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SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK
EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary,
Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards,
CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING,
23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime
Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely
sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to
those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence
and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on
extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive
military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by
air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or
overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the
US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for
Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in
Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action
was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through
military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.
The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for
publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little
discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would
brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of
250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to
Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus
60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in
theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi
casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning
even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as
essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either
option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less
vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus,
plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air
assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution
of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering
from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US
had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No
decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US
minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline
beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would
discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush
had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not
yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his
neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North
Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to
allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the
legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the
desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There
were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian
intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be
the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be
difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would
make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow
in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense
that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different
strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context
were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were
whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political
strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not
know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing
to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences,
if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban
warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on
Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US
would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a
winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the
political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US
resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would
continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would
allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military
action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the
Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide
this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth
going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime
Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that
the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller
picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS
should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on
the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this
operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister
full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK
contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the
Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work
up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister
advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey,
and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime
Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues:
the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal
advisers.
(I have written separately to commission
this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
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