EPA'S RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE:  CHALLENGES, SUCCESSES, AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Chapter 1

Introduction

Purpose

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on this country and their environmental aftermath were unprecedented. Unfortunately, further terrorist attacks on this country remain likely and a response to such a tragedy could be needed again.  Accordingly, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this evaluation, in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Deputy Administrator, to evaluate EPA’s response to the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers on September 11. The objectives of our evaluation were to answer the following:

• Did the available monitoring data and analyses of that data support EPA’s major public communications regarding air quality and associated health risks resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers?

• Were EPA actions and decisions in regard to evaluating, mitigating, and controlling risks to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in the WTC area consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, policies, guidance, and practice?

• Were asbestos demolition and renovation work practice standards followed during WTC cleanup and recovery operations and, if not, why not?

• To what extent were EPA and government communications regarding air quality and associated health risks: (a) received by the public; (b) understood by the public; and (c) effective in getting people to take the desired actions to reduce their potential health risks?

• What additional actions, if any, should EPA take to improve its response and recovery efforts in the WTC area related to ambient and indoor air quality?

• Should EPA revise its preparation and contingency planning for dealing with air pollution resulting from future catastrophes?

Background

On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, terrorists flew two hijacked commercial jets into the WTC towers. Both towers collapsed within 2 hours of impact, killing almost 2,800 people, including 343 firefighters and 60 New York City and Port Authority police officers. In addition to the devastating loss of life,

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the dust and debris emanating from the collapse and the ensuing fires created environmental concerns for the public that have persisted more than a year after the disaster.

Airborne dust from the collapse of the towers blanketed Lower Manhattan and was blown or dispersed into many of the surrounding office buildings, schools, and residences. One person described the aftermath in Lower Manhattan as “looking like a blizzard” had hit. However, this blizzard did not deposit snow, but instead a complex mixture of building debris and combustion by- products.  This mixture included, among other substances, asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and concrete dust.

Dust cloud from the WTC collapse.  Source NYPD

In addition to the initial dispersion of dust and debris, fires at the site created various emissions of potentially harmful pollutants. These fires were not officially declared extinguished until December 19, 2001, and debris continued to smolder and fires flared up for weeks after that. Emissions resulting from these fires included particulate matter, various metals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and dioxin.

Street level conditions in Lower Manhattan after collapse.  Source:  wtcphotos by flagsoncars.com

On September 11, 2001, the President signed a major disaster declaration for the five counties of New York City to provide assistance to New York State, thus activating the Federal Response Plan (FRP).  The FRP establishes the process and structure for the Federal Government to provide assistance to local agencies when responding to the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq.).  The FRP employs an operational 

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structure based on the principles of the Incident Command System, [1]  a system adopted by the fire and rescue community.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for administering the FRP. This plan includes 12 Emergency Support Functions, which describe the types of support provided to local authorities and identify the Federal agencies responsible for leading and assisting in providing that support.  To obtain assistance under the FRP, a State requests assistance from FEMA, which in turn issues a mission assignment to the appropriate Federal lead agency as outlined in the Emergency Support Functions.

EPA is the designated lead agency for Emergency Support Function No. 10, “Hazardous Materials Annex.” The intent of this function is to provide support to State and local governments in responding to an actual or potential discharge and/or release of hazardous materials following a major disaster or emergency, including the release of airborne contaminants. To ensure the most efficient and effective use of resources in responding to an actual or potential release of hazardous materials, this function also places the response mechanisms of the National Contingency Plan within the FRP coordination structure. The National Contingency Plan is the implementing regulation for EPA’s Superfund program, and provides guidelines and procedures for responding to releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants, including releases that threaten air quality.

Early Response

Various circumstances complicated the Government’s and EPA’s ability to respond to environmental concerns in what was an unprecedented and extremely difficult situation. The New York City Office of Emergency Management’s Emergency Operations Center was destroyed in the attacks. EPA’s Region 2 office, about a half-mile from the WTC site, was evacuated and not re- opened until 2 weeks after the attacks. Electrical power was lost in Lower Manhattan, as well as radio and telephone communications. Further, transportation to Lower Manhattan was halted, as well as commercial air travel nationwide.

As with most disasters, local authorities were the first responders. “Ground Zero,” as the seven- building WTC area site would become known, was initially a search and rescue effort under the direction of the Fire Department of New York and, subsequently, a recovery operation under the jurisdiction of the New York City Department of Design and Construction (NYCDDC) and the Fire Department of New York. According to New York City’s Deputy Assistant Chief

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1. Incident Command System Principles include use of common terminology, modular organization, integrated communications, unified command structure, action planning, manageable span of control, pre-designated facilities, and comprehensive resource management.

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of the Fire Department, “the complexity of the activity performed at one site – rescue, recovery, demolition, and construction – at one time is unprecedented.”  The New York City Office of Emergency Management was responsible for coordinating the response efforts of approximately 150 governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations. Further complicating the situation was the fact that the area was treated as a crime scene, with law enforcement authorities strictly limiting access for agencies such as EPA, particularly in the first 48 hours.

Nonetheless, EPA officials immediately recognized the need to monitor environmental conditions after the attacks occurred. After the collapse, EPA on-scene coordinators collected bulk dust samples that were analyzed for asbestos and lead. EPA’s Edison, New Jersey, location provided workspace for essential Region 2 personnel while EPA’s New York City office was closed. The Environmental Response Team in Edison also collected ambient air samples in New Jersey and Brooklyn on September 11, which were analyzed for the presence of asbestos, lead, and VOCs. On September 12, nine ambient (outdoor) air samples were collected from Ground Zero.

As the first week progressed, the assessment of environmental conditions became a primary emphasis for EPA and other Federal, State, and local government organizations. An EPA air monitoring specialist in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, took a team to New York and helped develop a monitoring network to assess the ambient air conditions for the general public around Lower Manhattan.  In addition, a multi-agency task force was established to address environmental concerns, with EPA eventually being designated the lead agency for managing all of the ambient air data collected by the various government agencies.

In addition to responding to the air quality issues, which are the focus of this report, EPA conducted many other response activities. These included overseeing the removal of hazardous wastes, monitoring and assessing water quality, monitoring environmental conditions at the landfills, and establishing and operating personal and truck washing stations at the disaster site and landfills. Hazardous material removed from the site included an estimated 236 batteries, 802 containers, and 3,049 cylinders that had potential to cause environmental and human health damage. Further, approximately 639,465 gallons of fuel oil and/or oily water mixture were pumped from basements, manholes, trenches, and underground storage tanks. A NYCDDC official told us that EPA’s response was “phenomenal” in his opinion and that EPA’s response crews were on top of every issue.

Other Federal agencies in addition to EPA were involved in providing support to local authorities regarding environmental quality and safety. For example:

• FEMA was in charge of coordinating the FRP.

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• The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), within the Department of Labor, conducted ambient and bulk dust sampling within the immediate Ground Zero work zone and provided guidance to Ground Zero workers regarding the use of personal protective equipment.

• Within the Department of Health and Human Services:

• < The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) assisted in ensuring worker health and safety.

• < The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) provided technical assistance to the New York City Department of Health by conducting an indoor residential sampling and assessment project.

• < The Public Health Service provided assistance to the New York City Department of Health.

Appendix A provides further details on the various tasks performed by these and other Federal Agencies.

Scope and Methodology

Our evaluation focused on EPA’s response to air quality concerns – both ambient and indoor – for the period September 2001 through April 2003. Our work was performed at various EPA offices and the offices of several other Federal agencies, such as FEMA, OSHA, and ATSDR. We also performed work at various New York City offices. Further, we visited and consulted selected health research, air quality testing, academic, and environmental organizations.

Our approach included the independent review and verification of WTC air monitoring and bulk dust data. For example, we randomly selected monitoring results posted on EPA’s web site and traced the test results back to the raw data to verify the accuracy of the information posted. Further, we selected certain data from EPA’s “NYC Response” database and determined whether it was included on EPA’s public web site.

Our approach included a synthesis of WTC-related research reports, independent legal interpretation of applicable statutes and regulations, and independent analysis of EPA technical decisions used in interpreting and presenting air quality information. We interviewed key officials within and outside of EPA who collected, analyzed, interpreted, or made decisions with WTC air monitoring and bulk dust data, as well as environmental and medical external experts. We conducted our field work during the period June 2002 through July 2003. We

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conducted this review in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States.

A detailed description of our scope and methodology is in Appendix B.

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Chapter 2

EPA Statements About Air Quality Not Adequately Qualified

EPA’s early statements reassured the public regarding the safety of the air outside the Ground Zero perimeter area. However, when EPA made a September 18 announcement that the air was “safe” to breathe, the Agency did not have sufficient data and analyses to make the statement. The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) influenced, through the collaboration process, the information that EPA communicated to the public through its early press releases when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones.  Conclusions from an EPA draft risk evaluation completed over a year after the attacks have tended to support EPA’s statements about long-term health effects when all necessary qualifications are considered. However, EPA’s statements about air quality did not contain these qualifications. (Details on indoor air are in Chapter 3.)

Communicating Information to the Public Critical

Communicating the potential health risks resulting from an environmental hazard is a key mechanism for warning the public to mitigate potential exposures and take other precautions to avoid unnecessary health risks. However, an emergency situation often presents significant challenges.

EPA has many years of experience in communicating environmental risks to the public, especially through its Superfund program. The Agency has issued numerous guidance documents on how to effectively communicate risks to the public, including EPA’s “Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication” (see box). EPA and the New York City Department of Health were significantly involved in communicating information on the air quality in Lower Manhattan after the WTC disaster.

Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication

 1. Accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner.
 2. Plan carefully and evaluate your efforts.
 3. Listen to the public’s specific concerns.
 4. Be honest, frank, and open.
 5. Coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources.
 6. Meet the needs of the media.
 7. Speak clearly and with compassion.

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What EPA Said in Its Major Public Communications

EPA used various methods to inform the public after September 11, including attending public forums; having interviews with newspaper, television, and radio reporters; and posting information on its public web site. Our analysis focused primarily on the information provided through press releases since the Agency develops its position through a deliberative process that represents the Agency’s official position.

EPA issued five press releases within 10 days after September 11, 2001, four more through the end of December, and another four through the end of May 2002. EPA’s WTC press releases from September through December 2001 reassured the public about air quality. Although EPA’s press releases generally recommended that rescue and cleanup workers take precautions to reduce their exposure to pollutants, EPA’s basic overriding message was that the public did not need to be concerned about airborne contaminants caused by the WTC collapse. This reassurance appeared to apply to both indoor and outdoor air.

For example, EPA Region 2 officials told us that the September 18 statement made by the EPA Administrator (see Appendix C) that the air was “safe” to breathe only applied to:

• long-term health effects – not short-term or acute health effects;

• the general public – not Ground Zero workers;

• outdoor air – not indoor air;

• healthy adults – not sensitive sub-populations such as children and the elderly; and

• asbestos – not other air pollutants.

However, except for the second point, the statements issued by EPA in press releases throughout 2001 generally did not contain the above qualifications. For the general public, EPA’s overriding message was that there was no significant threat to human health.

Key air quality related statements from EPA press releases issued during 2001 following the WTC collapse are in Table 2-1. The full text of each of these press releases are available at our web site. [2]

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www.epa.gov/oig

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Table 2-1: Key Air Quality Statements from 2001 Press Releases

Agency officials stressed that press releases were only one of many forms of communication used to provide air quality information to the public, and that public forums and media interviews were also important. Further, EPA provided public access to its monitoring data through its public web site, which included interactive maps that could be used to identify monitoring results. In regard to the monitoring data, we found no evidence that EPA attempted to conceal data results from the public.

Data Available at the Time Did Not Fully Support EPA Press Releases

Information and the analyses of available data did not fully support the statement  made in the September 18, 2001, release, which quoted the EPA Administrator as saying the air was “safe” to breathe. Four factors in particular posed limitations on the conclusions that could be made at that time about air quality:

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• A lack of data results for many pollutants,

• An absence of health benchmarks for asbestos and other pollutants,

• Imprecise optical asbestos sampling methodologies, and

• Over 25 percent of the bulk dust samples collected before September 18 showed the presence of asbestos above the 1 percent benchmark.

EPA did not have monitoring data to support reassurances made in press releases up to September 18 because it lacked monitoring data for several contaminants, particularly PCBs, particulate matter, dioxin, and PAHs.

According to a draft evaluation entitled Exposure and Human Health Evaluation of Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster, by EPA’s Office of Research and Development, that Office was not able to make health risk evaluations for exposures in the first couple of days because of the lack of monitoring data. For several pollutants of concern, sampling did not begin until September 16, and in many cases the results were not known until after the September 18 press release was issued. EPA was not able to obtain samples and monitor air due to difficulties in access and security, power supply sources, equipment availability, and analytical capacity. As a result, data available before September 18 for making conclusions about air quality for pollutants other than asbestos was limited.

Table 2-2 shows when air monitoring began and when the data results first became available for each pollutant of concern.

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Table 2-2: Outdoor Sampling Timeline for Pollutants of Concern

Health-based benchmarks for short-term and acute exposures did not exist for pollutants of concern resulting from the collapse of the WTC. For asbestos, EPA used benchmarks originally designed for other purposes to assess potential health risks from breathing the air following the WTC collapse. Because health-based benchmarks for short-term exposures did not exist for most of the other pollutants, EPA revised benchmarks for lifetime (30-year) exposures to develop screening levels for short-term (1-year) exposures. Further, health-based benchmarks did not exist for assessing the risk to human health from exposure to the combination of air pollutants that were emitted.

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EPA did not have health-based benchmarks for airborne asbestos nor for asbestos in bulk dust. Consequently, EPA used criteria from two programs originally developed for other purposes.

• Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA): Criteria for this program were developed for air monitoring inside schools following an asbestos abatement program, to clear those schools for re-entry. For the WTC testing, EPA used AHERA criteria to evaluate the ambient (outdoor) air quality for asbestos. However, this is not a health-based standard. The AHERA standard for re-entering schools was established at 70 structures per millimeter squared (s/mm2) in 1987 because this was considered to be the amount of background contamination found on the filters used to collect air samples when the AHERA standard was issued. Due to filter improvements over the years, the amount of background contamination today is considerably less, but the AHERA standard has not been revised.

• Asbestos National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP): Criteria for this program were developed to identify asbestos-containing material subject to demolition and renovation work practices. This criteria states that material containing at least 1 percent asbestos, by volume, is considered asbestos-containing material and subject to EPA’s NESHAP regulations. The 1 percent threshold, based on the smallest amount that can be measured using Polarized Light Microscopy, is not a health-based standard. This was emphasized in a September 19 e-mail from an EPA Branch Chief, who has testified as an Agency expert at an asbestos penalty hearing that: “Additionally, 1% asbestos in a material is not a safe level of asbestos [emphasis in original quotation] . . . one-half percent asbestos- containing material (ACM) could be just as hazardous as 20% ACM depending on the condition of the material and how it is handled.” New York City also recommended that building owners use this 1 percent benchmark in determining whether the interior of buildings should be cleaned for asbestos (see Chapter 3).

Guidelines were not available to assess the impact of acute (up to 8 hours) exposures. People caught in the initial debris and dust cloud on September 11 were potentially exposed to high levels of various pollutants for a short duration.  EPA has been funding a program to develop Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs), but none of these levels had been finalized at the time of the WTC disaster. The program had developed several draft AEGL’s but these draft AEGLs were not applicable to the pollutants of concern at the WTC site.

In general, EPA did not have benchmarks to evaluate short-term exposures such as those experienced from the WTC collapse. For the WTC situation, EPA adjusted the Superfund 30-year exposure benchmarks to 1-year (short-term) exposure benchmarks. (See Appendix D for a list of benchmarks used by EPA in

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assessing WTC ambient data.) Since this was done very quickly during an emergency situation, these benchmarks were not subjected to peer review.

In addition to not knowing the health impacts of certain individual pollutants, information was not available on the cumulative or synergistic impacts of being exposed to several pollutants at once. For example, one medical expert suggested there may be a synergistic effect between PAHs and asbestos, since PAHs resemble cigarette tar. Studies have shown the lung cancer risk from exposure to asbestos is increased exponentially for cigarette smokers. In addition, this expert noted that the combination of high pH and the small shards of glass found in WTC dust could have had a synergistic impact on the acute respiratory symptoms that many people experienced.

There were limitations with all three methods used to analyze asbestos concentrations in the ambient air and bulk dust in Lower Manhattan. These limitations, which were not noted in EPA’s press releases, restricted EPA’s ability to make definitive assessments about the health risks posed by asbestos.  However, even with these limitations, sufficient data existed to identify the presence of asbestos in the dust and ambient air, and to warrant that persons working around the dust take necessary precautions to not inhale the dust. The three methods used and their limitations follow:

• Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) is a sensitive method generally used to analyze air samples collected from a relatively clean indoor environment. At the WTC site, many samples could not be analyzed because the filters being used to collect asbestos were overloaded with particulates.  For example, 24 of the 69 samples collected as of September 17 could not be analyzed because the filters were overloaded.

• Phase Contrast Microscopy (PCM), which was used to analyze asbestos concentrations in ambient air beginning September 18, can only count fibers in the filter greater than 5 micrometers in length. A study at the WTC site found that the majority of the asbestos fibers at the site were less than 5 micrometers in length.

• Polarized Light Microscopy (PLM) was used to measure asbestos in bulk dust.  This method is primarily an estimation method that is not very precise, and has a detection limit of 1 percent. Therefore, using this method against a strict benchmark is not reliable.

According to EPA, essentially all outdoor areas at the WTC site were vacuumed, and the detection methods did not impact the action actually taken to remove the dust from outdoor areas. See Appendix E for a summary of EPA’s outdoor air asbestos sampling results.

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Some Asbestos Readings Exceeded Levels of Concern

Over 25 percent of the bulk dust samples that EPA had collected and analyzed by September 18 showed the presence of asbestos above the 1 percent threshold used by EPA to indicate significant risk. In addition, New York City used the 1 percent threshold to determine whether the removal of indoor dust was subject to its Asbestos Control Program regulation. The level of asbestos in dust was a concern because of the potential for the dust to be disturbed and become airborne, and thus inhaled. As noted above, this level is not a health-based standard and dust that contains less than 1 percent could pose a health risk. See Appendix F for results of EPA outdoor asbestos bulk testing.

EPA and the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) conducted extensive ambient air monitoring for asbestos around Ground Zero and Lower Manhattan after September 11. This sampling was conducted at up to 60 sites and a total of almost 10,000 samples were analyzed using TEM. During the month of September 2001, EPA and New York City monitoring recorded 30 exceedences of the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2. However, after September 2001 the number of AHERA exceedences decreased significantly. For the period October 2001 through May 2002, seven exceedences of the AHERA standard were recorded, as shown in Table 2-3.

Table 2-3. Ambient Asbestos Readings in Lower Manhattan In Excess of 70 s/mm2

Council on Environmental Quality Influenced EPA Press Releases

Coordination and collaboration impacted the completeness of the information and the substance of the message EPA communicated to the public through its press releases. As a result of the White House CEQ’s influence, guidance for cleaning indoor spaces and information about the potential health effects from WTC debris were not included in EPA’s issued press releases. In addition, based on CEQ’s influence, reassuring information was added to at least one press release and cautionary information was deleted from EPA’s draft version of that press release.

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EPA officials told us that EPA’s WTC press releases issued during the weeks following September 11 were discussed in conference calls that included EPA officials, OSHA, and CEQ. Accordingly, the content of an EPA press release issued during this period could come from several different sources.

Few written records were available on the process used to prepare WTC press releases. We found draft versions for two of the press releases. However, the White House’s role in EPA’s public communications about WTC environmental conditions was described in a September 12, 2001, e- mail from the EPA Deputy Administrator’s Chief of Staff to senior EPA officials:

All statements to the media should be cleared through the NSC [National Security Council] before they are released.

According to the EPA Chief of Staff, one particular CEQ official was designated to work with EPA to ensure that clearance was obtained through NSC. The Associate Administrator for the EPA Office of Communications, Education, and Media Relations (OCEMR) [3] said that no press release could be issued for a 3- to 4-week period after September 11 without approval from the CEQ contact.

Although EPA’s position has been that WTC area residents should obtain “professional cleaning,” [4] EPA’s press releases did not instruct residents to do so.  Instead they instructed residents to follow recommended and proper cleaning procedures and referred the public to the New York City Department of Health (NYCDOH) for recommended cleaning procedures. We asked the OCEMR Associate Administrator whether her office had considered advising the public through a press release that they needed to obtain professional cleaning for their indoor spaces. The Associate Administrator stated: “It was in a press release: it was removed by. . . [the CEQ contact].”

OCEMR’s records contained a document, entitled “PM FACT SHEET,” that discussed the health risk to “sensitive populations” from exposure to particulate matter. We asked the Associate Administrator whether she had considered putting any of this information in a press release. She said she had, but the CEQ  official discouraged her from doing so. Her recollection was that he told her health effects information should not be included in EPA’s press releases, and  that anything dealing with health effects should come from New York because they were on the ground and they were already dealing with it.

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3 EPA’s Office of Communication, Education and Media Relations (OCEMR) issued the press releases. The OCEMR Associate Administrator left the Agency in December 2001 and OCEMR was renamed the Office of Public Affairs in July 2002.

4  In this context, professional cleaning refers to the use of a certified asbestos cleaner trained in the proper use of personal protective equipment and procedures to prevent re-contamination.

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