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REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 |
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[Page 262] PART THREE-TOPICS-THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 Throughout the Joint Inquiry, Intelligence Community witnesses cited a lack of money and people to explain why agencies failed to produce more intelligence on al-Qa'ida, did not arrest or disrupt more terrorists, and were otherwise limited in their response to the growing terrorist threat. In general, between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, Intelligence Community resources fell or remained even in constant dollars. As a result, overall capabilities declined. The CIA, for example, reduced the number of its operations officers in the field. In addition, the necessary support "tail" for counterterrorism, such as communications and training, eroded. More generally, depth of coverage and expertise declined as personnel moved from crisis to crisis or focused only on the highest priorities. Within the overall intelligence budget, however, spending on counterterrorism increased considerably during the 1990s. The counterterrorism component of the overall National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) at least doubled at most agencies in the decade before the September 11 attacks, while funding for other intelligence missions declined or stayed even. In spite of this increase in counterterrorism resources, the overall decline in Intelligence Community resources made it difficult to expand the counterterrorism effort significantly to meet the growing threat. In addition, the overall decline in capabilities hindered the robustness of the counterterrorism effort. Spending on counterterrorism, and spending on al-Qa'ida in particular, relied heavily on supplemental appropriations, which carried with it additional disadvantages. Although details are imprecise, the Joint Inquiry's research and Intelligence Community agency estimates show that the number of people working on terrorism rose steadily, despite overall decreases in Intelligence Community staffing. Nonetheless, the number of people in 250 counterterrorism remained small, particularly when compared with post-September 11 levels. [Page 263] A. Joint Inquiry Resource Review Methodology and Limitations To explore resource allocations, the Joint Inquiry reviewed documents, requested additional information on specific issues, and interviewed knowledgeable personnel. Documents included formal NFIP submissions and responses; staffing descriptions for major counterterrorism offices, such as the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at CIA and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division; CIA and FBI submissions requesting additional resources; supplemental appropriations and justifications; National Security Council (NSC)-mandated reviews of counterterrorism spending throughout the Intelligence Community; Inspector General reports; internal assessments of the effort against al-Qa'ida; and many other documents. Because existing documentary information was insufficient, the Joint Inquiry asked the Intelligence Community for additional information. This included identifying the number of personnel who worked directly on al-Qa'ida and terrorism; determining and reviewing budget methodology; calculating full-time-equivalent staffing levels; and ascertaining resources that other groups received. Interviews related to resources spanned a range of policy officials, Intelligence Community leaders, and budget officers from the agencies and former OMB officials. Policy officials at the NSC and Department of Defense (DoD) were asked about the level of resources provided for intelligence and tor counterterrorism. Based on this review, it appears that the Intelligence Community has only a limited sense of what is budgeted for missions such as counterterrorism. Agencies submit budget requests for field agents or spy satellites, for instance, but do not systematically track the missions for which these capabilities are used. As a result, methodologies vary for estimating how much is spent on terrorism. Moreover, because Intelligence Community managers do not use this data for day-to- day operations, little information was readily available in response to our data requests. The Intelligence Community cannot quickly determine how or where money is spent, or which missions its personnel are carrying out. 251 Intelligence Community budgeting procedures thus make it difficult to determine whether counterterrorism as a mission is properly funded. Community components budget by capabilities, such as the number of intelligence officers or satellites, rather than by missions, such as counterterrorism. Many of these capabilities, however, serve more than one function or mission, making it difficult to measure resource allocation. For example, a CIA field officer may collect on the internal politics of a country, a weapons shipment, and terrorism. According to the CIA's Associate Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) for Resources, Plans and Policies, it is difficult to measure how much is spent on counterterrorism and the least precise area of accounting is human resources. For instance, in the field, personnel might work on several targets. Requiring them to keep track of the time they spend on particular tasks was considered, but rejected due to the administrative burden this would impose. Also, counterterrorism often entails infrastructure costs that cannot be readily allocated to a particular effort. Before Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, there was little effort to track counterterrorism spending because counterterrorism was not an office or an expenditure center. Counterterrorism is not limited to CTC, and other CJA components support the effort. Finally, the CIA's accounting system focused on capabilities and resources, not on missions. In FY 1999, the Office of Management and Budget COMB) required that spending on counterterrorism be tracked. According to the CIA Budget Office's Director and Deputy Director, counterterrorism spending was calculated by determining the cost of CTC and specific counterterrorism operations for other offices. Indirect costs for those offices, like infrastructure and computers, were not included. To make these calculations, budget officers had to examine each organization and each program. While efforts are underway to restructure budget procedures to make data more easily retrievable, it remains difficult to determine what the Intelligence Community is spending on specific issues and missions. Data must be manually retrieved since budget systems do not "talk" to human resources systems. The effort is time and labor intensive and not "repeatable" because different measures are used in different years. 252 Even the CIA report on the counterterrorism effort that was provided in response to a specific Joint Inquiry request required a manual reconstruction of hours worked, which is imprecise at best. Thus, the Agency could provide only limited information on how its officers [page 265] divided their time in 1998. A senior NSA official in testimony criticized personnel accounting procedures that focus only on one product line, such as counterterrorism, noting that cryptographers, target developers, and other personnel contribute to products even if they are not formally part of the product lines. However, NSA was unable to provide a procedure to account for the contributions of these personnel. As a result of these ambiguities, the Community often does not know how much it spends on particular efforts, making it difficult to compare funding across missions. Moreover, different components of the Community use different measures to determine how much they spend on missions, and there is no universally accepted method to measure indirect costs such as infrastructure. In light of these difficulties, the estimates of spending on counterterrorism that follow should be viewed as rough outlines, not detailed pictures of overall expenditures. Since counterterrorism is not an explicit budget category for the Intelligence Community, it is difficult to estimate the percentage of Community capabilities (e.g., field officers for spy satellites) dedicated to counterterrorism. Community budget officers advised that components of the Community use different measures to estimate total sums spent on counterterrorism and these measures are not consistently used within agencies. Finally, indirect costs (such as infrastructure or communications) are often excluded from these figures. In addition to this data problem, the White House refused to allow the Intelligence Community to respond to Joint Inquiry requests for information regarding budgets and budgetary decision making. Many important resource issues revolved around the question of "Who said no?" to requests for additional funds for counterterrorism. However, the White House invoked Executive privilege and refused to permit the Intelligence Community to provide "pre-decisional" data on budget requests that were made by agencies before they were sent to Congress. The Joint Inquiry received some of this information indirectly, but large gaps remain. The White House also invoked Executive privilege in response to requests for information on spending for covert action. 253 [Page 266] B. Overall Intelligence Community Funding Overall funding of intelligence agencies and associated personnel levels fell or remained roughly even in constant dollars from the end of the Cold War until September 11, 2001, hindering the Community's response to the growing terrorist threat. As Chart 1.0 shows, the Intelligence Community budget fell or remained even in constant dollars throughout the 1990s. Chart 1.0: Total NFIP Funding And Positions, FY1990 To FY 2000 [Redacted]
Source: CMS [Page 267] Many of the overall capabilities, such as communications and training, that are needed to support counterterrorism and other intelligence operations were cut as part of money-saving efforts. Some critics claim these cuts went too far. For example, Deputy Secretary of Defense 254 Wolfowitz testified that his work with the "Rumsfeld Commission" in 1998 concerning the ballistic missile threat to the United States made clear to him that "resources for intelligence had been cut too deeply." DCI Tenet testified that the CIA regularly asked OMB for more money, but had little success. This led to a shortage of trained agents and other resources. Former FBI Director Freeh testified that the FBI did not have sufficient resources to "maintain the critical growth and priority of the FBI's counterterrorism program." From 1996 to 1999, Congress increased appropriations substantially, but from 2000 to 2002, requests for additional funds were denied. As a result, FBI Headquarters units that dealt with Islamic extremism had insufficient resources. According to Mr. Freeh: For FY 2000, 2001, and 2002 FBI counterterrorism budgets, I asked for a total of 1,895 Special Agents, analysts, linguists, and others. The final, enacted allocation I received was 76 people over those three years. ...Thus, at the most critical time, the available resources for counterterrorism did not address the known critical needs. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees typically authorized more for the Intelligence Community in the years before September 11 than the Congressional appropriators eventually approved. As Chart 1. I indicates, only in one fiscal year (FY 1996) did the appropriation exceed the authorization. [Page 268] 255 Chart 1.1: NFIP Appropriations and Authorizations, FY1993-FY2001 [Redacted]
Source: HPSCI C. Resources Dedicated To Counterterrorism [Spending dedicated to counterterrorism grew, however, even as overall resources on intelligence declined. Former National Security Advisor Samuel Berger noted for the record that "working with Congress, [the Clinton administration] more than doubled the counterterrorism budget from 1995 to 2000, during a time of budget stringency -with a 350% increase in the FBI's counterterrorism funds, and (although classified) substantial increases in CIA's counterterrorism resources." Information from the CIA's Chief Financial Officer shows that funds appropriated to CTC increased from [] in FY 1992 to [] in FY 2000, excluding supplemental appropriations, Former FBI Director Freeh testified that the number of [page 269] Special Agent and support positions dedicated to terrorism more than doubled from 1993 to 1999. To achieve these increases, the Intelligence Community shielded counterterrorism programs from 256 budget cuts and, as the terrorist threat grew, increased the number of personnel and the amount of resources dedicated to counterterrorism. However, despite this relative increase in resources, there was no massive increase before September 11, 2001]. Chart 1.2 describes overall trends in the Intelligence Community budget dedicated to counterterrorism before September 11, 2001. As Chart 1.2 shows, in the decade before September 11, direct spending on counterterrorism throughout the Community roughly quintupled in a time of tight budgets. [Page 270] Chart 1.2: Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Spending Before September 11 [Redacted]
Source: CMS 257 Charts 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 compare the amounts the President requested of Congress for CIA, NSA and the FBI with the amounts, including supplemental appropriations, that were eventually appropriated. Agency leaders testified that their requests for resources were sometimes not satisfied, even though Congress appropriated as much or more than the President requested. This is because OMB often reduces agency requests before transmitting them to Congress. As mentioned earlier, the White House denied the Joint Inquiry access to pre-decis1onal budget data about what was asked of the White House and what was transmitted to Congress. Thus, the Joint Inquiry was not able to obtain that information for the Intelligence Community agencies, apart from FBI data available to the Senate Intelligence Committee. [Page 271] Chart 1.3. CIA Spending on Counterterrorism Before September 11 [Redacted]
Source: CMS 258 As Chart 13 illustrates, CIA appropriations for counterterrorism increased throughout the 19905, In general, appropriations for CIA met or exceeded the requests that were submitted by the President to Congress. [Page 272] Chart 1.4. FBI Spending On Counterterrorism Before September 11 [Redacted]
Source: FBI (information provided to SSCI) The FBI usually received more -at times far more -than the amounts the President initially requested from Congress, FBI appropriations for counterterrorism increased dramatically in the mid-1990s and then fell or remained roughly constant in the years before September 11, 2001. [Page 273] 259 Chart 1.5. NSA Spending On Counterterrorism Before September 11 [Redacted]
Source: CMS NSA received increases in counterterrorism funding, consistent with the rest of the Intelligence Community, with dramatic increases throughout the 1990s. Appropriations consistently met or exceeded Presidential requests to Congress. Intelligence Community officials contend that the increasing resources they received were not sufficient to meet the growing threat, For example, Cofer Black, former CTC Chief, testified that a lack of resources was a major impediment for CTC, Officials at NSA and CIA also stated in Joint Inquiry interviews that resources had been a problem. D. Personnel Shortages [Page 274] The number of analysts, operations officers, field agents, and other intelligence professionals working on al-Qa'ida was limited, creating personnel shortages that led to important information being overlooked. 260 At the request of the Joint Inquiry, the CIA reviewed its counterterrorism effort from 1998 to 2002. This included analysts and operators outside CTC, many of whom made important contributions but worked only part time on al-Qa'ida. The review resulted in estimates of total "work-years" (i.e., 2087 labor hours per annum) combining the time expended by analysts focusing exclusively on al-Qa'ida and those working on related issues, such as terrorist financing. The results are summarized in Table 2.0. Table 2.0. Full-Time Equivalent Personnel Dedicated to Counterterrorism at CIA (Excludes CIA Contractors and Detailees From Other Agencies)
As Table 2.0 indicates, the number of CIA personnel working on al-Qa'ida almost doubled from the August 1998 East Africa U .S. embassy attacks to September 11, 2001. Before [page 275] September 11, the numbers of CTC personnel involved in the effort against terrorism grew, though much of the increase occurred in the field. Despite these increases, the former Chief of the CTC's Sunni Extremist Group testified that "[w]e always needed more," though he also noted that every other part of the CIA's Directorate of Operations CDO) also believed they needed more resources. DCI Tenet testified 261 that "we never had enough" personnel working on al-Qa'ida." Many CTC personnel asserted in interviews that the number of employees was well below the levels that were necessary, given the volume of information and the growing nature of the threat. One officer claimed she was told when appeals for more resources were rejected: "People [ will] have to die for them to get resources." The lack of adequate resources meant that CTC personnel responsible for al-Qa' ida were required to work extremely long hours without relief. This created morale problems, made retention difficult, and fostered the perception that the DO did not truly support the counterterrorism mission. As the former Chief of the CTC unit focused on Bin Ladin testified: We never had enough officers from the [DO]. The officers we had were greatly overworked. And there was always more senior-level concern for [ ] than for providing more officers to protect the health and welfare of the unit's officers. [Despite recognition of the menace al-Qai'da posed and the relatively limited understanding of its network, the CIA had relatively few analysts working on the problem. At CTC, the total work-years for terrorism analysis relating to al-Qa'ida inside its analytic group was only nine in September 1998. According to CIA, nine CTC analysts and eight analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence were assigned to UBL and al-Qa'ida in 1999. This was only a fraction of the analytic effort that was to be devoted to al-Qa'ida in July 2002]. [NSA had only a limited number of Arabic linguists. Before September 11, 2001, few were dedicated full-time to al-Qa'ida, which was only one of many priority counterterrorism targets at NSA for which Arabic linguists were needed. For example, those linguists were also used to support other important regional topics and to translate intelligence originating in other parts of the world]. 262 c. Personnel Concerns At The FBI The FBI labored under a hiring freeze in the last years of the Clinton Administration, As a result, it did not train new agents, according to an interview of former Director Freeh Although FBI full-time-equivalent work-years on international terrorism doubled from 1993 to 1998, they fell or remained constant from 1999 to September 2001, according to FBI information, That information also shows that actual work-years of agents and support personnel in the field grew from 482 in 1993 to 1,034 in 2000. Despite this dramatic increase, FBI officials claim they did not receive enough resources to manage the emcrging threat. A summary of FBl requests for additional personnel for counterterrorism and the responses from the Department of Justice, Office ofManagemcnt and Budget, and Congress is presented in Chart 1.6. [Page 277] Chart 1.6 FBI Resource Requests
263 Source: FBI Chart 1.6 demonstrates that FBI requests for additional personnel were cut or rejected at times by the Department of Justice, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress. Sometimes the Bureau received most of its initial request, and its request was exceeded in one instance. Former OMB officials noted in Joint Inquiry interviews that it was rare for any agency to receive more than its initial request during a time of budget stringency. They also pointed out that, while the FBI often did not receive additional personnel for counterterrorism, many other agencies faced significant cuts. E. Counterterrorism and the Competition for Scarce Resources [Page 278] Because intelligence budgets were shrinking while counterterrorism resources were steadily growing, senior policy and intelligence officials were reluctant to make the additional cuts in other programs that would have been necessary to augment counterterrorism programs further . This would have jeopardized their ability to satisfy other collection priorities within the Intelligence Community. As Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified: As I "declared war" against al-Qa'ida in 1998 -- in the aftermath of the East Africa embassy bombings -- we were in our fifth year of round-the-clock support to Operation Southern Watch in Iraq. Just three months earlier, we were embroiled in answering questions on the India and Pakistan nuclear tests and trying to determine how we could surge more people to understanding and countering weapons of mass destruction proliferation. In early 1999, we surged more than 800 analysts and redirected collection assets from across the Intelligence Community to support the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [Similarly, NSA Director Hayden testified that his energy was focused heavily on a range of regional and global issues. An FBI budget official told the Joint Inquiry that counterterrorism was not a priority for Attorney General Ashcroft before September 11, 2001 and that the FBI faced pressure to make cuts in counterterrorism to satisfy the Attorney General's other priorities]. The CIA 's Associate Deputy Director for Operations CDDO) for Resources recalled some attempt to protect counterterrorism in response to the DCI's declaration of war. However, this did not lead to any change in training, any dramatic increase in the size of CIA 's Middle East stations, 264 or significantly greater numbers of personnel assigned to CTC. A particular problem was that counterterrorism was a worldwide target, and the DO was closing stations in less strategic areas [-] even though al-Qa'ida was active there. This hindered acquisition of information on terrorism in these areas. In interviews, CIA officials explained that they were reluctant to cut entire areas of collection, particularly in the field, because senior U.S. Government policymakers had many requirements for intelligence across a wide variety of issue areas. [Page 279] By the late 1990s, Intelligence Community coverage ofmany issues was exceptionally slim, and staffing was skeletal. The CIA 's DO cut by almost one-third the number of personnel deployed overseas, according to the DDO. The Associate DDO for Resources noted that the DO often was not able to meet its collection goals, in part because an increased focus on counterterrorism meant that other issues received less attention. At best" the DO could sustain what it had, but could not invest in the future. Communications and training suffered tremendously, DO officials reported. [The Intelligence Community was unable to reduce requests for collection on other priorities. As NSA Director Hayden testified, "Our efforts in 2000 to chum money internally were not accepted by the Community; its reliance on [signals intelligence] had made it reluctant to give it up." Former CTC Chief Black noted that shifting resources was difficult because the policy community had other demands for intelligence. He stated in an interview that "[w]e could see it coming in Afghanistan, but, for example, couldn't get more Agency slots [within the theater]" In an interview, the CIA official responsible for the Near East noted that, even after September 11, no major issues were deleted, despite the imperatives of the war on terrorism]. As a result, Intelligence Community officials contend they had too many priorities for the resource levels that were available. The NSA Director testified that, "[g]iven all the other intelligence priorities, it would have been difficult at that time within the [Intelligence Community] or the Department of Defense to accept the kind of resource decisions that would have been necessary to make our effort against the target more robust." Requests for additional assistance by counterterrorism officials often fell on unsympathetic ears because of declining resources. Mr. Black noted in an interview that the DDO told him that 265 the CTC had more than its share of people when compared with other divisions. According to the Associate DDO for Resources, every office in the DO asked for more people and the demand for Arabists was particularly high. In general, requests for additional personnel were small because managers knew that resources were limited. [Page 280] When additional resources did become available, intelligence officials sought to build up overall capabilities, not just those tied to terrorism. According to the Director of the CIA's Office of the Budget, proposals for putting more DO officers in the field, which was a priority for several years, were not specifically tied to counterterrorism. Any additional field officers would be tasked according to current requirements. F. Policymaker Criticism of Intelligence Community Budget Allocations Several former OMB and NSC officials asserted in interviews that the FBI and CIA focused too much on protecting overall funding, and not enough on shifting priorities to increase spending on terrorism. Budget requests specifically tied to counterterrorism were generally approved, according to former OMB officials. However, most requests were for overall capabilities, which met with less support. For example, former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure and Counterterrorism Richard Clarke criticized the Intelligence Community and the FBI for not putting aside other priorities to ensure that al-Qa'ida received sufficient coverage. Mr. Clarke explained in a briefing that only a small part of CIA's counterterrorism expenditures was devoted to al-Qa'ida, even though "[w]e in the NSC and we in the OMB asked CIA repeatedly to find programs of lesser priority, either in the CIA budget or the Intelligence Community budget, to increase the size of these activities, and they claimed there was no program anywhere in the intelligence budget where they could get any funding to reprogram." Former OMB officials corroborate Clarke's argument that the Intelligence Community was reluctant to reprogram money to pay for efforts against al-Qa'ida or otherwise re-align overall spending. The FBI's use of counterterrorism resources received particular criticism. The Bureau assigned fewer than ten tactical analysts and only one strategic analyst to al-Qa'ida before 266 September 11. Analysts instead focused on critical infrastructure, case support, and domestic terrorism. FBI officials told the Joint Inquiry that they focused on investigating overseas terrorism, rather than on strategic analysis or on radical activity in the United States. [Page 281] G. Reliance on Supplemental Funding For Counterterrorism The President submits to the Congress an annual budget for the Intelligence Community for the coming fiscal year. The budget request includes funding for ongoing and new programs. Programs that are part of the President's request are considered programs of record (also called base programs) and have established and well understood oversight and accountability procedures. Whereas the President's budget request anticipates funding for current priorities, supplemental appropriations are a reaction to unforeseen events and are granted in addition to base funding. The Intelligence Community relied heavily on supplemental appropriations to finance the effort against terrorism. The Community received large supplementals to fight terrorism following several major al-Qa'ida attacks and as part of the effort during the Millennium celebrations. In particular, most of the CIA's program against al-Qa'ida in later years was funded from supplemental appropriations. This hindered efforts to sustain and plan counterterrorism programs. Chart 1.7 illustrates the critical importance of supplemental funding in the effort against al-Qa'ida. [Page 282] 267 Chart 1.7 Supplemental Appropriations In The Effort Against al-Qa 'ida [Redacted]
Source: CIA In interviews, Intelligence Community officials criticized the reliance on supplementals for vital programs such as counterterrorism. Former CTC Chief Black, for example, told the Joint Inquiry that reliance on supplementals made it hard to create a stable program. The Associate DDO for Resources explained several of the challenges supplementals posed:
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Despite these problems, the Intelligence Community sought additional supplementals to sustain its counterterrorism effort, rather than alter program funds in the President's budget request. DO officials reportedly did not change overall funding patterns because they did not want to lose expertise or capabilities in other areas; they were confident that supplemental funding would be appropriated to sustain their effort; and the overall funding was largely for "target neutral" infrastructure, such as communications, that would also hinder the effort against al-Qa' ida if cut. The Director of CIA's Office of the Budget noted that, if a supplemental is expected, program managers can plan without changing their base. In his judgment, from late 1998 through 2001, managers reasonably expected supplementals (though the amount was never fixed) and thus could do some planning. If supplemental funding was not appropriated, base funding could have been adjusted to spend more on al-Qa'ida. H. How Easily Can Money Be Moved? [The Intelligence Community has limited flexibility in redistributing resources in response to crises. Reallocation can occur within budget categories. For example, operational activities relating to both a foreign country and counterterrorism may fall into "agent operations" or "analysis" and tradeoffs between them are easier to make. According to a senior Community Management Staff CCMS) budget official, there is considerable latitude in re-allocating small sums, though what counts as "small" varies across agencies. To re-allocate larger amounts, approval must be obtained from the Congressional Intelligence Committees]. According to the CMS budget official, CMS tries to influence this budget and agency spending, but has limited authority. CMS tries to use a "bully pulpit" and takes matters up with the DCI when intelligence components do not comply with CMS directives. CMS also has some leverage in these matters because of its influence over future budget proposals. [Page 284] 269 However, CMS exerts only limited control over the expenditure process. Unlike agency comptrollers, CMS cannot withhold money from agencies that do not comply with its directives. Agencies may also appeal to the DCI to overturn CMS guidance or inform Congressional staff about their dissatisfaction. The interests of the Secretary of Defense also matter tremendously in the appropriations process, as the Secretary controls the vast majority of the Intelligence Community budget. As a result, CMS is often able to influence only the margins of the process. Within agencies, resource realignment is also restricted, according to the CIA's Budget Director. Resources cannot be taken out of programs that OMB and Congress have "fenced," i.e., dedicated for only specified activities. National Security Council-mandated [ ] program money is always fenced. To move fenced money, budget office must negotiate with the Congress, CMS, OMB, and others. In addition, personnel services funds cannot be reallocated to pay for non-personnel services costs. In light of these limits, there has been a call for increasing the budget authority of Intelligence Community managers. For instance, former National Security Advisor Berger testified: "I believe in strengthening the DCI's program to plan, program, and budget for intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination will permit much more effective integration of our intelligence priorities and efforts, including better concentration on counterterrorism." And former FBI Director Freeh criticized the budget process as taking away discretion from the FBI Director and making it difficult to transfer money to priorities such as terrorism. AI-Qa'ida is engaged in a worldwide struggle against the United States and its allies. Those responsible for the September 11 plot, for example, became radicalized in Germany, held meetings in Malaysia, and received funds channeled through the United Arab Emirates. The September 11 attack is only one example of the global scope of al-Qa'ida's activities. The group has conducted or supported attacks not only in America, but also in the Balkans, the Caucasus, [Page 285] France, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and dozens of other countries. 270 The Intelligence Community recognized early on that an effective U.S. response to al-Qa'ida must be global and that foreign intelligence and security services ("liaison services") would be important allies in fighting terrorism. Improving ties to liaison services became increasingly important for the CIA, FBI, NSA, and other agencies, and their efforts helped make foreign countries more effective partners and more willing to assist U.S. counterterrorism efforts. [Several problems remained, however, some of which are inherent to bilateral relationships. CIA's liaison partners vary in competence and commitment. Others are unwilling to share information and some include individuals believed to have cooperated with terrorist groups. At times, U.S. policies and procedures also hinder successful liaison]. |
