposal envisages an agreement on the  basis of the 'B' proposal in toto" with the two exceptions already noted  (ex. 1, p. 176). The same day the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador  Nomura that as soon as he reached a settlement on the basis of the  November 20 note

"it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods  in connection with clauses 2 and 3 (*Note*: clauses 3 and 4 of the  November 20 note) of that proposal. Of these goods the acquisition of  petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the  Empire. Therefore, * * * prior to the signing of an understanding, and  at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes  known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following  lines:

"4,000,000 tons per year from the United States (ex. 1, p. 177)."

On November 21 (Washington time) Ambassador Kurusu had called on  Secretary Hull and handed him a letter which he proposed to sign as a  clarification of Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. The  proposed letter asserted that the Pact did not in any way infringe the  sovereign rights of Japan as an independent state; that Japan was free  to make its own interpretation; that the Japanese Government would not  become involved in war "at the behest of any foreign power"; and that it  would " accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for  the maintenance of its security and the preservation of its national  life against active injustice" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 757). The record of  the conversations shows that the substance of all of these assertions  had been made by the Japanese many times before. Secretary Hull asked  the Ambassador whether he had anything more to offer on the whole  subject of a peaceful settlement, and Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 756). Secretary Hull described this incident in his  testimony:

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"The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and was  talking about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize that,  and I suddenly inquired of him if his government had anything more to  offer on the general peace situation, and he quickly said, 'No.'

"So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal and what  their interceptions had informed us was very final in the matter (tr.  1181)."

Secretary Hull had also received a report from Ambassador Grew of his  talk with Foreign Minister Togo on November 24 (Japan time), during  which the Foreign Minister stated that the withdrawal of the Japanese  troops from southern to northern Indochina was the maximum concession  Japan could make "in any event", and that Japan would be willing to have  President Roosevelt act as "introducer" between Japan and China "with  the understanding that then the United States would refrain from action  prejudicial to restoring peace between China and Japan," I. E., cease  all aid to China (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 762-763).

On Wednesday, November 26 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson talked  with Secretary Hull at 9:15 a. M. And again at 9:50 a. m., according to  the White House telephone records (tr. 5546). Mr. Stimson summarized the  conversations in his notes:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up  his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on  the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over to tell  them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected  to that proposition when he showed it to them; that is, to the  proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving  to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the  interval of the truce of the three months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a  special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that  they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that  the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has  asked to see me and I had called Hull up this morning to tell him so and  ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said  above that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in  respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no  further action to propose (tr. 14,420)."

On his return to the State Department from the War Council meeting the  preceding day, Secretary Hull had been told by Secretary Stimson that  the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of 30, 40, or 50  ships at Shanghai and that this expedition was proceeding along the  China coast south of Formosa. Secretary Stimson had also telephoned  President Roosevelt about this, and had sent copies of the intelligence  report to him. A few minutes after his telephone conversations with  Secretary Hull on the morning of November 26, Secretary Stimson  telephoned the President to inquire whether he had received the report  on the Japanese expedition. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the  President

"fairly blew up jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't  seen it and that that changed the whole situation because it was an  evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were  negotiating for an entire truce-an entire withdrawal (from China) they  should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-china, I told him  that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy  Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent  last night and sent it over to him by special messenger (tr. 14,420- 14,421)."

The record before the Committee contains the following "Memorandum for  the President," dated November 26 (Washington time) and signed by  Secretary Stimson:

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JAPANESE CONVOY MOVEMENT TOWARDS INDO-CHINA

"About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese  Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move  approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000  already there by previous agreement.

"Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from  ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been  assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could  mean a force as great as 50,000 but more probably a smaller number.  Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat  carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment.  Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships  leave been seen south of Formosa.

 "The officers concerned in the Military Intelligence Division feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal  movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to  the Vichy Government.

"I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular  field (ex. 98)."

At 6:54 p. M. That day the following priority message was dispatched from the Navy Department:

"From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines

"Admiral Hart will deliver to you a copy of a despatch which with my  approval the CNO and the COS addressed to the senior Army and Navy  commanders in the Philippines. In addition you are advised that the  Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrisons and naval forces on  the Mandates in a manner which indicates they are preparing this region  as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by US Forces.  However, I am more particularly concerned over increasing opposition of  Japanese leaders and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai  and Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming apparent in  China, Formosa, and Indo China for an early aggressive movement of some  character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its  strength or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road,  Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.  Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I consider it possible  that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of  hostilities between the U. S. and Japan. I desire that after further  informing yourself as to the situation and the general outlines of naval  and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General  MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the  President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I  am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people.  Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding public  pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more  difficult. Roosevelt (tr. 13,861-13,862)."

The evidence before the Committee shows that at about 1:20 p. m. that  day, November 26, Secretary Hull telephoned n Stark (tr. 1166, 5546),  that Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull at 2:35 p. m. after attempting  to telephone General Marshall (who was out of town) at 1:28 (tr. 5546),  and that late that afternoon Secretary Hull conferred at the White House  with President Roosevelt (tr. 1147). The Secretary was preceded at the  White House by the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, and Mr. T. V. Soong  (ex. 179). Secretary Hull testified that on November 26 he recommended  to President Roosevelt and that the President approved the Secretary's  calling in the two Japanese Ambassadors and handing them the proposals  contained in the second section of the counterproposal that had been  under consideration at the State Department, while withholding the modus  vivendi plan (tr. 1147). President Roosevelt was, Secretary Hull  testified, "thoroughly familiar" with both sections of the  counterproposal (tr. 14, 312). The record before the Committee contains the following memorandum dated November 26 (Washington time) from  Secretary Hull for President Roosevelt:

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"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

"With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the  Japanese Government, namely:

"(1) A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad, basic,  peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made  a part of the general conversations now going on and to be carried on,  if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on  this subject.

 "(2) The second proposal is really closely connected with the  conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature  of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the  conversations.

"In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the  half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the  Netherlands, and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide  publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will  naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast  importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, without in any way  departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to  all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested  in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this  time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the  comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at  the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal.

"/S/ CORDELL HULL (ex. 18)."

In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull gave a more  detailed statement of the considerations which led to his recommendation  to the President: 

"I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese  military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were  demanding and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended  later to November 29, for acceptance by our Government of their extreme  last-word proposal of November 20.

 "It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other  high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal  was remote.

"So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese,  it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton,  oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.

"It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American  opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the  supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese  Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments  were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable  or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that  the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major  blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear  that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did  not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it,  especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance  and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly  evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.

"The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were  being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the  other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing  Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to  restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered  all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and  mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to  Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It  still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's  decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually  extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic  effort in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be  worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort  should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement  (tr. 114S1147). "

Upon his return to the State Department from his conference with President Roosevelt, at 5 p. M. Secretary Hull met with Ambassadors

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Nomura and Kurusu at the Department and handed them, in reply to the  Japanese note of November 20, the second section of the counterproposal  which had been under consideration since November 22, together with an  explanatory statement. The explanatory statement was the first section  of that counterproposal as quoted herein (pp. 70-71) modified by the  deletion of the modus vivendi and with further changes made necessary  thereby. It reviewed briefly the objectives sought in the exploratory  conversations, and stated that it was believed that some progress had  been made with respect to the general principles involved. Note was  taken of the recent statements of the Japanese Ambassadors that it would  be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to that successful  outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be  agreed upon, to be in effect while the conversations looking toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area were  continuing. It was stated that the United States Government most  earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of the  discussions to this end. The statement continued:

"The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on  November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this  Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part  of the general settlement under consideration and to which each  Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the  United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be  likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under  law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that  further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to  the practical application of the fundamental principles already  mentioned.

"With this object in view *the Government of the United States offers  for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but  simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical  exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as  something to be worked out during our further conversations.*

"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap  between our draft of June 21, 1941. and the Japanese draft of September  25, by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a  comprehensive Pacific settlement. *This plan contains provisions dealing  with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we  have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for  worth-while international relations. We hope that in this way progress  toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be  expedited (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 767)."

The outline of a proposed basis for agreement which Secretary Hull  handed to the Japanese Ambassadors follows, in full:

"Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment.

"WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941.

"OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOB AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  JAPAN

"SECTION I

"*Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy*

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both  being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national  policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the  Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that  they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using  military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that,  accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and  give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon  which their relations with each other and with all other governments are  based:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and  sovereignty of each and all nations.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 383

"(2) The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other  countries.

"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial  opportunity and treatment."

"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and  conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies  and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and  processes.

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have  agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing  recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will  actively support and practically apply the following principles in their  economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

"(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations.

"(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition  of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

"(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw  material supplies.

"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming  countries and populations as regards the operation of international  commodity agreements.

"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and  arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential  enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may  permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of  all countries.

"SECTION II

"Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the  Government of Japan

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will  endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British  Empire China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and The United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland, and Thai Governments an  agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to  respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event  that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of  Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking  such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the  threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the  Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential  treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would  use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of  treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and  police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will  not support militarily, politically, economically any government or  regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of  China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China,  including rights and interests in and with regard to international  settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of  1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British  and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in  international settlement's and in concessions and under the Boxer  Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will  enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and  Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation  treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including  an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan  will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds  in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the  dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose,  half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

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"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has  concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in  such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this  agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the  Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other  governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic  political and economic principles set forth in this agreement (ex. 167;  ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 768-770)."

Ambassador Grew was fully informed the same evening of the sub-stance of the United States' reply. (Tr. 4513-4522; ex. 75.)

The record before the Committee shows that, commencing with the first  draft of an American counterproposal on November 22 (Washington time),  all the officials of the United States Government who were consulted by  Secretary Hull regarding the proposed modus vivendi necessarily saw and  considered the successive drafts of the foregoing so-called "Ten Point"  note, since from the outset the provisions which, as revised, became the  "Ten Point" note had constituted the second section of the  counterproposal and had been attached to the first section containing  the modus vivendi. The record also shows that the provisions of the "Ten  Point" note probably received more attention from the high officers of  the Army and Navy than did the terms of the modus vivendi, since the  part containing the so-called "Ten Points" was based primarily upon the  State Department's revision of the Morgenthau suggestions of November  18. It will be recalled that that revision was sent to the Army and Navy  for comment on November 19, and was the subject of the conference at the  State Department on November 21 attended by General Gerow and Admiral  Stark, who thereafter submitted their comments and suggestions to  Secretary Hull in memoranda of the same date. As has already been  pointed out, the first section of the "Ten Point" note was based almost  entirely upon the statement of principles contained in the draft  proposal submitted by the State Department's Far Eastern Division to  Secretary Hull on November 11, which in turn had been frequently  discussed with the Japanese during the six months since the  conversations began in the spring of 1941.

Returning to Secretary Hull's meeting with Ambassadors Nomura and  Kurusu, after the Japanese had read the documents handed them by the  Secretary, Ambassador Kurusu asked whether this was the United States  reply to their proposal.

"The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as  there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the  United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United  States we have a political situation-to deal with just as does the  Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which  have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a  natural reaction among the public in this country. *He said that our  proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial  cooperation, to which, however, were not referred to in the outline for  fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding.* He also referred to  the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the  Ambassador of the ambition that had been his *of settling the  immigration question* but that the situation had so far prevented him  from realizing that ambition (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 764).

Ambassador Kurusu then commented adversely on various provisions of the  American note, saying among other things that he did not see how his  Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4), and that if this  represented the idea of the American Government he did not see how any  agreement was possible. He said that when they reported the United  States' answer to their Government "it would be

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 385

likely to throw up its hands". He suggested that it might be better if  they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents  further informally in Washington. Later, he said that he felt the reply  could be interpreted "as tantamount to meaning the end." He asked  whether the United States was interested in a modus vivendi. Secretary  Hull replied that he had explored that and that he had done his best in  the way of exploration (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-766).

In reply to Ambassador Kurusu's suggestion that the document should be  discussed informally before reporting it to Tokyo

"The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents  carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were  trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a  result of their being harangued. He explained that in the light of all  that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we would go  at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so  much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about  some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has  lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a  document which would present a complete picture of our position by  making provision for each essential point involved.

"The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public  feeling was so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if  he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan  should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies  ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He  reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they  were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries  neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our  permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina  affects our direct interests (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 765)."

At the conclusion of the meeting, Ambassador Nomura asked whether the  two Ambassadors could see President Roosevelt, and Secretary Hull  replied that he had no doubt the President would be glad to see them at  any time. The Ambassador also said that he would like to have the  counselor of the Japanese Embassy call on Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, one  of the Secretary's principal advisors on Far Eastern affairs, the next  day "to discuss further details" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 766).

Secretary Hull testified:

"The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's  foreign policy. The practical application of those principles to the  situation in the Far East as embodied in the ten points contained in the  document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the  Japanese representatives in the course of the in- ormal exploratory  conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in  question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable  policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country  and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis  for further conversations.

*                *                 *                *               *

"Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the  Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked  out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either  Government was free to offer.

We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the  conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there  was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task  of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter  how slight. It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was  given to the Japanese Government (tr. 1151-1152)."

*Before their meeting with Secretary Hull late in the afternoon of  November 26 (Washington time)*, the two Japanese Ambassadors had sent a  joint telegram to Foreign Minister Togo in which they recognized, *even  before Secretary Hull delivered the " Ten Point" note to them,*

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that the negotiations were for all practical purposes at an end. They told the Foreign Minister:

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of  having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we  let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so,  the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, *if indeed they may not  already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete* (ex. 1,  p. 180)."

They then asked the approval of the Foreign Minister of the only  remaining suggestion they had to offer, as a device to obtain more time.  The Ambassadors suggested, with "grave misgivings," that they be  permitted to propose to Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt wire  Foreign Minister Togo (not Emperor Hirohito) that "for the sake of  posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will co-operate for  the maintenance of peace in the Pacific * * * and that you in return  reply with a cordial message." The Ambassadors asked that their request  be shown to the Navy Minister (ex. 1. p. 189).

While Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu were meeting with  Secretary Hull at the State Department, and at their direction, the  counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasugi, using the trans-Pacific  telephone, informed the Foreign Office in Tokyo that the meeting was in progress and that "the future of the present talks would be decided  during the course of today's conversation" (ex. 1, p. 179). In making  this call, Mr. Wakasugi used a telephone code established earlier that  day in a message from the Foreign Minister which said "the situation is  momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long" (ex. 1, p.  178). There is no evidence before the Committee of the use of a trans- Pacific telephone code in connection with the negotiations prior to the  establishment of this code by the Japanese Foreign Office before the  American note was delivered on November 26 (Washington time).

Almost immediately upon his return to the Japanese Embassy, Ambassador  Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the trans- Pacific telephone. He told the Chief of the American Division, Kumaicho  Yamamoto:

"I have made all efforts, *but they will not yield*. I sent a cable  expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. [1] The  situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of  accomplishing it (ex. 1, p. 179)."

He continued

"I rather imagine you had expected this outcome (ex. 1, p. 180)."

To which Bureau Chief Yamamoto replied:

"Yes, I had expected it, but I wished to exert every effort up to the  final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished (ex. 1, p.  180)."

That evening Ambassador Nomura cabled three reports to the Foreign  Minister of the Ambassadors' meeting with Secretary Hull. The first was  a brief resume of the "Ten Point" note, accompanied by this comment:

"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and  said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to  Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why  did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well,  England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then,  too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a  number of important Japanese in speeches have

[1] The message referred to above in which the Ambassadors said "Our failure and humiliation are complete".

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 387

been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover,  there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us  complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in  these two hard proposals, or we think so (ex. 1, p. 182)."

The third telegram was a detailed account of the meeting (ex. 1, pp.  183-185). The second telegram consisted of general comments on the  situation (ex. 1, pp. 182-183). In it Ambassador Nomura showed great  concern lest some "independent action" taken by Japan *while the  negotiations were continuing* should place upon Japan the responsibility  "for the rupture of the negotiations." He pointed out that "up to the  present we have only been able to press them for an early solution.  During this time we have not expressed any final intention!" Recognizing  that "such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict  military secret," the Ambassador recommended:

"consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of  course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations  be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to  the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and  external consumption.* I would like, if such a course is followed, to  make representations here at the same time (ex. 1, p. 183)."

THE TOJO CABINET MAKES A PRETENSE OF CONTINUING THE JAPANESE- AMERICAN  CONVERSATIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME MOVES ADDITIONAL JAPANESE TROOPS INTO  SOUTHERN INDOCHINA

(November 27-December 7, 1941)

The record before the Committee thus shows that there was little hope or  expectation in Washington on November 27, either among those in the  United States Government who were familiar with the Japanese-American  conversations or on the part of the two Japanese Ambassadors, that the  Tojo Government in Tokyo would continue the conversations. Nevertheless,  as requested by Ambassador Kurusu the day before, a meeting with  President Roosevelt was arranged for 2:30 p. m. on November 27  (Washington time) at the White House.

That morning, before the White House conference, Secretary Hull held a  "special and lengthy" press conference at which he reviewed the Far  Eastern situation and particularly the state of the Japanese-American  conversations in much greater detail than had been true of the statement  made to the press late the preceding afternoon, following his conference  with the two Japanese Ambassadors (tr. 1154- 161). That statement had  said only that the Japanese Ambassadors had been handed for their  consideration a document that was the culmination of conferences back  and forth during recent weeks, and that it was unnecessary to repeat  what had been said so often in the past that it rested on certain basic  principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in  the light of many repetitions (ex. 167). At Secretary Hull's press  conference on the morning of November 27, he emphasized that from the  beginning he had kept in mind that the groups in Japan led by the  military leaders had a plan to conquer by force half of the earth with  half its population; that this movement had started in earnest in 1937,  and carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of  conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of  justice or fair play. The Secretary said that from the beginning, as the  world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy, the   United States had sought to keep

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alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing  viewpoint in international relations, but that it was no easy under- taking. He then briefly reviewed the nature of the conversations he had  had with the Japanese, commencing in the spring of 1941, to determine  whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area might  not be possible. He said that while the conversations during the  preceding several months had been purely exploratory, for the past 10  days or so all phases of the basic questions presented and of  suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States  as close together as possible had been explored, on the theory there  might thus be reached the beginning of some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations in the Pacific area, including  the United States. He said that during the conversations it had been  necessary to keep in mind not only the political situation in Japan but  also the activities of the Japanese Army and Navy, and he cited the  fact:

"that we had known for some days * * * that the Japanese were pouring  men and materials and boats and all kinds of equipment into Indo-China.  * * * There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make  attacks some-where there around Siam, any time within a few days (tr.  1156-1157)."

He said that if the Japanese established themselves in Indochina in  adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they would have a base  not only for operations against China but the whole South Sea area. The  Secretary said that the United States Government had exhausted all its  efforts to work out phases of this matter with the Japanese; and that  those efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general  agreement. On November 26, he continued, because he had found there was  so much confusion and so many collateral manners brought in, while at  the same time high Japanese officials in Tokyo continued to proclaim  their old doctrine of force he had thought it important to bring the  situation to a clear perspective by restating the fundamental principles  to which the United States was committed and at the same time show how  those principles could be applied to a number of specific conditions  which would logically be a part of a broad basic settlement in the  entire Pacific area. When he was asked whether he expected the Japanese  to come back and talk further on the basis of what he had given them on  November 26, Secretary Hull replied that he did not know, but that the  Japanese might not do that. In reply to a question whether it could be  assumed there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept the  principles to which he had referred and go far enough to afford a basis  for continuing the conversations, the Secretary said there was always a  possibility but that he would not say how much probability there might  be.

Secretary Hull's press conference took place at about 10 o'clock that  morning. Both before and after it, at 9:17 and 11 o'clock, the Secretary  talked with Secretary Stimson regarding the state of the negotiations;  he also talked with Admiral Stark that morning (tr. 1167, 5547).  Secretary Stimson's notes for that day (November 27) describe his two  conversations with Secretary Hull:

"A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and  movement south by the Japanese of a large Expeditionary Force moving  south from Shanghai and evidently headed towards Indo-China with a  possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma  Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but prob-

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 389

ably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position  from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives. The first thing in the morning I call up Hull to find out what his  finale has been with the Japanese whether he had handed them the new  proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he  suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told me  now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have  washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox the  Army and the Navy." I then called up the President. The President gave  me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they ended up  with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards  that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our  constant and regular position.

"General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of  our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated  Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in  the Mandated Islands and these planes can fly high over them, beyond the  reach of their pursuit planes and take photographs.

"Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General  Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence  very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and  Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I  didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States  or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The  main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur.  We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the first signal for an  alert, and now, on talking with the President this morning over the  telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the  final alert; namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack  and telling him how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went  over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally  got it in shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I  got the exact statement from him of what the situation was (tr. 14,421- 14,423)."

Because of its relationship to events which followed, it is necessary  here to refer briefly to the background of Secretary Stimson's  observation in his notes that General Gerow and Admiral Stark desired  "to seek for more time." It will be recalled that on November 5, in  connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for British and  American aid, General Marshall and Admiral Stark had concluded that

"war between the United States and Japan should be avoided while  building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan  attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United  States is of very great importance (ex. 16)."

As has been seen, one of the major considerations in the modus vivendi  proposal was the desire of the military and naval authorities "for more  time." However, at the War Council meeting on November 25 attended by  General Marshall and Admiral Stark, Secretary Hull stated that there was  "practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan"  (ex. 174, Item 13). The next day, at an Army-Navy Joint Board meeting,  General Marshall and Admiral Stark directed the preparation of a  memorandum to President Roosevelt regarding what steps should be taken  if the negotiations with Japan should end without agreement. The meeting  on November 27 described by Secretary Stimson in his notes for that day  was also described in a memorandum for General Marshall  prepared the same day by General Gerow:

"2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of  War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the  Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint  message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy  attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you  and Admiral Stark

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