CBS) This
is the story of hundreds, if not thousands, of foreign language
documents that the FBI neglected to translate before and after the Sept.
11 attacks -- documents that detailed what the FBI heard on wiretaps and
learned during interrogations of suspected terrorists.
Sibel Edmonds, a translator who
worked at the FBI's language division, says the documents weren't
translated because the division was riddled with incompetence and
corruption.
Edmonds was fired after
reporting her concerns to FBI officials. She told her story behind
closed doors to investigators in Congress and to the Justice Department.
Most recently, she spoke with the commission investigating the Sept. 11
attacks.
She first told Correspondent Ed
Bradley her story a year after Sept. 11.
Because she is fluent in
Turkish and other Middle Eastern languages, Edmonds, a Turkish-American,
was hired by the FBI soon after Sept. 11 and given top-secret security
clearance to translate some of the reams of documents seized by FBI
agents who have been rounding up suspected terrorists across the United
States and abroad.
Edmonds says that to her
amazement, from the day she started the job, she was told repeatedly by
one of her supervisors that there was no urgency -- that she should take
longer to translate documents so that the department would appear
overworked and understaffed. That way, it would receive a larger budget
for the next year.
“We were told by our
supervisors that this was the great opportunity for asking for increased
budget and asking for more translators,” says Edmonds. “And in order to
do that, don't do the work and let the documents pile up so we can show
it and say that we need more translators and expand the department.”
Edmonds says that the
supervisor, in an effort to slow her down, went so far as to erase
completed translations from her FBI computer after she'd left work for
the day.
“The next day, I would come to
work, turn on my computer, and the work would be gone. The translation
would be gone,” she says. “Then I had to start all over again and
retranslate the same document. And I went to my supervisor and he said,
‘Consider it a lesson and don't talk about it to anybody else and don't
mention it.’
"The lesson was don’t work, and
don’t do the translations. ...Don't do the work because -- and this is
our chance to increase the number of people here in this department."
Edmonds put her concerns about
the FBI's language department in writing to her immediate superiors and
to a top official at the FBI. For months, she said she received no
response. Then, she turned for help to the Justice Department's
inspector general and to Sen. Charles Grassley, whose committee, the
Judiciary Committee, has direct oversight of the FBI.
“She's credible,” says
Grassley. “And the reason I feel she's very credible is because people
within the FBI have corroborated a lot of her story.”
The FBI has conceded that some
people in the language department are unable to adequately speak English
or the language they're supposed to be translating. Kevin Taskasen was
assigned to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba to translate interrogations of
Turkish-speaking al Qaeda members who had been captured after Sept. 11.
The FBI admits that he was not fully qualified to do the job.
“He neither passed the English
nor the Turkish side of the language proficiency test,” says Edmonds.
Critical shortages of
experienced Middle Eastern language translators have plagued the FBI and
the rest of the U.S. intelligence community for years.
Months before the first World
Trade Center bombing in 1993, one of the plotters of the attack was
heard on tape having a discussion in Arabic that no one at the time knew
was about how to make explosives -- and he had a manual that no one at
the time knew was about how to blow up buildings. None of it was
translated until well after the bombing, and while the FBI has hired
more translators since then, officials concede that problems in the
language division have hampered the country's efforts to battle
terrorism.
According to congressional
investigators, this may have played a role in the inability to prevent
the Sept. 11 attacks. The General Accounting Office reported that the
FBI had expressed concern over the thousands of hours of audiotapes and
pages of written material that have not been reviewed or translated
because of a lack of qualified linguists.
“If they got word today that
within, in a little while, the Hoover Dam was going to be blown up, and
it takes a week or two to get it translated, as was one of the problems
in this department, you know, you couldn't intervene to prevent that
from happening,” says Grassley.
In its rush to hire more
foreign language translators after Sept. 11, the FBI admits it has had
difficulty performing background checks to detect translators who may
have loyalties to other governments, which could pose a threat to U.S.
national security.
Take the case of Jan Dickerson,
a Turkish translator who worked with Edmonds. The FBI has admitted that
when Dickerson was hired, the bureau didn't know that she had worked for
a Turkish organization being investigated by the FBI's own
counter-intelligence unit.
They also didn't know she'd had
a relationship with a Turkish intelligence officer stationed in
Washington who was the target of that investigation. According to
Edmonds, Dickerson tried to recruit her into that organization, and
insisted that Dickerson be the only one to translate the FBI's wiretaps
of that Turkish official.
“She got very angry, and later
she threatened me and my family's life,” says Edmonds, when she decided
not to go along with the plan. “She said, ‘Why would you want to place
your life and your family's life in danger by translating these tapes?’”
Edmonds says that when she
reviewed Dickerson's translations of those tapes, she found that
Dickerson had left out information crucial to the FBI's investigation --
information that Edmonds says would have revealed that the Turkish
intelligence officer had spies working for him inside the U.S. State
Department and at the Pentagon.
“We came across at least 17, 18
translations, communications that were extremely important for the
ongoing investigations of these individuals,” says Edmonds. “She had
marked it as 'not important to be translated.'"
What kind of information did
she leave out of her translation?
“Activities to obtain the
United States military and intelligence secrets,” says Edmonds.
She says she complained
repeatedly to her bosses about what she'd found on the wiretaps and
about Dickerson's conduct, but that nobody at the FBI wanted to hear
about it, not even the assistant special agent in charge.
“He said ‘Do you realize what
you are saying here in your allegations? Are you telling me that our
security people are not doing their jobs? Is that what you're telling
me? If you insist on this investigation, I'll make sure in no time it
will turn around and become an investigation about you,’” says Edmonds.
Sibel Edmonds was fired. The
FBI offered no explanation, saying in the letter only that her contract
was terminated completely for the government's convenience.
But three months later, the FBI conceded that on at least two occasions,
Dickerson had, in fact, left out significant information from her
translations. They say it was due to a lack of experience and was not
malicious.
Dickerson quit the FBI and now
lives in Belgium. She declined to be interviewed, but she told The
Chicago Tribune that the allegations against her are preposterous and
ludicrous. Grassley says he's disturbed by what the Dickerson incident
says about internal security at the FBI.
"You shouldn't have somebody in
your organization that's compromising our national security by not doing
the job right, whether it's lack of skills or whether it's intentional,"
says Grassley.
Does the Sibel Edmonds case
fall into any pattern of behavior, pattern of conduct, on the part of
the FBI?
“The usual pattern,” says
Grassley. “Let me tell you, first of all, the embarrassing information
comes out, the FBI reaction is to sweep it under the rug, and then
eventually they shoot the messenger.”
Special agent John Roberts,
recently retired as a chief of the FBI's Internal Affairs Department,
agrees. And while he is not permitted to discuss the Edmonds case, for
the last 10 years, he has been investigating misconduct by FBI
employees. He says he is outraged by how little is ever done about it.
“I don't know of another person
in the FBI who has done the internal investigations that I have and has
seen what I have, and that knows what has occurred and what has been
glossed over and what has, frankly, just disappeared, just vaporized,
and no one disciplined for it,” says Roberts.
Despite a pledge from FBI
Director Robert Mueller to overhaul the culture of the FBI in light of
9/11, and encourage bureau employees to come forward to report
wrongdoing, Roberts says that in the rare instances when employees are
disciplined, it's usually low-level employees like Edmonds who get
punished and not their bosses.
“I think the double standard of
discipline will continue no matter who comes in, no matter who tries to
change,” says Roberts. “You, you have a certain, certain group that,
that will continue to protect itself. That's just how it is.”
Has he found cases since Sept.
11 where people were involved in misconduct and were not, let alone
reprimanded, but were even promoted? Roberts says yes.
"That's astonishing," Bradley
told Roberts. "You would think that after 9/11, that's a big slap in the
face. 'This is a wake-up call here.'"
"Depends on who you are," says
Roberts. "If you're in the senior executive level, it may not hurt you.
You will be promoted."
Last month, the FBI took the
highly unusual step of retroactively classifying information it gave to
Congress two years ago about the Sibel Edmonds case.
As for the FBI's language
division, the bureau says it has dramatically beefed up its translation
capabilities.