THE TORTURE PAPERS:  THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB

Afterword

As this volume goes to press, additional materials on Abu Ghraib and new materials on Guantanamo are daily finding their way into the public arena via the media, human rights groups and indefatigable researchers. Included are a select few of those documents, brought to light by the American Civil Liberties Union. They include reports on detainee mistreatment and abuse and discussions among the FBI, the Department of Defense, and the White House.

Following the newly released ACLU documents is a statement from David Hicks, a detainee at Guantanamo. Hicks is an Australian citizen.

SECRET//NOFORN//20290625

INFO MEMO

S 0517/DR

June 25, 2004

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Subject: (S//NF) Alleged Detainee Abuse by TF 62-6 Personnel

(S//NF) During the afternoon of 24 June 2004, we were notified that DIA personnel serving with TF 6-26 in Baghdad had informed their ISG seniors of the following:

• (S//NF) Two DIA, Directorate for Human Intelligence (DIA/DH) interrogators/debriefers assigned to support TF 6- 26 (SOF) have observed:

  • Prisoners arriving at the Temporary Detention Facility in Baghdad with burn marks on their backs. Some have bruises, and some have complained of kidney pain.

  • One of the two DIA/DH interrogators/debriefers witnessed TF 6-26 officers punch a prisoner in the face to the point the individual needed medical attention. This record of treatment was not recorded by TF 6-26 personnel. In this instance, the debriefer was ordered to leave the room.

  • One DIA/DH interrogator/debriefer took pictures of the injuries and showed them to his TF 62-6 supervisor, who immediately confiscated them.

• (S//NF) TF 6-26 personnel have taken the following actions with regards to DIA/DH interrogators/debriefers:

  • Confiscated vehicle keys

  • Instructed them not to leave the compound without specific permission, even to get a haircut at the PX

  • Threatened them

  • Informed them that their e-mails were being screened

  • Ordered them not to talk to anyone in the US

• (S//NF) The two DH strategic debriefers assigned to TF 62-6 reported the above information to the Operations Officer.  He immediately contacted DIA IG Forward and asked that both individuals be interviewed.  The IG representative made the recommendation that VADM Church's group be immediately apprised in order to get this into official IG channels as the issue fell directly under its charter.  The Church IG Team senior investigating officer is conducting interviews of the interrogators/debriefers today.  The DIA IG was informed and concurred with this course of action.

• (S//NF) The ISG Operations Officer contacted and briefed the Director of the ISG, who was in Qatar attending a Commander's Conference.  The ISG Director informed the Deputy Commander for Detainee Affairs, MNF-1.  He subsequently contacted the Commander of TF 6-26 and directed him to investigate this situation.  In turn the TF 6-26 Commander informed his superior, the Commander ISOC.  The Commander, CENTCOM has also been informed of this situation.

• (S//NF) The two interrogators/debriefers were directed to return to the ISG compound at Camp Slayer due to these events.

SECRET//NOFORN/X1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE:  10 June, 2004

REPLY TO ATTN OF: [delete]

SUBJECT:  Memorandum for Record -- Report of Violations of The Geneva Conventions and the International Laws of Land Warfare (U)

1.  (S) From [delete] I was employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency as an Intelligence Officer assigned and under the operational control to [delete].  I have been in the civilian employment of the Department of Defense in the capacity of intelligence officer for approximately 14 years.  I have received specialized on-the-job-training in HUMINT operations, to include interrogation.  I spoke about the incidents reported in the document during a meeting with [delete] at approximately 12:15 pm.  Present at the meeting were [delete].

(U) This statement is in support of the following:

a.  (U) Two counts of violations of The Geneva Convention as it pertains to detainee abuse.

b.  (U) One count of violations of The Geneva Convention as it pertains to the illegal detainment of non-combatants.

3.  (U) Details:

a.  (S//NF) (1st count, ref para 2.a.)  On or about 11 May 2004, in Baghdad, Iraq, I witnessed the mistreatment of a TF 6-26 detainee during the initial interrogation after his capture. During the interrogation, conducted by a US Army interrogator, four or five non-interrogator personnel from the Task Force entered the room and began slapping the detainee white he was attempting to respond to the questioning. After approximately 15 minutes, a senior NCO, going by call sign "X03" entered the room and asked most of the personnel to leave, to include ALL of the interrogators. I am not aware of what specifically occurred during my absence. [Delete] officer assigned  to the Task Force, was present as well and witness the incident. [Delete] was observing the interrogation and I was assisting the lead interrogator, A 1st SF Group interrogator also augmenting the unit. I am not aware if this matter has been previously reported.

b.  (S//NF) (2nd count, ref para 2.a.)  During another TF 6-26 operation in Baghdad, a [delete] of the Coalition Provisional Authority's Counterintelligence office PA-C1) was arrested during a raid targeting an al-Qaida facilitator.  [Delete] and two male family members were detained and moved to the TF 6-26 screening facility.  [Delete] and his family members were released and during the initial debriefing of [delete] he reported to TF 6-26 and CPA-CI handlers that he had been "slapped around" during initial interrogation at the place of his capture.  The matter was reported in an internal TF contract report to the B Squadron commander by the DIA handling officer. [Delete]

c.  (S//NF) (Ref para 2.b.)  On 9 May 2004, TF 6-26 personnel detained the wife of a suspected Iraqi terrorist, in Tarmiya, Iraq.  The 28-year-old woman had three young children at the house, one being as young as six months and still nursing.  Her husband was the primary target of the raid, with other suspect personnel subject to detainment as well.  The house belonged to the primary target's in-laws, and it was believed his wife and children would be there as well.  During the pre-operation brief it was recommended by TF personnel that if the wife were present, she be detained and held in order to leverage the primary target's surrender.  I objected to the detainment of the young mother to the raid team leader, "X03."  I believed it was a dead issue, since I would be on-target and responsible for screening the occupants of the house for suspects to detain.  During my initial screening of the occupants at the target house, I determined that the wife could provide no actionable intelligence leading to the arrest her husband.  Despite my protest, the raid team leader detained her anyway.  I concurred with the arrest of one of her brothers, who had been identified as likely having knowledge of the primary target's location.  I reported the incident to the HUMINT support element operations officer. [Delete] as I understand it, the matter was in turn reported to the Task Force HQ.  Approximately two day later, the wife and her brother were released into the custody of their tribal sheikh.

4.  (U) Concluding statement:  The tactical interrogation report is a record of the interrogation and is more often then not the only written record forwarded with the detainees as they are moved through the detention system from screening facilities to final detention centers.  Since those interrogation reports, as a matter of record, contain the names of the interrogators, any mistreatment of detainees, whether in the presence of the interrogator or not, reflects adversely and directly on the interrogator named in the report.  This is a liability to the DHS collector and the DIA.  It is my recommendation that any direct interrogation support to a DoD element by DHS be supported with an MOU clearly defining DoD interrogation and detainee treatment policies.

FROM:  DH HUMINT SCG, SEP 03
DECL ON: X1

UNCLASSIFIED

Thu Jan 17 01:55:06 2002 (Islamabad 295) TFI COPY 14 OF 14 Page 1 OF 3

PTP0943

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RELEASED IN PART B1, 1.4(D)

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NODIS

FROM USLO KABUL #0050

FROM SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY ZAL KHALILZAD

SECSTATE FOR SECRETARY POWELL AND A/S ROCCA

NSC FOR NSA RICE AND HADLEY

SECDEF FOR RUMSFELD AND WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 12958:  DECL: 01/16/22
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PROP, PTER, PINS, AF
SUBJECT: VISIT TO QANDAHAR:  FOCUS ON DETAINEES

SECTION 01 OF 02 Islamabad 295

SUBJECT:  USLO-KABUL #0050 QANDAHAR DETAINEES

Classified by Special Presidential Envoy Zal Khalilzad.
Reason 1.5 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY:

1. (S) Accompanied by my delegation members, I called on [Delete] with a report on detainees as well as an assessment of the ground situation.  As a part of the briefing, I visited the airport holding facility for the Cuba-bound al Qaida and Taliban detainees.  End Summary.

OBJECTIVES

2.  (s) [Delete] has three principal objectives -- to process and transport the detainees, to clean up weapons and munitions caches and to support Special Forces operations -- tasks made all the more difficult because of the estimated 19,000 Taliban and al Qaida soldiers in the hills surrounding Qandahar as well as in the city itself. While the Taliban Pose a concern to the base - both because of the possibility of an attack on the U.S. military camp, either with a terrorist motive or in an attempt to free the captives - General Mattis told me that his primary concern relates to landmines and unexploded ordinance. He explained that the Taliban have re-mined areas that were marked as mine free. The General told me that several Marines and a number of local fighters had been seriously injured in land-mine incidents.

3. (C) [Delete] regard to access to detainees for interrogation purposes,  cooperation is also excellent between USG and foreign agencies seeking information.

DETAINEES

[Delete]

5. (S) There are currently 380 prisoners from a number of countries, [delete].  Some European detainees have told their interrogators that they joined the Taliban/al Qaida for the adventure. Others say hate for the U.S. led them to the Taliban. Most of the prisoners are between 20- 30 years of age, but several appear to be in their sixties. The detainees are held in groups of twenty in razor wired pens. There is no privacy and even calls of nature are performed in public a practice aimed at preventing suicide or escapes during the unsupervised periods. The only prisoners not held in open pens are those who are located in a small hangar, either for interrogation or because they are high-ranking and need to be separated from others for interrogation purposes. [Delete]

6. (S) Walking through the detention center, I observed the detainees, uniformly attired in blue coveralls, seated in pens and sleeping or reading the Koran, the only book they are allowed.  Several detainees ware carrying the honey buckets for disposal across the compound. Each prisoner had two blankets (purchased locally to boost the economy the General said).

7. (S) We also visited the field hospital where detainees are treated by the same military doctors who treat the American soldiers. The doctors explained that the detainees generally arrive with severe gastroenteritis complicated by malnutrition. A few have serious battle injuries, including some which require below the knee amputations. Respecting a policy of informed consent, the doctors said that no detainee has agreed to an amputation, preferring to rely on various temporary measures that will not save the limb but will prolong the situation. The doctors told me these detainees believe that their limbs will be repaired once they reach their next destination, perhaps the U.S. As a part of a delousing program, the military has had to shave off the beards of some of the Cuba-bound detainees, a practice the Red Cross has approved.

8. (S) Detainees eat MREs (Meals Ready to Eat) just like their captors although all pork products have been removed. The plastic spoons also are removed from the packets since the detainees might sharpen them and use the implements as weapons or a tool for suicide.

9. (S) Detainees are allowed to talk to residents in their own pen, but large groups are not allowed. They are not allowed to talk to prisoners in other pens. The General's assessment of the detainees is based on interaction with them over an extended period. He considers them hostile and dangerous. They shout epithets at their captors, including threats against the female relatives of the soldiers guarding them, knee Marines in the groin, and say that they will escape and kill "more Americans and Jews." The General is all business. There is a risk that the detainees may try to throw their blankets over the razor wire and make a run for it. [Delete]

10. (S) The General does not consider the Taliban and al Qaida to be particularly devout and cites as an example the defiled mosque at the airport. Littered with garbage and piles of human excrement, the General said people who would desecrate their own religious sites in this way were hardly religious. [Delete]

11. (C) Another part of the General's job is to clean up weapons and ammunition caches. The triage process involves sorting by category, removing those items which are of interest to the USG and shipping them back to the U.S., and destroying the rest. When I asked if we had considered turning these over to the Interim Authority, the General said that the items thus far were degraded to a point where they were no longer useful.

12. (C) Due to scheduling problems, I was unable to meet local officials but hope to return on January 18.
CHAMBERLIN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 19 OCT 2004 200303827
NODIS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

200201625

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Jan 24 2002

Dep Sec Has Seen

RELEASED IN PART B6

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/ES

SECRET/NOFORN
DECL:  1/24/12

TO:  The Deputy Secretary

FROM:  PM - Gregory M. Suchan, Acting

SUBJECT:  Nationalities at Bagram

You asked for information regarding the nationalities of the prisoners held at the Bagram facility. The CWG has collected the following information:

Bagram is a temporary "collection center" where some detainees stop over enroute to their permanent location. The conditions at Bagram are stable. Plans are to construct accommodations for 75 detainees. Currently there are 27 detainees at this location.

Attachment:
Tab 1- List of Detainees (in detail)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY:  WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 04 OCT 1004 200303827

Classified by PM A/S Gregory M. Suchan, Acting
Reasons:  E.O. 12958, 1.5 (b) and (d)
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NotesTele. TXT

UNCLASSIFIED
TELEGRAM

March 24, 2004

RELEASED IN PART
B6

To: SECSTATE WASH DC - PRIORITY

Action: IO

From:  USMISSION GENEVA (GENEVA 824 - PRIORITY)

TAGS: PHUM

Captions: None

Subject: LETTER FROM SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE TO AMBASSADOR BREMMER REGARDING FOUR MEN BEING HELD IN BASRA, IRAQ

Ref: None

1. Mission has received a letter dated March 12, 2004 from Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur on Torture regarding the detention of four individuals in Basra, Iraq.

2. Begin text of letter:

Excellency,

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Special Rapporteur on torture pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/62.

In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of your Excellency's Government to information I have received regarding [Delete]

[Delete] The four men are reportedly held incommunicado detention at the "Intelligence Directorate" in Basra; Basra being currently under control of the United Kingdom military.

The "Intelligence Directorate" was reportedly formed a few months ago by the Badr organization, the alleged armed wing of the political group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Several people are said to have been held incommunicado and tortured at the directorate's headquarters in Basra. The methods of torture reportedly include lashing on various parts of the body, specifically on the back with an iron stick inserted inside a plastic pipe.

In view of their alleged incommunicado detention, it is feared that they may be at risk of torture or ill-treatment.

Without in any way implying any determination of the facts of the case, I should like to appeal to your Excellency to seek clarification of the circumstances with a view to ensuring that the right to physical and mental integrity of the above-named persons is protected. Under Articles 3 and 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Coalition Provisional Authority, as the occupying power is obliged to respect the rights of civilians in occupied territories, including the prohibition of cruel treatment, torture, and humiliating and degrading treatment. Moreover, this is set forth, inter alia, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. I would also like to draw your Excellency's attention to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/62 and 2003/32 which remind all States that "prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate the perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and urges all States to respect the safeguards concerning the liberty, security and dignity of the person." (paras 10 and 14 respectively).

I would greatly appreciate receiving information from your Excellency's Government concerning the steps taken by the competent authorities in compliance with the provisions contained in the international legal instruments referred to above, as they apply to the aforementioned persons.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Theo van Boven

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART B1, 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL KABUL 001012

NSC FOR. ZKHALILZAD, JDWORKEN, HMANN, RHANSON, DSEDNEY
PACOM FOR POLAD
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL:  04/17/2013
TAGS:  PREL. PHUM, PTER, KAWC, AF, PK

SUBJECT:  IMPROVED CONDITIONS AT SHIBERGHAN PRISON

REF: STATE 95030 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS 1.5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 30 SEP 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

(B) AND (D)

1. (C) Summary. The prison in the provincial (Jowzjan) capital of Shiberghan has the largest population of Taliban prisoners in Afghanistan. Shortly after the fall of the Taliban the prison suffered from over-crowding as well as shortages of food and medicine. A site visit on April 17 revealed a significantly better life for the prisoners with one-third the population of a year ago and sufficient nutrition and medical care. End summary.

2. (C) Mazar-e Sharif-based Poloff conducted a site visit accompanied by a military civil affairs team with expertise in preventative medicine and prison assessment. A citizen soldier provided prison assessment expertise from the U.S. Army civil Affairs Unit. Prior to being called to active duty in Afghanistan, [delete]

3. (C) The delegation interviewed the prison warden, Akhtar Khan and [delete]  prior to inspecting the grounds, medical facility, and interviewing 13 prisoners.

4. (C) The warden reported this is a 43 year-old prison built to support 1000 inmates. In January 2002, the population swelled to 3478 as Taliban forces surrendered or were captured. Local forces were taxed to their capacity to care for the prisoners and requested assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for supplemental feeding assistance, prisoner registration, as well as, humanitarian medical and sanitation assistance.

5. (C) The picture is now better in April 2003 with a prison population of 1088, comprised of 564 Pakistani and 524 Afghan prisoners. Most of the prisoners have been in confinement for one and a half years. [Delete]  there are 75 known Taliban commanders and 35 inmates  convicted of civil crimes such as murder, robbery, gambling, and sexual abuse. The population was reduced by over 1000 through a series of amnesty decrees from President Karzai during Eid celebrations; others were released after investigation by the intelligence agencies. A small number of prisoners were transferred to U.S. control for detention elsewhere.

6. (C) The health of the prisoners has improved dramatically in the past year. There were three patients in the 14-bed sick ward with mild respiratory difficulties compared to an overflowing combat casualty ward in 2002. The humanitarian NGO Emergencies provides all the medicine and a medical staff of three. The physicians interviewed confirmed additional assistance is provided by the Shiberghan city public health hospital primarily to treat the 108 cases of tuberculosis (TB). There are 25 contagious TB patients housed in a stark but uncrowded TB isolation cellblock close to the infirmary and away from the prison population. The balance of the TB patients have been treated, do not have active TB and have been returned to the prison population. The medical facility is clean and provides a higher standard of care than the Balkh and Mazar regional clinics for Afghan citizens. The warden and medical staff reported one death in 2003 compared to 36 in 2002. There no longer is concern with dysentery or jaundice in the prison population. The ICRC has assisted in upgrading the sanitation system of the prison and the medical staff provides health education. Periodic outbreaks of lice and scabies are treated with appropriate medication and are not prevalent. The prisoner's clothes and bodies appeared as clean as the Afghan population we observe daily in Mazar and the Afghan countryside.

7. (C) The diet of the prisoners has steadily improved as the population decreased to a more manageable level. The ICRC provided a supplemental feeding program during the winter of 2002-2003 to ensure adequate nutrition. This was discontinued as the three meals currently provide sufficient calories. The diet includes bread and sugar for breakfast, rice for lunch and beans for dinner. Drinking water is from a tap in the cellblock.

8. (C) Poloff did not observe outward signs of physical mistreatment of the prisoners. Except for a walk through of the central courtyard where prisoners could be seen from behind locked gates and 13 randomly selected interiews with inmates, the delegation members did not go into the cellblocks for their own protection.  Prison officials wanted to offer access but were correctly concerned about a spontaneous uprising of passionate Taliban and suspected al-Qaida prisoners against an American official. The ICRC [delete] conduct bi-weekly visits to this prison with unfettered access to all prisoners.  All the prisoners interviewed by the delegation said they had spoken with an ICRC representative and some have received and sent letters and had visits from relatives as a result of registration.

9.  (C)  The prisoners rotate for exercise by cellblock. The cells are emptied, scrubbed down, and bedding is aired out during their exercise rotation. Prisoners may flow between the interior and exterior courtyards during this time. Non-compliant prisoners are isolated or have their movement restricted. Prisoners may have visitors for five minutes on Mondays and Thursdays and may receive packages from family and friends.

10. (C) Comment: Following a January 2002 visit by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) to Shiberghan prison. PHR released a report documenting the poor conditions there. Shiberghan became a synonym for misery. Human rights and press reporting since then have continued to feed off the PHR report that is now over a year old and out of date. Lodging and food at Shiberghan are on par with those of most Afghans who are not in prison. The medical facility and treatment is superior to what is available to citizens in the region. We saw no overt signs of animosity directed by the prison staff toward the prisoners, and the prisoners did not appear to be afraid of the guard staff. While conditions at Shiberghan are not ideal, prison officials working with IOs and NGOs have clearly improved prison standards and reduced the misery that was so evident in January 2002. End comment.

FINN

UNCLASSIFIED

200330899

United States Department of State

Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crimes Issues

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 12, 2003

RELEASED IN PART B6

Yvan Peeters

Dear Ms. Peeters:

Thank you for your letter of October 12 to Secretary Powell expressing concern related to juveniles detainees held under U.S. control at a U.S. Naval Base located in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Secretary Powell has asked me to respond to your letter on his behalf.

The detention of juveniles in accordance with the laws and customs of war is consistent with U.S. obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  As with all detainees, these individuals are being held because they are enemy combatants who pose a threat to United States forces.  The United States recognizes the special needs of younger detainees and the difficult circumstances surrounding their situation, and is treating young enemy combatants in a manner appropriate to their status and age.

Sincerely,

Pierre Prosper

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2004 200303827

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

S/S 200332515

S35

United States Department of State

Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crimes Issues

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASED IN PART B6

ORIG LTR TO ADDRESSEE BY BUREAU
COPY TO:
IPS
(HEW)

February 23, 2004

Tausif Paracha

Dear Mr. Paracha:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Powell expressing concern related to a detainee held under U.S. control at an airbase in Afghanistan.

The United States and its Coalition partners are at war with the al Qaida network and remnants of the Taliban who continue to support them. The al Qaida network today is a multinational enterprise with operations in more than 60 countries. Active hostilities are ongoing daily in Afghanistan and around the world. We continue to fight against enemy combatants who are planning and conducting attacks against the international community. In this context, operational and security concerns compel me to refrain from confirming or commenting on the circumstances of capture, transfer or detention of specific individuals believed to be held as enemy combatants in the course of that conflict.

Let me assure you, however, that President Bush has affirmed on any number of occasions that at Qaida and Taliban detainees are treated humanely, and, to the extent consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. As a result. representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) routinely visit detainees individually and privately. United States Government personnel are not permitted to torture detainees or participate in torture by others. Torture is a violation of the laws of the United States. Allegations of torture will be thoroughly investigated. In cases where the United States Government transfers detainees to other countries for detention or questioning on our behalf, we seek and receive assurances that the detainees will not be tortured and will be treated humanely.

The authority to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities exists in law independent of the civil or criminal justice system. In this war, as in every war, enemy combatants are not provided counsel or access to courts for the purpose of challenging their detention while hostilities are ongoing. While some enemy combatants may face criminal prosecution before the end of hostilities, nations at war traditionally have waited until hostilities cease to bring such charges. If and when an enemy is charged with a crime, he would then be entitled to access to counsel and be afforded other privileges necessary to receive a fair trial.

Sincerely,

Pierre-Richard Prosper

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Tausif Paracha

RELEASED IN PART B6

November 3, 2003

RE:  Illegal Detainment of Saifullah Paracha

Dear Mr. Powell

I hope you recover well from your surgery and wish you a Merry Christmas. This letter is in regards to my uncle.

Kidnapping, torture, use of chemicals, would you ever think the United States of America would be involved in this.  My uncle is living proof of this. The US government on July 5th kidnapped him. My family was literally begging the US government to let us know if he was just alive, and they refused to comment. We found out about two months after he was kidnapped. We received a letter from the International Red Cross that he is in US custody in Afghanistan.

As newspapers and well-known magazines like Time, Guardian, Newsweek state, torture and use of chemicals takes place at the US base on detainees in Afghanistan. How can the US be involved in such atrocious behavior. Nothing justifies kidnapping and torturing people. How can a country such as the US who has always supported Human Rights be involved in such uncivilized actions.

I myself am a 9/11 survivor, I was in front of the WTC on Sept 11th.  I am pleading for you to help us in our cause. We just want the US government to act civilized. If the US government has proof of my uncle being involved in something unjust, bring him into the legal process. Bring him to a court and provide him an attorney as amendment VI of the Bill of Rights state.

Everything the government is doing to my uncle is against the US constitution, International law, and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is a legal system the US follows; all we want is to have America follow that.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy, and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 5.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

Article 6.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

(I) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Everyone of these laws are being violated, on a national and international level.

I am a US citizen and have lived in New York my entire life. [Delete]  I am again pleading for your assistance, if you can help in anyway it will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully yours,
Tausif Paracha
President
Verticity

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2004 200303827

UNCLASSIFIED

H009 06/02/2004 14:07.

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Jun 1, 2004

Dear Mr. Skelton:

In your letter to Dr. Rice dated May 20, you asked ''when was Secretary Powell or his staff at the State Department given a copy of the ICRC report?" Similar questions were asked about when the President, the Secretary of Defense, and others were given the report. Dr. Rice has replied on behalf of the President. As she noted in her May 20 response to you, the U.S. Mission in Geneva obtained a copy, and transmitted it to the Department on March 5. The NSC was provided a copy of the ICRC report the same day. The Secretary of State received an internal memorandum describing the allegations of the report on March 11.

We hope this information is helpful to you. If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us again.

Sincerely,
Paul V. Kelly
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

The Honorable
Ike Skelton,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

H2004 0525-009

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 20, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Skelton regarding February 2004 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross

Representative Skelton wrote the president on May 10, 2004, to ask, among other things, when the Departments of State and Defense became aware of the February 2004 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (Tab B). I have provided a response to Representative Skelton on behalf of the President (Tab A). I request that each of you provide a response to Representative Skelton on behalf of your departments.

Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachments
Tab A:  Copy of Rice Letter to Representative Skelton
Tab B:  Copy of Incoming Correspondence from Representative Skelton

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 20, 2004

Dear Representative Skelton:

I am responding to your letter to the President dated May 10, 2004.

Before the date of your letter, neither the President nor I were given a copy of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) February 2004 report on Iraq. The ICRC did not provide a copy of the report to the White House. When ICRC President Kellenberger met with me on January 15, he did not raise the issue of mistreatment of detainees in Iraq nor did he mention that ICRC was preparing a report.

National security Council staff learned in mid-February that ICRC officials had provided a report about ill-treatment of Iraqi detainees to CPA officials in Baghdad. Our staff inquired with DOD officials in Washington about the ICRC report and were told that DOD officials were generally aware of the allegations, were seeking more information about them, and that military  authorities were investigating them. The Secretary of Defense had already informed the President that the Department of Defense was investigating allegations of mistreatment of detainees in Iraq.

National Security Council staff sought and eventually received a copy of the ICRC report from the State Department in early March. Our staff was told that the State Department's Mission in Geneva had obtained a copy of the report from ICRC officials in Geneva. Our staff was also told by State Department officials that the ICRC was reluctant to share the report with Washington because the issues were being handled between local ICRC officials and United States Government authorities in Baghdad with whom the ICRC had a positive working relationship that the ICRC did not wish to jeopardize. Finally, NSC staff were told that the ICRC had told the State Department that ICRC officials in Baghdad were pleased with the initial response by United States Government officials in Baghdad and with steps already taken by United States Government authorities to respond positively to the report. National Security council staff were informed that the ICRC had told the State Department that ICRC planned to conduct another round of inspections soon and expected to be able to report substantial improvements. Upon receiving the report, NSC staff asked appropriate DOD officials to review the issues raised in the report.

You also asked when Secretaries Powell, and Rumsfeld or their staffs were given copies of the ICRC report. In order to provide a rapid response to your letter, I have provided you information about when the NSC was informed about the ICRC report. Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld have asked their departments to collect information'about the handling of the ICRC report in their departments, and I have asked them to reply to you directly as soon as that information is available.

Finally, you have asked why the ICRC report was not shared with the Congress. ICRC reports are generally provided to the Departments of State and Defense and are not routinely shared with the White House. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense are in the best position to provide you information about their practices for handling ICRC reports. It is my understanding, however, that ICRC practice is to limit dissemination of their reports and often to provide copies only to local military commanders in order to maintain a confidential working relationship with the military units responsible, for detention of prisoners of war and other detainees.

Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President
tor National security Affairs

The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Washington; D.C. 20515-2504

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE 10: 26 OCT 2004 100303827
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
TIME OF TRANSMISSION
2004 MAY 20 AM 10:00

PRECEDENCE:  PRIORITY

CLASSIFICATION:  UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:  NSC  PH: 456-9425 ROOM: WWD

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM REP SKELTON RE FEB 04 REPORT OF THE INTL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

PAGES:  5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

STATE:  COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE

DEFENSE:  DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN PART B5

IKE SKELTON
4th District, Missouri

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-25-4
May 10, 2004

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have a copy of the February 2004 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment By the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment, and Interrogation.

As this report was dated February 2004 and Members of Congress did not find out about the issue of prisoner mistreatment until early May by way of the media, my question is three-fold:

1) When was the President or his Administration given a copy of the ICRC report?

2) When was Secretary Powell or his staff at the State Department given a copy of the ICRC report?

3)  When was Secretary Rumsfeld or his staff at the Department of Defense given a copy of the ICRC report?

According to an article by David S. Cloud in today's Wall Street Journal entitled, "Red Cross Cited Detainee Abuse Over a Year Ago,"

"It could not be learned last night how widely read the ICRC report was among senior Bush administration officials.  U.S. officials said yesterday that Secretary of State Colin Powell, for instance, had raised the problems with detention procedures at several high-level administration meetings this year.  A State Department official said last night that he couldn't say when Mr. Powell first saw the report.  But he noted that the ICRC had been making recommendations and raising concerns for a long time, and that Mr. Powell and other administration officials had been aware of that."

Please explain why this issue was not brought to the attention of Members of Congress whose committee responsibilities include oversight of the U.S. military and U.S. foreign affairs.

Sincerely,

IKE SKELTON
Member of Congress

IS:lb

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 29 OCT 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

[Delete] Fwd. GTMO matters

From: [Delete]
To: [Delete]
Date:  Mon, Dec 16, 2002 3:23 PM
Subject:  Fwd:  GTMO matters

b6 -1
b7C -1

[Delete]

Looks like we are stuck in the mud with the interview approach of the military vrs. law enforcement. We need to establish a Bureau policy laying out the boundaries for the interview process.  Apparently, CITF is formulating a policy for their agents.

The attached is a draft that is being worked on down at GTMO [delete]

Let me know what you think.

[Delete]

[Delete]

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription: 11/25/2002

Investigation on 11/25/2002 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

File # 265A-MM-C99102

by Det. [Delete]

DETAINEES-3117

On 11/25/2002 [delete] was interviewed at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  The interview was conducted by FBI Task Force Officer Det. [delete] was [delete].  The results of the interview are as follows:

[Delete] was asked if any changes had occurred in the detainee camp over the weekend. He said that he was given a paper by the guards indicating that there would be  four basic classes of detainees with regard to  privilege/discipline issues. An isolation unit would be  utilized for serious violators of camp regulations. All  rewards and punishment are to be based on camp behavior and cooperation with investigators. Rewards that may be given to detainees include cold water and the ability to store food in their cells.  [Delete] sees these new rules as a positive step in soliciting the cooperation of the detainees.

[Delete] said he experienced punishment at the  camp on one prior occasion about [delete] months ago.  He, along [delete].  He was placed in the isolation unit [delete].  He now regrets his actions in the [delete] incident and says that participating with the other detainees in the water [delete] was a mistake.

[Delete]

Page 2

[Delete]

The interviewer probed [Delete] on his guilt or innocence based on the facts of his detainment.  It was mentioned that if [delete] was truly innocent, he should have no hesitation answering any questions posed by interviewers.  If, on the other hand, [delete] was guilty of some crime, [delete] should admit his mistake(s) and move ahead with his life in the hopes of one day being released from custody.  [Delete] volunteered that he has not been overly enthusiastic about being interviewed during Ramadan.  With 10 days of Ramadan left, [delete] promised that he would be willing to answer any questions that this interviewer poses to him, without an "R.T.N." response, after Ramadan ends.  [Delete] was told that no promises could be made to him at this time with regard to when he is called for his next interview.

Page 3

[Delete]

[Delete]

[Delete]

[Delete] was asked if he ever thought he would be going home.  He asked the interviewer if he wanted the truth and then said that the other detainees [delete] [delete] and this helps to keep him strong.  He was never as religious as he is now.  He has been heavily influenced by the other detainees around him.

[Delete] was reminded of his answer to a question posed during his previous interview relating to if he had ever met USAMA BIN LADEN.  When the interview told him that he (the interviewer) would like to meet and interview UBL, [delete] smiled broadly and seemed genuinely pleased and intrigued.  He then asked the interviewer if he would also like to meet [delete] [delete] was asked again if he had ever met UBL.  While not directly answering it, [delete] replied that it would not be unusual for someone to have met UBL [delete.  He denied that anyone from the Middle East having met UBL [delete] would achieve celebrity status considering the vast amounts of sympathizers and followers they both have.

The interview was then concluded.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:  DEADLINE 10/24/2003

Date:  10/21/2003

To:  Counterterrorism

Attn: A/SC [delete]
ITOS II Rm 4972 JEH
SA [delete]
Conus II, Rm 5432 TEH
Attn: SSA [delete]
Eurasian, CD-IC, Rm 4323 JEH
Attn:  SA [delete]
Attn:  SA [delete]
Attn:  SA [delete]
Attn:  SA [delete]
Attn: [delete]

From:  CIRG
NCAVC/BAU I
Contact:  SSA [delete]

Approved By: [delete]

Drafted By: [delete]

Case ID # IV-IR-A-6033-NCAVC (Pending)

Title:  INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION
OF EXTREMISTS WORKING GROUP
CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP (CIRG)
NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CRIME (NCAVC)
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS UNIT I (BAU I)
11/04-07/2003

Synopsis:  The purpose of this working group is to bring together personnel with background in terrorist investigations and incorporate this information into a practical guide for personnel involved in conducting interviews both in the field and in controlled environments such as in Guantanamo Bay.

Details:  The Behavioral Analysis Unit I (BAU I) is one of several National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) units within the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) in Quantico, Virginia, providing support to field offices as well as to state, local, and foreign police.  Although the NCAVC is best known for providing behavioral analyses on violent crime cases, i.e., serial murder, sexual assault and child abduction, stalking, etc., the NCAVC has considerable experience in the area of terrorism and threat assessment.  In recognition of the changing nature of FBI priorities, and in order to be more responsive to requesting offices, the NCAVC recently reorganized and established a unit (BAU I) which focuses on matters involving terrorism and threat assessment.  Services offered by BAU I will continue to include crime scene analysis, personality assessment, interview strategies analysis of threatening communications and investigative suggestions.

Of particular interest and concern to BAU I, especially amidst our war on terrorism, is how the FBI can best obtain information from those involved in terrorist activities.  The FBI has successfully investigated a wide range of domestic and international terrorist groups throughout the years and a host of dangerous domestic terrorist groups.  The recent attacks against U.S. interests and citizens in New York, Virginia, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, East Africa, Indonesia, Baghdad, and other places, highlight the need to better understand, not only the midset of those terrorist, but also the cultural, political, and economic influences which may have cont4ributed to their decision to align themselves with extremist causes.  More important, BAU I is interested in learning how we can better elicit information from these individuals either as sources, subjects, suspects, witnesses or victims.

Of the thousands of persons involved in terrorist investigations, the above-listed individuals have come to the attention of BAU I as a sample of those who have been particularly successful in obtaining information from terrorists and their associates or in developing excellent sources.  Although, ideally, BAU I would like to include all personnel who have had successes in the terrorist arena, it is believed that the use of a small working group, initially, will be more conducive to capturing the understanding and organizing a voluminous amount of information.

BAU I is inviting these individuals to the CIRG facility in Stafford, Virginia, for a two-day working group on 11/05-06/2003, in order to debrief them in detail about their successes and failures and to better understand the elements of their personality experiences, approaches, and other factors which contributed to their information and, hopefully, incorporate it into a practical guide for individuals involved in conducting interviews both in the field and in controlled environments such as in Guantanamo Bay.  Although a comprehensive guide may not be possible as a result of one seminar, BAU I believes this is a first step in collecting important details from the recent valuable experiences and insights from these individuals to benefit future investigative and operational requirements.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:  ROUTINE

Date: 10/06/2003

To: Counterterrorism
Attn:  SC Frankie Battle
Rm 4712 JEH
UC [delete]
Rm 5382 JEH
SA [delete]
Rm 1B223 JEH
SA [delete]
Rm 4383 JEH
SA [delete]
Rm 5999 JEH
SA [delete]
Rm 5258 JEH
SA [delete]
Rm 8672 JEH
IOS [delete]
Rm 8672 JEH

Security
Attn:  SA [delete]
Polygraph Unit, GRB 2

CIRG
Attn: UC [delete]
UC [delete]
UC [delete]
SSA [delete]
IRS [delete]
MA [delete]
MA [delete]

Baltimore
Attn: SA [delete]

Chicago
Attn: SA [delete]

Miami
Attn: SA [delete]

Milwaukee
Attn: SA [delete]
Madison RA

New York
Attn: SA [delete]
SA [delete]
SA [delete]
SA [delete]
SA [delete]
SA [delete]
SA [delete]
SA [delete]

Philadelphia
Attn: SA [delete]

Pittsburgh
Attn: IOS [delete]

Phoenix
Attn: SA [delete]
SA [delete]

San Diego
Attn: SA [delete]

Seattle
Attn: SA [delete]

From:  CIRG

DETAINEES-2746

Questions Concerning FBI Personnel ActivitIes at Abu Ghurayb Prison - IRAQ

Time period: October 2003 - December 2003

1.  Did you observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during your presence at Abu Ghurayb prison? No.

2. Old you have any reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb was occurring? These reasons could include casual  observations, prisoner appearance or demeanor, or conversation with prison personnel. No.

3. Did interviews conducted by you and members of your team comport with prescribed Department of Justice and/or FBI protocols?  Yes.

4. Please identify where the interviews occurred in the prison.

5. Were they ever held in Unit 1Aor 1B (where the abuses occurred)?

6.  Did you have any substantive contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison? If so, who?

7.  Please explain the roles of members which composed your interview team?  N/A.

8.  During your interviews did any interviewee bring to your attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel?  No.

9. Are you in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees?  Are you aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items?  No.

10.  What, if any, was your understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for the permitted use of certain interrogation techniques?

11.  If you were aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees, did you document or report it to anyone?  No.

12.  Do you have any additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees?

DETAINEES-3514

hgb:bgb
297-HQ-A1327669-E3

On May 17, 2004, SA [delete] was contacted telephonically at the Little Rock Division's El Dorado RA, by SSA [delete] concerning FBI personnel activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison to which he provided the following information.

SA [delete] advised that during the course of the interviews he conducted of [delete] and [delete] [delete] at no time did he observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at ABU Ghurayb prison.

SA [delete] advised that he did not have reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at ABU Ghurayb was occurring nor did anyone ever volunteer any information to him that any mistreatment of prisoners had occurred.  He further stated that all interviews conducted by him and/or members of his team comported with FBI protocols.

SA [delete] advised the interview conducted by him of [delete] took place in an isolated area of the prison whereas the interview of [delete] took place in the office of the Military Intelligence (MI).  During the interviews SA [delete] was assisted by [delete] (MI) and SSG [delete] U.S. Army and a translator.

SA [delete] advised that he never felt a need to have an understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for permitted use of certain interrogation techniques.  That was because he was a bomb technician and he was there for "intel" and evaluation.  He also stated that he does not have any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees or was not aware of anyone else who was in possession of such items.

SA [delete] advised that if he was aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees, he would have reported the inappropriate actions to the authorities.

DETAINEES-3463

297-HQ-A1327 6697-E
HGB. hgb

On May 18, 2004, SA [delete] was contacted telephonically [delete] at the [delete] in DOHA QATAR by SSA [delete] concerning FBI personnel activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison to which he provided the following information:

SA [delete] advised that during his time at the ABU Ghurayb Prison his role was to only process and fingerprint prisoners and at no time did he observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at ABU Ghurayb prison.  SA [delete] processed prisoners at two separate locations, on two occasions he processed detainees inside the ABU Ghurayb prison in a side storage room off to the side of the prison cell block.  He didn't recall if that area actually had a particular name.  The second location where he processed the majority of the detainees was outside in a tent on the ABU Ghurayb prison grounds.  SA [delete] stated the processing of the detainees occurred around October 2003, generally between the hours of 10am to 5pm, two to three times per week.  SA [delete] further reiterated that he did not interview any of the detainees.

SA [delete] advised that he did not have reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at ABU Ghurayb was occurring in Unit 1A or 1B nor did anyone ever volunteer any information to him that any mistreatment of prisoners had occurred.

SA [delete] advised that he never felt a need to have an understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for permitted use of certain interrogation techniques.  That was because he was only at the prison to pro and fingerprint prisoners.  He also stated that he does not have any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees or was not ware of anyone else who was in possession of such items.

SA [delete] advised that he had no additional information relating to the abuse of detainees and if he had been aware of any mistreatment or abuse he would have reported the inappropriate actions to the authorities.

DETAINEES-3464

297-HQ-A13276691-E-3
KBC . kc

The following investigation was conducted by AI [delete] [delete] INSD, on 05/17/2004 in New York, NY:

SA [delete] NYO, Squad CD-22, [delete] DOB. [delete] SSAN. [delete] was interviewed.  He was advised of the identity of AI [delete] and the nature of the interview.  He provided the following information:

SA [delete] deployed to IRaq on or about 11/13/2003 through 01/16/2004.  His primary duties while in Iraq consisted of conducting FCI interviews at Camp Cropper in the vicinity of Baghdad International Airport.  He worked primarily with SA [delete] [delete]  He went to Abu Ghurayb prison on approximately five occasions.  On one occasion he was searching for a "ghost" detainee through both cell blocks and the tent compound, but did not locate him.  He described a "ghost" detainee as someone detained at the prison by intelligence personnel without any record of the detainee's presence.  He did not know how many such detainees existed.  On one occasion he processed for fingerprinting and DNA approximately 25-50 detainees at the prison.  He also introduced a detainee whose name he could not recall to the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) because of the WMD knowledge that detainee possessed.  The ISG was U.S. military, to the best of his recollection.  He also dealt with Department of Defense (DOD) personnel who were civilian clothes.  He believed they represented Defense Intelligence Agency.

Other than his search for the "ghost" detainee in the cell blocks, he interviewed detainees in the stand alone buildings known as "wood" and "steel," respectively.  He actually interviewed teh "ghost" detainee prior to the search on one occasion and saw no signs of abuse.  The detainee was subsequently released, and that is why SA [delete] could not locate him during the search.  These stand-alone buildings were located outside the cell blocks.  Those detainees were from the tent compound, not the main cell blocks.  He recalled interviewing [delete] with SA [delete] [delete] was a tent compound detainee.  The detainee was delivered to the stand alone building by MPs who did not participate in the interview.  The detainee was brought to the interview in hand cuffs.  He also saw detainees wearing hoods while they were escorted on the prison grounds.

SA [delete] did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at Abu Ghurayb prison.  He conducted a thorough search of all the cells in the prison for the "ghost" detainee and saw no evidence of any mistreatment or misconduct.

SA [delete] had no reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees was occurring at the prison.  While processing numerous (25-50) detainees for fingerprints and DNA samples, he noticed no marks or signs of abuse on the prisoners.  He did not recall meeting the guards who were depicted in the media allegedly abusing prisoners in the prison.

SA [delete] advised his interviews conducted at Camp Cropper and Abu Ghurayb prison were reported via EC.  He did not advise detainees of their Miranda Warning rights, and could not recall why.  His interviews always took place in the stand alone buildings previously described and none of his interviewees were housed in units 1A or 1B.  He had no substantive contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison.  The only other member of his interview team at the prison was SA [delete].  He did not recall a translator being present because the subject of the interview spoke English.

During his interviews, no interviewee brought to his attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel.  He was in possession of no pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees.  He was not aware of anyone in possession of such items.  He had no knowledge of DOD or DOJ authorization for the use of certain interrogation techniques.  He and other interviewers, including the MI handlers, would discuss interview strategies as to whether or not the interview would use a positive, rapport building tone, or an accusatorial, negative tone.  No discussion or thought was given to using physical interrogation techniques during any interview.  He had no knowledge of sleep deprivation or isolation used on detainees.  He had no additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees.

297-HQ-A13276691-E-3
CMR

The following investigation was conducted by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [delete] in Portland, Oregon on May 18, 2004.

Special Agent {SA) [delete] assigned to the Fly Away/Rapid Deployment Team at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) provided the following information:

SA [delete] started work with the FBI on [delete].  His FBIHQ extension is [delete] and cell phone is [delete].  In his capacity as an SA assigned to the Fly Away Team, he served in Iraq from 11/05/2003 until 01/30/2004.  As one of his duties in Iraq, he interviewed detainees at Abu Ghurayb Prison.  As a result, the following questions were posed to SA [delete].

1.  Did you observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during your presence at Abu Ghurayb prison?

Response:  SA [delete] stated he did not observe any mistreatment of the nature, or extent, as recently reported by the media.  SA [delete] stated he observed three incidents that caught his attention.  On one occasion at Abu Ghurayb Prison, SA [delete] observed military personnel restraining a detainee.  The detainee was spread eagle on a mattress on the floor and yelling and flailing.  The military personnel advised SA [delete] the detainee was mentally ill.  The detainee was covered with a blanket.  SA [delete] also thinks he remembers observing an IV bag for the detainee.  SA [delete] stated his observations were consistent with military personnel attempting to assist a mentally ill person.  SA [delete] also noted the prison held numerous mentally ill detainees.

The second incident consisted of a detainee, either naked or wearing boxer shorts, lying prone on the wet floor.  There was one military person in the vicinity, but no one was interacting with the detainee.

The third incident consisted of a detainee standing on the second floor of the prison and handcuffed to a waist high railing.  An empty green nylon sand bag was placed over the detainee's head.  The prisoner was draped in a shower curtain.  The military personnel advised SA [delete] the detainee was being subjected to sleep deprivation.  SA [delete] observed a military policeman (MP) lightly slap the detainee on the back.  The slap was not hard, and consistent with someone trying to assure the detainee did not fall asleep.

2.  Did you have any reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb was occurring?  These reasons could include casual observations, prisoner appearance or demeanor, or conversations with various personnel.

Response:  No, other than the limited observations documented in the response to question number one.  SA [delete] noted there was documentation and limited conversation related to "Ego Up and Ego Down," and "Fear Up and Fear Down," referring to the detainees.  Before SA [delete] was able to conduct interviews in the prison, he was required to sign a Military Intelligence (MI) document delineating the interview techniques allowed, and those requiring specific approval.  The document appeared to be a standard form, and applicable to agencies wanting to conduct interviews of detainees.  SA [delete] thinks the document specifically mentioned "Ego Up and Ego Down," as well as "Fear Up and Fear Down".  SA [delete] noted sleep deprivation was not on the list of permissible interview activities, but required a specific request.  SA [delete] stated he generally discussed the form, read the form, and signed the form.  He did not maintain a copy of the form.

3.  Did interview conducted by you and members of your team comport with prescribed Department of Justice and/or FBI protocols?

Response:  Yes.  SA [delete] noted he was not aware of any specific DOJ or FBI protocols established for the detainee interviews.  He said he did not give the detainees Miranda rights, but stated he was conducting the interview for intelligence information.  SA [delete] added that he, and his associates, treated the interviewees professionally and humanely at all times.

4.  Please identify where the interviews occurred in the prison.

Response:  SA [delete] stated each of his interviews was conducted in an interview facility called the "wood site."  It was called the wood site because it was a structure built of wood.  It was located approximately 150 yards from the security cell block portion of the main prison.  The "wood site" consisted of six interview rooms. Each room held a plastic table and plastic or metal chairs.  Each room also had one door, a one way glass/mirror for persons outside the room to observe the interview, and an air conditioning/heating unit.

SA [delete] stated the interviewees would be removed from the main prison and escorted to the interview site, the "wood site."  Per prison regulations, the prisoners were escorted in handcuffs and hoods.  For the first interviews conducted by SA [delete] the detainee was escorted by MI or other military police personnel.  Later, SA [delete] sometimes escorted the detainee from the cell area to the interview site.

5.  Were they ever held in Units 1A or 1B (where the abuses occurred)?

Response:  SA [delete] stated he was not aware of the 1A or 1B classification for areas of the prison, nor was he aware of the specific area in question.  He stated he obtained his detainees from the last wing of the prison.  To get to the wing holding his detainees, he would enter the front of the prison building and walk down the center corridor.  Four or five wings, on both sides of the central corridor, spoked off from the main corridor.  SA [delete] stated he walked to the last set of wings, and passed all the wings while traveling to his destination.  On one occasion when SA [delete] interviewed detainee [delete] unidentified military personnel brought the detainee to SA [delete]. SA [delete] thought the detainee was in Camp Vigilant, the open air detention camp next to the Abu Ghurayb Prison.  From the wing holding SA [delete] interview subjects, SA [delete] escorted them out the back door to the interview building.

6.  Did you have any substantive contact with Military Police Personnel in charge of the prison?  If so, who?

Response:  SA [delete] stated his conversations with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison were frequent, but not substantive nor related to interviews other than in general terms.  Relative to Military Intelligence personnel, SA [delete] noted he met Colonel [delete] on one occasion.  He did not hold any substantive conversation with the Colonel.

SA [delete] met Lt. Colonel [delete] on several occasions because of attempted prison escapes, prisoner uprisings, a shooting incident inside the high security cellblock, and attacks on the prison from the surrounding village.  They did not discuss interview techniques.

SA [delete] met both Captain [delete] and Major [delete].  SA [delete] thinks Captain [delete] was in charge of the MI interview teams.  SA [delete] conversed with both officers on several occasions, but did not discuss specific interview techniques.  SA [delete] noted he knew how he was going to proceed on his interviews, and knew his procedures were within DOJ and FBI parameters.  SA [delete] stated he introduced other interviewers to Major [delete].

SA [delete] said his primary prison contact person was Chief Warrant Officer [delete].  Chief [delete] supervised the Sgts. and Specialists responsible for scheduling and monitoring interviews.  On several occasions, SA [delete] discussed his proposed interview approaches for specific detainees, with Chief [delete].  SA [delete] indicated his intent, to Chief [delete] to pursue a lengthy and professional series of interviews with a detainee.  At no time did Chief [delete] suggest a more aggressive approach for the interviews.

7.  Please explain the role of members which comprised your interview team.

Response:  SA [delete] said he primarily interviewed detainee [delete].  SA [delete] primary counterpart in the interviews was SA [delete]  SA [delete] served as a translator and co-interviewer.  After SA [delete] left the country, []delete] served as a translator in the interviews.  On one occasion, Intelligence Analyst [delete] served as an observer and note taker.  On one occasion, [delete] served as a linguist during an interview.  On another occasion, SA [delete] served as a co-interviewer with SA [delete].

9.  During your interviews, did any interviewee bring to your attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel?

Response:  No.  During the first interviews with detainee [delete] complained of commotion and screaming at night.  SA [delete] said he interpreted the detainee's statements as possible surmise on the detainee's part that other detainees might be subject to torture.  SA [delete] said the detainee was in a cell with a solid door and walls, so was unable to report on anything he observed.  SA [delete] also perceived the detainee's complaint of hearing screams as "posturing" to support his early anti U.S. position, as well as a complaint regarding lack of sleep.  SA [delete] noted the prison was a very noisy environment with frequent wailing and/or yelling.  SA [delete does not recall his interview subjects complaining of abuse to themselves, or to anyone else in the prison.  At one point, detainee [delete] complained of not being able to see a doctor.  SA [delete] arranged for doctor visits to detainee [delete].

9.  Are you in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees?  Are you aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items?

Response:  No / No.

10.  What, if any, was your understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for the permitted use of certain interrogation techniques?

Response:  SA [delete] stated that other than the initial DOD form he signed prior to conducting interviews, he was not aware of DOD authorizations or techniques regarding interviews.  SA [delete] said the DOD techniques were irrelevant to his interviews.  SA [delete] stated he did not have any understanding of altered DOJ interview standards, other than not utilizing Miranda warnings.

11.  If you were aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees, did you document or report it to anyone?

Response:  Not applicable.

12.  Do you have any additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees?

Response:  No.  SA [delete] wanted to note the difference in his interview techniques between detainee [delete] and detainee [delete].  SA [delete] noted detainee [delete] was a potential long term interview subject with information of possible value over a period of time.  Conversely, detainee [delete] was thought to hold information of immediate value only.  As a result, the interview technique with detainee [delete] was more aggressive.  The techniques included yelling and hitting the table.  SA [delete] stated they did not, at any time, threaten the detainees with abuse or harm, or harm a detainee.

SA [delete] noted he provided amenities to one detainee/interviewee.  SA [delete] brought a light bulb for the detainee's cell, provided him with polypropolene underwear and sandals, and provided him a copy of the Koran.  SA [delete] requested the prison guards to treat one detainee, of interview interest, very professionally.  Specifically, SA [delete] requested the prison personnel to not ridicule or humiliate the detainee, and to respect his needs for prayer time.

DETAINEES-3484
DETAINEES-3485|
DETAINEES-3486
DETAINEES-3487
DETAINEES-3488
DETAINEES-3489

297-HQ-A13276691-E-3
CMR

The following investigation was conducted by SSA [delete] on 05/21/2004.  The information was gathered from a telephonic follow up interview, of SA [delete] to a personal interview between SSA [delete] and SA [delete] on 05/18/2004.

SA [delete] provided information concerning the reference, from his prior conversation with SSA [delete] to his request that prison guards not "ridicule or humiliate" a specific detainee.  SA [delete] stated he did not observe any physical harassment of detainees, other than the examples he previously noted.  He observed the prison guards verbally harassing and ridiculing the detainees.  It was never aggressive, but was degrading.

As an example, SA [delete] observed the guards give the detainees cleaning supplies and ordered them to scrub the floors.  He observed the orders given in a "theatrical and humiliating" manner, that is the guards ordered the detainees to clean "their" (meaning the guard's) floor and repeatedly yelled orders to the detainees.  SA [delete] described the treatment as constant verbal haranguing.  SA [delete] noted the treatment was not unlike treatment he had observed in U.S. prisons/jails.

SA [delete] stated he requested the guards spare the specific detainee the "ridicule and humiliation" not because SA [delete] was concerned for the safety of the detainee, but because SA [delete] wanted the detainee to think SA [delete] had the power to change the detainee's environment.  SA [delete] requested the guards call the specific detainee by his true name.

DETAINEES-3492

297-HQ-A13276691-E-3
ELM elm

On 05/18/2004, Language Specialist (LS) [delete] EOD [delete] telephone number [delete] assigned to FBI Houston, was contacted by SSA [delete] [delete] at the J. Edgar Hoover Building, FBIHQ, Washington, D.C. regarding his knowledge concerning FBI personnel activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison, Baghdad, Iraq. [Delete] provided the following information:

[Delete] stated that between 09/12/2003 through 11/11/2003, he served as an interpreter at the Abu Ghurayb prison.  During that time, he did not observe any misconduct of mistreatment of prisoners.  [Delete] stated that on one occasion, he witnessed one military police (MP) officer yelling in the face of a prisoner who did not understand the directions of the MP.  This particular incident stood out because several agents, and MPs were around and witnessed the MP shouting and "talking down" to the prisoner.  However, no observations of physical contact or abuse were noted.

[Delete] advised that he was part of interview teams that consisted of at least two FBI agents, two HRT members, and him.  The agents, [delete] (phonetic), from FBI El Paso, and [delete] NU, from FBI Los Angeles were [delete] primary team members.  [Delete] [delete] stated that all contact with the prisoners was conducted in either an office outside the cell blocks, an air conditioned tent, or a fixed office building (similar to a trailer) detached from the cell blocks, but on the Abu Ghurayb Prison compound.  [Delete] stated that all prisoners were afforded water, restroom breaks, and chairs.  Detainees were placed in comfortable settings and agents went out of their way to treat all detainees with dignity and respect.  On several occasions, FBI agents delivered messages to family members of detainees.  All interviews were conducted in a professional manner and in accordance with Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice protocols.  [Delete] stated that FBI employees went out of their way to ensure each detainee was treated with dignity and respect.

[Delete] stated that during his interviews with detainees, on three occasions, prisoners brought to his team's attention acts of abuse had taken place prior to arriving at Abu Ghurayb Prison.  [Delete] stated that his interviews determined those acts of abuse occurred during arrests by military personnel further described as non-American (presumed to be Iraqi Military).  Examples of the reported acts of abuse included being kicked in the stomach, electric shock, threats to harm family members, and one burn victim.  The burn victim, an Iraqi Intelligence Officer (IO) was the only individual [delete] recalled contacting outside the prison compound.  This individual was a patient in a Baghdad hospital and was contacted there several times by himself and SA [delete] [delete] stated that FBI Agents took pictures of all injuries, even those which occurred prior to the incarcerations at the AGP.  These findings were documented on the FD-302's of interviewing agents.

[Delete] advised that he had limited contact with MPs.  Aside from FBI personnel, his other contact would have been with individuals [delete] who accompanied him to a few interviews.  [Delete] stated that only agents had direct contact with MPs.  His role as the translator did not lend itself to other outside contacts.  [Delete] advised that during the time in Abu Ghurayb Prison, he did not record, photograph, or video tape any instances of abuse nor did he have the same in his possession.  Other than what was reported above, [delete] was not aware of any improprieties resulting in the abuse of prisoners as described on television today.

DETAINEES-3493
DETAINEES-3494

[Delete]

1. No misconduct or mistreatment.  3-4 times detainee ordered to strip.  [illegible ] in isolation  [illegible] w/no clothes.

2.  Yes.  One instance in which detainee complained about being stripped naked, kept naked and [illegible] [illegible] deprivation [illegible] roughed up by [illegible].  Detainee was [big illegible] in military uniforms  [illegible] him.  Detainee was in [illegible] about 8 times, DYNG & [illegible] 1 hr. was [illegible] [illegible] to [delete] [illegible] [delete] Anssar Al Islam - no physical [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ties w/Al Qaeda. SA [delete] [illegible]

3.  As [illegible].

4.  Interrogation rooms.  Different [illegible] buildings within prison compound, [illegible] [illegible] 6 rooms in [illegible] building.  2 rooms [illegible] w/windows.  [Illegible]

DETAINEES-3502

L.S. [delete], Houston, Texas EOD [delete] [illegible] Time in Baghdad Houston; LS [delete]

1.  Observed yelling in face and prisoner not understanding shouting at prisoner's face -- no physical contact "Talking down -- don't eyeball me -- [illegible] loud voices -- one of the military guys.

(Only [illegible] for 5 wks) - 2 SA [delete] El Paso [delete] LA

No -- other than above.

2.  No -- (End of Oct) [illegible] Transferred prisoners

3.  Yes, Very prof.  water.  chair.  comfortable.  out of their way.

(1) One prisoner - [delete] Al Najaf bombing suspect described he was tortured Badan group (non-Amer).  Burned with elec. shocks & [illegible] No Amer.

(2) UN bomb suspect -- FBI released said when he was arrested he was kicked in stomach by Military [illegible ].

(3) Hospital Al-Anni Iraqi I.D. -- Burns over body told came during arrest in [illegible]

-- which was hot and caused burns over body [illegible] SA [delete] El Paso determined [illegible] (Suspect & I.D.) [Delete] [illegible]

Prof team in dealing w/prisoners -- all [illegible] of SA -- Very respectful.  [Illegible] needs messages to family.

[Delete] [illegible] outside prison -- Outside cells

4.  In a room located in tent - Bungalo Trailer - [illegible] fixture w/[illegible] Rooms & air.  Prisoner to them.

5.  Don't Know -- Not sure where there are pictures on TV are [illegible]  But not sure.

6.  Very minimal contact.  Agents w/PP.

None.

7.  LS, 2-0 agents did Al Anni (Hosp).  Prisoner w/2 people HRT outside.

8. Other before.

9.  No & No.  Nothing from him or people talking.

10.  Don't recall anything other than [illegible] at that time he didn't know at time their interview [illegible] "Good Guys."

11.  Others were there no need to report.  Everything was shared to agents.

12.  No.  Muslims -- taking clothes off.  Not sure if truth or not.

DETAINEES-3515
DETAINEES-3516
DETAINEES-3517

297-HQ-A13276697-E-3

[Delete]

5/21

True in theory

observed [illegible]

harassing & ridiculing in [illegible]

name calling and verbal harassment

not aggressive -- but degrading to inmates

because I wanted detainee to know I had power to change his environment

asked they call him by true name & allow dignity -- was when I gave light bulb

not observed physical harassment of detainee

saw guards frequently, request detainees to clean/scrub cells [illegible] in humiliating way -- guard give cleaning supplies & almost in theatrical manner yell to [illegible] my floor was clean."  Inmate appeared humiliated by constant orders &

DETAINEES-3521

[Delete] INSD) (FBI)

From:  [Delete]

Sent:  Satuday, May 22, 2004 12 23 PM

To:  Caproni, Valerie E (OGC) (FBI)

Cc:  [Delete] INSD) (FBI). [Delete] (INSD) (FBI)

Subject:  RE Post report

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Valerie, We are ready to launch on the other interviews and as you know there is zero indication of this thus far.

---Original Message---
From:  Caproni, Valerie E. (Div09) (FBI)
Sent:  Saturday, May 22, 2004 12 17 PM
To:  CHANDLER, CASSANDRA M. (Div00) (FBI), LAISCH, ELENI P. (Div000) (FBI) WAINSTEIN, KENNETH L. (Div00) (FBI), MUELLER, ROBERT S. III (Div00) (FBI), MCCRAW, STEVEN C.; GEBHARDT, BRUCE J. (Div00) (FBI)
Cc:  BRIESE, M.C. (Div13) (FBI); HARRINGTON, T.J. (Div13) (FBI)
Subject:  Post report

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

According to the Washington Post, one of the MPs that gave a statement in the Abu Ghraib prison investigation said that FBI was involved in the abuse.  We are going to try to get a copy of the statement and see if there is anything we can do to follow up.  As of right now, my information is that because of the danger at the prison, our people never spent the night.

UNCLASSIFIED

DETAINEES-3527

[Delete] (IR) (FBI)

From:  [Delete]
Sent:  Thursday, May 13, 2004 3:42 PM
To:  [Delete] (IR) (FBI)
Subject:  current events

for a better understanding of the issue we spoke about, one should read not only the bau ec, but the attachments as well.

[delete] is here with me and should anyone be interested, he could illuminate a lot about gen miller's view on interrogation.  [delete] was the miami case agent for 14 months.

from what cnn reports, gen karpinsky at abu gharib said that gen miller came to the prison several months ago and told her they wanted to "gimotize" abu gharib.  i am not sure what this means.  however, if this refers to intell gathering as i suspect, it suggests he has continued to support interrogation strategies we not only advised against, but questioned in terms of effectiveness.

yesterday, however, we were surprised to read an article in stars and stripes, in which gen miller is quoted as saying that he believes in the rapport-building approach.  this is not what he was saying at gitmo when i was there.  [delete] and i did cart wheels.  the battles fought in gitmo while gen miller he was there are on the record.

check out not only the bau ec but one written by miami division.  [delete] should know about this as should [delete] in san francisco.  it's a must read.  [delete] knows these issue quite well and has also fought battles.  has anyone checked with [delete]?

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

DETAINEES-2706

[Delete] (IOR) (FBI)

From:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI)
Sent:  Monday, May 10, 2004 12:26 PM
To:  HARRINGTON, T.J. (Div13) (FBI)
Cc:  BATTLE, FRANKIE (Div13) (FBI) [delete] (IR) (FBI) [delete] (Div13) (FBI) [delete] (Div13) (FBI) [delete] (Div13) (FBI), CUMMINGS, ARTHUR M. (Div13) (FBI)
Subject:  Instructions to GTMO interrogators.

SECRET/ORCON, NOFORN
RECORD 315N-MM-C99102

TJ,

I will have to do some digging into old files [delete] [delete].  We did advise each supervisor that went to GTMO to stay in line with Bureau policy and not deviate from that [delete].  I went to GTMO with [delete] early on and we discussed the effectiveness [delete] with the SSA.  We (BAU and ITOS1) had also met with Generals Dunlevey & Miller explaining our position (Law Enforcement techniques) vs. DoD.  Both agreed the Bureau has their way of doing business and DoD has their matching orders from the Sec Def.  Although the two techniques differed drastically, both Generals believed they had a job to accomplish.  It was our mission to gether critical intelligence and evidence [delete] [delete] in furtherance of FBI cases.  In my weekly meetings with DOJ we often discussed [delete] techniques and how they were not effective or producing Intel that was reliable.  [Delete] (SES} [delete] [delete] (SES) [delete] (now SES) [delete] at the time) and [delete] (SES Appointee) all from DOJ Criminal Division attended meetings with FBI.  We all agreed [delete] were going to be an issue in the military commission cases.  I know [delete] brought this to the attention of [delete].

One specific example was [delete].  Once the Bureau provide DoD with the findings [delete] [delete] they wanted to pursue expeditiously their methods to get "more out of him" [delete]  We were given a so called deadline to use our traditional methods.  Once oru timeline [delete] was up [delete] took the reigns.  We stepped out of the picture and [delete] ran the operation [delete.  FBI did not participate at the direction of myself [delete] and BAU UC [delete].  We would receive IIRs on the results of the process.

I went to GTMO on one occasion to specifically address the information coming from [delete] [delete].  We (DoD 3 Star Geoff Miller, FBI, CITF [delete] etc) had a VTC with the Pentagon Detainee Policy Committee.  During this VTC I voiced concerns that the intel produced was nothing more than what FBI got using simple investigative techniques (following the trail of the detainee in and out of the US compared to the trail of [delete was providing [delete] portion of the briefing.  [Deleted] was present at the Pentagon side of the VTC.  After allowing [delete] to produce nothing, I finally voiced my opinion concerning the information.  The conversations were somewhat heated.  [Delete] agreed with me.  [delete] finally admitted the information was the same info the Bureau obtained.  It still did not prevent them from continuing the [delete] methods."  DOJ was with me at GTMO [delete] during that time.

Bottom line is FBI personnel have not been involved in any methods of interrogation that deviate from our policy.  The specific guidance we have given has always been no Miranda, otherwise, follow FBI/DOJ policy just as you would in your field office.  Use common sense.  Utilize our methods that are proven (Reed school, etc).

If you would like to call me to discuss this on the telephone I can be reached at [delete].

---Original Message-----

SECRET

DETAINEES-2709

SECRET

From:  HARRINGTON, T.J. (Div13) (FBI)
Sent:  Monday, May 10, 2004 9:21 AM
To:  [Delete] (Div 13) (FBI)
Subject:  RE:  pls confirm

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

We have this information, now we are trying to go beyond did we ever put into writing in an EC, memo, not or briefing paper to our personnel our position [delete] that we were pursuing our traditional methods of building trust and a relationship with subjects.  Tom.

---Original Message---
From:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI)
Sent:  Monday, May 10, 2004 10:52AM
To:  HARRINGTON, T.J. (Div13) (FBI)
Cc:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI); BATTLE, FRANKIE (Div13) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (Div09) (FBI)
Subject:  RE:  pls confirm

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

BAU at the request of the then (GTMO Task Force, ITOS1) wrote an EC (quite long) explaining the Bureau way of interrogation vs. DoDs methodology.  Our formal guidance has always been that all personnel conduct themselves in interviews in the manner that they would in the field.  [Delete] [delete] along with FBI advised taht the LEA (Law Enforcement Agencies) at GTMO were not in the practice of the using [delete] and were of the opinion results obtained from these interrogations were [delete].  BAU explained [delete] FBI has been successful for many years obtaining confessions via non-confrontational interviewing techniques.

We spoke to FBI OGC with our concerns.  I also brought these matters to the attention of DOJ during detainee meetings with [delete] express their concerns to [delete].

[delete] has a copy of all the information regarding the BAU LHM.  I believe she has provided that to TJ Harrington.

I may have more specific information in my desk at HQ.  I will search what I have when I return (5/17).

---Original Message--
From:  HARRINGTON, T.J. (Div13) (FBI)
Sent:  Monday, May 10, 2004 4:33 AM
To:  BATTLE, FRANKIE (Div13) (FBI); [delete] (Div 13) (FBI) [delete [delete] (Div 13) (FBI)
Subject:  FW:  pls confirm

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Please review our control files, did we produce anything on paper???

---Original Message--
From:  Caproni, Valerie E. (Div09) (FBI)
Sent:  Sunday, May 09, 2004 2:31 PM
To:  [delete] (Div09) (FBI); HARRINGTON, T.J. (Div13) (FBI) [delete

SECRET

DETAINEES-2710

[Delete] (IR) (FBI)

From:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI)
Sent:  Wednesday, May 05, 2004 8:50 AM
To:  [delete] 9Div13) (FBI) [delete] (Div13) (FBI) [delete] Delete] (Div13) (FBI); [delete] (Div13) (FBI) [delete] (Div 13) (FBI); [delete] (Div13) (FBI) [delete] (Div09) (FBI); [delete] (IR) (FBI)
Subject:  RE:  Detainee abuse claims

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

ALCON,

Based on Rumsfeld's public statements, DoD is against hooding prisoners, threats of violence and techniques meant to humiliating detainees (there is a list of these I have seen) [delete].  An EC outlining these [delete] was done by MLDU in November 2003 as to FBI's disapproval [delete] [delete] regardless of whether they were approved by the Deputy Secretary Defense.  DAD Harrington has also been interested in following up on this. [Delete] where does that stand?

SSA [delete]
CTD/ORS/MLDU
JEH, Room 5382
[Delete]

---Original Message---
From:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI)
Sent:  Wednesday May 05, 2004 8:23 AM
To:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI) [delete] (Div13) (FBI); [delete] (Div13) (FBI); [delete] (Div13) (FBI)
Cc:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI); [delete] (Div09) (FBI); [delete] [delete] (IR) (FBI)
Subject:  RE:  Detainee abuse claims
Importance:  High

We need to be very careful here.  Everyone should pay particular attention to the distinctions between allegations of abuse and the use of techniques which fall outside of FBI/DOJ training and policy.  As I stated in my email yesterday, I am not aware of any credible allegations of abuse by anyone in GTMO.

[Delete]

Our Behavioral Assessment Unit (BAU) disagreed with the use of specific techniques in the case of [delete] as they opined that the techniques would not be successful and they could produce unreliable results.  BAU did not make any allegations of abuse that I am aware of.

---Original Message---
From:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI)
Sent:  Tue 5/4/2004 7:46 PM
To:  [delete] (Div13) (FBI); [delete] (Div13) (FBI); [delete] [delete] (Div13) (FBI)
Cc:
Subject:  Detainee abuse claims

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

I can think of two specific examples ... you may want to talk to BAU about [delete] and [delete] [delete] in GTMO.

DETAINEES-2715
DETAINEES-2716

SECRET

To:  Counterterrorism  From Counterterrorism
Re:  315N-HQ-C1409646-E  02/28/2004

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Delete] was then asked if he had heard of UBL, KSM, [delete] Al Qaeda, [delete] appeared uncomfortable with this line of questioning and continued to deny any knowledge of the above.  When reminded that he had been shown a video of the 09/11/2001 terror attacks that explained the relevance of UBL, KSM and Al Qaeda, [delete] said he had first heard of these matters from his interrogators.  When reminded that writer had posed this exact question to him just one week prior, [delete] appeared confused and stated he was losing his mind while in custody.  [delete] went on to state that all he can think of is his family and returning home to them.  [delete] then stated if the writer went to his village of [delete] the writer would be moved to tears by the desperate situation there.  When told it was difficult to believe no one ever discussed UBL whether in his home village or while in custody at Bagram, [delete] stated no one is allowed to speak inside the BCP and therefor none of his fellow PUC's discuss terrorism or terrorist activities.  [Delete] [Delete]

[Delete]

[Big Delete]

DETAINEES-1989

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date:  04/09/2004

Precedence:  ROUTINE

To:  Counterterrorism

Attn:  ITOS1, UC [delete
TRRS, IOS [delete]
ITOS2, UC [delete]
ITOS2, IOS [delete]
ITOS2, UC [delete]
ITOS2, Iran Unit

From:  Counterterrorism
ORS/MLDU/Bagram, Afghanistan
Contact:  TDY-SA [delete]

Approved By: [delete]

Drafted By: [delete]

Title:  GTMO TASK FORCE
BAGRAM AFGHANISTAN

Synopsis:    Provide results of interviews conducted [delete] and [delete] with Person Under Control (PUC) [delete] writer conducted the interviews with the assistance of US Army Major [delete] and [delete] [delete] Linguist [delete].

Administrative:  As a result of meetings conducted by Bagram SSA [delete] with representatives of the Department of Defense [delete] the FBI is now permitted to release the following information to the USIC

Details:  [Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Delete] [Delete] When asked what [delete] he himself understood [delete] stated that even though he can conduct basic conversations in [delete] he is unable to read it.  When asked why he spends so much time with [delete] Koran in his cell, [delete] responded that he essentially is just looking at the words but is unable to comprehend them.  [Delete] said he was not familiar himself with the content of the Koran other than what he had been told by others.  Additionally, [delete] did not know the Koran has been published in [delete] English and several other languages.  When asked if he would like to receive a copy of the Koran in [delete] [delete] became excited at the possibility.

Note:  Writer believes [delete] would be an excellent candidate for an ideological/theological approach by an Islamic scholar that speaks [delete].  He appears to be a genuinely religious individual that is easily influenced by persons that hold positions of authority within Islam.

The subject then provided the following information regarding the day he was captured by coalition forces [delete] [big delete]

[Delete] [Delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]  He was later awakened by the sound of explosions and gunfire.  [delete] said he put his hands in the air, but was struck in the head and passed out.  He later regained consciousness in a hospital.

Two or three days later, [delete] was spoken to by two men, one that appeared to be an American and another that was of Arab descent.  When questioned by the two, [delete] said he provided truthful answers to the questions that he understood.  [Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

When questioned, [delete] said he was familiar with Mir Amal Kansi, a Pakistani that was convicted for murdering two CIA employees outside of CIA headquarters.  [Delete] said he did not know him personally, but was aqware of his case because it had garnered so much media attention.  [Delete] said he was not familiar with Ramzi Yousef.  [Delete] [Delete]

When asked what he would like more than anything, [delete] said he wanted to know what his punishment was going to be.  When asked why he picked that over seeing his family or going home, [delete] said he knows he is going to be in American custody for a long time and that he will eventually be turned over to the [delete] authorities when the US is done with him.  When asked why the [delete] would want him, [delete] replied that it is because he is a [delete] citizen and has a case pending against him in [delete] went on to explain that he has a [delete] [delete] case pending [delete]

[Big delete]

DETAINEES-1991
DETAINEES-1992
DETAINEES-1993

SECRET/NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date:  05/02/2004

Precedence:  ROUTINE

To:  Counterterrorism

Attn:  ITOS1, CONUS1, SSA [Delete]
ITOS1, CONUS1, IOS [Delete]
TRRS, IOS [delete]
TRRS, IOS [delete]
Legat
SA [delete]
Det [delete]

From:  Counterterrorism
ORS/MLDU/TDY Bagram, Afghanistan
Contact:  TDY-SSA

Approved By:  [delete]

Drafted By:  [delete]

Case ID # 315N-NY-285984
315N-HQ-C1406946-E

Title:  [delete]
IT-OTHER

GTMO TASK FORCE;
FBIHQ-AFGHANISTAN

Synopsis:  Documentation of [delete] interviews of [delete] at Bagram Air Field (BAF), Afghanistan.

Details:  On [delete] Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [delete] and Sgt. [delete] USA, Military Intelligence (MI), interviewed [delete] [delete] hereafter referred to as [delete].

On [delete] [delete] was asked whether he had thought about Interviewing Agents comments regarding a need to be truthful and candid in all aspects of interviews.  [Delete] stated that he had been completely candid and that he could do no more.  Interviewing Agents bluntly told [delete] that he had not been truthful and his continued lack of candor was the reason he remained where he was.   [Delete] steadfastly insisted that there was nothing he has hidden from investigators the entire time he has been in custody.

Interviewing Agents spent some time reminding [delete] of his transparent and frequent contact with [delete] [delete].  Furthermore, Interviewing Agents logically laid out the facts of his associations with Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and how that led to interaction with [delete].  Interviewing Agents also interjected with comments made by [delete] which showed [delete] overall complicity.

After a lengthy time, [delete] finally admitted that he knew all along that when he was dealing with [delete] [delete] that they were associated with Al Qaeda (AQ).  However, [delete] continued to deny that he knew [delete] was associated with AQ. The interview was concluded.

By design, the mood throughout the [delete] interview was hostile.  Interviewing Agents refused to allow [delete] to misdirect or deny known facts.  Interviewing Agents also maintained an aggressive attitude toward [delete] throughout the course of the interview.  Furthermore, Interviewing Agents advised [delete] they felt his simple denials were childlike and that it was shameful [delete] [delete].  Interviewing Agents believe that [delete] is egotistical and enjoys playing the role of mentor.  With [delete] being told that Interviewers saw him so negatively, future statement by [delete] might be influenced so he could avoid this negative perception.  Interviewing Agents believe [delete] feels that to state he knew [delete] was AQ would be tantamount to signing a confession.  However, even if [delete] never provides truthful statements on the topic of [delete] his fear of being viewed as an intellectual or ethical inferior may drive him to be more careful about making untruthful statements in other areas.

[Delete] was reinterviewed.  Interviewing Agents wanted to see how Paracha's attitude had changed after the hostile nature of the last interview.  [Delete] was greeted and asked how he had been feeling.  [Delete] stated that he had been experiencing dizzy spells and shortness of breath.  Interviewing Agents pent a few minutes discussing further [delete] health.

[Delete] was then asked to talk about his attitude toward the Taliban.  [Delete] stated that throughout history Pakistan and Afghanistan were so closely linked that they could not be separated.  [Delete] advised that the Taliban was the only group that has been able to bring stability to Afghanistan.  [Delete] believed that the Taliban maintained law and order and successfully controlled the drug trade within Afghanistan.

[Delete] stated that Islam is a flexible religion and the Taliban's only problem was that it was not flexible.  [Delete] explained that Afghanistan was not an educated society so the only means to properly control the population was through religion which the Taliban did do successfully.

[Delete] then broadened the topic and discussed Islam in relation to other religions of the Book (Christianity and Judaism).  [Delete] stated that Islam forces no person to change his religion and that actually Muslims have a responsibility to protect non-Muslims.

[Delete] was asked to discuss his views on personal jihad versus group jihad.  [Delete] stated that his view of a personal jihad was for one to maintain self control and contribute what one can to society.  Group jihad was in the defense of the Islamic State.  In a sovereign state with an army there is no need for group jihad by the civilians.  Furthermore, [delete] stated taht group jihad is authorized against the government which poses the threat but not against the innocent or civilians.  Jihad in defense can be in the form of physical power (action), tongue (verbal), or simply condemnation within one's heart.

[Delete] was then asked that based on his believe in the Islamic State ruling peacefully with persons of other religions and the belief of group jihad only in defense against an attacking government, what did he think of actions carried out by UBL and AQ.  [Delete] stated that UBL had no authority under Islamic Law to proclaim jihad.  Interviewing Agents continued and advised that though UBL did not have such authority he was in league with others that did have the authority and supported UBL's jihad proclamation.  Interviewing Agents asked [delete] if he wished to see Christians hating Muslim's because of the violent actions of a few [delete] reiterated that he wished Muslim and non-Muslim could live peacefully.  [Delete] was told that if this were truly his wish he could not logically support UBL or AQ.   [Delete] remained quiet during much of this discourse but finally agreed that what UBL did was harmful to the Islamic cause.

At his point the interview was concluded.  Interviewing Agents did not notice any harmful effects as a result of the adversarial nature of the previous interview.  [Delete] spoke freely to Interviewing Agents and did not mention the previous interview.  [Delete] has been in isolation for several months and it is apparent [delete] needs and enjoys the interaction these interviews bring.  Interviewing Agents feel [delete] can be pushed fairly far and it will not cause him to cease speaking with Interviewing Agents.

In general, Interviewing Agents believe [delete] relies on the fact that Interviewers do not have the knowledge to refute many statements he makes.  [Delete] is free to make comments on various topics in an authoritative manner and has thus far not been challenged on his interpretation of the facts.  When [delete] is challenged on the statements he makes and those challenges are backed with other evidence, [delete] loses the control he feels during the interview.  Interviewing Agents believe asking [delete] questions in which the Interviewers have solid evidence to refute any possible lies and constantly challenging [delete] is the best approach to use at this stage with him.

LEAD(s)

Set Lead 1:

DETAINEES-2000

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN

To:  Counterterrorism   From Counterterrorism

Re:  315N-HQ-1406946-E  07/28/2004

[Big Delete] [Delete] stated that they were taught to fight the "infidels" and to spread the word of Islam.  Everyone in the training camp was prepared to kill "infidels" if they did not accept the word of Islam.

[Big delete]

[Big delete]  It was at this time that [delete] related stories from his time spent in the Cuban prison (presumably GTMO).  [Delete] told [delete] that they were denied sleep, they were only given certain types of food and they were beaten.  [Delete] claimed to had been released in a "trade" for Coalition prisoners.

[Big Delete]

DETAINEES-2006

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHAFIQ RASUL, et al.,
Petitioners.
DAVID M. HICKS,
Petitioner,
-against-
GEORGE W. BUSH, et al.,
Respondents.
______________________________________x

Civil Action No. 02-299 (CKK)

SUBMITTED UNDER SEAL

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED COMPLAINT AND APPLICATIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

DAVID M. HICKS, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I. I am David M. Hicks, a Petitioner in the above-captioned action, and I make this Affidavit, submitted under seal, [1] in support of my Amended Complaint, and my applications for injunctive relief.

2. I am a native and citizen of Australia, born in Adelaide August 7, 1975. I have completed the 9th Grade in the Australian school system.

3. This Affidavit provides an outline of the abuse and mistreatment I have received, witnessed, and/or heard about since I have been detained by the United States in Afghanistan, aboard U.S. Naval vessels and U.S. military aircraft, and at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (hereinafter "Guantanamo Bay''). I have been detained by the United States Armed Forces from December 2001 until present. I arrived in Guantanamo Bay in January 2002. It does not detail all of the abuse I have received, or witnessed, or heard about, but merely sketches some of it. I have been careful to specify what happened to me, what I saw happen to others, and what I have heard about. During the course of my interrogations, I have repeatedly asked for a lawyer and why I am not being treated as a Prisoner of War.

4. Since I do not have access to either a typewriter or computer, this Affidavit has been prepared by my attorneys based on information I have provided to them. I have reviewed the Affidavit carefully, and verify that it is completely accurate.

5. I have been beaten before, after, and during interrogations.

6. I have been menaced and threatened, directly and indirectly, with firearms and other weapons before and during interrogations.

7. I have heard beatings of other detainees occurring during interrogation, and observed detainees' injuries that were received during interrogations.

8. I have been beaten while blindfolded and handcuffed.

9. I have been in the company of other detainees who were beaten while blindfolded and handcuffed. At one point, a group of detainees, including myself, were subjected to being randomly hit over a eight hour session while handcuffed and blindfolded.

10. I have been struck with hands, fists, and other objects (including rifle butts). I have also been kicked. I have been hit in the face, head, feet, and torso.

11. I have had my head rammed into asphalt several times (while blindfolded).

12. I have had handcuffs placed on me so tightly, and for so long (as much as 14-15 hours) that my hands were numb for a considerable period thereafter.

13. I have had medication - the identity of which was unknown to me, despite my requests for information - forced upon me against my will. I have been struck while under the influence of sedatives that were forced upon me by injection.

14. I have been forced to run in leg shackles that regularly ripped the skin off my ankles. Many other detainees experienced the same.

15. I have been deprived of sleep as a matter of policy.

16. I have witnessed the activities of the Internal Reaction Force (hereinafter "IRF'), which consists of a squad of soldiers that enter a detainee's cell and brutalize him with the aid of an attack dog. The IRF invasions were so common that the term to be "IRF'ed" became part of the language of the detainees. I have seen detainees suffer serious injuries as a result of being IRF'ed. I have seen detainees IRF'ed while they were praying, or for refusing medication.

17. I was told repeatedly that if I cooperated during the course of interrogations, I would be sent home to Australia after the interrogations were concluded. I was told there was an "easy way" and a "hard way" to respond to interrogation.

18. Interrogators once offered me the services of a prostitute for fifteen minutes if I would spy on other detainees. I refused.

19. Failure to cooperate meant the loss of the ordinary necessities of living, such as showers, sufficient food, relief from the prospect of IRF'ing and other regular abuse visited upon non-cooperative detainees, access to reading material, and social contact (including receiving mail).

20. During Ramadan, food was withheld from detainees after the break of the daily fast in order to coerce cooperation with interrogators. Detainees who refused to cooperate were punished regularly, and denied the ordinary necessities of living.

21. I have been told that strobe lights and extreme cold were also used to disorient detainees in order to soften them up for interrogation. I have also heard that religious detainees were exposed to pornography, and were dragged around naked in order to break their will.

22. Detainees were not allowed to know the date, day, year, or time. We were deprived of any and all information and news from the world. Detainees were permitted very little exercise.

23. At one point during 2003 alone, my weight dropped by 30 pounds (and I was not overweight to start).

24. Other detainees also informed me that interrogators attempted to turn them against me by spreading rumors about me. In any event, due to the way interrogations were conducted, and the physical layout of the camps, it was obvious to all of the detainees who was being interrogated, for how long, and whether that detainee emerged abused or not (with the latter signifying cooperation). Thus, any detainee would know who was cooperating with the interrogators.

25. The interrogation process ruled the detention camps and the lives of detainees. Cooperation with interrogators offered the only means of relief from the miserable treatment and abuse the detainees suffered. Those who failed to comply suffered abuse until they gave in.

26. My conditions changed after I was moved to Camp Echo (as did the treatment afforded me by the military personnel on duty there) July 9, 2003, and then again after the visits from my attorneys began. However, at Camp Echo, I have been held in a solitary cell and have been so since arriving at Camp Echo. I was not allowed outside of my cell in Camp Echo for exercise in the sunlight, from July 2003 until March 10, 2004.

27. As noted earlier, the above catalogue of abuse and mistreatment is not complete. It is but a summary of some of the abuse I suffered, witnessed, and/or heard about since my detention began. I would be able to provide further information and detail if the Court so desires, but a complete account would require a substantially longer document. In fact, at my request and due to the persistence of my lawyers, I have recently met with U.S. military investigators conducting the probe into detainee abuse in Afghanistan. Also, this is not the first time I protested my mistreatment, since on several occasions - in Afghanistan, and later at Guantanamo Bay - I informed representatives of the International Red Cross of the abuse.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Court grant the relief sought in my Amended Complaint, and for any such other relief that the Court deems proper.

DAVID M. HICKS

Sworn to before me this 5th day of August, 2004

M.D. MORI
Major
United States Marine Corps
Judge Advocate

_______________

1. This Affidavit is submitted under seal due to restrictions on information dissemination placed by U.S. military authorities on my attorneys and me. I have no objection to the unsealing of this Affidavit the Court determines it is appropriate to do so.

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