Secretary of War Henry Stimson's Do-Don't Warning -- "Hostile action possible", at American Buddha Online Library

SECRETARY OF WAR HENRY STIMSON'S DO-DON'T WARNING -- "HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE"

WAR WARNINGS

To General Short To Admiral Kimmel

Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat can not, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action at might jeopardize your defense. Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

DELIBERATELY CONFUSED MESSAGES

One message says negotiations have ended and the other says they may continue. The Navy message emphasizes conflict and the Army message avoiding conflict. The Navy message points attention away from Hawaii and mentions sabotage. The Army message says not to alarm the civilian population or disclose intent which means the lowest level of alert. The lowest level of alert was sabotage alert which specifically prevented attention to outside threat. The Army is ordered to do reconnaissance which it could not do because traitor Bloch had previously made them agree not to. The Navy plan implements War Plan WPL-46 ONLY, which forced Kimmel to use the few long-range patrol planes he had to scout the Marshall Islands to the SW.

The Army message forbids the first overt act. Those are the words of FDR accordinng to testimony by Marshall. They are also words that denote knowledge of the coming attack. What OVERT ACT do you think FDR was referring to? The order is to prevent sabotage, so it is not that. Since submarines were prevented from entering the harbor by a net, that leaves only one possibility - air attack. The words "overt act" prove that FDR knew Pearl Harbor was subject to attack.

The President's own commission on Pearl Harbor declared that the Hawaiian commanders needed to "consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings" because they were so confusing. These messages were held by the Roosevelt administration as sufficient warning to Hawaii both before and after December 7. No other defense was raised for denying IQ and not sending warnings to HI. The Navy Court and Army Board found them totally inadequate, as indeed they are. Churchill states that they were inadequate in GRAND ALLIANCE p 602. The premise of FDR's last defender Professor Wohlstetter in her 1962 book PH WARNING AND DECISION is that they are inadequate. Indeed they were meant to deceive. The best discussion of them is in Congress's Minority Report, sections 13-15. JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REPORT

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