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REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 |
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ENTIRE Connection - Entire Connection - [1] May 29, 2003 No. 070 P. 11 2002 1:25 PM 1 CMLML02 [ ] [ ] [ ] code then press enter SECRET [ ] [ ] C=Cover M=Modify D=Discontinue T=Transfer
Serial : 71 SECRET F1=Help F3-Exit F4=Prompt F6=Multv F7 Bkwd F8=Fwd F12=Cancel F15=Print 00.009 May 29, 2003 NO. 070 P. 10 ENTIRE Connection - [Entire Connection - [1] 12/06/01 Modify Leads 14:03:20 View Lead, then press Enter : [ ] : Covered : COUNTERTERRORISM : WASHINGTON, D.C. : [ ] : 07/27/2001 Time: 0150 PM : 09/25/2001 Time: 0500 PM : 08072001 Time: 0433 PM > COVERED - CONSULTED WITH UBLU, NO ACTION AT THIS TIME RECONVENE ON THIS ISSUE ............ > ...... Disp [ ] [ ] 199M-PX-67026 (S) > .... > ........................... > Y F1=Help F3-Exit F4=Prompt F6=Multv F7 Bkwd F8=Fwd F12=Cancel F15=Print 14,017 APPENDIX MOUSSAOUI-RELATED FBI FIELD AGENT NOTES AND FIELD OFFICE/HEADQUARTERS E-MAILS* _______________ * The contents of this Appendix have been withheld at the request of the Department of Justice so as to avoid any impact on the prosecution of Zacharias Moussaoui. APPENDIX GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE ANALYSIS OF U.S. ANTHRAX ATTACKS LIMDIS FOUO
SUMMARY OF JOINT INQUIRY REVIEW OF ANTHRAX ATTACKS In October 2001, the Congress, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and elements of the domestic infrastructure were the targets of anthrax attacks that eventually killed five Americans. The Joint Inquiry requested that the General Accounting Office review those attacks, focusing on the difficulty of producing and spreading anthrax, mail as a delivery system, the status of USPS efforts to detect anthrax, the federal investigation into the attacks, and how the government is preparing for other incidents. When the Joint Inquiry report was filed, the GAG investigation had been substantially completed, with an initial finding that no consensus exists among experts regarding the ease with which terrorists or a disgruntled scientist could effectively produce and disseminate anthrax on U.S. soil. According to the GAG, technical experts believe that it would be very difficult to overcome technical and operational challenges to produce and deliver biological warfare agents sufficient to cause mass casualties. According to the experts the GAG interviewed, delivery of anthrax by mail is not as efficient a method of producing mass casualties as military technologies. However, in the public's mind and in terms of economic damage, anthrax powder in the mail represents a potentially significant problem. The USPS effort to defend against biological agents illustrates a key aspect of homeland defense: the distinction between reactive and proactive operational environments. Whereas the nation's posture had been to prevent attacks against military facilities, the anthrax attacks targeted civilian facilities that unprepared to react. LIMDIS FOUO LIMDIS FOUO According to the GAG, the FBI is aware of numerous anthrax incidents throughout the United States, which were random in nature and determined to be hoaxes. Because this was the first time the FBI responded to an actual attack, however, there was some initial confusion about the investigative roles and responsibilities of various agencies. The Bureau has recognized the need to involve subject-matter experts and, as a result, its investigative teams include scientists, criminal investigators, hazardous- material experts, investigators from other federal agencies, and federal laboratories. As a result of the anthrax attacks, the FBI and other investigative agencies have increased attention on chemical and biological threats. These agencies have reached agreements delineating roles and responsibilities, increased liaison with public health officials, developed a Center for Disease Control and FBI handbook for conducting investigations, and identified state and local officials who need security clearances for access to classified information. To date, no connection has been established between the anthrax attacks and the terrorist attacks of September 11. A copy of the GAG report follows. LIMDIS FOUO GAO December 6, 2002 The Honorable Bob Graham, The Honorable Richard Shelby The Honorable Porter J. Goss The Honorable Nancy Pelosi Subject: Analysis of U.S. Anthrax Attacks The purpose of this letter is to transmit a copy of our statement for inclusion in the Committee record, regarding our response to your request to collect information on the October 2001, anthrax in the United States using the United States Postal Service (USPS) as a vehicle. To address this objective, we specifically drew upon the biodetection work we are conducting at the USPS and tile chemical-biological defense work we are performing at the Department of Defense. We have also collected the Federal Bureau of Investigation's response to last year's anthrax attacks, and analyzed new information regarding the steps necessary to produce dry anthrax spores. This statement has been designated "Limited Official Use Only" because of the sensitive nature of the information it contains. Release to the public could be detrimental to the government and/or public safety. Recipients should not discuss or release this report to anyone whose official duties do not require access to the information it contains. This report should be safeguarded when not being used and destroyed when no longer needed. It is my understanding that your procedures for handling materials submitted to the Committee will fully address these concerns. This assignment was conducted by staff from our Applied Research and Methods team and office of Special Investigations under assignment code 460539. If you have any questions, please contact Sushil Sharrna, Assistant Director, Center for Technology and Engineering, at (202) 512-3460, Don Fulwider, Assistant Director, office of Special Investigations at (202) 512-7413, or me at (202) 512-6412. We can also be reached at SharimaS@gao.gov, FulwiderD@gao,gov, or RhodesK@gao.gov, respectively. Sincerely yours, Keith A. Rhodes Page 2 United States General Accounting Office Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives Tuesday, December 10, 2002 DIFFUSE SECURITY THREATS Information on U.S.
Domestic Anthrax Attacks LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY This statement has been designated "Limited Official Use Only" because of the sensitive nature of the information it contains. Release to the public could be detrimental to the government. Recipients should not discuss or release this statement to anyone whose official duties do not require access to the information it contains. This statement should be safeguarded when not being used and destroyed when no longer needed. Released by GAO 6/12/03 GAO GAO-O3-323T Limited Official Use Only Mr. Chairman and Members of the Joint Committee: As you requested in your letter of October 31, 2002, we are pleased to submit our statement for the record on the anthrax threat. We collected this information as part of several ongoing and completed projects dealing with the anthrax threat, the anthrax vaccine, and technologies to detect and identify anthrax spores, [1] that is, anthrax in a powder form. As you requested, my testimony will focus on the following questions: (1) How easy is it to produce and weaponize anthrax? (2) What studies were conducted to test mail as a weapon delivery system? And (3) what is the status of the United States Postal Service's (USPS) efforts to detect anthrax in the mail? You also requested that we provide an overview of federal law enforcement agencies' initial investigation in response to the October 2001 anthrax attack and how these agencies are preparing for similar incidents in the future. In conducting our work on anthrax production processes, we identified and consulted with a "Wide range of current and retired experts in anthrax and biological weapons production processes from the U.S. Army's Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, a principal site of biological weapons testing; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Ft. Detrick, Maryland; the Institute of Genomic Research, Bethesda, Maryland; the University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona; and the United Kingdom. In conducting our work on lJSPS's efforts to detect anthrax in the mail, we reviewed documents associated with USPS efforts to procure anthrax detection devices, met with USPS officials, and also met with industry experts and vendors representing the technologies USPS is considering. We also met with officials of the Canadian Defense Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) and observed the results of their tests of anthrax in mail in an office setting. Finally, in conducting our work on how law enforcement agencies responded to the October 2001 anthrax attack, we contacted representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of Criminal _______________ [1] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies for Mail Sanitization Exist, but Challenges Remain, GA,0-02-365 (Washington, D.C., April 23, 2002) and Diffuse Security Threats: USPS Air Filtration Systems Need More Testing and Cost Benefit Analysis before Implementation, GAO-O2-838 (Washington, D.C. August 22, 2002). Limited Official Use Only Page 1 GaO-03-323T Limited Official Use Only Enforcement, Forensics and Training (OCEFT); the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Weapons of Mass Destruction Unit and Washington Field Office; USPS's Manager for Environmental Management, Incident Commander for the Brentwood facility, and Postal Inspector; and the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Public Health Preparedness and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The work on which this statement is based began m November 2001 and has continued through November 2002, and it was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Background As of October 2002, intelligence assessments have not changed since 1990 for chemical and biological warfare threats on the battlefield or by terrorists. This is especially true, intelligence analysts told us, in terms of the numbers of countries suspected of developing anthrax spores, the types of biological agents these countries are known to possess, and their ability to weaponize and deliver such agents. [2] Unfortunately, for assessing a similar nonbattlefield threat, there are no current data on which to base an estimate apart from data on the October 2001 attack. As to the-terrorist threat, according to officials at the State Department's Diplomatic Security and at the Central Intelligence Agency, no clear evidence exists at this time that U.S. missions or interests overseas are threatened by foreign states or terrorist attacks using chemical and biological agents. According to these officials, terrorist attacks involving the use of conventional bombs are considered the greatest threat to U.S. overseas missions. [3] In 1998, at least 12 U.S. abortion clinics received letters that claimed to contain anthrax powder, followed by more than 35 such letters in 1999 and over 30 in 2000. All of these were found to be hoaxes. In addition, DOD committed to a program on December 15, 1997, to vaccinate the entire military because it considered anthrax powder to be a major battlefield _______________ [2] See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-148 (Washington, D.C.,Apri129, 1999). [3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Serious Problems in the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program, GAO-01-21 (December 13, 2000). Limited Official Use Only Page 2 GAO-03-323T Limited Official Use Only threat. [4] Simultaneously, the American public was introduced to biological warfare threats in a series of evening prime-time television addresses, including one by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen, showing the relative power of bio-weapons. There was much attendant publicity, both about the importance of the threat and concerns about the safety and efficacy of the vaccine. From 1998 to September 2001, more than 400 anthrax powder hoaxes occurred in the United States. While much attention has been paid to the anthrax letters sent in October 2001, more than 750 hoax letters involving anthrax threats were sent worldwide in October and November 2001. According to a non-profit center specializing in issues related to weapons of mass destruction, a single group, called the Army of God, sent more than 550 hoax letters to abortion clinics in the United States. [AB-1] Ease of Production of Anthrax Spores As you know, many conflicting statements have been made in public testimony before Congress and in the press concerning the ease or difficulty with which terrorists or a lone scientist could effectively disseminate, on U.S. soil, a chemical or biological agent, specifically anthrax, and cause mass casualties. [AB-2] As to the biological agents, all of the experts we met with agreed that while a laboratory scientist may be able to grow cultures of some bio-agents, the production and use of most biological warfare agents would require a relatively high degree of sophistication in terms of both expertise and equipment. According to technical experts in the many fields associated with biological agents, including those formerly with state-sponsored offensive biological weapons programs, it would be very difficult for a terrorist to overcome major technical and operational challenges to effectively and successfully weaponize and deliver a biological warfare agent to cause mass casualties. [5] If terrorists could overcome these obstacles, experts believe that those without a prior knowledge of these agents would have to conduct extensive experimentation to perfect their skills, which would _______________ [4] In July 2000, DOD ordered a temporary slowdown of its program because the U.S. anthrax vaccine manufacturer could not win Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of its manufacturing process and facilities. In January 2002, FDA approved the U.S. manufacturer's facilities and vaccine manufacturing process and DOD announced the resumption of its anthrax vaccination program in June 2002. [5] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSlAD-99-163 (Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999). Limited Official Use Only Page 3 GAO-03-323T Limited Official Use Only result in their increased risk of discovery .Specialized knowledge is needed to acquire the right biological warfare agent, process it, improvise a weapon or device, and effectively deliver it to cause mass casualties. To make high-quality anthrax powder, a number of challenging steps and specialties are involved: Acquisition of a virulent strain of anthrax (such as the Ames strain), by (1) locally isolating a strain from a dead animal, (2) purchasing a small sample from an organization that already possessed it, or (3) stealing or by other means obtain it from a laboratory known to possess it. Culturing or growing the organism to yield a large quantity, which could be done in commercially available fermenters or on agar plates (if fermented, the result is a slurry or liquid concentrate; if on an agar plate, the result is a wet paste). [5] Harvesting; washing, and concentrating the cultured sample, typically done in a centrifuge, which also removes most of the liquid and results in a wet paste. [6] Drying and grinding or milling the sample to sufficiently small size [7] including milling the spores to achieve the required particle size, and, possibly, adding appropriate chemicals to prevent aggregation of spores and to reduce static charge. [8] Testing to confirm dispersion patterns and potency to cause mass casualties, unless the perpetrators are highly confident of their abilities. Studies Conducted to Test Mail as a Delivery System for Anthrax Prior to 1998, the military did not envision mail as a delivery system for anthrax powder. In 1998, SAIC, a defense contractor, asked a scientist from the former U.S. offensive biological weapons program, to articulate in a paper several scenarios for delivery of biological warfare agents to support decontamination and containment. One of these scenarios included anthrax powder being sent through the mail. According to this _______________ [6] Experts told us that anthrax production is not an exact science. The yield and quality of each batch is variable even when produced legitimately in a highly sophisticated facility. [7] There are several drying and milling methods. Some will greatly increase the static charge, and some will reduce the efficiency of the production. Any anthrax powder of < 5 microns is essentially a vapor. [8] While it has been suggested that static charge could be reduced without adding chemicals, we have not been provided data to support this assertion. At this point, containment becomes imperative if the perpetrator wants to leave no evidence and protect himself or herself. Limited Official Use Only Page 4 GAO-03-323T Limited Official Use Only paper, if a letter contained more than 2 to 3 grams of powder, it would be relatively easy to detect by its visible shape. In addition, the author believed, by sending the anthrax in a letter, the area of contamination would be limited, so decontamination procedures could be implemented successfully. In this paper, however, the operational environment of automated mail processing was not considered. In Canada, the first Canadian anthrax hoax letter incident occurred on January 30, 2001) at the Citizenship and Immigration Office. Since no experimental study on which to base a realistic assessment of the threat posed by these "anthrax letters" could be found, Defense Research Establishment Suffield (DRES), a Canadian defense research and development organization, undertook a series of experiments to determine the extent of the hazard. This study was an attempt to (1) mimic what might occur in an office or mailroom if an envelope containing anthrax powder was received and opened and (2) estimate the aerosol release of the anthrax powder from the letters. This study also did not consider the operational environment of automated mail processing. Although this study was not published until October 1, 2001, DRES officials provided a schedule of briefings that were conducted through the spring and summer of 2001, when the results of the study were discussed. The results indicated that dispersion of spores in an office setting would be far more effective than had initially been suspected. Significant numbers of aerosolized particles (>99% in the 2.5 to 10 micron size range) were released when envelopes, containing 0.1 or 1.0 grams of anthrax powder, were opened. A lethal dose could be inhaled within seconds of opening such an envelope. In addition, the powder quickly spread throughout the room so that if other workers were present, depending on their location and the airflow within the office, they would also be likely to inhale a lethal dose. The results also indicated that envelopes with corners not totally sealed could pose a threat to individuals in the mail-handling system. However, it is important to note that the scientists were only evaluating, the anthrax threat that could result from opening an anthrax- contaminated letter. They did not evaluate whether the mail going through the pinch rollers in a postal sorting machine could also result in secondary contamination. Although these results are significant with respect to local area contamination, overall, the mail as a means of producing mass casualties remains an inefficient method of dissemination as compared with the various military technologies. Nonetheless, in terms of public concerns and economic damage, anthrax powder in the mail represents a potentially significant problem. Limited Official Use Only Page 5 GAO-03-323T Limited Official Use Only USPS Efforts to Detect Anthrax in the Mail USPS has been pursuing several approaches, including procedural changes and a number of currently available technologies, to reduce risk through early detection of biohazards, primarily anthrax. U8PS has identified several key areas of focus, including (1) redesign of mail collection boxes for both risk reduction and detection, (2) development of technology and procedures to reduce the volume of "anonymous" mail, (3) deployment of vacuum/filtration technology on automated sorting equipment, (4) use of mass spectrometry for detection, and (5) pursuit of a variety of technologies to aid investigators in finding whoever was responsible for earlier anthrax attacks through the mail and deterring future attempts at placing biohazards in the mail. To date, USPS has focused on systemwide detection technology -- centered mainly on Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) detection -- placed on the initial operation in processing facilities for mail with the greatest risk, which is picked up at collection boxes, residences, and small businesses. [9] USPS continues to face challenges in developing this technology for its operational environment. USPS continues to work with the manufacturers of several different technologies and is conducting additional testing and prototyping to fully determine the viability of these technologies in a mail processing environment. We are continuing to monitor USPS efforts to procure and deploy these technologies. The USPS efforts to defend against biological agents illustrate a key aspect of homeland defense -- namely, the distinction between reactive and proactive operational environments. Prior to the October 2001 letters containing anthrax powder, the vast majority of technologies and techniques for defending against biological agent attacks were based on a post-release reaction approach. This post-release approach assumed that the delivery of the biological warfare agent would be via a known weapon system; that the target would be an active military site; that the soldiers at the site would be protected by adequate training, clothing; and prophylaxis; and that a high number of false positive detections would not hinder the site's operations in any significant way. The USPS efforts illustrate a completely new proactive environment and concept of operations for these techniques and technologies. The USPS _______________ [9] PCR technology is able to detect small quantities of DNA with a particular genetic sequence (e.g. anthrax) and is the nucleus of the biohazard detection system (BDS) specifically designed for USPS. Limited Official Use Only Page 6 GAO-03-323T Limited Official Use Only environment is a civilian one, in which the. assumptions are that affected people would not have the full protection and training that would be available in a battlefield setting; that the biological warfare agent would have to be intercepted prior to its release, to minimize the impact on both humans and operations; that the delivery mechanism may not be obvious; and that the rate of false positive detection must be minimal in order to avoid unnecessary interruption to normal mail processing activities. As we stated earlier, overcoming the lack of data on the threat, in this domestic civilian environment will be critical to USPS success in establishing a biological agent defense. Overview of Law Enforcement's Initial Response to the Anthrax Attack The FBI as lead investigative agency is currently investigating a series of bioterrorism incidents using anthrax spores that were sent through the mail and which resulted in 22 anthrax cases, including five deaths, since October 3, 2001. This is the first time the FBI has conducted this kind of investigation. The FBI's investigative team includes criminal investigators with scientific knowledge. In addition, the FBI has reached out to the scientific community to gain additional scientific knowledge about anthrax. Further, the FBI's HAZMAT Response Team was used to gather evidence at various crime scenes contaminated by anthrax utilizing Personal Protection Equipment. [10] The FBI also utilized the expertise of (1) EPA's Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training (OCEFT) to assist in gathering evidence at one of the crime scenes, the Senate Hart Building; (2) USPS's Postal Inspector in collecting evidence involving the contamination of the mail system; (3) CDC and the Florida health unit that initially reported the first anthrax case; and (4) Department of Defense laboratories. The FBI had previously been made aware of numerous anthrax incidents throughout the United States, which were random in nature and determined to be hoaxes. [AB-1] Because this was the first time the FBI responded to an actual anthrax attack, there was some confusion about the investigative roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies. As a result, the FBI recognized the need for increased coordination with public health officials, including CDC, and other investigative agencies. The CDC particularly is a key agency in any biological terrorist threat because it is _______________ 10. The FBI has 17 Field Offices that have HAZMAT Response Teams that are fully trained and equipped to respond to a hazardous material incident. These teams work in conjunction with the state and local first responders, to assess and evaluate the incident and provide direction to obtain evidence that could be used in subsequent prosecutions. Limited Official Use Only Page 7 GAO-03-323T Limited Official Use Only able to identify biological agents and has the tools to investigate and respond quickly. Current Efforts to Prepare for Future Bioterrorist Attacks The anthrax investigation has prompted the FBI and other investigative agencies to focus additional attention on the chemical and biological threat. Some of these efforts include (1) agreements among the FBI, other federal agencies, and state and local governments delineating each organization's role; (2) increasing liaison efforts with public health officials; (3) preparation by the FBI and CDC of a handbook for conducting investigations involving biological agents; and (4) identification of key state and local officials needing security clearances to allow access to classified information. Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving us the opportunity to submit this statement If you have any questions on the statement or follow-up questions, we will be happy to respond. Limited Official Use Only (460539) Page 8 GAO-03-323T APPENDIX CTC WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE Questions raised by Senator Shelby and his staff in December 2002 prompted the Joint Inquiry to inquire further regarding whether CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) had any established guidance concerning the watchlisting program. The Joint Inquiry had asked CTC about such watchlisting guidance in April 2002, and had been told in a written CIA response that no such guidance existed. As a result of this renewed request, the Joint Inquiry was able to determine that CTC had sent a cable in December 1999 to all Directorate of Operations (DO) stations and bases, the subject of which was "Terrorism Guidance." The cable was designated as "Read and Retain," and its purpose was to remind DO personnel of pre-existing, periodically republished guidance regarding several important subjects of relevance to their counterterrorism efforts. The Joint Inquiry also determined that the unit in CTC that was responsible for matters relating to Usama Bin ladin and al-Qa'ida received a copy of the cable. One paragraph of the nine paragraph "Terrorism Guidance" cable (see attached copy) reminded recipients of the procedures for watchlisting "potential," "possible," "known," or "suspected" terrorists. The guidance stated, in part, that: ...It is important to flag terrorist personality information in DO intelligence reporting for [the State Department watchlist program] so that potential terrorists may be watchlisted. Information for inclusion in [the State Department watchlist program] must raise a reasonable suspicion that the individual is a possible terrorist. ... Information for [the State Department watchlist] program should be based on the following priorities: -- known or suspected terrorists who pose or may pose a present threat to U.S. interests in the United States or abroad: ...
2 DEC.17.2002 SECRET DOSE DIRECTION 67309 11 DECEMBER 1999 5. VISAVIPER PROGRAM: THE VISAVIPER PROGRAM PROVIDES A CONSULAR CHANNEL FOR WATCHLISTING POTENTIAL TERRORISTS BY CONTRIBUTING TERRORIST PERSONALITIY INFORMATION FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S UNCLASSIFIED CLASS AND CLASSIFIED TIPOFF DATABASES. IT IS IMPORTANT TO FLAG TERRORIST PERSONALITY INFORMATION IN DO INTELLIGENCE REPORTING FOR VISAVIPER SO THAT POTENTIAL TERRORISTS MAY BE WATCHLISTED. INFORMATION FOR INCLUSION IN VISAVIPER MUST RAISE A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS A POSSIBLE TERRORIST, AND BIOGRAPHIC DATA MUST BE SUFFICIENT FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES OR STATE DEPARTMENT WILL NOT MAKE A VISAVIPER ENTRY. INFORMATION FOR THE VISAVIPER PROGRAM SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIES: -- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WHO POSE OR MAY POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD; -- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS NOT NOW KNOWN TO BE ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS BUT WHO WERE SO ENGAGED WITHIN THE PAST 15 YEARS; -- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WHO ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGING IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST NON-U.S. INTERESTS, OR WHO WERE SO ENGAGED WITHIN THE PAST TEN YEARS SECRET APPENDIX THE JOINT INQUIRY IN COURT On August 20, 2002, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a motion in United States v, Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A, in the Eastern District of Virginia, concerning potential disclosure in the Joint Inquiry's public hearings and reports of information provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other Executive Branch agencies about the Government's investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui. The relief sought by DOJ would have imposed significant limitations on the Joint Inquiry's ability to inform the public about the FBI's conduct of its Moussaoui investigation in the weeks leading up to September 11, 2001. For that reason, the Joint Inquiry appeared before Judge Leonie Brinkema, the presiding judge in the Moussaoui prosecution, to oppose DOJ's motion. The issue was finally resolved favorably for the Joint Inquiry in a court order on September 23, 2002 that effectively cleared the way for FBI testimony at the Joint Inquiry's public hearing the next day on the FBI's conduct of the Moussaoui investigation. This portion of the Appendix briefly describes the issues that were presented and the orders that were issued in conjunction with the Moussaoui litigation. Although begun as a nonpublic, or "sealed" proceeding, the pleadings in the case were unsealed by the court and the orders were also filed on the public record. At the outset of the Joint Inquiry, representatives of the Joint Inquiry and DOJ discussed procedures for access to FBI and DOJ information that would recognize the need for a thorough Congressional inquiry and yet avoid interfering with the Moussaoui case and other pending criminal prosecutions and investigations. On April 19, 2002, the Joint Inquiry Staff Director wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence -- with copies to the FBI and other Intelligence Community agencies -- to describe procedures for meeting this goal that were being adopted by the Joint Inquiry. These procedures included a commitment by the Joint Inquiry to consult with the Justice Department "before any information that is obtained from Intelligence Community records and that may constitute evidence in a criminal proceeding is made public." Over the following weeks, it became clear that DOJ believed there were legal bars to the Joint Inquiry's public disclosure of materials about the FBI's Moussaoui investigation. As a result of these concerns, DOJ advised the Joint Inquiry in a May 31, 2002 letter that "the Department may have to oppose efforts to release publicly certain protected information prior to the trial, to the extent that it would impair the government's ability to present its case, infringe upon the defendant's right to a fair trial, or compromise the integrity of other investigations." One bar, in DOJ's view, was a Protective Order in the Moussaoui case that had been prepared by DOJ and entered by the District Court on February 5, 2002. That Order provided, among other things, "that none of the discovery materials produced by the government to the defense shall be disseminated to the media by the government." The other bar, in DOJ's view, was Eastern District of Virginia Local Criminal Rule 57. That Rule bars several categories of out-of-court statements by the prosecution or defense "which a reasonable person would expect to be further disseminated by any means of public communication," but also contains a specific proviso that nothing in it is intended to preclude "hearings or the lawful issuance of reports by legislative, administrative, or investigative bodies." In the next several months, as the date for the first public hearings approached, the Joint Inquiry sought to assure DOJ that its concerns could be accommodated by the Inquiry. A June 27, 2002 letter to the Attorney General from the leaders of the Joint Inquiry stated that the objective of the Inquiry's planned public hearing on the Moussaoui matter was "not to consider the guilt or innocence of Mr. Moussaoui, which is a matter for the Judicial Branch, but to examine the counterterrorist efforts of U.S. Government personnel and the organizations and authorities under which they operate." The letter also informed the Attorney General that the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel had advised the Joint Inquiry that neither the Protective Order nor the Local Rule governed the public proceedings of Congress. 2 In July 2002, DOJ's Criminal Division asked for a further description of the subjects that would be addressed in the Joint Inquiry's public hearings, which were scheduled to begin in September. On August 5, 2002, the Joint Inquiry Staff Director wrote to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division and explained that the scope of the Inquiry's planned public examination of the Moussaoui matter would include "FBI activity concerning Zacarias Moussaoui from August 15, 2001, when an intelligence investigation was opened, through September 11, 2001." On August 20, 2002, DOJ filed an "Expedited Motion of the United States for Clarification Regarding the Applicability of the Protective Order for Unclassified but Sensitive Material and Local Criminal Rule 57 to Information that May be Made Public in Congressional Proceedings." DOJ asked the District Court to order that "[t]he Protective Order and Local Rule would preclude the provision of information regarding 'The Moussaoui Investigation,' as described [in the Joint Inquiry letter of August 5], for public use. ..."' The Department also submitted an order, which the District Court granted, "to authorize the service of its Expedited Motion with its attachments on the representatives of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees who are involved in the Joint 9/11 Inquiry, and to enable these committees to reply to the motion and attend any scheduled hearing." With the assistance of the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel, the General Counsel of the Joint Inquiry filed a reply on behalf of the Joint Inquiry on August 26 and participated in the argument on August 29, 2002. The reply asked that the District Court deny DOJ's requested relief for three main reasons: "(1) the protective order does not govern testimony before Congress, nor does it govern the production of documents to Congress, the use of documents by it, or the issuance of its reports; (2) Local Criminal Rule 57 specifically does not preclude the holding of legislative hearings or the issuance of legislative reports, and (3) the proposed expansion of the order by the Department of Justice runs afoul of the separation of powers," 3 On August 29, the District Court entered an order that denied DOJ's motion. Stating that the Protective Order "is too complicated in its present form," the order directed the submission of a new Protective Order. The August 29 order also stated "that nothing in this Order is intended to affect the applicability of Local Rule 57 to the participants in this case." The transcript of the August 29 hearing was released publicly on August 30. Representatives of DOJ and the Joint Inquiry discussed, but could not agree on, the import of the Court's ruling, particularly regarding the applicability of the Local Rule to the testimony of FBI witnesses at the public hearing. During the first week of September 2002, DOJ asked the Joint Inquiry to advise it regarding which of the documents that had been provided to the Joint Inquiry by the FBI were believed to be relevant to a public hearing concerning the Moussaoui investigation. On September 11, 2002, the Joint Inquiry's General Counsel provided DOJ with a list of documents that were substantially likely to be included in public questioning of FBI witnesses at public hearings. On September 20, DOJ filed a "Renewed Expedited Motion of the United States for Clarification Regarding the Applicability of Local Criminal Rule 57 to Information to be Made Public in Congressional Proceedings." Focusing only on the Local Rule, the Department did not renew its earlier arguments about the applicability of the Protective Order to Congressional proceedings. The Department asked the District Court to enter an order that "Local Criminal Rule 57 applies to Department of Justice personnel who are testifying at public Congressional hearings, including but not limited to, all statements such personnel make in response to questions asked by Members and staff at such hearings." Again assisted by the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel, the Joint Inquiry General Counsel replied in writing that: ...the order sought by the United States would substantially shut down the opportunity of the full Congress and the public to understand the important issues involved in the FBI's handling of the Moussaoui investigation prior to September 11. The relief sought by the United States would, in effect, amount to an injunction blocking a proceeding of the Congress that no Court has ever issued. 4 On September 23, 2002, the District Court denied the DOJ motion, as follows: The Joint Inquiry made clear in its August 5, 2002 letter to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division the limited parameters of the inquiry and has reiterated in its Reply that the Committees will not ask witnesses to comment about the merits of this case, Indeed, the questions are expected to focus on "what government officials heard, observed, reasoned, recommended, and acted on (or did not act on) prior to September 11." [Quoting Joint Inquiry Reply.] The Committees are not interested in "expressions of current judgment from government witnesses about the defendant's guilt or innocence or the government's plans for presenting its case." [Quoting Joint Inquiry Reply.] Given the ground rules articulated by the Joint Inquiry, FBI personnel should have no difficulty responding to Congress' questions without violating Local Rule 57 or any other order of this Court. Accordingly, the Renewed Expedited Motion for Clarification is DENIED. In accordance with its commitment to consult with the Department of Justice, the Joint Inquiry continued to allow DOJ to review and comment regarding the contents of staff statements related to the Moussaoui case and other matters. At the Joint Inquiry's September 24 public hearing and the closed hearing that followed concerning the Moussaoui matter, the Joint Inquiry permitted a DOJ representative to attend with FBI witnesses for the purpose of advising whether any question called for an answer that might impair the Moussaoui prosecution. Thus, the Inquiry was able to proceed with a full public exposition of the issues raised in the Moussaoui investigation without impeding the due process and fair trial interests of Moussaoui and DOJ. 5 APPENDIX ACCESS LIMITATIONS ENCOUNTERED BY THE JOINT INQUIRY The Joint Inquiry received assurances from the White House, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of the Intelligence Community agencies that its access would be complete and unprecedented and that the agencies would "bend over backwards" and "be forward leaning" in response to requests for information made in the course of the Inquiry. While the major agencies in the Inquiry -- CIA, FBI and NSA -- provided substantial support and allowed access to large volumes of information, there were certain areas in which no access was allowed, and others where access was achieved only after extensive discussions and delays or under conditions that limited the scope of the Inquiry's work. Access Denied --The President's Daily Brief (PDB): the White House determined, and the DCI and CIA agreed, that the Joint Inquiry could have no access to the contents of the PDB. Ultimately, this bar was extended to the point where CIA personnel were not allowed to be interviewed regarding the simple process by which the PDB is prepared. Although the Inquiry was inadvertently given access to fragments of some PDB items early on, this decision limited the Inquiry's ability to determine systematically what Presidents Clinton and Bush, and their senior advisors, were being told by the Intelligence Community agencies, and when, regarding the nature of the threat to the United States from Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida. Despite the White House decision, the Joint Inquiry was advised by Intelligence Community representatives of the content of an August 2001 PDB item that is discussed in the report. This glimpse into that PDB indicated the importance of such access [ ].* TOP SECRET 1 --Foreign Liaison Relationships: The DCI refused to allow the Joint Inquiry to have access to a series of reports that had been prepared within CTC regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA's liaison relationships with a variety of foreign governments. This decision affected the Inquiry's ability to determine the extent to which some foreign governments had or had not cooperated and shared information with the United States in countering Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida prior to September 11. --Budget Information: Because a lack of resources was raised repeatedly by Intelligence Community representatives throughout the Inquiry, it became important to review the budget requests that had been made by the various agencies through the relevant years and to compare the treatment of those requests within the agencies from which they originated, within the Administration, and by Congress. While certain information was made available regarding agency and Congressional action, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the White House prevented the agencies from sharing information regarding budget requests that were submitted by the agencies to OMB and the actions OMB took to increase or decrease those requests before they were submitted to Congress. This limited the Inquiry's ability to determine where in the budget process requests for additional counterterrorism resources were changed. --[Covert Action Programs: Covert action was an important part of CIA 's overall effort to counter the threat posed by Bin Ladin prior to September 11, 2001. [ ]. The NSC denied the Joint Inquiry access to documents, thereby limiting its ability to inquire into this area]. _______________ * National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice stated in a May 16, 2002 press briefing that, on August 6, 2001, the President's Daily Brief (PDB) included information about Bin Ladin's methods of operation from a historical perspective dating back to 1997. One of the methods was that Bin Ladin might choose to highjack an airliner in order to hold passengers hostage to gain release of one of their operatives. She stated, however, that the report did not contain specific warning information, but only a generalized warning, and did not contain information that al-Qa'ida was discussing a particular planned attack against a specific target at any specific time, place, or by any specific method. TOP SECRET 2 --NSC-Level Information: There were several areas of counterterrorism intelligence policy development where insight into discussions inVolving the DCI, CIA and other Intelligence Community officials, and personnel at the National Security Council and White House levels would have been helpful in determining why certain options and programs were or were not pursued in particular time frames. Access to most information that involved NSC-level discussions was blocked, however, by the White House. Even agency documents that were drafted in anticipation of NSC discussion were denied to the Inquiry as "pre-decisional." The Inquiry also was denied access to, or a briefing concerning, the findings and conclusions of the report of the National Security Presidential Directive-5 Commission on Intelligence Reform chaired by Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft. --Interview of the DCI: The Joint Inquiry attempted to schedule an interview of DCI George Tenet in order to solicit his recollections, understandings and opinions regarding a host of questions relating to policy, resource, organizational, authority, priorities, and other issues that had been developed during the Inquiry. Such an interview was at first delayed and then made conditional on further discussions with DCI staff. Ultimately, the DCI testified at length in closed and open sessions before the Joint Inquiry and the interview was denied on that basis. --[Interview of FBI Informant: On August 8, 2002, the FBI informed the Joint Inquiry that two of the hijackers had numerous contacts with a long time FBI counterterrorism informant. The Joint Inquiry made numerous requests to the FBI to interview the informant in an effort to resolve some of the inconsistencies in the informant's reporting and to better evaluate how effectively the FBI utilized the informant. The FBI, supported by the Attorney General and the Administration, refused to make the informant available for an interview or to serve a Congressional deposition notice and subpoena on the informant, whose whereabouts were known to the FBI at the time. The FBI also strongly objected to a Joint Inquiry interview of the informant, citing concerns about adverse impact on FBI efforts to recruit future informants. The Joint Inquiry instead agreed with a suggestion by FBI officials that, as an initial step, written TOP SECRET 3 interrogatories be served on the informant. The FBI agreed to deliver those interrogatories to the informant for a written response. Soon after, the informant retained an attorney, who advised the Joint Inquiry that the informant would not respond to the interrogatories. The attorney also advised the Joint Inquiry that, if subpoenaed, the informant would be unwilling to testify without an immunity agreement. As a result, while the Joint Inquiry interviewed and received testimony from FBI personnel familiar with the information provided by the informant, it was denied the opportunity to discuss that information directly with the informant]. --NSA Technical and Contractual Information: The Joint Inquiry sought to determine whether and how NSA is planning to cope with changing technology and requirements, and how it is equipped to manage the allocation of scarce resources for research and development in the counterterrorism area. Despite numerous requests for specific planning and other documents and briefings, NSA provided very limited responsive information in this area. --CIA and NSA Documents: CIA took the position that so-called "operational cables" from the field and certain other documents it deemed to be sensitive could be subject to Joint Inquiry review at CIA Headquarters, but that no copies could be brought to the Joint Inquiry's office. NSA adopted a similar position concerning its transcripts and disseminated intelligence reports and, ultimately, almost all other materials. This prevented the incorporation of the original documents in the Inquiry's central records where they could be drawn upon effectively for research and reference purposes. Both agencies did, however, allow verbatim notes to be made and removed to Inquiry offices. This consumed many hours and slowed the Inquiry's progress. Both agencies then agreed to allow copies to be removed from their premises if the Joint Inquiry agreed to allow them to be stored by the agencies at the end of the Inquiry, and even provided a draft of an agreement that would recognize this. When the Inquiry later agreed in principle and responded 4 with a revised draft, however, the agencies decided that such an agreement was no longer desirable and returned to their original positions. --Military Options: In order to evaluate allegations that the U.S. military was reluctant to become involved in the effort against Bin Ladin prior to September 11, and to assess the interplay between the CIA and the military in covert action and special operations relating to counterterrorism, the Joint Inquiry asked to review documents regarding 13 military options that had been reportedly prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in response to a White House request. The JCS Legal Counsel, supported by the Defense Department (DOD) General Counsel and the NSC, took the position that this request exceeded the scope of the Joint Inquiry's authority, but provided a summary briefing concerning the options. Access Limited --Foreign Government Information at the FBI: The FBI allowed the Joint Inquiry to review information provided by foreign governments at the FBI, but would not allow the documents or verbatim notes to be carried to the Inquiry's offices. This limited and delayed the Inquiry's efforts to understand the level of cooperation displayed by the [ ] and other governments in counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11. --Interview Policies: The Intelligence Community agencies insisted that agency representatives -- usually legal or congressional affairs -- be present to monitor all interviews of their personnel -- present or former. The Inquiry took the position that agency monitors would be excluded where an agency employee, or Joint Inquiry personnel, decided that their presence would inhibit the full and frank discussion of any matter. Some of the agencies "pre-briefed" personnel who were to be interviewed by the Joint Inquiry, explaining to them what the agency position was on certain matters and urging the employees not to range too broadly in their responses. In one instance, after lengthy discussions with DOJ and FBI personnel, a former FBI agent was interviewed without monitors present at his request. On occasion, agency legal 5 representatives instructed individuals not to respond to questions that the monitors deemed would reveal pre-decisional matters or legal advice. Access Delayed -- Department of Justice (DOJ) Concerns: The Joint Inquiry agreed with DOJ's position that information sealed by court order or relating directly to Grand Jury proceedings, and evidence obtained by means of electronic surveillance conducted under 18 U.S.C. §2510, et seq., not be provided to the Inquiry. Some previously sealed information was, with the assistance of DOJ and by court order, eventually provided to the Inquiry. While this agreement was not inconsistent with the goals of the Inquiry, significant delays resulted in the first months of the Inquiry while Intelligence Community and other U.S. Government agencies waited for DOJ to develop an efficient process for review of all information requested by the Inquiry. Subsequently, DOJ took the position that FBI personnel who had been involved in the Moussaoui investigation or the September 11 investigation and who might be trial witnesses could not be interviewed by the Joint Inquiry about those matters. This issue was not resolved until the Congressional leaders of the Joint Inquiry met with the Attorney General and senior Department of Justice officials in early May and expressed their objections to the DOJ position. Other DOJ objections and concerns relating specifically to Joint Inquiry access to and use of information relating to the Moussaoui investigation were dealt with in federal court and are discussed in a separate section of this Appendix, entitled "The Joint Inquiry In Court." --The Third Agencv Rule/Internal Reviews: The Intelligence Community initially took the position that any information from one agency that was found in the files of another agency could not be shared with the Joint Inquiry until the originating agency had been consulted and given its permission. This slowed the disclosure process significantly. Based on Inquiry objections, the Community first reduced the application of this procedural obstacle to only intelligence that TOP SECRET 6 TOP SECRET had not been disseminated in finished form, and finally agreed to provide the Inquiry with access and simultaneous notice to the originating agency. In addition, the agencies insisted on reviewing and redacting certain information from documents before they were provided to the Inquiry, further preventing timely responses to Inquiry requests. Finally, the agencies would not provide the Inquiry with electronic access to information, but insisted on providing paper copies of all information. This not only slowed production of the material, but also hindered the efficient review and utilization of this information by the Inquiry. --Interview of the Deputy National Security Advisor: The Joint Inquiry requested the opportunity to conduct an interview of the National Security Advisor to the President in May 2002 in order to obtain a better understanding of the development of counterterrorism policy in the Bush Administration before September 11, 2001. The NSC resisted this and suggested in June that the Deputy National Security Advisor be the subject instead and that written questions be provided instead of conducting an interview. The Joint Inquiry provided written questions in July but did not receive responses until November 2002. TOP SECRET 7 Congress of the United States Committee Sensitive July 1, 2002 President George W. Bush Dear Mr. President: As you know, the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is reviewing the performance of the Intelligence Community in connection with the attacks of September 11. Key aspects of this Inquiry include the organization arid functions of the Community and whether legislative action is necessary to improve its ability to produce and share critical intelligence for counter-terrorism purposes. We are requesting that the draft report of the 2001 NSPD-5 Presidential Commission on Intelligence Reform chaired by General Brent Scowcroft be made available to the Joint Inquiry as it considers those issues. As you know, reports of the Commission's tentative findings have appeared in the media. Based on those reports, the findings appear to be highly relevant to the work of the Joint Inquiry. If your staff has any questions or would like to discuss this request further, they should contact Eleanor Hill, the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff Director, at (202) 226-0911. We appreciate your support for our effort and look forward to receiving the Commission report. Sincerely, Bob Graham Porter Goss Richard Shelby Nancy Pelosi PRINTED ON RECYLED PAPER Committee Sensitive Congress of the United States Committee Sensitive July 1, 2002 Mitchell E, Daniels, Jr. Dear Mr. Daniels: The Joint Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees seeks access to several Office of Management and Budget documents that are relevant to our ongoing inquiry. These documents have either been referred to in briefings or hearings before the Committees or during staff interviews of Intelligence Community personnel. As you know, the Committees announced the scope of their joint inquiry in June, which focuses on the performance of the Intelligence Community in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11th [enclosure (1)]. As part of that inquiry, we are reviewing the resources granted to the Intelligence Community during the course of its counter-terrorism efforts: Enclosure (2) is an initial list of requests. Your assistance will facilitate the Joint Inquiry in key areas of interest to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Please do not hesitate to call me if there is anything I can do to expedite this request. I can be reached at (202) 226-0911, Please have your staff contact Daniel Byman ai the same number with any specific questions regarding this request. We appreciate your cooperation in this most important effort. Sincerely, Eleanor Hill Enclosures: Committee Sensitive PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER Committee Sensitive Joint 9111 Inquiry OMB Document Request
Committee Sensitive Congress of the United States PREAMBLE To reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks; to honor the memories of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks by conducting a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that their families and many Americans have raised; and to lay a basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of government: THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ADOPT THIS Pursuant to section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule XI(: I )(b) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the two Committees have authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community's activities before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The Committees have undertaken this Joint Inquiry pursuant to their responsibility to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government and all other authority vested in the Committees. The purpose of this Joint Inquiry is -- (a) to conduct an investigation into. and study of: all matters that may have any tendency to reveal the full facts about -- (1) the evolution of the international terrorist threat to the United States, the response of the United States Government including that of the Intelligence Community to international terrorism, from the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center in 1986 to the present. and what the Intelligence Community had, has, or should have learned from all sources of information, including any terrorist attacks or attempted ones, about the international terrorist threat to the United States; (2) what the Intelligence Community knew prior to September 11 about the scope and nature of any possible attacks against the United States or United States interests by international terrorists, including by any of the hijackers or their associates, and what was done with that information; (3) what the Intelligence Community has learned since the events of September 11 about the persons associated with those events, and whether any of that information suggests actions that could or should have been taken to learn of, or prevent, those events; (4) whether any information developed before or after September 11 indicates systemic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community from learning of or preventing the attacks in advance. or that, if remedied. could help the Community identify and prevent such attacks in the future; (5) how and to what degree the elements of the Intelligence Community have interacted with each other, as well as other parts of federal, state, and local governments with respect to identifying, tracking. assessing. and coping with international terrorist threats; as well as biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear threats, whatever their source (such as the Anthrax attack of 2001). (6) the ways in which the Intelligence Community's responses to past intelligence problems and challenges, whether or not related to international terrorism, have affected its counterterrorism efforts; and (7) any other information that would enable the Joint Inquiry, and the Committees in the performance of their continuing responsibilities, to make such recommendations, including recommendations for new or amended legislation and any administrative or structural changes, or other actions. as they determine to be necessary or desirable to improve the ability of the Intelligence Community to learn of, and prevent, future international terrorist attacks; and (b) to fulfill the Constitutional oversight and informing functions of the Congress with regard to the matters examined in the Joint Inquiry. Congress of the United States TOP SECRET Committee Sensitive July 8, 2002 Dr. Condoleezza Rice Dear Dr. Rice: The Joint Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees seeks access to several National Security Council (NSC) documents that are relevant to our ongoing inquiry. These documents have either been referred to in briefings or hearings before the Committees or during staff interviews of Intelligence Community personnel. As you know, the Committees announced the scope of their Joint Inquiry in June, which focuses on the performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11th [enclosure (1)]. In keeping with that guidance, the Joint Inquiry Staff is reviewing the U.S. Government response to international terrorism as part of its examination of the Intelligence Community's performance. As part of that effort, it is important that we review the policy guidance the Intelligence Community received from the National Security Council, including covert action instructions. Enclosure (2) is forwarded as an initial list of requests. This list focuses primarily on covert action and the use of force against al-Qa'ida. Your assistance will facilitate the Joint Inquiry in key areas of interest to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Please do not hesitate to contact me if there is anything I can do to expedite this request. I can be reached at (202) 226-0911. Please have your staff contact Daniel Byman with any specific questions regarding this request. We appreciate your continued cooperation in this most important effort. Sincerely, Eleanor Hill Enclosures: Top Secret PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER Committee Sensitive Top Secret -Committee Sensitive Joint 9/11 Inquiry NSC Document Request
Top Secret --Committee Sensitive Congress of the United States PREAMBLE To reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks; to honor the memories of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks by conducting a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that their families and many Americans have raised; and to lay a basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of government: THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE Pursuant to section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule XI(: I )(b) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the two Committees have authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community's activities before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The Committees have undertaken this Joint Inquiry pursuant to their responsibility to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government and all other authority vested in the Committees. The purpose of this Joint Inquiry is -- (a) to conduct an investigation into. and study of: all matters that may have any tendency to reveal the full facts about -- (1) the evolution of the international terrorist threat to the United States, the response of the United States Government including that of the Intelligence Community to international terrorism, from the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center in 1986 to the present. and what the Intelligence Community had, has, or should have learned from all sources of information, including any terrorist attacks or attempted ones, about the international terrorist threat to the United States; (2) what the Intelligence Community knew prior to September 11 about the scope and nature of any possible attacks against the United States or United States interests by international terrorists, including by any of the hijackers or their associates, and what was done with that information; (3) what the Intelligence Community has learned since the events of September 11 about the persons associated with those events, and whether any of that information suggests actions that could or should have been taken to learn of, or prevent, those events; (4) whether any information developed before or after September 11indicates systemic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community from learning of or preventing the attacks in advance. or that, if remedied. could help the Community identify and prevent such attacks in the future; (5) how and to what degree the elements of the Intelligence Community have interacted with each other, as well as other parts of federal, state, and local governments with respect to identifying, tracking. assessing. and coping with international terrorist threats; as well as biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear threats, whatever their source (such as the Anthrax attack of 2001). (6) the ways in which the Intelligence Community's responses to past intelligence problems and challenges, whether or not related to international terrorism, have affected its counterterrorism efforts; and (7) any other information that would enable the Joint Inquiry, and the Committees in the performance of their continuing responsibilities, to make such recommendations, including recommendations for new or amended legislation and any administrative or structural changes, or other actions. as they determine to be necessary or desirable to improve the ability of the Intelligence Community to learn of, and prevent, future international terrorist attacks; and (b) to fulfill the Constitutional oversight and informing functions of the Congress with regard to the matters examined in the Joint Inquiry. Congress of the United States Top Secret -Committee Sensitive July 31, 2002 Dr. Stephen Hadley Dear Mr. Hadley: The Joint Inquiry is examining the performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Per our discussions with John Bellinger, I ask that you submit a written response for inclusion in the record of the ongoing Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Your assistance will make an important contribution to our effort. Attached is an initial list of questions that cover your time at the National Security Council. After we receive your answers, our staff seeks to interview you to discuss any remaining issues. Your assistance will facilitate the Joint Inquiry in key areas of interest to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Please do not hesitate to call me if there is anything I can do to expedite this request. I can be reached at (202) 226~0911. For any specific questions regarding this request, please have your staff contact Daniel Byman at the same number. We appreciate your cooperation in this most important effort. Sincerely Eleanor Hill Enclosure: Top Secret Committee Sensitive Top Secret -Committee Sensitive Proposed Questions for Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley Terrorism as a Policy Priority 1. During your time as Deputy National Security Advisor, what priorities did you establish for U.S. intelligence priorities and where did terrorism fit in? How did this change from the priorities of the Clinton administration? 2. How were these priorities conveyed to the Intelligence Community? Did the Intelligence Community propose any changes in priority with regard to counterterrorism or al-Qa'ida? What were they? 3. Prior to September 11, who at the National Security Council and the U.S. government played a leading role in setting counterterrorism policy? Who else was involved in this process? Please describe the process, the participants, and the fora. 4. Prior to September 11, did Congress support the NSC's counterterrorism efforts? Did Congress oppose NSC priorities related to terrorism in any way? Please provide details of both, as appropriate. 5. Was Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, included all in Principals' meetings related to terrorism after January 2002? If not, why not? How was it determined who would be involved in such meetings? What was his role in counterterrorism policy and intelligence prioritization after January 2002? 6. During the transition from the Clinton administration, did former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger or other senior Clinton NSC officials provide any advice, information, warning, or guidance requiring policy, priorities, or threats from al-Qa'ida and Bin Ladin? If so, what was the advice, information, warning, or guidance? 7. Prior to September 11, was the Administration engaged in a review of counterterrorism policy? What issues were identified for change? What stage were plans in? What changes in the role of the Intelligence Community, if any, were planned? What happened to the review after the. September 11 attacks? 8. When the new Administration came into office, was it aware that Usama bin Ladin had declared war on the United States in 1998? Who provided this information, and how was it provided? What was the impact of that fact on the Top Secret -Committee Sensitive Top Secret Committee Sensitive Administration's national security priorities? How did it affect the Intelligence Community's posture? 9. Prior to September 11, did the President or other senior officials in the administration make any public statements or give any speeches on the subject of the threat of terrorism, or Usama bin ladin's terrorist network in particular? If so, please make copies available to the Joint Inquiry Staff. Resources 1. Prior to September 11, did the Intelligence Community come to the new Administration with any requests for additional counterterrorism resources, e.g, , additional funding? Who made the request, and what was the nature of the proposal? 2. Did the Intelligence Community ask the Administration for more resources to fight Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida? Who made this request? 3. Did the Intelligence Community ever cite a lack of resources as the basis for not acting? If so, provide details and the NSC response. 4. When the DCI, Director of NSA, and FBI Director requested more counterterrorism resources, what was the stated justification for their requests? 5, What was the NSC's response to each specific Intelligence Community request for any increases in resources for counterterrorism? For al-Qa'ida? Agency responsiveness and support for policy makers 1. What specific strengths did you observe in intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting on Bin Ladin, al-Qaeda or terrorism in general prior to September 11? What specific weaknesses? Please provide specific examples of each. 2. What was the quality of intelligence received by the NSC? Did the NSC make any efforts to improve this quality? 3. With respect to Intelligence Community counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11, how responsive were the CIA, the FBI, NSA, and DIA?
Top Secret Committee Sensitive
Threat to the homeland 1, Prior to September 11, including especially spring/summer 2001, what information did the Intelligence Community provide to the National Security Council, orally or in writing, indicating the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the United States? 2. Prior to September 11, what information did the Intelligence Community provide to the National Security Council on al-Qa'ida activities and infrastructure inside the United States? 3. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council ever consider alerting the American people to the internal threat from al-Qaeda? What happened? 4. Did the National Security Council ever consider enhancing U.S. border controls, e.g., by strengthening watchlist programs, alerting the FAA or the airlines, or inspecting cargo containers on a larger scale? If so, what happened? 5. Prior to September 11, what was the National Security Council's view regarding how well postured the FBI was with respect to combating terrorist groups inside the United States? What steps were taken to improve the FBI, if any? 6. Prior to September 11, did the Intelligence Community provide the NSC with any information regarding the possibility that al-'Qa'ida members would use airplanes as weapons or hijack airplanes in the United States? What did the NSC do in response to this information? Foreign governments 1. Prior to September 11, which foreign governments were most and least helpful regarding counterterrorism? How were they helpful or riot helpful in each case? 2. Prior to September 11, were the governments of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supportive of U.S. counterterrorism efforts? How responsive were European allies? What priority was counterterrorism cooperation in Saudi Arabia relative to military operations against Iraq, the Middle East peace negotiations, and other concerns? Top Secret Committee Sensitive Top Secret -Committee Sensitive 3. Did Intelligence Community agencies ask for NSC assistance in getting foreign governments to take action against terrorist cells? Did the NSC take any specific actions to support the Intelligence Community? What did the NSC do? Did the NSC ask or instruct the State Department or the Department of Defense to assist the Intelligence Community in this regard? 4. Prior to September 11, was there any discussion of increasing information sharing and/or counterterrorism cooperation with the Sudan? Use of Force/Overt and Covert 1. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council consider the use of military force against al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan? How? In what form? Why was it not pursued? Was there sufficient intelligence to support military options? Was there tasking to gain further intelligence to support military operations? 2. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council issue any tasking to the CIA or the U.S. military to develop plans involving the covert or overt use of force? 3. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council ever review the CIA's authorities to conduct covert action against Bin Ladin or al-Qa'ida? What problems were identified regarding existing authorities, [ ] [ ]? Were there any proposals to change those authorities before September 11th? What steps were taken? 4. Prior to September 11, was the unarmed Predator flown in Afghanistan after the Bush Administration came into office? Were proposals made to the NSC to fly it? Which participants favored flying it? If it was not flown, why not? 5. Did the National Security Council support the development of the armed Predator? Did any administration official try to expedite the process? Were any discussions held on this issue at the NSC? Who participated? 6. Did you consider [ ]? Why or why not? What impact did you expect? 7: Why was there no military response to the attack on the USS Cole? Was this considered? Recommendations 1. What recommendations would you make to improve the intelligence community's performance? Top Secret -Committee Sensitive Congress of the United States Top Secret August 12, 2002 Mr. John Bellinger Dear John: We have been engaged, for several weeks now, in a discussion regarding Joint Inquiry Staff (JIS) access to a variety of types of documents and information relating to the President's Daily Brief (PDB). Rather than continuing to rely on periodic oral exchanges, I thought it would be helpful to describe in writing the specific areas of JIS interest in this regard and to solicit your written response as to each in order to illuminate the JIS and the relevant Intelligence Community personnel who must implement your instructions. First, the JIS seeks access to information relating to the process by which the PDB is created. This would include questions such as: By whom is it prepared? How? When? What standards are applied? What source quality is required? With whom and how is it coordinated? How are analytic disagreements. handled? What is its relation to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief and other intelligence publications? By what means is it presented to the President? Who else reads it? Etc. In addition, the JIS would like to know the specific genesis of the August 2001 PDB item relating to Usama Bin Ladln (UBL) and terrorism threats to the United States. As I have told you, we have received very different versions of how this item came to be published. This is especially significant in light of the timing and content of that particular item in reference to the September 11 attacks and the substantial public interest in how well the Intelligence Community was serving the President at the time. Thus, we believe it important to establish a clear and complete record in that regard, and suggest that the National Security Council (NSC) should share that goal. Finally, as I have told you, I believe there is a significant case to be made that the JIS should be provided with special access in some form to the complete record of the numbers and contents of any PDB items regarding UBL, al-Qa'ida, and the terrorism threat to U.S. interests that appeared from January 1998 -- the year the Director of Central Intelligence declared we were at war with UBL -- to September 11, 2001. Again, the public has a compelling interest in the circumstances in understanding how well the Intelligence Community was performing its principle function of advising the President and the NSC of threats to U.S. national security. There must be a way to recognize and Top Secret Top Secret Mr. John Bellinger accommodate this interest without waiving the Executive's prerogatives in this regard in other circumstances. In the absence of such access, we will have no choice but to extrapolate the number and content of PDB items on these subjects from the items that appeared on these subjects in the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief and other lower level intelligence products during the same period. This may result, however, in dangerously skewed and misleading conclusions regarding what the president was being told about the threat during the months preceding the September 11 attacks. [AB-3] I appreciate your efforts on behalf of the JIS in the weeks and months since we began this effort. Please let me have your response by August 26, 2002. Sincerely, A. R Cinquegrana Top Secret Congress of the United States Top Secret August 12, 2002 Mr. John Bellinger Senior Associate Counsel to the President & Dear John: As I have explained, the Central Intelligence Agency continues to deny Joint Inquiry Staff (JIS) access to a broad range of documents and information relating to covert action, "National Security Council (NSC) programs," etc., on the grounds that these materials relate to NSC proceedings and are thereby precluded from JIS access by virtue of NSC instructions. Based on my discussions with you, my understanding is that the only documents and information the NSC intends to have withheld from the JIS relate to direct advice to, and discussions with, the President. In order to clarify this access issue in a timely and definitive manner, I request your written response as soon as possible regarding whether my understanding is correct. Only in this way, I believe, will we be able to break this particular logjam with the Agency. I would appreciate your response before August 23, 2002. Thanks very much for your continued cooperation and assistance in this regard. Sincerely, A. R Cinquegrana Top Secret _______________ American Buddha Librarian's Comments: [1] There is nothing random about the Army of God sending, at the very least, 75% of all the anthrax letters sent worldwide from October-November 2001 to abortion clinics. Obviously, these people are the prime suspects in the anthrax scare. And if they are terrorizing with anthrax, perhaps they are terrorizing with other things as well. What efforts have been made to investigate this group's activities, and why haven't they been designated as a possible terrorist organization? [2] You mean, "conflicting [with the truth] statements" by Paul Wolfowitz? http://www.american-buddha.com/911.reportjointinquiryhouse8.htm At the same hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified: "I would say near-term we perceived the threat to be overseas, as Secretary Armitage says. In the mid- to longer-term, we perceived the threat to be mass casualties in the United States as a result of chemical or biological or conceivably nuclear attack. . . ." [3] Well, you know what, fucker? That applies to the people as well. All we're given is the dregs, a bunch of lies, by the fascist elders of our society who treat the citizens like children. But who's crying over our "dangerously skewed and misleading conclusions?" By the way, let me say that your committee has done a terrible of fulfilling your purpose here. The Intelligence Community has obviously taken over our government, and that your committee would allow the intelligence Community to be its boss, as if it was separate from the government, as if it was separate from the People, is tragedy for democracy. If people had any sense at all, they would be marching in the streets over this, because there is no issue of greater importance to our democracy. We the People deserve to have true information about what our government is up to -- no, what we are up to. The government is our servant, not our master. And what all this stonewalling says about the "Intelligence Community's" concern for the victims and families of 9-11 is "Fuck you, we could give a shit about your tragedy. Our sacred secrecy is more important than anything else!" As if they had the right to anything We the People didn't specifically give them in trust for ourselves. Obviously, we need a new Martin Luther, a political man to give us back our language of government. Secret government is just another metaphor for Latin. Keeping the intelligence from the people. Fuckers! |
