SECRET UK EYES ONLY
IRAQ: OPTIONS PAPER
SUMMARY
Since 1991, our
objective has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which
does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbors, into the
international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur with
Saddam Hussein in power. As at least worst opinion, we have
supported a policy of containment which has been partially
successful. However:
* Despite
sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD, although our
intelligence is poor. Saddam has used WMD in the past and
could do so again if his regime were threatened, though
there is no greater threat now than in recent years that
Saddam will use WMD; and
* Saddam’s brutal
regime remains in power and destabilises the Arab and wider
Islamic world.
We have two
options. We could toughen the existing containment policy.
This would increase the pressure on Saddam. It would not
reintegrate Iraq into the international community.
The US
administration has lot faith in containment and is now
considering regime change. The end states could either be a
Sunni strongman or a representative government.
Tre [sic] three
options for achieving regime change are:
* covert support to
opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup;
* air support for opposition groups to mount an
uprising/coup; and
* a full-scale ground campaign.
These are not
mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural
precursors to Option 3. the greater investment of Western
forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the
greater the cost and the longer we would need to stay. the
only certain means to remove Saddam and his elite is to
invade and impose a new government. But this could involve
nation building over many years. Even a representative
government could seek to acquire WMD and build-up its
conventional forces, so long a Iran and Israel retain their
WMD and conventional armouries and there was no acceptable
solution to Palestinian grievances.
A legal
justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law
Officers advice, none currently exists. This makes moving
quickly to invade legally very difficult. We should
therefore consider a staged approach, establishing
international support, building up pressure on Saddam and
developing military plans. There is a lead time of about 6
months to a ground offensive.
CURRENT OBJECTIVES
OF UK POLICY
1 Within our
objectives of preserving peace and stability in the Gulf and
ensuring energy security, our current objectives towards
Iraq are:
* the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq which does not
possess WMD or threaten its neighbours, into the
international community. Implicitly this cannot occur with
Saddam in power; and
* hence, as the least worst option, we have supported
containment of Iraq, by constraining Saddam’s ability to
re-arm or build up WMD and to threaten his neighbours.
2 Subsidiary
objectives are:
* Preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq;
* improving the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people;
* protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq;
*sustaining UK/UK co-operation, including, if necessary by
moderating US policy; and
* maintaining the credibility and authority of the Security
Council.
HAS CONTAINMENT
WORKED?
3 Since 1991, the
policy of containment has been partially successful;
* Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme;
* Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its conventional
arsenal to pre-Gulf War levels;
* ballistic missile programmes have been severely
restricted;
Biological weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes
have been hindered;
* No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq
have given some protection to the Kurds and the Shia.
Although subject to continuing political pressure, the Kurds
remain autonomous; and
* Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his
neighbours.
4 However:
* Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction,
although our intelligence is poor. Iraq has up to 20
650km-range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are
capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work
for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km
continues. Iraq continues with the BW and CW programmed and,
if it has not already done so could produce significant
quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within
weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver
CBW by a variety of means, including is ballistic missile
warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing
nuclear programme. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could
do so again if his regime were threatened.
* Saddam leads a brutal regime, which impoverishes his
people. While in power Saddam is a rallying point for
anti-Western sentiment in the Arab and wider Islamic world,
and as such a cause of instability; and
* despite UN controls over Iraq’s oil revenue under Oil for
Food, there is considerable oil and other smuggling.
5 In this context,
and against the background of our desire to re-integrate a
law-abiding Iraq into the international community, we
examine the two following policy options:
* a toughening of the existing containment policy,
facilitate by 11 September; and
* regime change by military means: a new departure which
would require the construction of a coalition and a legal
justification.
TOUGHENING
CONTAINMENT
6 This would
consist of the following elements:
* full implementation of all relevant UNSCRs, particularly
687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). We should ensure that the Good
Review List (GRL) is introduced in May and that Russian
holds to its promise not to block. The signs are positive
but continuing pressure is needed. (The GRL focuses
sanctions exclusively on preventing shipments of WMD-related
and other arms, while allowing other business without
scrutiny. As such, it will greatly facilitate legitimate
Iraqi commerce under Oil for Food.);
* encourage the US not to block discussions to clarify the
modalities of Resolution 1284 once Russian agreement to the
GRL has been secured. We should take a hard-line on each
area for clarification - the purpose of clarification is not
to lower the bar on Iraqi compliance; but
* P5 and Security Council unity would facilitate a specific
demand that Iraq re-admit the UN inspectors. Our aim would
be to tell Saddam to admit inspectors or face the risk of
military action.
* push for tougher action (especially by the US) against
states breaking sanctions. This should not discriminate
between allies (Turkey), friends (UAE) and others
(especially Syria). It would put real pressure on Saddam
either to submit to meaningful inspections or to lash out;
* maintain our present military posture, including in the
NFZs, and be prepared to respond robustly to any Iraqi
adventurism; and
* continue to make clear (without overtly espousing regime
change) our view that Iraq would be better off without
Saddam. We could trail the rosy future for Iraq without him
in a ‘Contract with the Iraqi People’, although to be at all
credible, this would need some detailed work.
7 What could it
achieve:
* There will be greater pressure on Saddam. The GRL will
make sanctions more attractive to at least some of their
detractors. Improving implementation of sanctions would
reduce the regime’s illicit revenues; and
* the return of UN weapons inspectors would allow greater
scrutiny of Iraqi programmes and of Iraqi forces in general.
If they found significant evidence of WMD, were expelled or,
in face of an ultimatum, not re-admitted in the first place,
then this could provide legal justification for large-scale
military action (see below).
8 But:
* Some of the difficulties with the existing policy still
apply;
those states in breach of sanctions will want compensation
if they are to change tack;
* Saddam is only likely to permit the return of inspectors
if he believes the threat of large scale US military action
is imminent and that such concessions would prevent the US
from acting decisively. Playing for time, he would then
embark on a renewed policy of non co-operation; and
* although containment has held for the past decade, Iraq
has progressively increased it international engagement.
Even if the GRL makes sanctions more sustainable the
sanctions regime could collapse in the long-term.
9 Tougher
containment would not re-integrate Iraq into the
international community as it offers little prospect of
removing Saddam. He will continue with his WMD programmes,
destabilising the Arab and Islamic world, and impoverishing
his people. But there is no greater threat now that he
will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so
continuing containment is an option.
US VIEWS
10 The US has
lost confidence in containment. Some in government want
Saddam removed. The success of Operation Enduring Freedom,
distrust of UN sanctions and inspection regimes, and
unfinished business from 1991 are all factors.
Washington believes the legal basis for an attack on Iraq
already exists. Nor will it necessarily be governed by wider
political factors. The US may be willing to work with a much
smaller coalition than we think desirable.
REGIME CHANGE
11 In considering
the options for regime change below, we need to first
consider what sort of Iraq we want? There are two
possibilities:
* A Sunni military strongman. He would be likely to maintain
Iraqi territorial integrity. Assistance with reconstruction
and political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances
on abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human rights,
particularly of ethnic minorities. The US and other
militaries could withdraw quickly. However, there would then
be a strong risk of the Iraqi system reverting to type.
Military coup could succeed coup until an autocratic, Sunni
dictator emerged who protected Sunni interests. With time he
could acquire WMD; or
* a representative broadly democratic government. This would
be Sunni-led but within a federal structure, the Kurds would
be guaranteed autonomy and the Shia fair access to
government. Such a regime would be less likely to develop
WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive it
would require the US and others to commit to nation building
for many years. This would entail a substantial
international security force and help with reconstruction
OTHER FACTORS TO
CONSIDER: INTERNAL
12 Saddam has a
strong grip on power maintained through fear and patronage.
The security and intelligence apparatus, including the
Republican and Special Republican Guard, who protect the
regime to effectively are predominantly drawn from the Arab
Sunni minority (2-25 per cent of the population); many from
Tikrit like Saddam. They fear non-Sunni rule, which would
bring retribution and the end of their privileges. The
regime’s success in defeating the 1991 uprising stemmed from
senior Sunni officers looking into the abyss of Shia rule
and preserving their interests by backing Saddam. In the
current circumstances, a military revolt or coup is a remote
possibility.
13 Unaided, the
Iraqi opposition is incapable of overthrowing the regime.
The external opposition is weak, divided and lacks domestic
credibility. The predominant group is the Iraqi National
Congress (INC), an umbrella organisation led by Ahmad
Chalabi, a Shia and convicted fraudster, popular on Capitol
Hill. The other major group, the Iraqi National Accord
(INA), espouses moderate Arab socialism and is led by
another Shia, Ayad Allawi. Neither group has a military
capability and both are badly penetrated by Iraqi
intelligence. In 1996, a CIA attempt to stir opposition
groups ended in wholesale executions. Most Iraqis see the
INC/INA as Western stooges.
14 The internal
opposition is small and fractured on ethnic and sectarian
grounds. There is no effective Sunni Arab opposition. There
are 3-4m in northern Iraq. Most live in Kurdish Autonomous
Zone, established in 1991. The Kurds deploy at least 40,000
lightly armed militia but are divided between two main
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). These groups have an
interest in preserving the status quo and are more
interested in seeking advantage over the other than allying
against Saddam. Divide and rule is easy; in 196 the KDP
assisted the Iraqi Army’s expulsion of the PUK and Iraqi
opposition groups from Irbil.
15 The Kurds do not
co-operate with the Shia Arabs who form 60 per cent of the
population. The main Shia opposition group is the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), with
3-5,000 fighters, but it is tainted by Iranian support. Most
Shia would like to have a greater say in Iraqi government,
but not necessarily control: they do no want secession,
Islamic autonomy or Iranian influence.
REGIONAL
16 Iraq’s
neighbours have a direct interest in the country’s affairs.
Iran and Turkey, in particular, are wary of US influence and
oppose some opposition groups. Turkey, conscious of its
own restive Kurdish minority, will do anything to prevent
the establishment of a independent Kurdish state in northern
Iraq, including intervention. Iran, also with a Kurdish
minority, would also oppose a Kurdish state and is keen to
protect the rights of its co-religionists in the south (see
FCO paper on P5, European and regional view of possible
military action against Iraq, attached.)
17 We have looked
at three options for achieving regime change (we dismissed
assassination of Saddam Hussein as an option because it
would be illegal):
OPTION 1: COVERT
SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS
18 The aim would be
to bring down the regime by internal revolt, aided by the
defection or at least acquiescence of large sections of the
Army. A group of Sunni generals probably from within the
Republican Guard, might depose Saddam if they decided the
alternative was defeat. This option could be pursued by
providing covert intelligence, large scale financial and
Special Forces support to opposition groups. The Kurds would
be persuaded to unite and attack into northern Iraq, tying
down some Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, in a greater threat
to the regime, the Shia would rise up in the southern
cities, and in Baghdad.
19 This option also
has a very low prospect of success on its own. The
external opposition is not strong enough to overthrow Saddam
and would be rejected by most Iraqis as a replacement
government. The Kurds could only mount a very limited
offensive in the north. Mass uprisings in the south would be
unlikely. The US failure to support the 1991 uprising
remains vivid. The Republican Guard would move against any
opposition and any wavering regular Army units. There would
also be a high risk of US/coalition forces being captured.
The remaining elements of opposition could be eliminated,
buttressing Saddam and his reputation as Arab folk hero. On
the other hand, this option has never been pursued in a
concerted, single-minded way before and should not be
dismissed, at least as a possible precursor to Options 2 and
3.
OPTION 2: AN AIR
CAMPAIGN PROVIDING OVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS
LEADING TO A COUP OR UPRISING
20 The aim would be
to assist an internal revolt by providing strategic and
tactical air support for opposition groups to move against
the regime. Such support would disable Saddam’s military and
security apparatus. Suspected WMD facilities would also be
targeted. Substantial numbers of aircraft and munitions
would need to be built up in threatre over a period of
months. Any campaign would take several weeks at least
probably several months. Pressure on the regime could be
increased by massing ground and naval forces and threatening
a land invasion.
21 This option has
no guarantee of success. The build up of pressure might
persuade other Sunnis to overthrow Saddam and his family,
but there is no guarantee that another Sunni autocrat would
be better. Comparisons with Afghanistan are misleading.
Saddam’s military and security apparatus is considerable
more potent and cohesive. We are not aware of any Karzai
figure able to command respect inside and outside Iraq. Arab
states would only back the plan if they were sure Saddam
would be deposed. At least the co-operation of Kuwait would
be needed for the necessary military build-up. The Arab
street would oppose an air attack against Iraq, but
visibility of a popular uprising could calm Arab public
opinion.
OPTION 3: A GROUND
CAMPAIGN
22 The aim would be
to launch a full-scale ground offensive to destroy Saddam's
military machine and remove him from power. A pro-Western
regime would be installed which would destroy Iraq’s WMD
capability, make peace with Iraq’s neighbours and give
rights to all Iraqis, including ethnic minorities. As in the
Gulf War, this would need to be preceded by a major
air-offensive to soften up defences.
23 US contingency
planning prior to 11 September indicated that such a ground
campaign would require 200-400,000 troops. The numbers
would be roughly half those of 1991 because Iraqi forces are
now considerably weaker. Any invasion force would need
to pose a credible threat to Baghdad in order to persuade
members of the Sunni military elite that their survival was
better served by deserting to the coalition than staying
loyal to Saddam. Sufficient air assets would need three
months and ground forces at least four-five months to
assemble so on logistical grounds a ground campaign is not
feasible until autumn 2002. The optimal times to start
action are early spring.
24 From a purely
military perspective it would be very difficult to launch an
invasion from Kuwait alone. Carrier-based aircraft would not
be enough because of the need for land-based air-to-air
refuelling. To be confident of success, bases either in
Jordan or in Saudi Arabia would be required. However, a
wider and durable international coalition would be
advantageous for both military and political reasons.
Securing moderate Arab support would be greatly assisted by
the promise of a quick and decisive campaign, and credible
action by the US to address the MEPP.
25 The risks
include US and others military casualties. Any coalition
would need much tending over the difficult months of
preparation for an actual invasion. Iran, fearing further US
encirclement and that it will be invaded next will be
prickly but is likely to remain neutral. With his regime in
danger, Saddam could use WMD, either before or during an
invasion. Saddam could also target Israel as he did during
the Gulf War. Restraining Israel will be difficult. It would
try to pre-empt a WMD attack and has certainly made clear
that it would retaliate. Direct Israeli military
involvement in Iraq would greatly complicate coalition
management and risk spreading conflict more widely.
26 None of the
above options is mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2
would be natural precursors to Option 3. All options had
lead times. If an invasion is contemplated this autumn, then
a decision will need to be taken in principle six months in
advance. The greater investment of Western forces, the
greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the greater the
cost and the longer we would need to stay. Option 3 comes
closest to guaranteeing regime change. At this stage we
need to wait to see which option or combination of options
may be favoured by the US government.
27 But it should be
noted that even a representative government could seek to
acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces, so long as
Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional armouries.
LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS
28 A full opinion
should be sought from the Law Officers if the above options
are developed further. But in summary CONTAINMENT generally
involves the implementation of existing UNSCRs and has a
firm legal foundation. Of itself, REGIME CHANGE has no
basis in international law. A separate note by FCO Legal
Advisors setting out the general legal background and the
obligations in the relevant UN Resolutions is attached.
29 In the
judgement of the JIC there is no recent evidence of Iraq
complicity with international terrorism. There is therefore
no justification for action against Iraq based on action in
self-defence (Article 51) to combat imminent threats of
terrorism as in Afghanistan. However, Article 51 would
come into play if Iraq were about to attack a neighbour.
30 Currently,
offensive military action against Iraq can only be justified
if Iraq is held to be in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire
resolution, 687. 687 imposed obligations on Iraq with regard
to the elimination of WMD and monitoring these obligations.
But 687 never terminated the authority to use force mandated
in UNSCR 678 (1990). Thus a violation of 687 can revive the
authorisation to use force in 678.
31 As the
ceasefire was proclaimed by the Security Council in 687, it
is for the Council to decide whether a breach of obligations
has occurred. There is a precedent, UNSCR 1205 (1998),
passed after the expulsion of the UN inspectors, stated that
in doing so Iraq had acted in flagrant violation of its
obligations under 687. In our view, this revived the
authority for the use of force under 678 and underpinned
Operation Dessert Fox. In contrast to general legal
opinion, the US asserts the right of individual Member
States to determine whether Iraq has breached 687,
regardless of whether the Council has reached this
assessment.
32 For the P5 and
the majority of the Council to take the view that Iraq was
in breach of 687:
* they would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of
its obligations regarding WMD, and ballistic missiles. Such
proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale
activity. Current intelligence is insufficiently robust to
meet this criterion. Even with overriding proof China,
France and Russia, in particular, would need considerable
lobbying to approve or acquiesce in a new resolution
authorising military action against Iraq. Concessions in
other policy areas might be needed. However, many Western
states, at least, would not wish to oppose the US on such a
major issue; or
* if P5 unity could be obtained, Iraq refused to readmit UN
inspectors after a clear ultimatum by the UN Security
Council; or
* the UN inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found
sufficient evidence of WMD activity or were again expelled
trying to do so.
CONCLUSION
33 In sum, despite
the considerable difficulties, the use of overriding force
in a ground campaign is the only option that we can be
confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the
international community.
34 To launch such a
campaign would require a staged approach:
* winding up the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam
through tougher containment. Stricter implementation of
sanctions and a military build-up will frighten his regime.
A refusal to admit UN inspectors, or their admission and
subsequent likely frustration, which resulted in an
appropriate finding by the Security Council could provide
the justification for military action. Saddam would try to
prevent this, although he has miscalculated before;
* careful planning: detailed military planning on the
various invasion and basing options, and when appropriate
force deployment;
* coalition building: diplomatic work to establish an
international coalition to provide the broadest political
and military support to a ground campaign. This will need to
focus on China, France and particularly Russia who have the
ability to block action in the UN Security Council and on
the other Europeans. Special attention will need to be paid
to moderate Arab states and to Iran;
* incentives: as an incentive guarantees will need to be
made with regard to Iraqi territorial integrity. Plans
should be worked up in advance of the great benefits the
international community could provide for a post-Saddam Iraq
and its people. These should be published.
* tackling other regional issues: an effort to engage the US
in a serious effort to re-energise the MEPP would greatly
assist coalition building; and
*sensitising the public:
a media campaign to
warm of the dangers that Saddam poses and to prepare public
opinion both in the UK and abroad.
35 The US should be
encouraged to consult widely on its plans.
OVERSEAS AND
DEFENCE SECRETARIAT
CABINET OFFICE
8 MARCH “))” [sic]