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Page 380
to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the
Second Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible
in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense
until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to
do, it appears that the Navy, although its ranking officers were fully
informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare,
failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until
their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of
the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action
by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet
and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile
action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds
of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel
them to bring about that implementation [18] of the plans that was
necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least
mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in
several important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air torpedo attack was not properly
evaluated, although there was ample information available on this
subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this
information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense
plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack,
but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these
selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack
had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate
provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the
fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army
and the Navy, in practice, none of these measures came into being to any
appreciable extent prior to the attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, conduct of the organization was such as to
submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail
pertaining to the procurement and materiel programs incidental to the
rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans
and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience
has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the
critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage
of hindsight nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that
any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost
impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however, to all
these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas
in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which,
though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack would have
tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to
inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center
upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective
sphere, to take appropriate action.
12. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of
the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is
pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel, as the responsible officers, might have taken to
lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
[19] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement on the Report of the
Naval Court of Inquiry, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to
give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in
Washington, particularly in respect of:
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese,
which was a definite step toward breaking relations.
(2) Certain information indicating Japanese interest as to the
disposition of the ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) In failing to appreciate the significance of the information which
he received on the morning of 7 December indicating that a message was
to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. and in failing to
transmit it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available;
(4) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement
that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of
mounting intensification of critical relations between Japan and the
United States.
I concur generally with these.
Page 381
Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it
might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the
failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available
information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate
that information, particularly on 7 December 1941. Although it was not
known on 6 December precisely when or where the attack was to be
delivered, there was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a
surprise move was due within narrow limits of time. On the morning of
December 7 by 10:30 Admiral Stark had information indicating that a
message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. Eastern
Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time
corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far
East. Although no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl
Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an
attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have
dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral
Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring bout
some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
[20] (b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5 (b) of the
Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there
stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep
him fully formed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of
relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the
"war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at
any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the
Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6
December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential
matter at outlying Pacific islands.
In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal
letters which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in
the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of
attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information received by
Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval
forces after 27 November 1941 should be been evaluated, as previously
pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of
such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel
was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941 and again on
28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks
assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was
carrying forward the arrangements for the reenforcing of and continuing
the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28
November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating
area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He
continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the
lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He
neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent
nor advised his fleet air wing and other commanders of the receipt of
the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective
action is neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the
meaning of or disagreement to what would constitute an "appropriate
defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial
tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and
guarding against surprise attack by Japan, and if he did not know what
was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment," he should
have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation. The Second
Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel could
and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger which
the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action
were open to him, viz.:
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct
long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made
the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have
resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers;
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less
routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have
predicted when there would be any vessels in port;
(3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which
Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period,
ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control
organizations fully operational.
[21] The absence of positive information as to the location of the
Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them.
Under radio
Page 382
silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due
appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have
induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the
effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open
to him were:
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most
probably approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably
permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at
least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by
ships in port particularly, during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in
port.
(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept
possible attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry
into port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and
aircraft warning installations.
The evidence indicates clearly, however, that Admiral Kimmel's most
serious omission was his failure to conduct long range air and/or sea
reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week
preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest from the evidence
obtained by Admiral Hewitt.
The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have
secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the
approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service,
traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air
reconnaissance from Oahu.
During the critical period after November 27th, the limitations of the
aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the
only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled
to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant
air and/or sea reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach
bearings, would have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to
detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the
success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.
[22] In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander
in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel
also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and
the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command.
That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is
indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of the Court
that the social relationship between him and General Short was
excellent. The need for Admiral King taking such measures existed from
the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency
as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
13. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to
the Naval Court record concludes that:
"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel
were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for
exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned
duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the
evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be
the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of
superior judgment may not result in future errors."
The first endorsement of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy states
his conclusion and recommendation that trial by general court martial is
not warranted by the evidence produced.
14. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of
the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate
General thereto and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, thereto, and the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt, and on
the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E Kimmel and Admiral Harold B Stark,
particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December, 1941,
failed
Page 383
to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command
commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action
should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to
active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of
superior judgment may be necessary.
[23] (d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully
acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public
disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
obtained in these investigations, should be made to the extent that such
action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the
national security.
15. Accordingly I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any
position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of
superior judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position
in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior
judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with
the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the
facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these
investigations, will be made to the extent that such action can be take
without injuring current military operations or the national security.
(Signed) JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
[1] SECRET
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
3 Dec. 1944.
FF1/A17.
Serial: 003489.
SECRET.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board-Comments concerning.
1. The following comments on the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
are submitted.
2. The Army findings as to the basic cause of the surprise are not at
variance with the findings of the Navy Court. In brief, they are that no
one in authority appreciated the danger to which Pearl Harbor was
exposed and consequently the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii were
preoccupied with training activities to the exclusion of adequate
alertness against attack.
3. There was general agreement between the Army Board and the Navy Court
the following particulars as to lack of awareness of danger:
a. It was impossible for United States agents to get information in
Japan while Japanese agents were given free rein in Hawaii and
encountered little difficulty in transmitting intelligence by cable.
b. The information that did reach Washington was not correctly
evaluated, and vital parts of it either never were sent to Hawaii or
else got there too late.
c. Estimates of Japanese intentions were based predominately on what the
Japanese were likely to do, rather than upon what they could do. All
basic plans contain the assumption that hostilities might be opened by
an air attack on Oahu, but this assumption was generally ignored during
the period preceding the attack. Is of interest to note in this
connection that AA batteries of ships in port were ready to open fire
when the Japanese planes came in. This is evidence that Admiral Kimmel
was less blind to the potential danger than was the Army command. [2]
The Army forces had no ammunition at mobile guns and
Page 384
it was a matter of hours before it could be distributed from the
magazines to the anti-aircraft batteries.
d. The Army was in readiness against sabotage. The Navy condition of
readiness, though far from fully effective, was designed to meet air
attack. In this connection, the Army Board (Page 229 of the Record)
observes that there was conflict in the nature of the information sent
to Hawaii, in that Navy Department messages were predominate with
warning of conflict while War Department messages were predominate with
the idea of avoiding conflict and taking precautions against sabotage
and espionage.
e. The Army air warning system was usable, but was being used for
training—not for warning-when the Jap planes came in.
4. The Army Board finds that General Short established cordial relations
with the Navy, but did not accomplish fully the detailed working
relationship necessary for his full information in the performance of
his mission. For example, the Board points out that General Short was
under the impression that distant reconnaissance was being adequately
provided by naval task forces in connection with exercises (he
apparently knew that no such exercises were in progress on 7 December),
that Admiral Kimmel failed to acquaint him with certain messages he
received from the Navy Department (there is conflict of testimony as to
some of these), that General Short hesitated to inquire as to the
details of naval arrangements, and that he was not informed of the fact
that a Japanese submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor in the
early morning of 7 December (the Naval Court explains that Admirals
Kimmel and Bloch withheld report of this attack until the contact could
be verified, in view of many false contacts that had occurred; the air
attack began before verification was obtained). This finding of the Army
Board is in conflict with the Navy finding that relations—official as
well as personal—were not only cordial but adequate. I am inclined to
agree with the Army Board for reasons discussed in the next paragraph.
[3] 5. The Army Board criticizes the command arrangements in Hawaii.
There was no unity of command, and no integrated staff to evaluate
information and to attend to the details of coordinating defense
measures. Certain joint plans had been prepared which were sound in
concept, but defective in that neither Service had the means to carry
them out. Furthermore, for the most part, these plans did not become
effective until an emergency arose, and the emergency came too suddenly
to permit effective implementation. Unity of Command could have been put
into effect (but was not put into effect before the 7th of December) by
the President, or by agreement between the Departments or by local
arrangement. My comment on this is as follows:
a. Coordination by mutual cooperation, which was the system in effect in
Hawaii until after the attack, is a well recognized system of Command.
Personally, I consider it inferior to unity of Command in circumstances
such as existed in Hawaii, but it is a fact that this system has worked
effectively elsewhere during the current war. I think Kimmel and Short
were at fault in not making the system work better than it did.
b. The lack of coordination in Hawaii was not in itself a disease, but a
symptom of the deeper ill—lack of awareness of danger. As stated by the
Army Board, local Commanders were unwilling to put war measures into
effect because they would interfere with training.
6. The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between
the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea
Frontier, the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air
Commander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment "The
Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells
(Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and
responsibility." My comment as to this is that there are some
unavoidable complexities in the Command relation ships between a fleet,
a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. [4] However, in this case,
there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all naval
forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have been
able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The
reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5
above.
7. The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent
upon the U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was
doing and for estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is
obviously sound. It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General
Short but also the War Department fully acquainted with the estimate of
the Japanese naval situation.
Page 385
There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War
Department information which should have been given to them by the Navy,
but the basic trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the
Japanese Navy could, and did, do.
8. The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further
investigated by the Navy. These are:
a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some
naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a
Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About
1 December it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is
noted in the Record that this information never got to General Short.
There is some reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval
Court, but it was not followed up, presumably because the officer who
was Director of Naval Intelligence at the time was not called as a
witness. The matter is probably not of importance, since even if there
actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it apparently had nothing
to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for the sake of
completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.
b. The Army Board is of the Opinion that Japanese midget submarines
operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th
of December, for the [5] purpose of obtaining information. This opinion
is based on the testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, who apparently reached his conclusions by a study of
certain captured Japanese charts which were made available to F. B. I.
By Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there is no real ground for
the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam around Pearl
Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record, it
is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval
investigation.
c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from
naval and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but
no record of what this information was. This should be cleared up.
9. The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault
in that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international
situation and that he delayed in getting critical information to General
Short. In these respects, the Army Report parallels the Naval Court
findings as to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army Board further
Finds that General Marshall was at fault and that he failed to keep his
Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could act
intelligently in his absence; in that he did not take action on General
Short's report on 28 November that he had established "Alert No. 1"; and
in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian
Command.
10. The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he
failed to place his Command in an adequate state of readiness (the
information which he had was incomplete and confusing, but it was
sufficient to warn him of tense relations), in that he failed to reach
an agreement with local naval officials for implementing joint Army and
Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in that he failed to inform
himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being
conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace inefficient
staff officers.
11. I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify
the opinions expressed in my endorsement on the [6] Record of the Naval
Court of Inquiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral
Kimmel and General Short. In view of the extensive and explicit
discussion of this phase of the matter by the Army Board, I am no longer
of the opinion that cooperation between these two officers was adequate
in all respects. The cordial, but informal, contact which they
maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordinate the means at their
disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out, this
fault was part and parcel of the general blindness to Japanese
potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the
Pearl Harbor disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and
the Naval Court are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to
our disadvantage, but they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more
than that the two naval officers in the high commands concerned—Admiral
Stark and Admiral Kimmel—failed to display the superior judgment they
should have brought to bear in analyzing and making use of the
information that became available to them.
Page 386
12. I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further
investigation to be made in the matters referred to in paragraph 8
above; namely, the alleged radio contact with a Japanese force in the
Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of Japanese midget submarines
inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the substance of
information obtained by naval and F.B.I. telephone and cable
intercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this
purpose. The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or
by an investigating officer, for attachment to the Record of the
original Court of Inquiry.
13. I find no reason to modify the recommendations I made in my
endorsement on the Record of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
/S/ E. J. King
E. J. KING.
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