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Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these
messages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatehes he
did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known
and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions,"
the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an
adequate summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in
this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the
handling of the "14 part message", originated in Tokyo and addressed to
the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received
in the Navy Department on 6 December at 2100, on that date. They set
forth the Japanese views as to certain United States proposals for
resolving matters under dispute between the [12] countries, and leave no
doubt that the United States proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but
do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about
0700, 7 December, the 14th part of the message was received. This part
of the message said that the Japanese Government had finally lost hope
of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was
impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiation. This part
of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and
0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox.
Secretary Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.
(3) At about 1030 on 7 December, the so-called "1:00 p. m. message" was
received in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador
deliver the 14 part message to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. on
that day. This message was of significance because 1:00 p. m. in
Washington was dawn at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to
the Office of the Chief Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to
the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to
point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. 13 the significance of the "1:00 p. m.
time of delivery". In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about
10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) Navy Department, or at least,
some officers therein, appreciated that the formation just received
pointed to the possibility—even to the probability-of a dawn attack on
Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this mess came to his
attention about 11:00 a.m., and that he immediately telephoned to
Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with
Japan was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii would be expected
soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the [13] need for sending
this message, but after brief consideration asked General Marshall to
include in his proposed despatch directions to pass the contents to
naval commanders. General Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that
the Japanese were presenting "what amounts to an ultimatum at 1:00 p.m., Washington time, on 7 December; that Japanese are under orders to
destroy their codes immediately and that while the War Department does
not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, you
are to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of
this communication." He sent this via commercial radio, which was then
the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The
despatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu
time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu
time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the
message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was
already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of
delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could
have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began.
The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor
means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack,
or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome,
since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best suited
to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor
naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go
along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning
would have been of great value in a planes and in augmenting the
condition of readiness existing on board ship.
(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the Findings: it is
stated Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was [14] informed that the Japanese
had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington
and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his
statement, page 28) that "the significance of this despatch was diluted
substantially by publication
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of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he
did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to
strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the
destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those
necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant
destruction in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6
December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and
confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater
emergency". (Exhibit 22.)
(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the
Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three
preceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the
so-called "Winds message". This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo
on 19 November, was received in the Navy Department on 28 November. It
set forth that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our
diplomatic relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the
middle of the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed
that when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This
message was received in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and
Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look
out for the expected "weather forecast". On 4 and 5 December the Federal
Communications Commission monitored the expected "weather forecast"
which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again
at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing
message meant that Japanese relations with Russia were [15] in danger.
These two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal
Communications Commission. In addition to this indication that the
Japanese were about to break relations with Russia, there is evidence
(Volume 5, page 746) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the
Director of Naval Communications saw on 4 December, a "yellow slip" on
which was written a different version of the implementing code, which
meant that relations with the United States and Great Britain were in
danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message was intercepted by an
East Coast station, but he was not sure. No written trace of the message
referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War
Department or the Navy Department There is considerable testimony in the
record as to what was done with the "Winds message." Various officers
testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval
Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they
do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact
that none of the implementing messages were ever sent to Admiral
Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds
that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that
the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far
East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on
page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was
delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese
representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and
likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of
the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the
attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had
particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of
the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all
important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means
available."
[16] (s) Fact XIX (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime
obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied
with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information
in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7
December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus
depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese
situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view
of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important
phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy
information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem
essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony
of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for
handling information of the enemy.
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It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then
Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a
witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information
was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify;
however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was
unfortunate.
3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion:
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses
the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in
Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information
available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any
departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not
entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information
available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly
disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's
dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they
actually were on that occasion.
[17] (b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court
expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and materiel which
existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the
defense of Pear I Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the
comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and
materiel at the time and that available means were spread thin
throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of
means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration.
However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means
available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The
fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy
Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of
the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to
some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications
of that information which was given to him.
(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds
that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct
responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means
provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base
was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think
this is a narrow view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had
to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in
general.
(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties
satisfactorily. I concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX (page 1203), the Court states that
naval defense plans were complete and sound in [18] concept, but
contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely
upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the
Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were
ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that
there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected
within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I
cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be
no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner
best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces
available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the
Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky
chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently
alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own
fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by
the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.
(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X (page 1204), expresses the view that
Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in
placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the
Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility
for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and
effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI (page 1204), as to the effect that
the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper,
and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take
place on 7 December could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to
the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The
Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes should
have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all
anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that
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no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of
routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not
indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December
approached. I think they did.
[19] (h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court
holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine
long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating
that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow
limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I
think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral
Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would
have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance
in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.
(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII (1207), the Court expresses the
view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials
in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and
Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East
rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable
scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact,
the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December.
However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor
would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a
campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of
this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information
received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court
expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment
in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical
period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he
had received regarding the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that,
on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the
fact that information had been [20] received which appeared to indicate
that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in
the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first
endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this
Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and
his principal advisers did not construe this message as indicating an
attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge
Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon
the message in question nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer
(attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did
take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the
fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu, and
midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum to the Findings).
It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did not have his
attention drawn to the possible significance of this message,
nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers
of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this
important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of
conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to
this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if
Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the
Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation
better than he did.
4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page 120S) the Court finds
that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the
part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that
no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not
adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this
does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree
likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the
Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor [21]
incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond
human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a
whole is basically responsible in at the people were unwilling to
support an adequate army and navy until was too late to repair the
consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack
that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for
local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been
done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it
is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have
taken.
Part 344
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was
primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important
United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and
the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those
two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had
been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that
Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to
the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all
important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure
means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact
that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his
initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the
situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running
picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my
opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary
of the information available in Washington, particularly in the
following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26
November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking
relations.
[22] (2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain
Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl
Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a
possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds
Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but
it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together
with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of
efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.
(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December, although the
implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It
appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available
means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have
reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute
preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl
Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral
Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the senseof intensification of the critical relations between the United States
and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark
to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of
increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had
the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible
at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that
Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6
December [23] concerning destruction of United States Secret and
confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be
considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral
Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due
consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion
that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the
danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses
of action were open to him:
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to
conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether
or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the
Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the
Japanese task more difficult.
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessel in a less
routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to
have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have
made the Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours
before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes
would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships'
batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control
organizations would have been fully operational.
6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
questions they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for
exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned
duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
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[24] 7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the
evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be
the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of
superior judgment may not result in future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my
views concerning how much of the record bears such a relation to present
military operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King.
E. J. KING.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Memo for File: This is Admiral King's Second Endorsement, as
paraphrased, by the deletion of the magic. This is the paraphrase that
was made public because the public interest required that the magic not
be made public.
JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR,
Special Assistant to the Secretary.
COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
FF1/A17-25.
Serial:
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Correspondence re Court of Inquiry Investigating Pearl Harbor.
Enclosure: (A) Subject correspondence.
1. The attached file copy and rough draft (which was published) is the
paraphrased version of my second endorsement to the record of
proceedings of the Court of Inquiry investigating Pearl Harbor.
/S/ E. J. KING,
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.
[1] COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
SECOND ENDORSEMENT
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese
armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941,
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of
Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the
Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following
remarks.
2. (A) As to Facts I and II, the routine practice of rotating units of
the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time
at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely
scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the
ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel
sufficient recreation to keep them from
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going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one
task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I
discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III the Court points out that, because of constitutional
requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until
after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a
declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an
unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for
Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of
defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was
charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of
Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval
measures concerned with local defense.
(d) Fact VI sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were
personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were
cordial and cooperative in every respect, that they frequently
conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by
either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each
was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of
the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is
important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since
the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not
cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the
War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the
defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to
cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that
the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence
as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every
possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that
Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should
be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet
free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is
further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given
full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to
augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general
state of unpreparedness for war.
[3] (f) Fact VII sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President
on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan
at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing
numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States
Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security
policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own
strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to
obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment
is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United
States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war,
or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a
disadvantage during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are
necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided,
and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and
recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the
concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume
responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits
of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes
upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United
States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that
this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical
extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were
inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and
did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely
because, in principles this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears
from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of
the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should
have been strong enough for self-defense. The [4] fact that it was not
strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the
employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless,
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he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the Fleet in
defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX. This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by
Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It
points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned
responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned
to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be
made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that th
basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval
participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the
availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this
circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the
fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must
be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks
that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance
knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of
time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes
permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his
own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the
Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that
the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol
planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was
sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of
Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at
his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense
forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI set forth the states of readiness of the forces
at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of
readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the
assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise
attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships
in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures
prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of
operating areas by air, certain extensive anti- ubmarine precautions,
the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "augmented
Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "Condition of readiness No. 3"
provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and
anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court
points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire
promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in "Alert
No. 1" which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with
no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer
the comment that "condition of readiness No 3" is normally maintained in
port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a
considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense
forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was
not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was
well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was
not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I
discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings
that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes
moored on the water, were not in condition to take the air promptly.
Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some
patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises; 50% were
on 4 hours notice. This is further indication of the lack of
appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of
large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the
Findings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance
in effect on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on.
It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI reads:
"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7
December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending
the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition
of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defense."
This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur,
for reasons set forth later on.
(J) Fact XII. The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can
be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to
the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a
carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and
sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this
instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown
port, and that it is an established fact that
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no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or
received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other
ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941 The
Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7
December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and
unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive
knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian
area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might
logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii
was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly
narrow limits.
[7] (k) Fact XIII discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance
with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral
Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine
long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to
have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were
used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out
and, therefore, unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a
difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be
considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However,
after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it
seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no
attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation
became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the
Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit
an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the
approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there
were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been
covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover
would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel
in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this
connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he
provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes, using the few at
his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He
considered the are between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance,
and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the
southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before,
Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.
(1) Fact XIV. This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed
responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of
installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but
that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in
condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and
it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching
Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this
fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an
officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army
bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report
of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted
feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at
Pearl Harbor—both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the
states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese
potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it
was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the
air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor
resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court
points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against
break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual
ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be
made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision
not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy
Department. Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered
but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that
the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously
underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI. In this section of the Findings the Court traces the
deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain
information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject The more important
items are as follows:
[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a
grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese
cabinet,
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that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for
the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as
would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action
against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral
Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that
the Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating
that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful
and that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a
possibility.
(o) Fact XVII. In this section the Court sets forth certain information,
which as known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel
which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7
December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and
Navy Departments and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that
there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in
the Far East, rather an elsewhere. The summary of the information on
which this is based is as follows:
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO
beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war
warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was
expected within the next few days; [10] that there were indications of
an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute
an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War
Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be
terminated; Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile
action was possible any time; and that it was desirable that Japan
commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information
Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
directing him scout for information of Japanese movements in the China
Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided
relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the
Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII. This section of the Findings deals with information that
became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November.
It set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which
had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued,
coming an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information
as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of
the Navy Department are set forth as follows:
[11] (1) Information was received from trusted sources during and prior
this period which was made available in the Navy Department but which
was to sent to Admiral Kimmel. This information indicates definite
Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor and indicates a desire
in some cases to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral
Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel
this information, because to do so might compromise the sources from
which it was obtained. This intention has some merit, in my opinion. It
was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this
information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral
Kimmel a general picture of the information which he was receiving.
Admiral Stark says that he considered that the dispatches he did send to
Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred
as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court
holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate
summary of the information at Admiral Stark's disposal. I have to concur
in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, the Court goes at length into the
handling certain information which was received in the Navy Department
on the 6th of December, at 2100 on that date. The greater part of this
information indicated the Japanese views concerning certain United
States proposals for solving matters under dispute between the
countries, and leaves no doubt that the United States' proposals were [12] unacceptable to Japan, but do
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