AMBASSADOR EIKENBERRY'S CABLES ON U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

by The New York Times

January 25, 2010

U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Worries on Afghan Plans By ERIC SCHMITT

WASHINGTON — The United States ambassador in Kabul warned his superiors here in November that President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan “is not an adequate strategic partner” and “continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden,” according to a classified cable that offers a much bleaker accounting of the risks of sending additional American troops to Afghanistan than was previously known.

The broad outlines of two cables from the ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry, became public within days after he sent them, and they were portrayed as having been the source of significant discussion in the White House, heightening tensions between diplomats and senior military officers, who supported an increase of 30,000 American troops.

But the full cables, obtained by The New York Times, show for the first time just how strongly the current ambassador felt about the leadership of the Afghan government, the state of its military and the chances that a troop buildup would actually hurt the war effort by making the Karzai government too dependent on the United States.

The cables — one four pages, the other three — also represent a detailed rebuttal to the counterinsurgency strategy offered by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, who had argued that a rapid infusion of fresh troops was essential to avoid failure in the country.

They show that Mr. Eikenberry, a retired Army lieutenant general who once was the top American commander in Afghanistan, repeatedly cautioned that deploying sizable American reinforcements would result in “astronomical costs” — tens of billions of dollars — and would only deepen the dependence of the Afghan government on the United States.

“Sending additional forces will delay the day when Afghans will take over, and make it difficult, if not impossible, to bring our people home on a reasonable timetable,” he wrote Nov. 6. “An increased U.S. and foreign role in security and governance will increase Afghan dependence, at least in the short-term.”

Without offering details, Mr. Eikenberry has said in public hearings since then that his concerns have been dealt with, and that he supported the White House’s troop increase plan.

But it is not clear what might have changed about his assessment of President Karzai as a reliable partner, and the strong language of the cables may increase tensions between the ambassador and the Karzai government, especially as world leaders meet in London on Thursday to discuss a much-debated Afghan plan to reintegrate Taliban fighters. It also coincides with a strong effort by the administration to mend ties with Mr. Karzai.

An American official provided a copy of the cables to The Times after a reporter requested them. The official said it was important for the historical record that Mr. Eikenberry’s detailed assessments be made public, given that they were among the most important documents produced during the debate that led to the troop buildup.

On Nov. 6, Mr. Eikenberry wrote: “President Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner. The proposed counterinsurgency strategy assumes an Afghan political leadership that is both able to take responsibility and to exert sovereignty in the furtherance of our goal — a secure, peaceful, minimally self-sufficient Afghanistan hardened against transnational terrorist groups.

“Yet Karzai continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden, whether defense, governance or development. He and much of his circle do not want the U.S. to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further,” Mr. Eikenberry wrote. “They assume we covet their territory for a never-ending ‘war on terror’ and for military bases to use against surrounding powers.”

He continued, “Beyond Karzai himself, there is no political ruling class that provides an overarching national identity that transcends local affiliations and provides reliable partnership.”

In a second cable, dated Nov. 9, he expressed new concerns: “In a PBS interview on November 7, Karzai sounded bizarrely cautionary notes about his willingness to address governance and corruption. This tracks with his record of inaction or grudging compliance in this area.”

On Monday, Mr. Eikenberry declined through an embassy spokeswoman, Caitlin M. Hayden, to comment on the cables and his views on Mr. Karzai. She said by e-mail, “We stand by what we provided during the review process, which got us to the clear strategy we’re now implementing, that the ambassador unequivocally supports.”

In his memos, Mr. Eikenberry raised other concerns. He said he had serious doubts about the ability of the Afghan police and military forces to take over security duties in the country by 2013. “The Army’s high attrition and low recruitment rates for Pashtuns in the south are crippling,” he wrote. “Simply keeping the force at current levels requires tens of thousands of new recruits every year to replace attrition losses and battlefield casualties.”

The ambassador, who left the military last April to become Mr. Obama’s emissary, also complained about an inadequate civilian counterpart organization to the NATO military command in Afghanistan. Nearly three months later, he is still expressing concerns about too few civilian experts in Afghanistan.

He also noted worries that the success of Mr. Obama’s Afghanistan policy hinged on Pakistani forces’ eliminating militants’ havens in the mountainous region near the Afghan border.

“Pakistan will remain the single greatest source of Afghan instability so long as the border sanctuaries remain,” he wrote. “Until this sanctuary problem is fully addressed, the gains from sending additional forces may be fleeting.”

“As we contemplate greatly expanding our presence in Afghanistan, the better answer to our difficulties could well be to further ratchet up our engagement in Pakistan,” he wrote without elaboration.

On Nov. 9, he repeatedly warned against rushing into a large deployment of more American forces without further study.

He urged that the White House appoint a bipartisan panel of “civilian and military experts to examine the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy” and provide recommendations by the end of 2009. The recommendation, which would have extended a White House-led policy review of many months, was not accepted.

Mr. Eikenberry suggested sending a relatively small force to train Afghan security forces and protect some population centers, and to condition more troops on the Afghans’ meeting objectives, like committing to taking full responsibility for national defense by a specific date.

And while General McChrystal warned of failure if additional troops were not deployed, Mr. Eikenberry concluded by cautioning of competing risks “that we will become more deeply engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves, short of allowing the country to descend again into lawlessness and chaos.”

***

In November 2009, Karl W. Eikenberry, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan and retired Army lieutenant general, sent two classified cables to his superiors in which he offered his assessment of the proposed U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. While the broad outlines of Mr. Eikenberry's cables were leaked soon after he sent them, the complete cables, obtained recently by The New York Times, show just how strongly the current ambassador feels about President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government, the state of its military, and the chances that a troop buildup will actually hurt the war effort by making the Karzai government too dependent on the United States.

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Classified By:  Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Madame Secretary,

As we near the end of our deliberations on the way forward in Afghanistan, I would like to outline my reservations about a counterinsurgency strategy that relies on a large infusion of U.S. forces.  I fully agree that the security situation in Afghanistan is serious and that additional troops will help reverse the worsening trends in areas where the troops are deployed.  There is an unassailable logic to the argument that a robust counterinsurgency approach will yield measurable progress, at least in the security realm.

But I am concerned that we underestimate the risks of this expansion of our mission and that we have not fully studied every alternative.  The proposed troop increase will bring vastly increased costs and an indefinite, large-scale U.S. military role in Afghanistan, generating the need for yet-more civilians.  An increased U.S. and foreign role in security and governance will increase Afghan dependency, at least in the near-term, and it will deepen the military involvement in a mission that most agree cannot be won solely by military means.  Further, it will run counter to our strategic purposes of Afghanizing and civilianizing government functions here.

Perhaps the charts we have all seen showing the U.S. presence rising and then dropping off in coming years in a bell curve will prove accurate.  It is more likely, however, that these forecasts are imprecise and optimistic.  In that case, sending additional forces will delay the day when Afghans will take over, and make it difficult, if not impossible, to bring our people home on a reasonable timetable.  Moreover, none of these charges displays dollar costs.  Acknowledgement of the astronomical costs might illustrate the greater desirability of civilian alternatives now dismissed as too costly or not feasible.

Here are my reasons for this assessment:

1.  President Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner.  The proposed counterinsurgency strategy assumes an Afghan political leadership that is both able to take responsibility and to exert sovereignty in the furtherance of our goal, a secure, peaceful, minimally self-sufficient Afghanistan hardened against transnational terrorist groups.  Yet Karzai continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden, whether defense, governance or development.  He and much of his circle do not want the U.S. to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further.  They assume we covet their territory for a never-ending war on terror and for military bases to use against surrounding powers.

With his re-election, Karzai will remain Afghanistan's dominant political actor.  We hope we can move him toward taking firm control of his country and guiding its future.  But sending more combat forces will only strengthen his misconceptions about why we are here.  Before any troop announcement, we should first have a high-level dialogue with Karzai and his new government to explain our goals and obtain agreement on what we expect from them.  Even with such an understanding, it strains credulity to expect Karzai to change fundamentally this late in his life and in our relationship.

Beyond Karzai himself, there is no political ruling class that provides an overarching national identity that transcends local affiliations and provides reliable partnership.  Even if we could eradicate pervasive corruption, the country has few indigenous sources of revenue, few means to distribute services to his citizens, and most important, little to no political will or capacity to carry out basic tasks of governance.  As a practical matter, this means that expanding assistance, either military or civilian, will increase Afghan dependence and make more remote the day when we can transfer most sovereign responsibilities to the Afghans and draw down our presence.

2.  We overestimate the ability of Afghan security forces to take over.  Success of the proposed counterinsurgency strategy hinges upon Afghan forces steadily assuming responsibility for security and fully taking over this duty by 2013.  Yet achieving that goal will require President Karzai to embrace his role as commander-in-chief, a step he resists, and for him to commit his government to recruiting and training.  I have serious doubts about the Afghan government's ability to meet the ambitious targets and timelines necessary to meet our requirements.  The Army's high attrition and low recruitment rates for Pashtuns in the south are crippling.  Simply keeping the force at current levels requires tens of thousands of new recruits every year to replace attrition losses and battlefield casualties; those requirements would steepen dramatically under the proposed strategy.  Building an effective Afghan National Police, which is in many ways more crucial to extend the Afghan government's reach into villages and districts, will prove even tougher.  The Police receive lower benefits and face higher risks in many places than the Army.

Given the exorbitant political and fiscal costs of large-scale U.S. deployments, we should consider increasing the financial incentives for joining the ANA and ANP.  If our assumption is that more forces are essential to stabilize Afghanistan, then we should investigate the benefits to security of making service in the Afghan security forces more attractive, rather than relying more heavily on foreign troops.

There is also the deeper concern about dependency.  The proposed counterinsurgency strategy calls for partnering in the field to quickly improve the Afghan security forces.  I do not question the ability of U.S. forces to effectively take on this mentoring mission, one that they have performed ably in Iraq.  However, I am concerned that it is U.S. and other NATO-ISAF troops that will continue to do most of the fighting and take most of the casualties.  Rather than reducing Afghan dependence, sending more troops, therefore, is likely to deepen it, at least in the short term.  That would further delay our goal of shifting the combat burden to the Afghans.

3.  We underestimate how long it will take to restore or establish civilian government.  The proposed strategy assumes that once the clearing and holding process has been accomplished in a given area, the rebuilding and transferring to Afghans can proceed apace, followed by a relatively rapid U.S. withdrawal.  In reality, the process of restoring Afghan government is likely to be slow and uneven, no matter how many U.S. and other foreign civilian experts are involved.  Many areas need not just security but health care, education, justice, infrastructure, and almost every other basic government function.  Many have never had these services at all.  Establishing them requires trained and honest Afghan officials to replace our own personnel.  That cadre of Afghan civilians does not now exist and would take years to build.

At the moment it is mostly U.S. civilians and those of our allies who follow behind our forces into cleared areas to establish formal governance.  We are not trying to build on a Western model, but as we assume this responsibility in an ever-widening area, it becomes harder to leave until the Afghans can provide basic services themselves.  We have little clarity about how long it will be until cleared districts are connected to an Afghan government that both functions in Kabul and reaches down to the local level.

4.  The proposed strategy does not remedy an inadequate civilian structure.  There is no civilian organizational counterpart to ISAF and no political leadership equivalent to the NATO-ISAF commander, a deficiency that hampers civilian effectiveness and heavily skews the NATO-ISAF dialogue with the Afghan government.  UNAMA is not capable of coordinating all the civilian efforts, because its role is not to serve as the civilian policy and program counterpart to NATO-ISAF.  Its capabilities and will are likely to diminish further with the recent post-attack withdrawal of U.N. personnel.  Progress on governance, anti-corruption, rule of law, and reconstruction will ultimately determine our success, but our coalition efforts will remain less than optimum unless a stronger civilian structure is created.

No one questions the military's need for coherent command and control.  Yet the same attention has not been paid to the civilian configuration, even though we are engaged in a long-term operation in which one of the central premises is a fully-integrated civilian-military effort.  There is no debate that the U.S. is in the military lead.  We need to reach the same understanding with our allies and partners on the civilian side, especially if more troops are sent.  NATO should designate the U.S. as the "Lead Nation" for those civilian tasks delineated in its operational plan.  Arguments that this will increase the U.S. role are beside the point.  Right now the U.S. leads the civilian dialogue by default.  But the ambiguity in the Afghan government's eyes over the status of the U.S. versus the ISAF commander opens a seam that Karzai is quick to exploit.  Unless we create a civilian authority comparable to the military chain of command, this problem will deepen and we are likely to see further militarization of our effort, instead of "civilianization" and "Afghanization," which are our real aims.

5.  The proposed strategy may not be cost-effective.  Sending additional combat brigades will require tens of billions of dollars annually for years to come, costs not detailed in DOD charts.  Yet an Embassy request this summer for a $2.5 billion increase in our budget for development and governance was analyzed and debated in great detail, only to be rejected.  If more troops are sent to Afghanistan, we should revisit decisions about our development funding.

In particular, we should weigh whether a relatively small additional investment in programs for development and governance would yield results that, if not as visible as those from sending more troops, would move us closer to achieving our goals at far lesser cost and risk, both in lives and dollars.  Accelerating our work on signature projects to deliver greater access to electricity, water, and education could have a high payoff in stability over the long term.  With a greatly stepped-up development effort we could be in a position at some point to call off further troop deployments, as Afghans began to see their lives improving and their needs addressed.

6.  More troops won't end the insurgency as long as Pakistan sanctuaries remain.  Pakistan will remain the single greatest source of Afghan instability so long as the border sanctuaries remain, and Pakistan views its strategic interests as best served by a weak neighbor.  There is reason to be encouraged by Pakistan's current military offensive in Waziristan, but the lasting result of this effort is still unclear.  Nor does the Pakistan military action address the role of the Quetta Shura, which has the most influence over the insurgency in southern Taliban strongholds, or the Haqqani network, the most lethal killer of allied troops and Afghan civilians.  Until this sanctuary problem is fully addressed, the gains from sending additional forces may be fleeting.

We are always looking for game-changers.  If we are looking for a strategic partner and military or political moves likely to have decisive results, those might be in Pakistan.  As we contemplate greatly expanding our presence in Afghanistan, the better answer to our difficulties could well be to further ratchet up our engagement with Pakistan.

This memorandum summarizes my concerns about the counterinsurgency strategy now under consideration and my thoughts about other steps to achieve our goals.  After our discussion at the SVTS Principal's Committee this evening, I will follow up with a cable that will include specific recommendations.  For now, I cannot support DOD's recommendation for an immediate Presidential decision to deploy another 40,000 troops here.

Madame Secretary, I would ask that you pass this assessment to the White House, if you deem it appropriate, in advance of the Principal's Committee.

Respectfully,

EIKENBERRY

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Classified By:  Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

Madame Secretary,

My previous cable addressed concerns about taking a decision too soon on a proposed counterinsurgency strategy that relies on a large, all-or-nothing increase in U.S. troops.  I now propose that the White House commission a deliberate process to lay out the range of strategic options on Afghanistan and Pakistan, broadening the analysis beyond military counterinsurgency doctrine.

There are three purposes for doing so:

First, to make sure that we have tested every assumption behind the Afghan-focused military counterinsurgency proposal;

Second, to examine non-military alternatives or companion requirements to a major troop increase;

Third, to develop U.S. political understanding and support, as well as Afghan and allied public commitment.

After such a process, the standing COMISAF proposal may prove exactly what the President will decide is needed, but the time and effort put into this further deliberation will yield benefits far offsetting the costs, in my judgment.

I support COMISAFs military analysis and recommendations as logical and compelling, within his narrow mandate to define the needs for a military counterinsurgency campaign within Afghanistan.  But the problems confronting our own strategic purposes, as laid out by the President on March 27, are broader, and we must consider a wider set of variables before reaching a final decision.

These unaddressed variables include Pakistan sanctuaries, weak Afghan leadership and governance, NATO civil-military integration, and our national will to bear the human and fiscal costs over many years.  The current military proposal properly sets aside each of these issues and many more because they are outside COMISAFs counterinsurgency mandate.  Yet, in reality, each has the potential to block us from achieving our strategic goals, regardless of the number of additional troops we may send.

We Have Time

Some argue that we must decide on the full-up troop deployment now.  The military's long lead times, the requirement to bring along our NATO allies, and the need to signal decisiveness and resolve are adduced as compelling reasons to announce the full troop request quickly.  I disagree.  We have the time we need certainly into early next year.  We must take that time to decide on the right course.

As serious as the security picture in Afghanistan is today, it is not so dire that we need to announce or commit ourselves to sweeping changes immediately, either in our military or civilian posture.  For example, additional combat brigades could be designated for possible deployment and begin training without requiring an immediate decision on whether to send them all.  They would be arriving in increments, in any case.

To show resolve, the President could announce that he was immediately ordering a smaller contingent of U.S. forces to mentor ANSF and to protect the population, while emphasizing that further deployments would be conditioned on specific steps by the Afghan government, such as a commitment and a plan to take full responsibility for national defense on a specific timeline.  Afghans, allies and others in the region would see this not as indecision, but rather as seriousness of purpose.

Why We Must Take the Time

We have not yet conducted a comprehensive, interdisciplinary analysis of all our strategic options.  Now have we brought all the real-world variables to bear in testing the proposed counterinsurgency plan.  We agree that more troops will yield more security wherever they deploy, for as long as they stay.  But the last time we sent substantial additional forces a deployment totaling 33,000 in 2008-2009, overall violence and instability in Afghanistan intensified.  Also, neither ANSF nor the Afghan government has demonstrated the will or ability to take over lead security responsibility much less governance -- in any area cleared and held by NATO-ISAF.  Experience with troop increases, therefore, offers scant reason to expect that further increases will permanently advance our strategic purposes; instead they will dig us in more deeply.

We also need time to work with President Karzai and his new team, many of whom may not be in place for several months, to test whether they are both able and committed to lead the counterinsurgency mission we are defining for them.  In fact, Karzai explicitly rejected the "counterinsurgency" basis and purpose of the COMISAF proposal when first briefed on it in detail two months ago, and he has not embraced it since then.  Rather, in a PBS interview on November 7, Karzai sounded bizarrely cautionary notes about his willingness to address governance and corruption.  This tracks with his record of inaction or grudging compliance in this area.  We need an intense, high-level dialogue to judge whether we can gain enforceable commitments from the Afghan government to build their own capacity and to assume responsibility for security and governance in cleared areas.  Absent such a judgment, we cannot presume that another large infusion of U.S. troops necessarily will give us leverage over them.  

Recommendation

Hence, we recommend a comprehensive, deliberate and interdisciplinary re-examination of our strategic options, carried out by the end of the year, to decide how best to accomplish the President's March 27 strategy.  This should go beyond a "war game" or "red team", yet not become a months-long Baker-Hamilton-style commission for Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Rather, the White House could appoint a panel of civilian and military experts to examine the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy and the full range of options.  It could include eminent, bipartisan political figures, such as former senior U.S. government and congressional leaders.  Among the issues this panel should examine are:

• the potential that reintegration/reconciliation program has for taking insurgents off the battle field (the only approach holding attraction for Karzai and the mass of Afghans);

• the prospects for the Pakistani security services putting meaningful pressure against the Afghan Taliban, the insurgent sanctuaries and leadership, and al Qaeda;

• the impact of increasing U.S. and international aid and development programs on long-term stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan;

• the second- and third-order effects within Afghanistan and the region of sending more U.S. troops;

• the U.S. and allies willingness to bear the costs in lives and treasure over the timelines in the ISAF proposal;

• and whether our definition of the strategic problem in purely military terms of counterinsurgency within Afghanistan is sufficient to address the President's strategic focus on al Qaeda with both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This strategic re-examination could either include or lead to high-level U.S. talks with the Afghans, the Pakistanis, the Saudis and other important regional players, including possibly Iran, as well as NATO, its component nations and even the United Nations.  Such a process of rigorous internal U.S. government deliberations, leading to deeper political-military consultations with allies and other stakeholders, could powerfully build support at home and abroad for the President's eventual decisions about the way forward.

The Risks

COMISAF has laid out the risk we face in not sending the full complement of additional troops right now.  But there are competing risks, for example, that we will become more deeply engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves, short of allowing the country to descend again into lawlessness and chaos.  Also, the demand for U.S. and allied civilian efforts in Afghanistan will only grow with the deployment of large numbers of additional U.S. troops.

To mitigate such countervailing risks, I believe there is no option but to widen the scope of our analysis to consider alternatives beyond a strictly military counterinsurgency effort within Afghanistan.

Respectfully,

Karl
EIKENBERRY
 

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