Page 350 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Upon receipt of Ambassador Nomura's report, Foreign Minister Togo cabled
the Ambassador that there were
"indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the
exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that
the date set forth in my message No. 736 is absolutely immovable under
present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore it is
essential that settlement be realized by about that time.* The session
of Parliament opens on the 15th * * *. The government must have a clear
picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You
can see, therefore, *that the situation is nearing a climax and that
time is indeed becoming short.*
"I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in
view of the above-mentioned situation, will you redouble them? When
talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to
them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S.
attitude in the minimum of time. At the same time do everything in
your
power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.
"We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not
they will accept our final proposal A (ex. 1, pp. 116-117)."
Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister that Secretary
Hull had agreed to study the Japanese proposals the following day,
Armistice Day, and that his next meeting with the Secretary was
scheduled for the afternoon of November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p.
118).
On November 11 (Japan time), as the result of statements made by Foreign
Minister Togo to him on October 26 (Japan time) (ex. 1, p; 91), the
British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, called on the Foreign
Minister upon instructions from the British Foreign Office and urged the
desirability of a supreme effort to reach an agreement with the United
States, saying that when the point of actual negotiations was reached
the British Government would be ready to join in seeking an agreement
(ex. 1, pp. 117-118; ex. 158). Secretary Hull was informed of the
instructions to the British Ambassador in Tokyo during a conversation
with Lord Halifax on November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 158). During the
conversation between Foreign Minister Togo and Sir Robert Craigie, the
Foreign Minister went to great lengths to convince the British
Ambassador how critical the situation was, saying that in the view of
the Japanese Government the negotiations had reached the final phase,
that the Imperial Government had made its " maximum concessions," and
that if the United States refused to accept those terms and sign the
agreement "within a week to ten days," it would be "useless" to continue
the negotiations, as the Japanese domestic political situation would
permit "no further delays in reaching a decision." He emphasized this
latter point in his report of the conversation to Ambassador Nomura,
saving that it was "absolutely impossible that there be any further
delays," that while there were indications that the United States
Government was "still under the impression that the negotiations are in
the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging
opinions," as far as Tokyo was concerned, "this is the final phase," and
expressed the "fervent" hope that Ambassador Nomura would do-
"everything in (his) power to make them realize this fact and bring
about an agreement at the earliest possible moment (ex. 1, p. 119)."
At the meeting between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura on November
12 (Washington time), the Ambassador said that his new Government had
asked him to emphasize its desire to expedite a
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page
351
settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult, people
were becoming impatient and a session of the Diet was impending. He
expressed the hope that "within a week or ten days" some agreement could
be reached. Secretary Hull commented that the matters submitted on
November 10 were being worked on as rapidly as possible, and that as
soon as a good basis had been reached in the exploratory conversations
the United States could then approach the Chinese Government and sound
out their attitude. He had previously handed to the Ambassador a
document setting forth his general ideas relating to mutual conciliation
between Japan and China. In response to a question from Minister
Wakasugi, who was also present, Secretary Hull hinted that Japan and
China might be "brought together" by the United States, but did not say
in so many words that the United States would mediate between them. The
conversation ended with Secretary Hull expressing the hope that he might
have something by way of comment on the Japanese proposals on November
14 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 722-726). According to Ambassador Nomura's
report to Tokyo, Secretary Hull also indicated that the British and the
Dutch were being informed generally of the nature of the conversations,
and that if a basis for negotiations should be worked out, it was
possible that they might sign with the United States, although the
Secretary "could not guarantee this" (ex. 1, p. 120). Ambassador Nomura
told the Foreign Minister he was not "satisfied with their attitude
toward taking up negotiations," and he sent Minister Wakasugi to see one
of Mr. Hull's advisors the following day to press for an early decision.
During that conversation, Mr. Wakusugi said that the public in Japan was
becoming impatient "and almost desperate," and that he hoped for a
clear-cut answer the next day as to whether the United States would
accept or not the Japanese proposal of September 25 as modified through
November 10, or desired changes therein, or whether the United States'
proposal of June 21 was its final proposal (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 729-
731; ex. 1, pp. 123-125). Similar representations concerning the need
for immediate agreement were made to Ambassador Grew on November 12
(Japan time), including statements that the negotiations had reached
their final phase, that Japan had made the greatest possible
concessions, and that "a very critical and dangerous state of affairs
will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in successfully
concluding the negotiations" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 719-722).
Secretary Hull testified that:
"during those early days in October, it looked more and more like they
were prepared to, and were intending to, adhere to their policies * * *
the situation floated along until Tojo's government came into power,
about the 16th, I think, of October * * * and the Konoye Government
fell.
"While they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the
conversations, we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of
duplicity and double dealing, and the real purpose was to go forward
more energetically with their plans, as was indicated by numerous
demands on us to make haste, and statements that this matter could not
go on without something serious happening.
[Discontinuous text]
The impression we received, at least myself, and some others, was that
during those months they tried to prevail on this Government by
persuasion and threats and other methods to yield its basic principles,
so that Japan could maintain intact her policy and her continued course
of aggression and conquest (tr. 1178-1179) .
Page 352 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On November 14 (Japan time), although he knew that Ambassador Nomura had
scheduled a meeting with Secretary Hull for November 15 (Washington
time) at which proposal "A" would be further discussed Foreign Minister
Togo cabled the Ambassador the English text to be used in presenting
proposal "B", and told the Ambassador he would be notified when to
present that "absolutely final proposal" to the United States Government
(ex. 1, pp. 125-126). This message was translated and available in
Washington on November 14 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 126). The same
day Ambassador Nomura cabled the Foreign Minister a long report (No.
1090) in which, although he realized he would be "harshly criticized,"
he cautioned against precipitate action:
"I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.
"I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations,
and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite
patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must
tell you the following:
"1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American
Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part
either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their
command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are
contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.
2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of
preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward;
they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather
than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they
believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It
is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich
conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be
such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been
passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate
peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in
evidence.
"3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China,
and insofar as possible she is assisting Chiang. For the sake of peace
in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of
China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to
the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the
United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.
"4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese
Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are
regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any
case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers
are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and
closer with the Axis.
"5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence
and our lives it naturally follows that we will have to fight England
and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will
participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central
America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those
of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for
their economic existence on the United States, and must maintain a
neutrality partial thereto.
"6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory
or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do
not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out
till the end will be the victor.
"7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and
deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and
as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength
to the Pacific.
"Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German
and Italian Navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength
into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that
should the United States start warlike activities in the Atlantic, there
would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there
has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now
many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal
questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the
Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be
carried out through the Pacific area.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 353
"8. *Though I cannot be a hundred percent sure of the present situation
in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition
must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding
that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am
going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be
harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan
permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order
to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be
the best plan (ex. 1, pp. 127-129).*"
The Foreign Minister's reply came back promptly and unequivocally:
"For your Honor's own information.
1." I have read your #1090, and you may be sure that you have all my
gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but *the fate of our
Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days*, so please fight
harder than you ever did before.
"2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so
and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only
to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you
please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait
and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, *I am
awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the
question.* I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in
my #736, and there *will be no change.* Please try to understand that.
You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States
to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a
solution *on the basis of our proposals*, and do your best to bring
about an immediate solution (ex. 1 p. 137- ).*
The next day, November 15 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura called on
Secretary Hull and the Secretary handed the Ambassador a statement, in
writing, regarding the formula proposed by the Japanese Government on
November 10 (Washington time) for dealing with the question of
nondiscrimination in international trade. After noting that in its
proposal, the Japanese Government recognized
"the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial
relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China,
*on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied
uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well* (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
734),"
the statement suggested that the meaning of the condition attached by
the Japanese was not entirely clear. It was assumed that the Japanese
Government did not intend to ask the United States Government to accept
responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside its
sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with
the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the
consent and cooperation of all other governments. The statement then
reviewed the efforts of the United States over recent gears to reduce
tariff barriers, and suggested that similar action by Japan would be a
"long forward step" toward the objective set forth in the Japanese
proposal. The need for the proviso noted above was then questioned, and
it was suggested that the proviso might well be omitted. The statement
was accompanied by a draft of a proposed joint United States-Japanese
declaration on economic policy, which Secretary Hull told Minister
Wakasugi constituted the United States reply to the Japanese proposal on
the question of nondiscrimination in international trade (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 731-737).
Ambassador Nomura then stated that his Government regarded the
conversations as having progressed to the stage of formal negotiations.
In reply to this, Secretary Hull said that until the conversations had
reached a point where he could call in the British, the Chinese, and the
Dutch and say that there was a basis for negotiation, the conversations
were exploratory. He pointed out that whereas the United States proposal
of June 21 made it clear that the settlement under discussion related to
the entire Pacific area, the proposal the
Page 354 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
previous Japanese Government had submitted on September 27 narrowed the
application of the proposals regarding economic nondiscrimination and
peaceful intent to the southwestern Pacific, and he then requested that
the new Japanese Government give assurances on that point. He said that
it would be difficult for him to go to the British and the Dutch and say
that Japan was willing to enter upon a peaceful program but at the same
time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany. The
Secretary said that if the United States made an agreement with Japan
while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call
upon Japan to go to war with us, this would cause "so much turmoil in
the country that he might be lynched." He asked the Ambassador whether
the United States Government could assume that if the Japanese
Government entered into an agreement with it the Tripartite Pact would
become a "dead letter." When Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether this was an
answer to the Japanese proposal on the question of Japan's relations
under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull said the United States would
be better able to reply after receiving an answer to the question he had
just raised. Ambassador Nomura said he was afraid the American
Government did not trust the Japanese Government, though there was no
material difference between the policies of the new Government and the
previous Government. Secretary Hull said that the new Japanese
Government seemed to be taking the attitude that the United States
Government must reply "at once" to their points, and that he did not
think that his Government
"should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese
Government under circumstances where the United States had been pursuing
peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government had been
violating law and order (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 734)."
He concluded by saying that when he had heard further from the new
Japanese Government regarding its peaceful intentions, and when the
question of nondiscrimination could be cleared up as suggested in the
proposals he had handed to Ambassador Nomura during the meeting, and
also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that some solution
could be reached on the question of stationing troops in China. The
Secretary emphasized at the same time that he did not desire any delay
and that he was working as hard as he could to bring about a wholly
satisfactory and broad settlement. It was agreed that there should be a
further meeting after Ambassador Nomura had received instructions from
his Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 731-734; ex. 1, p. 132).
In his report of this meeting to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura said that he
had told Mr. Hull he felt his Government would be "very disappointed"
over these replies. He continued: -1
"Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did
clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems,
although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They
harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and
apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion
(ex. 1, p. 137)."
There is no evidence before the Committee indicating that at that time
Ambassador Nomura had any knowledge that the Japanese naval striking
force had already started assembling for the attack on Pearl Harbor.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 355
THE TOJO CABINET REFUSES TO CONSIDER ANY SUGGESTION LESS FAVORABLE TO
JAPAN THAN ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"
(November 18-19, 1941)
Ambassador Kurusu reached Washington on November 15 (Washington time)
(tr. 1133). On the morning of November 17 (Washington time), with
Ambassador Nomura, he called on Secretary Hull prior to their meeting
with President Roosevelt. After he had been introduced, Ambassador
Kurusu said, among other things, that he was fully assured of Premier
Tojo's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United States, and
that Premier Tojo was optimistic regarding the possibility of settling
the differences in respect to nondiscrimination in international trade
and Japan's attitude toward the European war, but felt that there were
greater difficulties in the question of withdrawing Japanese troops from
China. Before the meeting with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura
handed Secretary Hull two documents which he said the Japanese
Government was submitting in response to the questions that had been
raised at the conference on November 12 regarding Japan's peaceful
intentions and the scope of the proposed understanding between the two
Governments (ex. 29, vol. It, pp. 738-739).
At the meeting at the White House, Ambassador Kurusu was formally
received by President Roosevelt. The conversation was largely devoted to
a discussion of the relation of Japan and the United States to the war
in Europe and to the China problem. Concerning the latter the President
said that at a suitable stage the United States would, so to speak,
"introduce" Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with
the remaining adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been
determined. Secretary Hull explained at length that America's military
preparations were for defense before it was too late, that the United
States was on the defense in the present Pacific situation and that
Japan was the aggressor. The conference ended with the understanding
that both Ambassadors would see Secretary Hull the next morning (ex. 29,
vol. II, pp. 740-743).
At that meeting at the White House no effort was made by either side to
solve the three major points of difference between the two countries,
and there is no evidence before the Committee of any contact between
representatives of the two Governments on the afternoon of November 17
(Washington time). However, as Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo the
next day (No. 1135), that evening the two Japanese Ambassadors "went to
call on a certain Cabinet member." "This," they cabled the Foreign
Minister, "is what he told us":
"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and
the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no
ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the
great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle
approve of a Japanese American understanding. If Japan would now do
something real, such as evacuating French Indo-China, showing her
peaceful intentions, the way would be open for us to furnish you with
oil and it would probably lead to the re-establishment of normal trade
relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so
long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the
Americans (ex. 1, p. 154)."
356 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There are indications in the record before the Committee that this
meeting between the two Japanese Ambassadors and a member of
President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening before their meeting
with Secretary Hull was more than a coincidence. Under Secretary
Welles testified before the Committee in another connection that he
had been told by Secretary Hull "and other individuals" that Mr.
Frank Walker, then Postmaster General and as such a member of
President Roosevelt's Cabinet, was "negotiating" with the Japanese
and that he thought Mr. Walker "had conversations both with Admiral
Nomura and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well" (tr.
1319-1320). Furthermore, the record of outside telephone calls
through the White House switchboard shows that at 6:25 p. m. on
November 17, before the meeting of the two Japanese Ambassadors
with the "certain Cabinet member," Postmaster General Walker
talked with Secretary Hull, and that he also talked with Secretary
Hull at 9:22 o'clock the next morning, November 18 (Washington
time) before Secretary Hull's conference at 10:30 o'clock with the
two Ambassadors (ex. 179).
The suggestion made that evening by the Cabinet member that
some action by Japan to show her peaceful intentions, "such as
evacuating French Indochina," would open the way for the United States
to
relax its freezing orders was substantially the proposal made by the
two Ambassadors to Secretary Hull at their meeting with him at 10:30
the next morning. While at that meeting the greatest emphasis was
placed on the question of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite
Pact, during the discussion of this subject, after Secretary Hull had
pointed out that the American public would never understand an
agreement between Japan and the United States if Japan continued
to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura said that the
situation in the southwest Pacific was now critical, with the United
States and Great Britain reinforcing their armed forces in Singapore
and the Philippine Islands to counter Japan's sending troops to
French Indochina. He suggested that if this situation could now be
checked, if the tension could be relaxed, an atmosphere could be
created in which the talks could continue. Ambassador Kurusu then
said that the freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and
a feeling that Japan had to fight while it could; he said that what was
needed now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course.
Secretary Hull asked to what extent a relaxation of freezing would
enable ,Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that
"what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get
control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence."
Ambassador Nomura then asked whether there was any hope of a
solution some small beginning toward the realization of "our high
ideals" and continued by suggesting:
"*the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the
date in July when following the Japanese move into southern French
Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect.* [1] The
Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo
on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had
mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn
from
French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement
elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some
move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. *The
Secretary said
[1] While the Japanese move that precipitated the United States freezing
order was into *southern* French Indochina, Japanese troops had moved
into northern French Indochina in 1940.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page
357
that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long
way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan
was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes
of conquest.* The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of
fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first
step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the
Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered
by the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 750)."
Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu pursued their suggestion further
at a conference with Secretary Hull the next day, November 19
(Washington time). Ambassador Nomura told the Secretary that
they had reported to their Government the conversation of the
preceding day and were momentarily expecting instructions.
"The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador (Nomura) felt about the
possibilities. *The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the
suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed
before the Japanese moved into south Indochina in the latter part of
July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing
measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if
something could be done on his suggestion, it could serve to relieve
that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations.*
The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a
proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would
go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.
The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in
Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a
peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some
time.
"The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now
appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the
Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing
measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in
mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further
efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had not so
far diverged. The Ambassador agreed (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 751)."
In reporting to Tokyo on November 18 (Washington time) the
substance of their conversation with Secretary Hull on that day, the
two Japanese Ambassadors had, in fact, dispatched four separate
telegrams (ex. 1, pp. 146, 149, 151, 152), each of which outlined the
suggestion they had made, thereby indicating the importance the two
Ambassadors attached to it. The sending of four telegrams may also
have reflected the fact that they had already received from the Foreign
Minister the English text of proposal "B", which was far more drastic
than their suggestion and was, they knew, regarded in Tokyo as
Japan's "absolutely final proposal." Furthermore, they had been
told by the Foreign Minister that they would be notified when to
present it to Secretary Hull. The two final telegrams show that both
Japanese Ambassadors regarded a return to the status prior to freezing
as the only means to success in the negotiations. In his message
(No. 1133) Ambassador Kurusu said:
"In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think
there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in
harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that *as a stopgap for
the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires for a
"time limit" in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present deadlock,
ask them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for
assurance regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.*
"*In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested
the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July*, but in view of the
progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent
to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory
aside from French Indo-China as per Proposal "B" or for our promise in
vague terms of evacuation of troops from French Indo-China * * * Please
have your mind made up to this. I desire instructions re "time limit"
and * * * as we desire to press for a
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 358
speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at
once (ex. 1, pp. 151-152)."
In his message (No. 1134) to the Foreign Minister Ambassador Nomura
outlined at greater length what he and Ambassador Kurusu had in mind:
"In our conversations of today, *as a practical means of alleviating the
ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful
situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing
before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the
evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French
Indo-China.
"Hull, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan had clearly
demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain,
the Netherlands and other interested powers."
"In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the
American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in
China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal
situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the
Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the
Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather,
exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans
insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to
other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to
bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions.
In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of
successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B"
immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if
we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". *Therefore, looking at
it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to
presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a
practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of
goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in
Proposal "B", and then to try to proceed with the solution of other
questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced
that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.*
[Discontinuous text]
"The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not
interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises
in effect. *It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to
withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and
materials are made available to us.*"
"Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133
(ex. 1, pp. 152-3)."
The temporary arrangement suggested by the two Japanese Ambassadors was
summarily rejected by the Japanese Government in Tokyo. On November 19
(Japan time), in a message in which he referred to the Ambassadors'
messages No. 1133 and No. 1134 above, Foreign Minister Togo emphasized
that in the negotiations consent could be given only "within the scope
of the instructions of this office." He told Ambassador Nomura that
"the internal situation in our country is such *that it would be
difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-
China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act
will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that
would come up to the B proposal.* With the situation as urgent as it is
now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the
amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your
message, then to push on for an understanding.
"*The Ambassador (Kurusu) did not arrange this with us beforehand, but
made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting
the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result
in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore,
having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797, 800
and 801) will please present our B proposal of the Imperial Government,
and no further concessions can be made.*
*If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will
have to be broken off*; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth
your very best efforts (ex. 1, p. 155).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 359
Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister in Tokyo his
astonishment at the Japanese Government's unwillingness to consider
seriously the suggestion he and Ambassador Kurusu had made. His message
(No. 1136), dated November 19 (Washington time) follows in full:
"I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the
Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation
and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and
the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality.
There are now three ways which the Empire might take
"(1) Maintain the status quo.
"(2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.
"(3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression arrangement.
"No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war
preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a
state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In
other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs
from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.
"No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the
present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our
objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. *My #1134 of
yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by
the government is beyond my power of comprehension*, but as I view it,
the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China
incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an
opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a
large scale. *I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary
"truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude
to greater achievements to come later.*
"I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary
to my message of yesterday (ex. 1, p. 158)."
In a separate message Ambassador Nomura requested the Foreign Minister
to "convey the above (message) to the Prime Minister" (ex. 1, p. 158).
In reply to this Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura
on November 20 (Japan time) that:
"under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested by
you, as we have stated in our message, would not suffice for saving the
present situation.*"
"We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock *except for you to push
negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our
#798.* Please understand this. *The Premier also is absolutely in
accord with this opinion* (ex. 1, p. 160)."
Message No. 798 referred to in the next preceding paragraph was the
message the Foreign Minister had sent on November 19 (Japan time) which
rejected Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for a "provisional arrangement"
and instructed him to present proposal "B," the Japanese Government's
"absolutely final proposal."
Foreign Minister Togo's message of November 20 (Japan time), which thus
finally and conclusively rejected the suggestion made by Ambassadors
Nomura and Kurusu, was sent not only after the Foreign Minister had
received the Ambassadors' four telegrams of November 18 (Washington
time), including No. 1133 and No. 1134 quoted in part above, but also
after the Foreign Minister had received Ambassador Nomura's message No.
1135 of the same date, reporting on the meeting of the two Ambassadors
with the member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening of
November 17 (Washington time). Consequently, the record before the
committee shows that the Japanese Government, including Premier Tojo,
refused to consider the provisional arrangement suggested by Ambassadors
Nomura and
Page 360 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Kurusu with knowledge not only that Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss
it with the British and the Dutch thus indicating, in the light of his
prior statements, that he believed a basis for negotiations had been
suggested by the two Ambassadors but with the further knowledge that
practically the same suggestion had been made to Ambassadors Nomura and
Kurusu by a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet.
The seriousness with which the Japanese Government regarded the stage
that had now been reached in the negotiations is evidenced by the fact
that on November 15 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Office sent out a
circular message to its officials abroad, including those in Washington,
prescribing "the order and method of destroying the code machines in the
event of an emergency" (ex. 1, p. 137). Four days later the Foreign
Office sent out circular messages establishing the so-called "winds
code," to be used in case of an emergency and the cutting off of
international communications. The receipt of a message implementing this
code was to be the signal to "destroy all code papers, etc." (Ex. 1, pp.
154-155). Those two messages were sent from Tokyo before Japan's
"absolutely final proposal" was presented to Secretary Hull, and appear
to have been the first Japanese messages intercepted which dealt with
the destruction of codes, code machines, et cetera.
JAPAN DELIVERS ITS ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND
DEMANDS AN AGREEMENT ON THAT BASIS
(November 20, 1941)
On November 20 (Washington time), Thanksgiving Day, Ambassadors Nomura
and Kurusu called at the State Department. Ambassador Kurusu told
Secretary Hull that they had referred to their Government the suggestion
Ambassador Nomura had made at the meeting 2 days before for a return to
the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into southern
French Indochina in July. He said that both he and Ambassador Nomura had
anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in
moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the
Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal "on that
basis." He said that the Japanese proposal represented an amplification
of the suggestion Ambassador Nomura had made (ex. 29 vol. II, p. 753)
The proposal which Ambassador Kurusu then read and handed to Secretary
Hull was the second formula, proposal "B," approved at the Imperial
Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) as a "last effort to
prevent something happening." In his messages to Ambassador Nomura,
Foreign Minister Togo had described it as "an ultimatum" (ex. 1, p. 99),
as "our absolutely final proposal" (ex. 1, p. 99), and as "our last
possible bargain" (ex. 1, p. 93). As originally drawn up and approved,
proposal "B" had consisted of four provisions, each of which was
contained in the Japanese proposal of November 20 (ex. 1, pp. 97,99; ex.
29, vol. II, pp. 755-756). "If necessary," those four provisions were to
be supplemented by others dealing with the three points previously at
issue in the conversations i. e., the evacuation of troops from China
and French Indochina, the Tripartite Pact, and nondiscrimination in
international trade. In the English text of proposal "B" cabled to
Ambassador Nomura on November
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 361
14 (Japan time), specific provisions covering those three points were
added to the original four provisions (ex. 1, p. 126). However, the
Foreign Minister's instructions to Ambassador Nomura on November 19
(Japan time) to present proposal "B" had also directed him to delete the
provisions dealing with nondiscrimination in international trade and the
Tripartite Pact, leaving only the provision relating to evacuation of
troops in addition to the four provisions approved on November 5 (Japan
time) (ex. 1, p. 156). But whereas the formula concerning the evacuation
of troops which Ambassador Nomura had presented to Secretary Hull on
November 7 (Washington time) had covered the evacuation of Japanese
troops from both China and French Indochina, the provision contained in
the Japanese proposal of November 20 covered the evacuation of Japanese
troops from French Indochina only. To this, possibly with an eye to the
suggestion made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on November 18,
the Japanese Government had added a provision for the transfer of their
troops from southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina "upon
the conclusion of the present arrangement." [1]
As read and delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Kurusu, the
Japanese proposal follows in full:
"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern
Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-
China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present
"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration (If peace
between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in
the Pacific area.
"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to
remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of
the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final
agreement.
"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a
view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which
the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.
"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to
restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the
freezing of the assets.
"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required
quantity of oil.
"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such
measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the
restoration of general peace between Japan and China (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 755-756).
When Ambassador Kurusu handed the Japanese proposal to him Secretary
Hull said that he would examine and study it sympathetically. Secretary
Hull referred to the fact that the United States was supplying aid to
both Great Britain and China, and indicated that until Japan made it
perfectly clear that her policy was one of peace it would be impossible
to cease aiding China. However Ambassador Kurusu observed in connection
with paragraph 5 of the proposal that it "might be interpreted to mean
that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that
negotiations were started." (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 753-755.)
In his testimony before the Committee Secretary Hull summarized the
Japanese note of November 20 in these words:
[1] Secretary Hull testified that the conditional offer of the Japanese
"to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was
meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern
Indochina within a day or two and furthermore they placed no limit on
the number of troops they might continue to send there." (Tr. ;4261.)
Page 362 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to
Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing
measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China and
for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese
government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed
forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no
limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into
Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until
after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the
establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there
were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into
southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there
were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh
Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to
the north of Indochina for example, China and the Soviet Union. The
proposal contained no Provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and
to revert to peaceful courses (tr. 1137-38)."
It is now known that the Japanese note of November 20, was in fact, a
restatement in more peremptory terms of Japan's "minimum demands"
determined at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on September 6 (Japan
time). As applied to the United States, the three major Japanese
"demands" decided upon at that Imperial Conference were, that the United
States would not "intervene in or obstruct a settlement by Japan of the
China Incident", i. e., would cease all aid to China; that the United
States would "take no action in the Far East which offers a threat to
the defense of the Empire"; and that the United States would " cooperate
with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials" (ex. 179,
Konoye Memoirs, pp. 77-78). In an intercepted message to Ambassador
Nomura which was translated and available in Washington on November 24
(Washington time), Foreign Minister Togo said:
"our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of
Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American
petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p.
172)."
Secretary Hull testified that the Japanese must have known that their
proposal was
"an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 or 5 years
exploration of each others situations and attitudes (tr. 1181)."
He continued
"To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly
unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan
in
Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with
Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the
United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have
meant
abject surrender of our position under intimidation (tr. 1140)."
Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, as well as other high officials
of the Government, not only knew from the intercepted Japanese messages
already mentioned that the note the Japanese delivered on Thanksgiving
Day, November 20, was their "absolutely final proposal," they also knew
from the same source that the Japanese Government had fixed November 25
(Japan time) as the dead line by which the written agreement of the
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to its demands were to
be obtained. On November 22 (Washington time), the following intercepted
message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura was translated
and available in Washington:
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my
#736 (November 25). You should know this, however, I know you are
working hard. Stick"
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page
363
"to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to
bring about the solution we desire. *There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by
the 26th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your
conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the
29th, (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes
can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and
the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it that the dead line
absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going
to happen.* Please take this into your careful consideration and work
harder than you ever have before (ex. 1, p. 165)."
Even with four added days of grace, the situation was, Secretary Hull
testified,
"critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired
to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution
and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this
country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need for time to
prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a show-
down.
"There the situation stood the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in
their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.
"The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically
vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws (tr. 1140)."
Neither Secretary Hull nor President Roosevelt, nor any of their
advisors, knew, however, that almost simultaneously with the delivery in
Washington of the Japanese ultimatum of November 20, the Imperial
Japanese General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered the commander in
chief of the Japanese combined fleet to direct the Japanese naval
striking force, already assembling in a harbor in northern Japan, to
"advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness" for the
attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 437).
THE UNITED STATES REPLIES
(November 26, 1941)
The United States reply was handed to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in
the late afternoon on November 26 (Washington time), 6 days after the
delivery of the Japanese ultimatum (tr. 1147). Those 6 days were a
period of intense activity, involving not only the highest officials in
the United States Government but also the highest officials of the
British, Dutch, Australian, and Chinese Governments.
From time to time Secretary Hull had told the Japanese Ambassadors that
when his conversations with them got beyond the exploratory stage he
would talk with the representatives of the British, Dutch, and Chinese
Governments. On November 18 (Washington time), after the Japanese
Ambassadors suggested a return to the status prior to the freezing
orders in July, Secretary Hull told them he would consult the British
and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
750). Immediately after that conference, Secretary Hull requested the
British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, to call on him. Secretary Hull's
memorandum of his conversation with the Minister is as follows:
"I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking
Japanese representatives, including Mr. Kurusu, who is here for the
purpose of carrying on conversations with this Government. I added that
the conversation related to the question of a proposed peaceful
settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing was agreed upon
at this meeting and that the discussion included the subject of two
opposing policies of conquest by force on the one hand and a
364 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
policy of peace, law, and order on the other. I went on to say that the
three main points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in
former conversations with Ambassador Nomura, namely, the bringing of
Japanese troops out of China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of
commercial policy, were discussed at length; but that the Japanese made
no concessions on the troop matter or on the matter of the Tripartite
Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally inquired whether a
brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out that would
enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of
peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea
of Japan's coming out of China. They said while the United States and
maybe Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be
so disposed on consultation, would to a partial extent relax embargoes
on exports to Japan, Japan on its part would correspondingly take steps
in the direction of a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating
its public opinion in support of such a policy during the next few
months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a
general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually
developed and public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more
satisfactorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us, on the
more difficult questions such as removing their troops from China and
the Tripartite Pact. They did not, however, make any definite
commitments as to just how far they could comply with our position with
respect to these two points."
"I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese
that if their Government cared to present something on this point. I
would give it consideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of
consideration, but that I could make no promise, and that if it should
be deemed feasible, I would confer with the British, the Dutch, the
Chinese and the Australians about any phase of the matter in which they
would be interested to which they would give consideration. I also said
to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a peaceful
policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far
in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might
need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated (ex. 168)."
The next day the Australian and Netherlands Ministers called separately
on Secretary Hull, at his request, and to each he gave the substance of
his talk with the British Minister (ex. 168).
Before turning to a discussion of the preparation of the United States'
reply to the Japanese note of November 20, it is important to recall
briefly the evidence before the Committee of the consideration given
earlier in November to-
"the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement with the Japanese
to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a
breakdown in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a
subsequent general agreement (Hull, tr. 1128)."
At the Joint Board meeting on November 3 (Washington time) which
followed the conferences called by Secretary Hull to determine whether
"the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings"
by the United States to Japan as urged by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
General Marshall had expressed the view that
"the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions
which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be
a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions (ex.
16)."
The Joint Board had decided that the War and Navy Departments would
prepare a memorandum for President Roosevelt which would, among other
things, oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan as urged by the
Generalissimo advocate State Department action to put off hostilities
with Japan as long as possible, and suggest that an agreement be made
with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.
However, the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark
actually submitted to President Roosevelt on November 5 contained only
the first of the Joint Board's
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page
365
recommendations; no reference was made in the memorandum to the second
or third points recommended by the Board and mentioned above (ex. 16).
The day after the Marshall-Stark joint memorandum was given to President
Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson
"had an hour's talk alone with the President with regard to the Far
Eastern situation and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was
coming from Japan. The thing uppermost in his mind was how to gain
more
time (tr. 14386-14387)."
In his notes of that talk with the President, Mr. Stimson recorded:
"The President outlined what he thought he might say. *He was trying to
think of something which would give us further time.* He suggested that
he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement of armament
for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their
arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis (tr.;
14414)."
At the Cabinet meeting the next day, November 7, the President had heard
Secretary Hull's estimate of the situation in the Far East and had
polled the Cabinet as already described (tr. 14415). On November 10,
during his talk with Ambassador Nomura, the President had made reference
to a "*modus vivendi*," and after this meeting, in his report to Tokyo,
Ambassador Nomura had said he intended to find out whether the President
referred to "possibly, a provisional agreement" (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
718; ex. 1, p. 11G). Again, in his report to Tokyo of the meeting
with
President Roosevelt on November 17, Ambassador Nomura had commented
that, in connection with a remark by the President that the United
States desired to preserve peace in the Pacific,
"I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind (ex. 1, p.
139)."
It was on the evening of the same day that the two Japanese Ambassadors
had called on a member of the President's Cabinet and had been told that
the President "was very desirous of an understanding between Japan and
the United States," and if Japan would do something real to show her
peaceful intent, "such as evacuating French Indo-China," the way would
be open "for us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to
the re-establishment of normal trade relations" (ex. 1, p. 154).
Exhibit 18 before the Committee includes the following undated, penciled
memorandum in President Roosevelt's handwriting:
"6 months
"1. U. S. To resume economic relations some oil and rice now more later.
"2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or
any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).
"3 Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact if U. S. gets into
European war.
"4 U. S. to *introduce* Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to
take no part in their conversations.
"Later on Pacific agreements. (Ex. 18). [Italics in original.]"
Attached to the President's memorandum, which was obtained from the
files of the State Department, is a cover sheet on which appears the
following typewritten note: "Pencilled memorandum given by the President
to the Secretary of State (not dated but probably written shortly after
November 20, 1941)" (ex. 18). However, the fact that the memorandum
suggests only that Japan should not be permitted to send "more troops to
Indochina or Manchurian Border," whereas by November 18 the Japanese
Ambassadors were suggesting to Secre-
Page 366 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tary Hull the withdrawal of Japanese troops from at least southern
French Indochina, would seem to indicate that the memorandum may have
been written by the President before the latter date.
Likewise, since early in November the State Department had been giving
intensive study to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement,
knowing that
"The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to
keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to
prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We
considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or
keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the
integrity of American principles (Hull, tr. 1128)."
Two of those suggestions were used in preparing the United States' reply
to the Japanese note of November 20. On November 11 (Washington time),
the Far Eastern Division of the State Department had submitted to
Secretary Hull a draft of a proposal intended to serve as a
"transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not
only to continue the conversations pending the advent of a more
favorable situation, even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to,
but also to provide the entering wedge toward a comprehensive settlement
of the nature sought providing the proposal is accepted by Japan and
provided further that China is able to obtain satisfactory terms from
Japan (ex. 18)."
This draft proposal consisted of two parts, the first of which contained
a statement of principles and mutual pledges with respect to economic
relations which followed closelythe lines of the counterproposals made
to the Japanese on several prior occasions beginning in April. The
second part contemplated immediate Japanese-Chinese negotiations during
which there would be an armistice between those countries and the United
States would hold in abeyance the shipment of supplies of a military
character to China and Japan would not increase or supply its military
forces in China and French Indochina. Upon the conclusion of a peace
settlement between Japan and China the United States was to negotiate
with both China and Japan for the resumption of normal trade relations
(ex. 18).
On November 18 (Washington time), Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
sent to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull a draft of a proposed
comprehensive settlement between Japan and the United States (ex. 168).
This draft was revised in the Far Eastern Division of the State
Department the same day and copies of the revised draft entitled
"Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and
Japan," were sent at once to General Marshall and Admiral Stark for
their consideration (ex. 18). As revised, the proposal set forth in
summary form various steps "proposed" to be taken by the United States
and Japanese Governments, respectively (ex. 18). The evidence before the
Committee shows that on the same day, November 19, Secretary Hull had
two meetings with Admiral Schuirmann, through whom the State Department
maintained liaison with the Navy Department (tr. 1173), and that a
conference attended by Admiral Stark for the Navy Department and by
General Gerow for the War Department (General Marshall was out of town)
was held at the State Department on the morning of November 21
(Washington time) at which the "Outline" was discussed. At that
conference Secretary Hull requested both Admiral Stark and General Gerow
to
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page
367
submit their comments on the "Outline" from the military and navaI
standpoint (ex. 18).
This they did the afternoon of the same day, November 21
(Washington.time). In his memorandum General Gerow said that he believed
General Marshall would concur in the views which he expressed concerning
the "Outline" and advised Secretary Hull that on the basis of a hasty
study War Plans Division saw "no objection to its use as a basis for
discussion." He said that
"the adoption of its provisions would attain *one of our present major
objectives-the avoidance of war with Japan.* Even a temporary peaee in
the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the
Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material
assistanee to the British both of which are highly important.
"The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to
all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. *War Plans
Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the suceess of
our war effort in Europe that we reach a *modus vivendi* with Japan*
(ex. 18)."
General Gerow suggested the deletion from the "Outline" of a provision
which would require Japan to withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria
except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided Russia
withdrew all her troops from her far eastern front except for an
equivalent remainder, on the ground that such a provision would probably
be unacceptable to Russia. He requested that the War Department be given
an opportunity to consider the military aspects of any major changes
that might be made in the proposal (ex. 18).
In his memorandum, Admiral Stark objected to provisions in the "Outline"
which would place limitations on American naval forces in Pacific
waters, commit the United States to use its influence toward causing
Great Britain to cede Hong Kong to China, and require Japan to sell to
the United States a specified tonnage of merchant vessels. He agreed
with General Gerow that the provision concerning the withdrawal of
Japanese troops in Manchuria should be deleted. He made several
suggestions regarding the phrasing of other provisions, and ended his
memorandum with the comment that while the provisions of the "Outline"
might be assumed to abrogate the Tripartite Pact on the part of Japan,
it would be helpful if that could be specifically stated (ex. 18).
The following day, November 22 (Washington time), there was completed in
the State Department the first draft of a counterproposal in reply to
the Japanese note of November 20. This draft counterproposal was in two
sections. The first section contained a proposed *modus vivendi*. As an
alternative to the Japanese proposals of November 20, and was prefaced
by a brief statement of the circumstances leading to its preparation.
Revised drafts of this section were prepared on November 24 and 25. From
November 22 to November 26 the *modus vivendi* project was discussed and
given intensive consideration within the State Department, by President
Roosevelt and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy, including
Secretaries Stimson and Knox and General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The
*modus vivendi* was also discussed with the British, Australian,
Chinese, and Dutch Governments, principally through their diplomatic
representatives in Washington. Such revisions as were made in the
original draft of this section are discussed
Page 368 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in connection with the final draft of November 25, which is set forth in
full below.
The second section of the November 22 draft consisted of two parts. The
first part contained the statement of principles and mutual pledges with
respect to economic relations which had been prepared by the State
Department's Far Eastern Division on November 11. The second part
was
based primarily upon the "Outline" sent by the State Department to the
War and Navy Departments on November 19, modified, however, in
accordance with the suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Gerow
in their memoranda of November 21 to Secretary Hull mentioned above. The
changes made in this section in the succeeding drafts of November 24 and
November 25 were few in number and, as so modified, this section became
the reply to the Japanese note of November 20 which was handed by
Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors on November 26 (Washington
time). Secretary Hull testified that all who saw the *modus vivendi*
section also saw the section which became the United States reply of
November 26 (tr. 14363).
The final, November 25 (Washington time), draft of the *modus vivendi*
section was as follows:
"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the
Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months
informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a
settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area
based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing
among nations. These principles include theprinciple of inviolability
of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the
principle of non interference in the internal affairs of other
countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon
international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and
pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international
conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in
reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the
Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous
of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and
peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward
creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the
conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be
in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in
the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such
*modus vivendi* include as one of its provisions some initial and
temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and
normal intercourse between Japan and the United States.
"*On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary
of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken
respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the
United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to
accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain
features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the
fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under
consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is
committed.*
"The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute
to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to
afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the
Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad- auge program of
peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the
Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the
Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary *modus
vivendi*, as follows:
"MODUS VIVENDI
"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan,
both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their
national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace
throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs
therein.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 369
"2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they
have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force
into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern
or the northern Pacific area.
"3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed
forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace
those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to
the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval,
land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.
"The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the
position of the Government of the United States with regard to the
presence of foreign troops in that area.
"4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify
the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the
extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the
United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their
peoples:
"(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the
sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the
purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at
Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese
obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds
in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is
understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of
which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the
adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United
States.
"(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:
(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade
here provided for and for such other
vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree
(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such
limitations as the appropriate
authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short
supply in the United States.
(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value per month.
(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such
limitations as the appropriate authorities may
prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the
United States.
(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to
Japan of petroleum, within the categories
permitted general export, upon
a monthly basis for civilian needs.
The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the
United States for such needs
will be determined after consultation
with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood
that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the
operation of the fishing industry, the transport system,
lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other
civilian uses.
(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by
agreement between the two governments as it may appear to them
that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful
and equitable solution of
outstanding problems in the Pacific
area.
"5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the
application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the
extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the
United States as provided for in paragraph four above.
"6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach
the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those
Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph
four above.
"7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China,
the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in
reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the
Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions
and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and
exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice,
which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between
the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and
which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.
"8. This *modus vivendi* shall remain in force for a period of three
months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the
instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an
extension of the *modus vivendi* for a further period (Ex. 18.)"
Comparison of this final draft of the *modus vivendi* section and the
prior drafts of November 22 and November 24 shows that paragraphs
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