|
by Howard Teicher
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARLOS CARDOEN, FRANCO SAFTA, JORGE BURR, INDUSTRIAS CARDOES LIMITADA,
a/k/a INCAR, SWISSCO MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., EDWARD A. JOHNSON, RONALD
W. GRIFFIN, and TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, INC., d/b/a/, TELEDYNE WAH CHANG
ALBANY,
Defendants.
Case No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH
DECLARATION OF HOWARD TEICHER
I, Howard Teicher, hereby state that, to
the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts presented herein are
true, correct and complete. I further state that to the best of my
knowledge and belief, nothing stated in this Declaration constitutes
classified information.
1. My name is Howard Teicher. From 1977
to 1987, I served in the United States government as a member of the
national security bureaucracy. From early 1982 to 1987, I served as a
Staff Member to the United States National Security Council.
2. While a Staff Member to the National
Security Council, I was responsible for the Middle East and for
Political-Military Affairs. During my five year tenure on the National
Security Council, I had regular contact with both CIA Director William
Casey and Deputy Director Robert Gates.
3. In the Spring of 1982, Iraq teetered
on the brink of losing its war with Iran. In May and June, 1982, the
Iranians discovered a gap in the Iraqi defenses along the Iran-Iraq
border between Baghdad to the north and Basra to the south. Iran
positioned a massive invasion force directly across from the gap in the
Iraqi defense. An Iranian breakthrough at this spot would have cutoff
Baghdad from Basra and would have resulted in Iraq's defeat.
4. United States Intelligence, including
satellite imagery, had detected both the gap in the Iraqi defenses and
the Iranian crossing of troops across from the gap. At the time, the
United States was officially neutral in the Iran-Iraq conflict.
5. President Reagan was forced to choose
between (a) maintaining strict neutrality and allowing Iran to defeat
Iraq, or (b) intervening and providing assistance to Iraq.
6. In June, 1982, President Reagan
decided that the United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose
the war to Iran. President Reagan decided that the United States would
do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war
with Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD") to this effect in June, 1982. I have
personal knowledge of this NSDD because I co-authored the NSDD with
another NSC Staff Member, Geoff Kemp. The NSDD, including even its
identifying number, is classified.
7. CIA Director Casey personally
spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military
weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war.
Pursuant to the secret NSDD, the United States actively supported the
Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of
credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the
Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to
make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required. The United
States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to
better use their assets in combat. For example, in 1986, President
Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein telling him that Iraq
should step up his air war and bombing of Iran. This message was
delivered by Vice President Bush who communicated it to Egyptian
President Mubarak, who in turn passed the message to Saddam Hussein.
Similar strategic operational military advice was passed to Saddam
Hussein through various meetings with European and Middle Eastern heads
of state. I authored Bush's talking points for the 1986 meeting with
Mubarak and personally attended numerous meetings with European and
Middle East heads of state where the strategic operational advice was
communicated.
8. I personally attended meetings in
which CIA Director Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates noted the need for
Iraq to have certain weapons such as cluster bombs and anti-armor
penetrators in order to stave off the Iranian attacks. When I joined the
NSC staff in early 1982, CIA Director Casey was adamant that cluster
bombs were a perfect "force multiplier" that would allow the Iraqis to
defend against the "human waves" of Iranian attackers. I recorded these
comments in the minutes of National Security Planning Group("NSPG")
meetings in which Casey or Gates participated.
9. The CIA, including both CIA Director
Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in
the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to
Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC files show or
tend to show that the CIA knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale
of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq.
10. The United States was anxious to
have other countries supply assistance to Iraq. For example, in 1984,
the Israelies concluded that Iran was more dangerous than Iraq to
Israel's existence due to the growing Iranian influence and presence in
Lebanon. The Israelis approached the United States in a meeting in
Jersualem that I attended with Donald Rumsfeld. Israeli Foreign Minister
Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld if the United States would deliver a
secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq. The United States agreed. I
travelled with Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present at the meeting in
which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foregn Minister Tariq Aziz about Israel's
offer of assistance. Aziz refused even to accept the Israelis' letter to
Hussein offering assistance, because Aziz told us that he would be
executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so.
11. One of the reasons that the United
States refused to license or sell U.S. origin weapons to Iraq was that
the supply of non-U.S. origin weapons to Iraq was sufficient to meet
Iraq's needs. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the
CIA made sure that non-U.S. manufacturers manufactured and sold to Iraq
the weapons needed by Iraq. In certain instances where a key component
in a weapon was not readily available, the highest levels of the United
States government decided to make the component available, directly or
indirectly, to Iraq. I specifically recall that the provision of
anti-armor penetrators to Iraq was a case in point. The United States
made a policy decision to supply penetrators to Iraq. My notes,
memoranda and other documents in my NSC files will contain references to
the Iraqi's need for anti-armor penetrators and the decision to provide
penetrators to Iraq.
12. Most of the Iraqi's military hardware
was of Soviet origin. Regular United States or NATO ammunition and spare
parts could not be used in this Soviet weaponry.
13. The United States and the CIA
maintained a program known as the "Bear Spares" program whereby the
United States made sure that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or
Soviet-style weaponry were available to countries which sought to reduce
their dependence on the Soviets for defense needs. If the "Bear Spares"
were manufactured outside the United States, then the United States
could arrange for the provision of these weapons to a third country
without direct involvement. Israel, for example, had a very large
stockpile of Soviet weaponry and ammunition captured during its various
wars. At the suggestion of the United States, the Israelis would
transfer the spare parts and weapons to third countries or insurgent
movements (such as the Afghan rebels and the Contras). Similarly, Egypt
manufactured weapons and spare parts from Soviet designs and provided
these weapons and ammunition to the Iraqis and other countries. Egypt
also served as a supplier for the Bear Spares program. The United States
approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's manufacturing capabilities.
The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's sale of
weaponry, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.
14. The mere request to a third party to
carry out an action did not constitute a "covert action," and,
accordingly, required no Presidential Finding or reporting to Congress.
The supply of Cardoen cluster bombs, which were fitted for use on
Soviet, French and NATO aircraft, was a mere extension of the United
States policy of assisting Iraq through all legal means in order to
avoid an Iranian victory.
15. My NSC files are currently held in
the President Ronald Reagan Presidential Archives in Simi Valley,
California. My files will contain my notes and memoranda from meetings I
attended with CIA Director Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates which
included discussions of Cardoen's manufacture and sale of cluster bombs
to Iraq. My NSC files will also contain cable traffic among various
United States agencies, embassies and other parties relating to Cardoen
and his sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq and other
Middle Eastern states.
16. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy
Director Gate, the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the
manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq. My
NSC files will contain documents that show or tend to show the CIA's
authorization, approval and assistance of Cardoen's manufacture and sale
of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq.
17. My files will contain notes,
memoranda and other documents that will show that the highest levels of
the United States government, including the NSC staff and the CIA, were
well aware of Cardoen's arrest in 1983 in Miami in a sting operations
relating to the smuggling of night vision goggles to Cuba and Libya. My
files will also show that the highest levels of government were aware of
the arrest and conviction of two of Cardoen's employees and his company,
Industries Cardoen.
18. CIA Director William Casey, aware of
Cardoen's arrest and the conviction of his employees and his company,
intervened in order to make sure that Cardoen was able to supply cluster
bombs to Iraq. Specifically, CIA Director Casey directed the Secretaries
of the State and Commerce Departments that the necessary licenses
required by Cardoen were not to be denied. My files will contain notes,
memoranda and other documents showing or tending to show that CIA
Director William Casey's intervention in order to maintain Cardoen's
ability to supply cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq.
I declare under penalty of perjury that
the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my memory and
recollection.
Executed on 1/31/95
Howard Teicher
Return to Table of Contents |