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by The New York
Times
March 8, 1992
Following are excerpts from the
Pentagon's Feb. 18 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal
Years 1994-1999:
This Defense Planning guidance
addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well
as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology
with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment
has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its coalition
allies over Iraqi aggression -- the first post-cold-war conflict and a
defining event in U.S. global leadership. In addition to these two
victories, there has been a less visible one, the integration of Germany
and Japan into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation
of a democratic "zone of peace."
DEFENSE STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Our first objective is to prevent
the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former
Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed
formerly by the Soviet Union.
This is a dominant consideration
underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor
to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources
would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.
These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the
former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
There are three additional
aspects to this objective: First, the U.S. must show the leadership
necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of
convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater
role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate
interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently
for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them
from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established
political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for
deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or
global role. An effective reconstitution capability is important here,
since it implies that a potential rival could not hope to quickly or
easily gain a predominant military position in the world.
The second objective is to
address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to
promote increasing respect for international law, limit international
violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and
open economic systems. These objectives are especially important in
deterring conflicts or threats in regions of security importance to the
United States because of their proximity (such as Latin America), or where
we have treaty obligations or security commitments to other nations. While
the U.S. cannot become the world's "policeman," by assuming responsibility
for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility
for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our
interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously
unsettle international relations.
Various types of U.S. interests
may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials,
primarily Persian Gulf oil;
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,
threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and
threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking.
It is improbable that a global
conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will re-emerge from
the Eurasian heartland for many years to come. Even in the highly unlikely
event that some future leadership in the former Soviet Union adopted
strategic aims of recovering the lost empire or otherwise threatened
global interests, the loss of Warsaw Pact allies and the subsequent and
continuing dissolution of military capability would make any hope of
success require several years or more of strategic and doctrinal
re-orientation and force regeneration and redeployment, which in turn
could only happen after a lengthy political realignment and re-orientation
to authoritarian and aggressive political and economic control.
Furthermore, any such political upheaval in or among the states of the
former U.S.S.R. would be much more likely to issue in internal or
localized hostilities, rather than a concerted strategic effort to marshal
capabilities for external expansionism -- the ability to project power
beyond their borders.
There are other potential nations
or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims
and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy
must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future
global competitor. But
because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile,
non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we
have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs
-- as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the
need to counter a global threat re-emerge. . . .
REGIONAL THREATS AND RISK
With the demise of a global
military threat to U.S. interests, regional military threats, including
possible conflicts arising in and from the territory of the former Soviet
Union, will be of primary concern to the U.S. in the future. These threats
are likely to arise in regions critical to the security of the U.S. and
its allies, including Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Southwest
Asia, and the territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have important
interests at stake in Latin America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
In both cases, the U.S. will be concerned with preventing the domination
of key regions by a hostile power. . . .
Former Soviet Union
The former Soviet state achieved
global reach and power by consolidating control over the resources in the
territory of the former U.S.S.R. The best means of assuring that no
hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the
former Soviet Union is to support its successor states (especially Russia
and Ukraine) in their efforts to become peaceful democracies with
market-based economies. A democratic partnership with Russia and the other
republics would be the best possible outcome for the United States. At the
same time, we must also hedge against the possibility that democracy will
fail, with the potential that an authoritarian regime bent on regenerating
aggressive military power could emerge in Russia, or that similar regimes
in other successor republics could lead to spreading conflict within the
former U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe.
For the immediate future, key
U.S. concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other republics to
demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to
civilian production, eliminate or, in the case of Russia, radically reduce
their nuclear weapons inventory, maintain firm command and control over
nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and
expertise to other countries.
Western Europe
NATO continues to provide the
indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe.
Therefore, it is of
fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of
Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence
and participation in European security affairs.
While the United States supports the
goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of
European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO,
particularly the alliance's integrated command structure.
East-Central Europe
The end of the Warsaw Pact and
the dissolution of the Soviet Union have gone a long way toward increasing
stability and reducing the military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of
democratic reformers in the Russian republic, should this process
continue, is likely to create a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe.
However, the U.S. must keep in mind the long history of conflict between
the states of Eastern Europe, as well as the potential for conflict
between the states of Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union.
. . .
The most promising avenues for
anchoring the east-central Europeans into the West and for stabilizing
their democratic institutions is their participation in Western political
and economic organizations. East-central European membership in the
(European Community) at the earliest opportunity, and expanded NATO
liaison. . . .
The U.S. could also consider
extending to the east-central European states security commitments
analogous to those we have extended to Persian Gulf states.
Should there be a re-emergence of
a threat from the Soviet Union's successor state, we should plan to defend
against such a threat in Eastern Europe, should there be an alliance
decision to do so.
East Asia and Pacific
. . . Defense of Korea will
likely remain one of the most demanding major regional contingencies. . .
. Asia is home to the world's greatest concentration of traditional
Communist states, with fundamental values, governance, and policies
decidedly at variance with our own and those of our friends and allies.
To buttress the vital political
and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain
our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area. This
will enable the U.S. to continue to contribute to regional security and
stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum
or a regional hegemon.
Middle East and Southwest Asia
In the Middle East and
Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside
power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's
oil. We also seek to
deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect
U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air
and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it remains
fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from
dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula.
Therefore, we must continue to play a strong role through enhanced
deterrence and improved cooperative security.
We will seek to prevent the
further development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. In
this regard, we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan,
adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear
energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We
should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in
South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a
constructive U.S.-Pakistani military relationship will be an important
element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in Southwest
Asia and Central Asia. We should therefore endeavor to rebuild our
military relationship given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concerns.
Latin America
Cuba's growing domestic crisis
holds out the prospect for positive change, but over the near term, Cuba's
tenuous internal situation is likely to generate new challenges to U.S.
policy. Consequently, our programs must provide capabilities to meet a
variety of Cuban contingencies which could include an attempted repetition
of the Mariel boatlift, a military provocation against the U.S. or an
American ally, or political instability and internal conflict in Cuba.
Copyright 1992 The New York Times
Company
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