REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

by The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS

• Transmittal Letters from the House and Senate
• Forward
• Members of the Joint Inquiry
• Joint Inquiry Staff
• Abridged Findings and Conclusions
• PART ONE-FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
  • I. The Joint Inquiry
  • II. The Context
  • III. Findings and Conclusions
    • A. Factual Findings
    • B. Conclusion - Factual Findings
    • C. Systemic Findings
    • D. Related Findings
  • Recommendations (Errata Print)
• PART TWO-NARRATIVE-THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMER 11, 2001
  • I. The Plot Unfolds for the Attacks of September 11, 2001
    • A. The al-Qa'ida Roots of the September 11 Attacks
    • B. The Springboards for the Attack-Germany and Malaysia
    • C. The Principals Arrive in the United States -- January 2000 through April 2001
    • D. The Supporting Hijackers Arrive--April to June 2001
    • E. Final Organization of the Attacks
    • F. Financing of the Attacks
    • G. Execution of the Attacks
  • II. Pentagon Flight Hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salim al-Hazmi
    • A. The Malaysia Meeting and Identification of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Salim and Nawaf al-Hazmi - First Watchlist Opportunity
    • B. Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi Travel to the United States - Second Watchlist Opportunity
    • C. Khalid al-Mihdhar Leaves the United States and Nawaf al-Hazmi Applies for a Visa Extension
    • D. The Attack on USS Cole and the Identification of Khallad-Third Watchlist Opportunity
    • E. The June 11, 2001 FBI/CIA Meeting and Khalid al-Mihdhar's Return to the United States
    • F. The Watchlisting of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi
    • G. The Search for Khalid al-Mihdhar
    • H. The Case Against Bin Ladin
  • III. NSA Communications Intercepts Related to Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf and Salim al-Hazmi
  • IV. Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Had Numerous Contacts With an Active FBI Informant
    • A. Background
    • B. Informant's Relationship with Two Hijackers
    • C. Questions About the Informant's Credibility
  • V. Associates of the September 11 Terrorists in the United States
    • A. U.S. Intelligence Community Knowledge of Support Networks Prior to September 11
    • B. Persons Known to the FBI With Whom September 11 Hijackers May Have Associated in the United States
      • a. Omar al-Bayoumi
      • b. Osama Bassnan
      • c. [Imam]*
      • d. [Business Manager]
      • e. [Business Owner]
      • f. [An Individual]
      • e. [An Individual]
  • VI. Germany-Investigation of the Hamburg Cell
  • VII. The Hijackers' Visas
  • VIII. The Rising Threat and the Context of the September 11 Attacks
    • A. A New Breed of Terrorists
    • B. Emergence of Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida
    • C. Attributes of Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations
    • D. Intelligence about Bin Ladin's Intentions to Strike Inside the United States
    • E. Indications of a Possible Terrorist Attack in Spring and Summer 2001
    • F. Intelligence Information on Possible Terrorist Use of Airplanes as Weapons
  • IX. The Development of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Before September 11
  • * The identities of several individuals whose activities are discussed in this report have been deleted by the Joint Inquiry. While the FBI has provided the Joint Inquiry with these names and those names are contained in the classified version of this final report, the Joint Inquiry has decided to delete them from this unclassified version due to the as yet unresolved nature of much of the information regarding their activities.
    • A. Counterterrorism as an Intelligence Priority
    • B. Growing Importance in the Clinton Administration
    • C. Uncertainty During the Transition
    • D. The George W. Bush Administration
    • E. Competing Priorities
    • F. Policy Measures to Fight Terrorism
    • G. The Law Enforcement Approach
    • H. Disruptions and Renditions
    • I. Afghanistan as a Terrorist Sanctuary
    • J. The Intelligence Community
    • K. The Declaration of War
    • L. The Intelligence Community's Response
    • M. Shortcomings in the Intelligence Community's Response
    • N. The President and Senior Policy Advisor Responsibility
    • O. Lack of an Integrated Response
    • P. The Intelligence Community's Failure to Establish a Coordinated Domestic Focus before September 11
    • Q. Steps Taken to Fight International Terrorism at Home
    • R. Lack of Focus on the Domestic Threat
    • S. Limited Counterterrorism Contributions by Other Intelligence Community Members
• PART THREE - TOPICS - THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
  • I. Counterterrorism Resources
    • A. Joint Inquiry Resource Review Methodology and Limitations
    • B. Overall Intelligence Community Funding
    • C. Resources Dedicated to Counterterrorism
    • D. Personnel Shortages
      • a. Personnel Concerns at CIA
      • b. Personnel Concerns at NSA
      • c. Personnel Concerns at FBI
    • E. Counterterrorism and the Competition for Scarce Resources
    • F. Policymaker Criticism of Intelligence Community Budget Allocations
    • G. Reliance on Supplemental Funding for Counterterrorism
    • H. How Easily Can Money Be Moved?
  • II. Foreign Liaison
    • A. Efforts to Improve Foreign Liaison
    • B. Benefits of Foreign Liaison
    • C. Disadvantages of Relying on Foreign Liaison Services
    • D. Liaison Service Problems with the United States
    • E. Coordination of Foreign Liaison
    • F. Additional Challenges for the FBI Overseas
    • G. Progress after September 11, 2001
  • III. Covert Action and Military Operations Against Bin Ladin
    • A. Background
    • B. Authorities to Conduct Covert Action Against Bin Ladin
    • C. Additional Operational Challenges and Constraints
    • D. CIA Covert Action Against Bin Ladin [Prior to September 11, 2001]
    • E. Use of [ ] Against Bin Ladin
    • F. Use of U.S. Military Force Against Bin Ladin
  • IV. Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding
    • A. Financial Tracking before September 11
    • B. Financial Tracking after September 11
  • V. Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM): The Mastermind of September 11
    • A. KSM's Links to Terrorist Attacks before September 11
    • B. The Hunt for KSM
    • C. Finding KSM and Building the Case
    • D. [ ]
    • E. Link to al-Qa'ida Discovered
    • F. The Emphasis on Renditions
    • G. KSM's U.S. Connection
    • H. The Hunt for KSM Continues
  • VI. The FBI's Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Before September 11
  • VII. The Phoenix Electronic Communication (EC)
    • A. The Phoenix EC
    • B. Headquarters' Response to the Phoenix EC
    • C. New York FBI Office Action in Connection with the Phoenix EC
    • D. Handling of Phoenix EC Indicates FBI Headquarters Weaknesses
    • E. Links from the Phoenix EC to September 11
    • F. Previous FBI Focus on Suspected Terrorists at U.S. Flight Schools
  • VIII. Strategic Analysis
    • A. The Intelligence Community's Lack of Strategic Analysis
    • B. Analyst Qualifications and Training
    • C. Analysts' Access to Information
    • D. Language Skills
  • IX. Views of Outside Experts on the Intelligence Community
    • A. Setting Priorities
    • B. Strategy and Organization
    • C. Should a Strong Director of National Intelligence Be Established?
    • D. Should the Same Person be both DNI and Director of the CIA?
    • E. Counterterrorism Within the United States and Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency
    • F. A Legislative Charter for the Intelligence Community
    • G. Respect for the Rule of Law
  • X. Information Sharing
    • A. Information Sharing Between Intelligence Agencies and within the Federal Government
      • a. National Security Agency
      • b. The Central Intelligence Agency
      • c. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
      • d. The Department of State
      • e. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
    • B. Information Sharing Between Intelligence Agencies and State and Local Officials
    • C. Additional Information Sharing Problems
    • D. The Wall - Barriers Between Law Enforcement and Intelligence
  • XI. Technology Gaps
    • A. Technology Gaps at NSA
    • B. [ ]
    • C. [ ]
    • D. [ ]
    • E. [ ]
    • F. Selection and Filtering for [ ] Communications
    • G. Analyst Tools
    • H. Collection Platforms
  • XII. Technical Collection of Terrorist Communications
    • A. NSA's Organizational Structure for Collecting Terrorist Communications
    • B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and the September 11 Attacks
    • C. A Chronological Review of NSA Collection Efforts Against al-Qa'ida
    • D. Technical Collection Problems and Limits at NSA
      • a. Difficulties of Gaining Actionable Intelligence on al-Qa'ida
      • b. Difficulties in Adjusting to Terrorist Targets
      • c. Problems Keeping Pace with [ ] Advances before September 11
    • E. Insufficient Resources for Counterterrorism at NSA
    • F. Technical Collection at CIA
    • G. NSA/CIA Disputes over [ ] Collection
    • H. Technical Collection at FBI
  • XIII. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection
    • A. CIA Human Intelligence Collection
    • B. DIA Human Intelligence Collection
    • C. FBI Human Intelligence Collection
  • XIV. Summary of Joint Inquiry Review of Anthrax Attacks
• PART FOUR-FINDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE REGARDING
• CERTAIN SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS
• GLOSSARY
• Additional Views of Members
• Appendices