CONFIDENTIAL
IRAQ: LEGAL
BACKGROUND
(i) Use of
Force:
(a) Security
Council Resolutions
(b) Self-defence
(c) Humanitarian Intervention
(ii) No Fly
Zones
(iii) Security
Council Resolutions relevant to the sanctions regime
(iv) Security
Council Resolutions relating to UNMOVIC
(i) Use of
Force: (a) Security Council Resolutions relevant to the
Authorisation of the Use of Force
1. Following
its invasion and annexation of Kuwait, the Security
Council authorised the use of force against Iraq in
resolution 675 (1990); this resolution authorised
coalition forces to use all necessary means to force
Iraq to withdraw, and to restore international peace and
security in the area. This resolution gave a legal basis
for Operation Desert Storm, which was brought to an end
by the cease-fire set out by the Council in resolution
687 (1991). The conditions for the cease-fire in that
resolution (and subsequent resolutions) imposed
obligations on Iraq with regard to the elimination of
WMD and monitoring of its obligations. Resolution 687
(1991) suspended but did not terminate the authority to
use force in resolutions 678 (1990).
2. In the UK’s
view a violation of Iraq’s obligations which undermines
the basis of the cease-fire in resolution 687 (1991) can
revive the authorisation to use force in resolutions 678
(1990). As the cease-fire was proclaimed by the
Council in resolution 687 (1991), it is for the Council
to assess whether any such breach of those obligations
has occurred. The US have a rather different view: they
maintain that the assessment of breach is for individual
member States. We are not aware of any other State which
supports this view.
3. The
authorisation to use force contained in resolution 678
(1990) has been revived in this way on certain
occasions. For example, when Iraq refused to cooperate
with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in 1997/8, a
series of SCRs condemned the decision as unacceptable.
In resolution 1205 (1998) the Council condemned Iraq’s
decision to end all cooperation with UNSCOM as a
flagrant violation of Iraq’s obligations under
resolution 687 (1991), and restated that the effective
operation of UNSCOM was essential for the implementation
of that Resolution. In our view these resolutions had
the effect of causing the authorisation to use force in
resolutions 678 (1991) to revive, which provided a legal
basis for Operation Desert Fox. In a letter to the
President of the Security Council in 1998 we stated that
the objective of that operation was to seek compliance
by Iraq with the obligations laid down by the Council
that the operation was undertaken only when it became
apparent that there was no other way of achieving
compliance by Iraq, and that the action was limited to
what was necessary to secure this objective.
4. The more difficult issue is whether we are still
able to rely on the same legal base for the use of force
more than three years after the adoption of resolution
1205 (1998). Military action in 1998 (and on previous
occasions) followed on from specific decisions of the
Council; there has now not been any significant decision
by the Council since 1998. Our interpretation of
resolutions 1205 was controversial anyway; many of our
partners did not think the legal basis was sufficient as
the authority to use force was not explicit. Reliance on
it now would be unlikely to receive any support.
USE OF FORCE:
(B) SELF-DEFENCE
5. The
conditions that have to be met for the exercise of the
right of self-defence are well known:
i) There
must be an armed attack upon a State or such an attack
must be imminent;
ii) The use of force must be necessary and other means
to reverse/avert the attack must be unavailable;
iii) The acts in self-defence must be proportionate and
strictly confined to the object of stopping the attack.
The right of
self-defence may only be exercised until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to ensure
international peace and security and anything done in
exercise of the right of self-defence must be
immediately reported to the Council.
6. For the
exercise of the right of self-defence there must be more
than “a threat”. There has to be an armed attack actual
or imminent. The development or possession of nuclear
weapons does not in itself amount to an armed attack;
what would be needed would be clear evidence of an
imminent attack. During the Cold War there was
certainly a threat in the sense that various States had
nuclear weapons which they might, at short notice
unleash upon each other. But that did not mean the mere
possession of nuclear weapons, or indeed their
possession in time of high tension or attempt to obtain
them, was sufficient to justify pre-emptive action. And
when Israel attacked an Iraqi nuclear reaction, near
Baghdad, on 7 June 1981 it was “strongly condemned” by
the Security Council (acting unanimously) as a
“military” attack .... in clear violation of the Charter
of the United Nations and the norms of international
conduct”.
USE OF FORCE:
(C) HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
7. In the UK
view the use of force may be justified if the action is
taken to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian
catastrophe. The limits to this highly contentious
doctrine are not clearly defined, but we would maintain
the the catastrophe must be clear and well documented,
that there must be no other means short of the use of
force which could prevent it, and that the measures
taken must be proportionate. this doctrine partly
underlies the very limited action taken by allied
aircraft to patrol the No Fly Zones in Iraq (following
action by Saddam to repress the Kurds and the Shia in
the early 90s), which involved occasional and limited
use of force by those aircraft in self-defence. The
application of this doctrine depends on the
circumstances at any given time, but it is clearly
exceptional.
(II) NO FLY
ZONES (NFZs)
8. The NFZs
over Northern and Southern Iraq are not established by
UN Security Council Resolutions. They were established
in 1991 and 1992 on the basis that they were necessary
and proportionate steps taken to prevent a humanitarian
crisis. Prior to the establishment of the Northern NFZ
the Security Council had adopted resolution 688 (1991)
on 5 April 1991 in which the Council stated that it was
gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi
civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including
most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which had led
to a massive refugee flow and that it was deeply
disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering
involved. The resolution condemned that repression of
the Iraqi civilian population and demanded that Iraq
immediately end the repression. In our view the purpose
of the NFZs is to monitor Iraqi compliance with the
provisions of resolution 688. UK and US air-craft
patrolling the NFZs are entitled to use force in self-defence
where such a use of force [sic] is a necessary and
proportionate response to actual or imminent attack from
Iraqi ground systems.
9. The US
have on occasion claimed that the purpose of the NFZs is
to enforce Iraqi compliance with resolutions 687 or 688.
This view is not consistent with resolution 687, which
does not deal with the repression of the Iraqi
population, or with resolution 688, which was not
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and does not
contain any provision for enforcement. Nor (as it is
sometimes claimed) were the current NFZs provided for in
the Safwan agreement, a provisional agreement between
coalition and Iraqi commanders of 3 March 1991, laying
down military conditions for the cease fire which did
not contain any reference to the NFZs.
(III) SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELEVANT TO THE SANCTIONS REGIME
10. The
sanctions regime against Iraq was established by
resolutions 661 (1990) of 8 August 1990, which,
following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, decides that
all states shall prevent the import into their
territories of any commodities originating in Iraq, the
sale or supply to Iraq of any commodities other than
medical supplies, and, in humanitarian circumstances,
food stuffs, and that Iraqi funds and financial
resources should be frozen. Resolution 661 remains in
force. The major exception to the sanctions regime is
the oil for food programme which was established by
resolution 986 (1993) by Iraq on condition that the
purchase price is paid into an escrow account
established by the UN Secretary-General, and the funds
to that account are used to meet the humanitarian needs
of the Iraqi people through the export of medicine,
health supplies, foodstuffs and materials and supplies
for essential civilian needs. The escrow account is also
used to fund the UN Compensation Commission and to meet
the operating costs of the UN, including those of
UNMOVIC (see below).
11. The oil for
food programme is renewed by the Security Council at
(usually) 6 monthly intervals, most recently by
resolution 1382 (211) of 29 November 2001. Under that
resolution the Council also decided that it would adopt,
by 13 May 2002, procedures which would improve the flow
of goods to Iraq, other than arms and other potential
dual use goods on a Good Review List. The US are
currently reviewing the final details of the list with
the Russians.
12. In
resolution 687 (1991) the Council decided that the
prohibition against the import of goods from Iraq should
have no further force when Iraq has completed all the
actions contemplated in paragraphs 8-13 of that
resolution concerning Iraq’s WMD programme. Iraq has
still not complied with this condition. Under paragraph
21 of resolution 687, the Council decided to review the
prohibition against the supply of commodities to Iraq
every 60 days in the light of the policies and practices
of the Iraqi government, including the implementation of
all the relevant resolutions of the Council, for the
purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift them.
These regular reviews are currently suspended as a
result of Iraqi noncompliance with the Council’s
demands.
13. The
intention of the Council to act in accordance with
resolution 687 on the termination of these prohibitions
has been regularly reaffirmed, including in resolution
1284 (1999). Paragraph 33 of that resolution also
contains a complex formula for the suspension of
economic sanctions against Iraq for renewable periods of
120 days, if UNMOVIC and the IAEA report cooperation in
all respects by Iraq in fulfilling work programmed with
those bodies for a period of 120 days after a reinforced
system of monitoring and verification in Iraq becomes
fully operational. Iraq has never complied with these
conditions.
(iv) SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO UNMOVIC
14. UNMOVIC was
established under resolution 687 (1991) (the ceasefire
resolution). UNMOVIC is to undertake the
responsibilities of the former Special Commission under
resolution 687 relating to the destruction of Iraqi CBW
and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150
kilometres and the on-going monitoring and verification
of Iraq’s compliance with these obligations. Like the
Special Commission, UNMOVIC is to be allowed
unconditional access to all Iraqi facilities, equipment
and records as well as to Iraqi officials. Under
paragraph 7 of resolution 1284 UNMOVIC and the IAEA were
given the responsibility of drawing up a work programme
which would include the implementation of a reinforced
system of ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) and
key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq,
which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi
compliance. There are currently no UNMOVIC personnel in
Iraq, and the reinforced OMV system has not been
implemented because of IRaq’s [sic] refusal to
cooperate.