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EPA'S RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE: CHALLENGES, SUCCESSES, AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT |
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The extent of the CEQ official’s influence on EPA’s WTC press releases was most clearly illustrated by the changes that were made to a draft press release dated September 14, 2001, that was issued on September 16, 2001. Every change that was suggested by the CEQ contact was made. The CEQ official’s suggested changes added reassuring statements and deleted cautionary statements. Details on these various revisions based on the CEQ contact’s input, including comparisons of draft and issued versions, are in Table 2-4, while the actual press release is in Appendix G. It should be noted that our analysis of CEQ’s input was limited because CEQ officials chose not to meet with us. Details on this limitation are in Appendix B. Table 2-4: Impact of CEQ Instruction on September 16 EPA Press Release
16 Report No. 2003-P-00012 We were unable to identify any EPA official who claimed ownership of EPA’s WTC press releases issued in September and early October 2001. When we asked the EPA Chief of Staff whether she could claim ownership of EPA’s early WTC press releases, she replied that she was not able to do so “because the ownership was joint ownership between EPA and the White House,” and that “final approval came from the White House.” She also told us that other considerations, such as the desire to reopen Wall Street and national security concerns, were considered when preparing EPA’s early press releases. The OCEMR Associate Administrator said of the September 16 release: “I did not feel like it was my press release.” September 13 Press Release Also Revised to Eliminate Cautionary Statements Cautionary statements in a draft version of the September 13, 2001, press release (see Appendix H) were removed and replaced with more reassuring statements. For example, the second clause of the caption to the draft press release, which noted that EPA was testing for environmental hazards, was replaced with a statement reassuring the public about environmental hazards. Further, the press release did not contain a statement in the draft version that EPA considered asbestos hazardous in this situation. We were unable to locate any record that explained why the changes were made, and the OCEMR Associate Administrator did not recall ever having seen the draft. The major differences between the draft and the issued press release are shown in Table 2-5. Table 2-5: Significant Changes to the September 13 EPA Press Release
17 Report No. 2003-P-00012 Recent Conclusions About WTC Air Quality The only formal risk evaluation of the health effects from exposure to the outdoor air in Lower Manhattan following the WTC collapse was performed by EPA’s Office of Research and Development. This evaluation, still in draft form as of July 2003, concluded that, except for the rescue and cleanup workers at Ground Zero who were not wearing respirators, as well as unknown exposures to the public during the first few days, persons in the area were unlikely to suffer adverse heath effects from the outdoor air. The report also had a caveat for the conclusions drawn in the report relative to human health risks. The draft report stated: This report should be viewed as the first phase of an ongoing analysis, and the conclusions and findings cited below should not be considered the final EPA judgment. At this point, the available data and analysis are still too preliminary to support reliable quantitative predictions of potential human health risks. We spoke to a number of experts in the field of environmental monitoring, including physicians, industrial hygienists, and researchers These experts generally agreed that the levels of airborne asbestos detected in the air outside the perimeter of Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan did not present a significant increase in long-term health risk to the public. Appendix I lists the experts we interviewed during this evaluation. We noted that several health studies pointed to potential problems for firefighters, rescue workers, and other persons working within the confines of Ground Zero who did not wear respirators:
_______________ 5 “ Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site,” David J. Prezant et al, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 347, No. 11, September 12, 2002. 18 Report No. 2003-P-00012 At the time we completed our report, no studies of the health effects of the WTC collapse on the general public had been completed, although we noted studies [6] were underway to determine the effects of the WTC collapse on pregnant women and their children. Further, in January 2003, New York City and Federal health officials announced a plan to study residents and employees in Lower Manhattan to identify whether there will be long-term pulmonary effects associated with exposure to WTC dust and air. EPA has initiated actions to strengthen its risk communication procedures for emergency situations. For example, EPA’s Office of Public Affairs has prepared a draft “Plan for Incident Communication” that establishes basic incident procedures and assigns responsibilities and authorities. Further, the Agency intends to use this plan as the basis for more inclusive best- practices emergency communications guidance. EPA’s early statement that the air was safe to breathe was incomplete in that it lacked necessary qualifications and thus was not supported by the data available at the time. CEQ influenced the final message in EPA’s air quality statements. Competing considerations, such as national security concerns and the desire to reopen Wall Street, also played a role in EPA’s air quality statements. The “safety” of the air in Lower Manhattan after the collapse of the WTC towers is still being debated and studied. However, given the current lack of health-based benchmarks, the lack of research data on synergistic effects, and the lack of reliable information on the extent of the public’s exposure to these pollutants, the answer to whether the outdoor air around WTC was “safe” to breathe may not be settled for years to come. _______________ 6 “Prospective Study of Pregnant Women and Infants Exposed in Utero to WTC Air Pollution,” Columbia University; and “Study of Pregnant Women and Children Near WTC,” Mt. Sinai School of Medicine. 19 Report No. 2003-P-00012 We recommend that the EPA Administrator: 2-1. Develop procedures for emergency risk communication to ensure that EPA’s public pronouncements regarding health risks and environmental quality are adequately supported with available data and analysis. Additional recommendations regarding contingency planning, risk characterization and assessment, and risk communication are presented in Chapter 7. Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation In her August 8, 2003 response to our draft report, the EPA Acting Administrator stated that the report placed too much emphasis on EPA’s press releases and did not sufficiently acknowledge EPA’s many other communications. She further noted that EPA’s early statement that the air was safe to breathe was made in direct response to the public’s concern about asbestos contamination following the WTC collapse, and that the press release detailed the monitoring that led to the statement and made it clear that further monitoring would take place. The Acting Administrator also pointed out that EPA never withheld data from the public and made its extensive monitoring data available on its interactive web site. With respect to CEQ’s involvement in the preparation of EPA’s press releases, the Acting Administrator stated that the Agency coordinated with CEQ and that this coordination was neither unusual nor unexpected during a catastrophic disaster on the scale of the WTC attacks. Further, she noted that EPA acknowledges that mistakes were made and things could have been done better, and that there are lessons to be learned in the difficult area of risk communication. Improving risk communications is an Agency priority as it implements its “lessons learned.” In our opinion, Agency press releases are a very important form of communication. As detailed in our draft report, EPA press releases result from a deliberative process that should reflect the Agency’s official position on significant issues. Press releases are made available to essentially all news media and may be quoted or paraphrased in radio, television, and other forms of communication. In our opinion, the Agency could have provided more complete and useful information in the press releases. Further, we reviewed other agency forms of communication including all communication-related documents provided by the Agency. These documents included videotaped interviews, newspaper articles, briefing notes, and other forms of communication. With respect to the Agency’s early statement about the air quality, we fully recognize the extraordinary circumstances that existed at the time the statement was made about the air being safe to breathe. It continues to be our opinion that there was insufficient information to support the statement. The Agency’s complete written response to our draft report and our detailed evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively. 20 Report No. 2003-P-00012 EPA’s actions to evaluate, mitigate, and control risks to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in the WTC area were consistent with applicable statutes and regulations. EPA is not obligated to respond to a given emergency, and New York City exercised a lead role regarding indoor air. Nonetheless, we believe EPA could have taken a more proactive approach regarding indoor air cleanup. EPA began to assume a lead role in February 2002, when the Agency initiated a multi-agency task force to address concerns about the indoor environment. Prior to initiation of the EPA-led cleanup, many WTC area residents had returned to their homes, and a study indicated most of them had not followed recommended cleaning practices. The full extent of public exposure to indoor contaminants resulting from the WTC collapse is unknown. Concerns Expressed Regarding Indoor Contamination Response The public and elected officials began raising concerns about the extent that indoor spaces were contaminated with asbestos and other contaminants shortly after the WTC collapse. New York City, which initially took lead responsibility for addressing indoor air, was criticized for:
EPA was criticized for not initially taking a greater role in indoor testing and cleaning. U.S. Congressman Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), whose district includes Lower Manhattan, contended that EPA violated the law by allowing New York City to handle indoor air quality and not exercising oversight authority pursuant to the National Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA maintained that the NCP does not create a right to a Federal response and its approach to indoor air was a “proper and legal exercise of our discretion” under the NCP. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, EPA undertook several activities to address various issues related to indoor air. However, according to EPA documentation, New York City officials stated on September 30, 2001, that the City would not be requesting assistance from EPA regarding residential sampling or reoccupation issues, or roof debris cleanup. 21 Report No. 2003-P-00012
Indoor dust contamination from WTC debris. Source: EPA/ORD - - photo courtesy of Dr. Lung Chi Chen - NYU Responses to Indoor Contamination Initially, building owners were held responsible for cleaning up their own buildings, including interiors and exteriors. According to New York City officials, the issue of funding the cleanup of privately owned buildings was discussed with FEMA and EPA; and the initial federal position was that the Stafford Act (the implementing statute for the FRP) did not provide direct funding to New York City for this cleanup. New York City officials said that during this discussion they informed the federal agencies that building owners would be responsible for funding the cleanup of their buildings and the federal agencies agreed with this position. Under this arrangement, owners of rental units were responsible for cleaning apartment walls, ceilings, and floors; common areas, such as hallways and lobbies; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, when deemed necessary as explained in guidance provided by New York City. Renters were responsible for cleaning personal belongings. In resident- owned condominiums, residents were responsible for cleaning their units, while building owners were responsible for cleaning common areas and HVAC systems. Table 3-1 notes key instructions New York City provided to building owners and residents regarding the potential for indoor contamination resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers and steps for cleaning the indoor contamination. Copies of the instructions are available on our web site. 22 Report No. 2003-P-00012 Table 3-1: Actions by New York City
NYCDEP officials told us that in September 2001 they began visually inspecting the exteriors of over 1,000 buildings and identified 323 with visible dust. NYCDEP documentation indicated that 102 of these 323 building exteriors were subsequently cleaned by the building owners. NYCDEP officials told us that the remaining owners stated they could not afford to clean their buildings, and these buildings were cleaned by NYCDEP with funding provided by FEMA. To determine the extent of indoor contamination in Lower Manhattan residences, 23 Report No. 2003-P-00012 the NYCDOH and ATSDR initiated an indoor air study in November 2001. The sampling phase was completed in December 2001, preliminary results released to the public in February 2002, and the final report issued by ATSDR in September 2002. The results of this study are discussed later in this chapter.
Indoor dust contamination from WTC debris. Source: EPA/ORD - Photo courtesy of Dr. Lung Chi Chen - NYU In the weeks following the disaster, EPA was involved in testing various indoor spaces. EPA worked with the U.S. Coast Guard [7] to monitor offices in the Wall Street area so that employees could enter their offices and obtain needed files. On September 13, 2001, EPA tested for asbestos in its building located at 290 Broadway. Further, on September 17, 2001, EPA sampled dust in the Jacob Javits Convention Center complex, and on October 23, 2001, tested in the Department of Justice offices on 100 Church Street. Details on the results of EPA’s indoor testing, as well as General Services Administration testing of Federal buildings and three significant non-EPA studies, are in Appendix K. Also, EPA conducted preliminary indoor assessments of 11 buildings at the request of the Ground Zero Elected Officials Task Force. These preliminary assessments included inspecting the interiors of the buildings, discussing cleanup plans with building owners/managers, and collecting dust samples from four of the buildings – three schools and one apartment building. An EPA Situation _______________ 7 The U.S. Coast Guard maintains strike teams that typically deploy for responses to oil and hazardous chemical spills and were deployed in response to the WTC attacks. 24 Report No. 2003-P-00012 Report for September 27-29, 2001, noted that a projected future action was to “finalize sampling plan for residential buildings.” However, EPA’s Situation Report for September 30 noted: Residential sampling/reoccupation: On 9/30/01, EPA spoke to US Public Health Service and NYSDOH (New York State Department of Health) who have been discussing issue with NYCDOH. NYC will not be requesting State or Federal assistance for residential sampling or reoccupation issues. The Federal Response Plan assigns responsibility to the U.S. Public Health Service under ESF-8, Health and Medical Services, when state and local resources request Federal assistance for medical and public health assistance. In addition, correspondence from the Region 2 Regional Administrator indicated that in an October 9, 2001, meeting between FEMA, EPA, and New York City officials, City officials stated that they would not be requesting EPA’s assistance for residential sampling or reoccupation issues. The September 30 report also indicated that New York City would not be requesting Federal assistance for cleaning roof debris. New York City officials disagreed with the characterizations of their statements presented in these documents and told us that they repeatedly expressed the position that the City welcomed any authorized federal assistance at that time. Though EPA press releases through 2001 generally addressed outdoor air and not indoor contamination, the September 16 and October 3 releases discussed cleaning procedures that business owners and residents should take in cleaning indoor spaces. The press releases advised residents and business owners they could clean their own spaces if they used “appropriate” vacuum filters, and followed “recommended” and “proper” procedures. These press releases did not define what “appropriate,” “recommended,” and “proper” procedures meant. Initially, EPA deferred to New York City to provide guidance for cleaning indoor spaces. As noted in Chapter 2, EPA was prepared to include recommendations in its press releases that residents obtain professional cleaning of their residences. The absence of instructions recommending that residents obtain professional cleaning in the initial weeks following the disaster may have increased the long- term health risks for those who cleaned WTC dust without using respirators and other professional cleaning equipment. EPA’s web site and press releases deferred to the NYCDOH guidance even though EPA’s position on indoor cleaning was different than the City’s. EPA’s basis for deferring to New York City was summarized by the testimony of the Region 2 Administrator before the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on February 11, 2002. The Administrator, when asked if the 25 Report No. 2003-P-00012 NYCDOH provided adequate cleanup directions to residents, answered as follows: Consistent with their responsibility for the indoor environment, the City DOH, working with ATSDR and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) took the lead on the development and dissemination of public health recommendations related to building cleanups. DOH statements emphasizing wet wiping, moping and use of HEPA vacuums were reasonable. EPA’s advice has been more conservative and suggested that people encountering more than minimal amounts of dust should consider this as a “worst case” and likely to be contaminated with asbestos. Under these circumstances, they should hire a certified asbestos cleanup contractor. . . ” Asbestos medical experts we consulted agreed that professional cleaning was preferred for the asbestos contamination found. Further, the experts stated that, at a minimum, if members of the public were to clean residences themselves, they should have been instructed to wear respirators. A study by NYCDOH found that most residents did not follow the City’s recommended cleaning practices. Although not specifically mentioned in the study, this conclusion would suggest that these residents did not obtain professional asbestos abatement contractors to clean their residences. The increased risk that residents placed themselves in by cleaning residences themselves is not known. Although Agency press releases did not recommend professional cleaning of residences, EPA officials told us that they consistently recommended that residents obtain professional cleaning during interviews, public forums, and other communications. We were unable to determine when EPA first told the public that they should obtain professional cleaning for WTC-contaminated indoor spaces. The earliest instance we could locate was on October 26, 2001, when the EPA Administrator recommended professional cleaning in a televised interview on MSNBC: However, again, as we said from the beginning, if you live there and you have any kind of breach - a window open, a broken window, anything like that in your apartment - or you have a heavy amount of dust - you should get a professional cleaner to clean it out . . . but just wiping it down, using your regular vacuum cleaner, that’s not good enough. But - you know - we provided that information and it is up to the City Health Department and OSHA and others to follow-up. . . 26 Report No. 2003-P-00012 EPA also posted information on its public web site that recommended that indoor spaces with “more than a minimal amount of dust” be cleaned by a “professional asbestos contractor.” We could not identify the exact date this information was posted, but determined that it was on EPA’s web site by December 11, 2001. In February 2002, EPA initiated a multi-agency task force on indoor contamination. The former EPA Chief of Staff told us that EPA initiated this effort because “Over time, we saw that New York City was not prepared to handle all the issues related to indoor air and offered to support them.” The task force developed a plan in which EPA assumed the lead role for overseeing a FEMA- funded cleanup of residences in Lower Manhattan. EPA, New York City, and FEMA officials announced this plan to the public on May 8, 2002. Residents of Lower Manhattan living south of Canal Street could request testing and cleaning of their residences, or just testing. Public registration for the indoor testing and cleaning program ended December 28, 2002. This residential cleanup program is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authority for Indoor Environment EPA does not have clear statutory authority to establish and enforce health-based regulatory standards for indoor air. EPA is provided the authority to respond to releases of hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund). Specifically, under Section 104(a) of CERCLA, EPA is authorized, consistent with the NCP, to remove or remediate any hazardous substance that is released into the environment, or any pollutant or contaminant that may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare. Asbestos is a hazardous substance under CERCLA. Neither CERCLA nor the implementing regulations under the NCP obligate EPA to undertake response actions. As provided in the NCP, “activities by the Federal and State governments in implementing this subpart are discretionary governmental functions” that do not create “a right to federal response” nor “any duty of the Federal government to take any response action at any particular time” (40 CFR § 300.404(h)(3)). Moreover, CERCLA contemplates State participation in response actions (42 U.S.C. 9621(h)), and the NCP allows for States to assume the lead agency role. CERCLA only applies to the release of hazardous substances “into the environment.” CERCLA defines “environment” as “the navigable waters ... and ... any other surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States.” Courts have held the emissions of dust within enclosed buildings are not releases “into the environment” and therefore are not CERCLA releases. However, in the WTC case, the contamination of indoor spaces was caused by an external event – the collapse of the WTC. The collapse itself caused a release of hazardous substances 27 Report No. 2003-P-00012 into the “environment” when a huge dust plume was released into the ambient air. Matter from the dust plume then entered buildings in the surrounding area. In such a case, when the release “into the environment” ends up contaminating enclosed structures, CERCLA provides EPA the authority to take any actions necessary to eliminate or mitigate the threat to public health from the release. A 1998 Presidential Decision Directive [8] (PDD 62) tasked EPA with the leadership role in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. This leadership role was discussed in the EPA Administrator’s November 28, 2001, testimony before a Congressional Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, wherein she noted that: Under the provisions of PDD 62, signed by President Clinton in 1998, the EPA is assigned lead responsibility for cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. This responsibility draws on our decades of experience in cleaning up sites contaminated by toxins through prior practices or accidents. The expectation that EPA should be the lead agency for responding to indoor contamination has been clarified since September 11, 2001. The July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security issued by the Department of Homeland Security states that: “After a major incident, the Environmental Protection Agency will be responsible for decontamination of affected buildings and neighborhoods and providing advice and assistance to public health authorities in determining when it is safe to return to these areas.” Prior Responses to Releases of Hazardous Substances Due to the magnitude of the WTC collapse, it is difficult to compare the WTC response with responses to other emergencies. However, we noted other emergencies involving indoor contamination in which EPA’s and other government entities’ response to those emergencies appeared more proactive or comprehensive than the response to the WTC incident.
_______________ 8 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas,” May 22, 1998. 28 Report No. 2003-P-00012 guidance document that addresses the applicability of the Asbestos NESHAP to emergency situations discussed the Gramercy Park incident and concluded that a Federal response under CERCLA could have been undertaken if deemed necessary. However, in this case a Federal response was not needed in light of the City’s response.
For indoor environment concerns resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers, EPA had the authority to act under CERCLA but was not obligated to do so. Guidelines exist for determining whether an emergency response is warranted; however, these guidelines are not definitive. Under the NCP, it was within EPA’s discretion to defer to New York City the responsibility for responding to indoor contamination concerns. EPA’s action was consistent with the FRP, which is intended to supplement local government response. Although EPA acted within its discretion, a 1998 Presidential directive and the more recent National Strategy for Homeland Security task EPA with taking the leadership role in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. EPA needs to work with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to determine the nature and form with which the Federal government should assume a more direct role in addressing indoor environment concerns, under what circumstances this direct role should occur, and the oversight mechanisms to be employed when local agencies undertake such responses. In the WTC case, the delay in providing a government-organized and adequately monitored cleanup in Lower Manhattan may have contributed to unnecessary exposures to asbestos and other pollutants by unprotected workers and residents. _______________ 9 The indoor air clearance memorandum for Libby had not been finalized at the time we drafted this report. A preliminary clearance level of non-detect for asbestos was being used; based on the method detection limit used in Libby, the clearance level being used is similar to the clearance level being used for residences in Lower Manhattan. 29 Report No. 2003-P-00012 We recommend that the EPA Administrator coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, other appropriate Federal agencies, and those State and local governments having jurisdiction over potential terrorist targets to: 3-1. Develop protocols for determining how indoor environmental concerns will be handled in large-scale disasters, to include addressing:
3-2. Develop and publish oversight criteria and State and local agency reporting requirements for those agencies involved in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by pollutants resulting from terrorist attacks or other disasters. Additional recommendations related to responding to indoor environmental concerns are in Chapters 6 and 7. Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation The Agency disagreed that unprotected workers and residents may have experienced unnecessary exposures to asbestos or other pollutants as a result of the delay in providing a government- organized and monitored cleanup, because (1) their recommended cleaning instructions (use of wet mops and HEPA vacuums) were proven effective in EPA studies, and (2) the Agency recommended professional cleaning when residents encountered more than minimal dust. The Agency generally agreed with the recommendations. EPA’s study of cleaning effectiveness concluded that 1 to 3 cleanings were needed to achieve the health-related benchmarks and did not address the exposure experienced by an unprotected person who may be performing these recommended cleaning procedures. Also, a NYCDOH study conducted in October 2001 concluded that the majority of households polled did not follow the recommended procedures of wet mopping and HEPA vacuuming. Also, a study of immigrant workers used to clean indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan around 30 Report No. 2003-P-00012 Ground Zero reported that the workers often did not wear respiratory protection and experienced numerous respiratory symptoms. With respect to professional cleaning, EPA’s press releases did not recommend this approach. Therefore, we continue to believe delays in implementing a government organized cleanup resulted in unnecessary exposure to asbestos and other contaminants. The Agency’s full written response to our draft report and our detailed evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively. New York City officials disagreed with some of the draft report’s characterizations of its position on the indoor response and offered clarifications which we incorporated into the final report. New York City’s response to draft report excerpts and our evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices S and T, respectively. 31 Report No. 2003-P-00012 32 Report No. 2003-P-00012 Asbestos Emission Control Work Practices Inconsistent Since asbestos is a known human carcinogen, EPA has established stringent work practices to control emissions of asbestos resulting from demolition and renovation projects. Evidence indicated that a significant requirement in emergency demolitions – wetting damaged buildings before demolition and keeping the waste material wet after demolition – was followed at the WTC site. However, work practices applicable to the transport of debris from the site were employed inconsistently. The specific impact on air quality of any variance from EPA’s asbestos emergency work practices is unknown, although outdoor air monitoring showed seven asbestos readings above the AHERA standard after September 2001. Application of NESHAP Demolition and Renovation Regulations to the WTC Disaster The applicability of the Asbestos NESHAP regulations to the demolition of damaged WTC Complex buildings and the removal of WTC building debris was discussed by EPA officials as early as September 12, 2001. An EPA official told us that EPA did not want to insist on any NESHAP requirement that would impede or deter the WTC search and rescue operation. An EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance official involved in these early discussions told us that, in theory, NESHAP would apply to all dust and debris from the WTC disaster and subsequent demolition and removal efforts if that material contained more than 1 percent asbestos. However, in his opinion, a literal interpretation of the requirements was not realistic under the circumstances. The Regional Counsel for EPA Region 2 told us that he concluded the Asbestos NESHAP was not applicable to the transport of steel from the towers since the collapse did not meet the definition of a NESHAP demolition. However, he did not render an opinion on the applicability of the NESHAP to the demolition and removal of the three buildings that had not fully collapsed. The Asbestos NESHAP regulations (40 CFR Part 61 Subpart M) prescribe requirements for industries and operators of certain activities to reduce the emissions of asbestos, including the demolition and renovation of buildings that contain asbestos. Generally known as the asbestos NESHAP work practice standards, many of these are applicable to emergency situations involving asbestos, as explained in EPA’s “Guidelines For Catastrophic Emergency 33 Report No. 2003-P-00012 Situations Involving Asbestos” [10] issued in February 1992. For example, asbestos- containing buildings that are in danger of imminent collapse and are ordered by the government to be demolished must be wetted down to reduce emissions. Further, asbestos-containing waste must be adequately wetted at all times after demolition and kept wet during the handling and loading for transport to a disposal site. Additionally, in response to questions about the proper handling of WTC dust and debris from a law firm representing Local 78, Asbestos, Lead and Hazardous Waste Laborers, OSHA issued an “interpretive letter” in January 2002 stating that the WTC dust was presumed to contain asbestos and the WTC demolition and salvage was subject to the Construction Asbestos Standard. Asbestos Work Practices Used in the WTC Complex Demolition The NESHAP emergency requirement – wetting damaged buildings before demolition and continuous wetting of the debris after demolition – appeared to have been followed. However, implementation of work practices to reduce asbestos emissions during transport of asbestos- containing debris appeared to be inconsistent. The New York State Department of Labor is delegated responsibility for implementing all Federal regulations under the NESHAP program. NYCDEP is responsible for the asbestos abatement program in New York City. Even though authority to run the program in New York was delegated to the State and local agencies, EPA retains the authority to oversee agency performance and to enforce NESHAP regulations as appropriate. NYCDDC was responsible for demolition and debris removal at the site. NYCDDC retained four construction companies to perform the demolition and debris removal. In addition, wetting and misting operations at the site were arranged by one of the four companies. According to New York City officials, because of the unprecedented nature of the situation, formal written contracts with detailed statements of the work were not prepared. Instead, daily meetings were held to plan the day’s activities and address any special work practices that may be required to reduce possible emissions of asbestos. EPA and New York State asbestos NESHAP regulations require that a notification be filed by building owners even in emergency situations. The process provides an opportunity for government officials to discuss and agree to preferred work practices to be used in demolition and renovation operations. _______________ 10 This guidance was issued to assist EPA regional offices and State and local agencies in managing potential asbestos hazards resulting from a catastrophic accident or disaster after three emergencies involving asbestos occurred in 1989. 34 Notification of a NESHAP demolition and removal operation was not filed for the WTC. City officials stated that a written notification was not filed for WTC buildings 4, 5, and 6 because they were advised by the property owners that there was no asbestos-containing material in the above- round structures. NYCDDC officials told us that they were advised by the Port Authority that subsequent to the WTC bombing in 1993, they initiated a program to remove asbestos- containing materials from the WTC complex. In regard to the WTC towers, the Port Authority advised the NYCDDC that one tower contained asbestos fire- proofing up to approximately the 40th floor while the other tower did not use asbestos-containing fire-proofing. An EPA On-Scene Coordinator’s understanding was that only accessible asbestos-containing material was removed from WTC buildings 4, 5, and 6. Although a formal notification was not filed, New York City officials told us that proper planning was ensured through the use of daily health and safety meetings. These meeting included representatives from a number of City, State, and Federal agencies, including EPA. New York City officials maintained that EPA had functional notice of NESHAP related activities through its participation at these meetings and that it was doubtful that notification would have changed the manner in which these activities were conducted. Demolition of Damaged Buildings In addition to WTC 1 and 2 (North and South Towers, respectively), WTC 3 (Marriott Hotel) collapsed from tower debris and WTC 7 also collapsed after burning for approximately 7 hours. The remaining three buildings in the WTC Complex – WTC 4 (South Plaza), WTC 5 (North Plaza), and WTC 6 (U.S. Customs) – were all significantly damaged. According to an EPA On- Scene Coordinator, the damaged buildings were considered in danger of collapse.
WTC complex. Source: New York Times The demolition of all WTC complex buildings to ground level was completed by late December 2001. WTC 4 and WTC 5 were brought down by a weight that was suspended by a cable. Use of this wrecking device required a special approval from the New York City Department of Buildings, which was granted. WTC 6 was brought down with mechanical grapplers and cutting shears. 35
Report No.
2003-P-00012 Both NYCDDC and EPA officials told us that when asbestos-containing material (e.g., pipe wrapping, steel insulation) was encountered during the removal, it was tested and treated in accordance with asbestos abatement procedures. According to the NYCDDC official, the majority of the asbestos-containing material was encountered when removing the remnants of the basement levels of WTC 6. EPA Situation Reports confirmed statements about asbestos abatements and recorded instances where asbestos was found during debris removal and asbestos abatements performed. For example, the EPA May 23, 2002, Situation Report noted that: Twelve (12) bulk asbestos samples were taken in the B1, B2, B3, levels of (WTC) Building 6. The samples were taken from sprayed on insulation at the request of NYC DOI. Of the twelve samples, nine (9) should (sic) results were in excess of 1% Chrysotile asbestos, the results ranged from 1.30% to 30.80%. The three samples that were not above 1% were detect for Chrysotile asbestos. According to the April 5, 2002, Situation Report, bulk testing showed that one sample of the pipe wrap that was being removed as part of this abatement contained 66 percent amosite [11] asbestos. Work Practices Related to Transporting Waste Not Always Followed To minimize dust emissions, City, State, and Federal officials established procedures for trucks hauling debris from the site. These procedures included the use of tarps (nylon mesh) to cover debris and procedures for wetting down the trucks before they left the site. The truck wetting operation was performed by contractors for EPA. The large volume of traffic made ensuring compliance with procedures difficult. Particularly in the weeks immediately following the disaster, trucks hauling debris from the site did not consistently stop to be wetted down before leaving the site. As a result, New York City obtained assistance from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Police and the National Guard to ensure that trucks stopped at the wash stations before leaving _______________ 11 Amosite is a form of amphibole asbestos. Several studies suggest that amphibole asbestos may be more harmful than chrysotile asbestos, particularly for mesothelioma. Test results from the site showed that the asbestos was predominantly chrysotile, not amphibole. 36 Report No. 2003-P-00012 the site. Even after getting assistance, EPA Situation Reports indicated that the trucks were not stopping long enough to get completely wetted down. Similar observations were reported in an October 6, 2001, report funded by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, which discussed worker safety issues at WTC. The report noted that: Vehicles leaving the site with debris, either dumps or lowboys with large sections of steel beams, are not deconned (decontaminated) [12] and the dumps do not have covers over the loads. As a consequence, potentially hazardous dust and debris is tracked off site or is blown from the loads during transit. EPA Situation Reports indicated that as late as October 13, 2001, this was still a problem. However, around this time period, New York City officials began issuing summonses to truck operators and their employers for failure to secure loads and to stop and be wetted down. City officials told us that approximately 300 summonses were issued and that compliance with the requirement for trucks to get wetted down before leaving the site was almost 100 percent by late October to early November 2001. However, certain requirements for transporting debris from the site were suspended by the Governor of New York in an Executive Order dated October 9, 2001. This Order temporarily suspended regulations regarding the transportation and handling of certain solid waste resulting from the WTC disaster. The Order applied to persons working at the site under the supervision of New York State or the New York City government officials and suspended requirements to:
Once debris was loaded onto trucks at Ground Zero it was transported to piers and unloaded on barges that carried the debris to landfills. The manner in which these trucking and barge operations were conducted was discussed at hearings held by _______________ 12 New York City officials disagreed with the report’s characterization of the debris removal operation. They stated that the requirement for dump trucks to be covered started September 12, and that this requirement was enforced. They also said that the vehicles did not require decontamination since they were not transporting hazardous waste as defined by EPA under 40 CFR Part 260-280; and while decontamination procedures were not required, wash down procedures were mandated. 37 Report No. 2003-P-00012 the EPA Superfund Ombudsman, Congress, New York City Council, and New York State Assembly. Concerned citizens and local elected officials testified at these hearings that trucks hauling debris from Ground Zero were not marked as carrying hazardous material, nor were they covered in such a manner to prevent dust from escaping. In addition, people testified that the wetting of debris at the barge operation at Pier 25, which was located north of Ground Zero and near Stuyvesant High School and residences, was inconsistent and resulted in the release of dust into the air. Parents of children at Stuyvesant High School and other members of the public raised concerns that these barge operations were re-contaminating Stuyvesant High School and other buildings in that area. EPA officials told us they asked New York City to consider alternatives for the placement of the barge, and while New York City officials were understanding of the concerns of the residential and school communities located nearby, viable alternatives were not available. Thus, emphasis was placed on ensuring use of appropriate work practices during unloading of debris-carrying trucks and transfer to barges. Further, the EPA Region 2 Regional Administrator advised us that EPA sampled for the potential air quality impact of these barge operations from September 22, 2001, through May 31, 2002, and found that “99.83% of samples were below the screening level.” She further noted that the New York City Department of Education collected daily air samples at Stuyvesant and other nearby schools from October 4, 2001, to the end of June 2002, and found that “the overwhelming majority of daily sampling has resulted in no structures detected.” We contacted the president of a consulting firm hired by the Stuyvesant High School Parents’ Association to review environmental test results for Stuyvesant High School. He told us that ambient asbestos testing at the school was conducted in accordance with AHERA standards and elevated levels of airborne asbestos were not found. However, he said that elevated levels of particulate matter were recorded that could have come from the debris off-loading operation or diesel fuel emissions from the trucks transporting the debris. Asbestos Still in Many U.S. Buildings Asbestos is present in many buildings across the country and is still used in some building materials. For example, a 1984 building study by EPA found that, on average, 20 percent of all buildings in the United Stated contained asbestos. These averages were higher for some cities. A 1988 building survey found that, overall, 68 percent of the buildings in New York City contained asbestos. Further, although the use of asbestos-containing material has been banned from some products, it is still used in others. For example, asbestos-containing material is still allowed in pipeline wrap, asbestos-cement corrugated sheet, asbestos- cement flat sheet, roofing felt, millboard, vinyl- sbestos floor tile, asbestos- cement shingle, and roof coatings. 38 Report No. 2003-P-00012 Although many steps were taken to reduce asbestos emissions from the WTC site, problems were encountered in fully implementing the applicable NESHAP requirements for emergency situations, such as ensuring that trucks transporting debris were adequately wetted down before leaving the WTC site. Further, the placement of a WTC debris unloading and transfer operation near schools and residences compounded the potential impact of not implementing normally required NESHAP requirements. Given the likelihood that many buildings across the country may contain asbestos, EPA and State and local agencies need to establish improved monitoring and oversight procedures for ensuring that appropriate NESHAP work practices are followed in responding to situations that cause widespread building damage. We recommend that the EPA Administrator: 4-1. Ensure that EPA Regional and Headquarters personnel are aware of the “Guidelines For Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbestos,” including its application in the event of future terrorist attacks or other disasters. 4-2. Develop specific monitoring, reporting, and oversight procedures for ensuring that Federal, State, and local responders follow the appropriate Asbestos NESHAP work practices, including initiating enforcement actions when EPA observes violations of NESHAP work practices. Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation The Agency noted in its response that ensuring compliance with NESHAP work practices in the immediate aftermath of the WTC collapse and fires was “extremely difficult” not because of a lack of knowledge about what was required, but because of the practicality of implementing these practices under the extreme conditions of duress. Further, the Agency noted that over time, these problems were eliminated to the maximum extent possible. The Agency agreed with the recommendations. The Agency’s full written response to our draft report and our detailed evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively. New York City offered additional information and clarification as to how NESHAP work practices were discussed and implemented at the site. We added this information to the final report. New York City officials objected to the inclusion of testimony from the EPA Superfund Ombudsman hearing on the basis of it being unsubstantiated and to the discussion of lead levels at Stuyvesant High School on the basis of not being relevant to the Chapter. We disagree and have retained that information in the final report. New York City’s response to draft report excerpts and our evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices S and T, respectively. 39 Report No. 2003-P-00012 |
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