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by
Richard Perle, James Colbert,
Charles Fairbanks, Jr., Douglas Feith, Robert Loewenberg, Jonathan Torop,
David Wurmser, Meyrav Wurmser
Following is a report prepared by
The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies’ "Study Group
on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000." The main substantive ideas in
this paper emerge from a discussion in which prominent opinion makers,
including Richard Perle, James Colbert, Charles Fairbanks, Jr., Douglas
Feith, Robert Loewenberg, David Wurmser, and Meyrav Wurmser
participated. The report, entitled "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for
Securing the Realm," is the framework for a series of follow-up reports
on strategy.
Israel has a large
problem. Labor Zionism, which for 70 years has dominated the Zionist
movement, has generated a stalled and shackled economy. Efforts to
salvage Israel’s socialist institutions—which include pursuing
supranational over national sovereignty and pursuing a peace process
that embraces the slogan, "New Middle East"—undermine the legitimacy of
the nation and lead Israel into strategic paralysis and the previous
government’s "peace process." That peace process obscured the evidence
of eroding national critical mass— including a palpable sense of
national exhaustion—and forfeited strategic initiative. The loss of
national critical mass was illustrated best by Israel’s efforts to draw
in the United States to sell unpopular policies domestically, to agree
to negotiate sovereignty over its capital, and to respond with
resignation to a spate of terror so intense and tragic that it deterred
Israelis from engaging in normal daily functions, such as commuting to
work in buses.
Benjamin Netanyahu’s government
comes in with a new set of ideas. While there are those who will
counsel continuity, Israel has the opportunity to make a clean break; it
can forge a peace process and strategy based on an entirely new
intellectual foundation, one that restores strategic initiative and
provides the nation the room to engage every possible energy on
rebuilding Zionism, the starting point of which must be economic
reform. To secure the nation’s streets and borders in the immediate
future, Israel can:
- Work closely with Turkey
and Jordan to contain, destabilize, and roll-back some of its most
dangerous threats. This implies clean break from the slogan,
"comprehensive peace" to a traditional concept of strategy based on
balance of power.
- Change the nature of
its relations with the Palestinians, including upholding the
right of hot pursuit for self defense into all Palestinian areas
and nurturing alternatives to Arafat’s exclusive grip on Palestinian
society.
- Forge a new basis for
relations with the United States—stressing self-reliance, maturity,
strategic cooperation on areas of mutual concern, and furthering
values inherent to the West. This can only be done if Israel takes
serious steps to terminate aid, which prevents economic reform.
This report is written with key
passages of a possible speech marked TEXT, that highlight the
clean break which the new government has an opportunity to make. The
body of the report is the commentary explaining the purpose and laying
out the strategic context of the passages.
A New Approach to
Peace
Early adoption of a bold, new
perspective on peace and security is imperative for the new prime
minister. While the previous government, and many abroad, may
emphasize "land for peace"— which placed Israel in the position of
cultural, economic, political, diplomatic, and military retreat — the
new government can promote Western values and traditions. Such an
approach, which will be well received in the United States, includes
"peace for peace," "peace through strength" and self reliance: the
balance of power.
A new strategy to seize the
initiative can be introduced:
TEXT:
We have for four
years pursued peace based on a New Middle East. We in Israel
cannot play innocents abroad in a world that is not innocent. Peace
depends on the character and behavior of our foes. We live in a
dangerous neighborhood, with fragile states and bitter rivalries.
Displaying moral ambivalence
between the effort to build a Jewish state and the desire to
annihilate it by trading "land for peace" will not secure
"peace now." Our claim to the land —to which we have clung for
hope for 2000 years--is legitimate and noble.
It is not within our own power, no matter how much we
concede, to make peace unilaterally.
Only the unconditional acceptance by
Arabs of our rights, especially in their territorial
dimension, "peace for peace," is a solid basis for the
future.
Israel’s quest for peace
emerges from, and does not replace, the pursuit of its
ideals. The Jewish people’s hunger for human rights — burned into
their identity by a 2000-year old dream to live free in their own land
— informs the concept of peace and reflects continuity of values
with Western and Jewish tradition. Israel can now embrace
negotiations, but as means, not ends, to pursue those ideals and
demonstrate national steadfastness. It can challenge police states;
enforce compliance of agreements; and insist on minimal standards of
accountability.
Securing the
Northern Border
Syria challenges Israel on
Lebanese soil. An effective approach, and one with which American can
sympathize, would be if Israel seized the strategic initiative along its
northern borders by engaging Hizballah, Syria, and Iran, as the
principal agents of aggression in Lebanon, including by:
- striking Syria’s
drug-money and counterfeiting infrastructure in Lebanon, all of
which focuses on Razi Qanan.
- paralleling Syria’s
behavior by establishing the precedent that Syrian territory is not
immune to attacks emanating from Lebanon by Israeli proxy forces.
- striking Syrian
military targets in Lebanon, and should that prove insufficient,
striking at select targets in Syria proper.
Israel also can take this
opportunity to remind the world of the nature of the Syrian regime.
Syria repeatedly breaks its word. It violated numerous
agreements with the Turks, and has betrayed the United States by
continuing to occupy Lebanon in violation of the Taef agreement in 1989.
Instead, Syria staged a sham election, installed a quisling regime, and
forced Lebanon to sign a "Brotherhood Agreement" in 1991, that
terminated Lebanese sovereignty. And Syria has begun colonizing
Lebanon with hundreds of thousands of Syrians, while killing tens of
thousands of its own citizens at a time, as it did in only three days in
1983 in Hama.
Under Syrian tutelage, the
Lebanese drug trade, for which local Syrian military officers receive
protection payments, flourishes. Syria’s regime supports the terrorist
groups operationally and financially in Lebanon and on its soil. Indeed,
the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon has become for terror
what the Silicon Valley has become for computers.
The Bekaa Valley
has become one of the main distribution sources, if not production
points, of the "supernote" — counterfeit US currency so well done that
it is impossible to detect.
Text:
Negotiations with
repressive regimes like Syria’s require cautious realism. One cannot
sensibly assume the other side’s good faith. It is dangerous for
Israel to deal naively with a regime murderous of its own people,
openly aggressive toward its neighbors, criminally involved with
international drug traffickers and counterfeiters, and supportive of
the most deadly terrorist organizations.
Given the nature of the
regime in Damascus, it is both natural and moral that Israel abandon the
slogan "comprehensive peace" and move to contain Syria, drawing
attention to its weapons of mass destruction program, and rejecting
"land for peace" deals on the Golan Heights.
Moving to a
Traditional Balance of Power Strategy
TEXT:
We must distinguish
soberly and clearly friend from foe. We must make sure that our
friends across the Middle East never doubt the solidity or value of
our friendship.
Israel can shape its strategic
environment, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, by weakening,
containing, and even rolling back Syria.
This effort can
focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq — an important
Israeli strategic objective in its own right — as a means of foiling
Syria’s regional ambitions.
Jordan has challenged Syria's regional ambitions recently by suggesting
the restoration of the Hashemites in Iraq. This has triggered a
Jordanian-Syrian rivalry to which Asad has responded by stepping up
efforts to destabilize the Hashemite Kingdom, including using
infiltrations. Syria recently signaled that it and Iran might prefer a
weak, but barely surviving Saddam, if only to undermine and humiliate
Jordan in its efforts to remove Saddam.
But Syria enters this conflict
with potential weaknesses: Damascus is too preoccupied with dealing with
the threatened new regional equation to permit distractions of the
Lebanese flank. And Damascus fears that the 'natural axis' with Israel
on one side, central Iraq and Turkey on the other, and Jordan, in the
center would squeeze and detach Syria from the Saudi Peninsula. For
Syria, this could be the prelude to a redrawing of the map of the Middle
East which would threaten Syria's territorial integrity.
Since Iraq's
future could affect the strategic balance in the Middle East profoundly,
it would be understandable that Israel has an interest in supporting the
Hashemites in their efforts to redefine Iraq, including such measures
as: visiting Jordan as the first official state visit, even before a
visit to the United States, of the new Netanyahu government; supporting
King Hussein by providing him with some tangible security measures to
protect his regime against Syrian subversion; encouraging — through
influence in the U.S. business community — investment in Jordan to
structurally shift Jordan’s economy away from dependence on Iraq; and
diverting Syria’s attention by using Lebanese opposition elements to
destabilize Syrian control of Lebanon.
Most important, it is
understandable that Israel has an interest supporting diplomatically,
militarily and operationally Turkey’s and Jordan’s actions against
Syria, such as securing tribal alliances with Arab tribes that cross
into Syrian territory and are hostile to the Syrian ruling elite.
King Hussein may have ideas for
Israel in bringing its Lebanon problem under control. The predominantly
Shia population of southern Lebanon has been tied for centuries to the
Shia leadership in Najf, Iraq rather than Iran. Were the Hashemites
to control Iraq, they could use their influence over Najf to help Israel
wean the south Lebanese Shia away from Hizballah, Iran, and Syria.
Shia retain strong ties to the Hashemites: the Shia venerate foremost
the Prophet’s family, the direct descendants of which — and in whose
veins the blood of the Prophet flows — is King Hussein.
Changing the
Nature of Relations with the Palestinians
Israel has a chance to forge a
new relationship between itself and the Palestinians. First and
foremost, Israel’s efforts to secure its streets may require hot pursuit
into Palestinian-controlled areas, a justifiable practice with which
Americans can sympathize.
A key element of peace is
compliance with agreements already signed. Therefore, Israel has the
right to insist on compliance, including closing Orient House and
disbanding Jibril Rujoub’s operatives in Jerusalem. Moreover, Israel and
the United States can establish a Joint Compliance Monitoring
Committee to study periodically whether the PLO meets minimum
standards of compliance, authority and responsibility, human rights, and
judicial and fiduciary accountability.
TEXT:
We believe that the
Palestinian Authority must be held to the same minimal standards of
accountability as other recipients of U.S. foreign aid. A firm peace
cannot tolerate repression and injustice. A regime that cannot
fulfill the most rudimentary obligations to its own people cannot be
counted upon to fulfill its obligations to its neighbors.
Israel has no obligations under
the Oslo agreements if the PLO does not fulfill its obligations. If the
PLO cannot comply with these minimal standards, then it can be neither a
hope for the future nor a proper interlocutor for present. To prepare
for this, Israel may want to cultivate alternatives to Arafat’s base of
power. Jordan has ideas on this.
To emphasize the point that
Israel regards the actions of the PLO problematic, but not the Arab
people, Israel might want to consider making a special effort to reward
friends and advance human rights among Arabs. Many Arabs are willing to
work with Israel; identifying and helping them are important. Israel may
also find that many of her neighbors, such as Jordan, have problems with
Arafat and may want to cooperate. Israel may also want to better
integrate its own Arabs.
Forging A New
U.S.-Israeli Relationship
In recent years, Israel invited
active U.S. intervention in Israel’s domestic and foreign policy for two
reasons: to overcome domestic opposition to "land for peace" concessions
the Israeli public could not digest, and to lure
Arabs — through money, forgiveness of past sins, and access to U.S.
weapons — to negotiate. This strategy, which required funneling American
money to repressive and aggressive regimes, was risky, expensive, and
very costly for both the U.S. and Israel, and placed the United States
in roles is should neither have nor want.
Israel can make a clean break
from the past and establish a new vision for the U.S.-Israeli
partnership based on self-reliance, maturity and mutuality — not one
focused narrowly on territorial disputes. Israel’s new strategy — based
on a shared philosophy of peace through strength — reflects
continuity with Western values by stressing that Israel is
self-reliant, does not need U.S. troops in any capacity to defend
it, including on the Golan Heights, and can manage its own affairs. Such
self-reliance will grant Israel greater freedom of action and remove a
significant lever of pressure used against it in the past.
To reinforce this point, the
Prime Minister can use his forthcoming visit to announce that Israel is
now mature enough to cut itself free immediately from at least
U.S. economic aid and loan guarantees at least, which prevent economic
reform. [Military aid is separated for the moment until adequate
arrangements can be made to ensure that Israel will not encounter supply
problems in the means to defend itself]. As outlined in another
Institute report, Israel can become self-reliant only by, in a bold
stroke rather than in increments, liberalizing its economy,
cutting taxes, relegislating a free-processing zone, and selling-off
public lands and enterprises — moves which will electrify and find
support from a broad bipartisan spectrum of key pro-Israeli
Congressional leaders, including Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich.
Israel can under these
conditions better cooperate with the U.S. to counter real threats to the
region and the West’s security. Mr. Netanyahu can highlight his desire
to cooperate more closely with the United States on anti-missile defense
in order to remove the threat of blackmail which even a weak and distant
army can pose to either state. Not only would such cooperation on
missile defense counter a tangible physical threat to Israel’s survival,
but it would broaden Israel’s base of support among many in the
United States Congress who may know little about Israel, but care
very much about missile defense. Such broad support could be helpful in
the effort to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.
To anticipate U.S. reactions
and plan ways to manage and constrain those reactions, Prime Minister
Netanyahu can formulate the policies and stress themes he favors in
language familiar to the Americans by tapping into themes of American
administrations during the Cold War which apply well to Israel. If
Israel wants to test certain propositions that require a benign American
reaction, then the best time to do so is before November, 1996.
Conclusions:
Transcending the Arab-Israeli Conflict
TEXT: Israel will not only
contain its foes; it will transcend them.
Notable Arab intellectuals have
written extensively on their perception of Israel’s floundering and loss
of national identity. This perception has invited attack, blocked Israel
from achieving true peace, and offered hope for those who would destroy
Israel. The previous strategy, therefore, was leading the Middle East
toward another Arab-Israeli war. Israel’s new agenda can signal a clean
break by abandoning a policy which assumed exhaustion and allowed
strategic retreat by reestablishing the principle of preemption, rather
than retaliation alone and by ceasing to absorb blows to the nation
without response.
Israel’s new strategic agenda
can shape the regional environment in ways that grant Israel the room to
refocus its energies back to where they are most needed: to rejuvenate
its national idea, which can only come through replacing Israel’s
socialist foundations with a more sound footing; and to overcome its
"exhaustion," which threatens the survival of the nation.
Ultimately, Israel can do more
than simply manage the Arab-Israeli conflict though war. No amount of
weapons or victories will grant Israel the peace its seeks. When Israel
is on a sound economic footing, and is free, powerful, and healthy
internally, it will no longer simply manage the Arab-Israeli conflict;
it will transcend it. As a senior Iraqi opposition leader said recently:
"Israel must rejuvenate and revitalize its moral and intellectual
leadership. It is an important — if not the most important--element in
the history of the Middle East." Israel — proud, wealthy, solid, and
strong — would be the basis of a truly new and peaceful Middle East.
Participants in
the Study Group on "A New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000:"
Richard Perle, American
Enterprise Institute, Study Group Leader
James Colbert, Jewish
Institute for National Security Affairs
Charles Fairbanks, Jr., Johns Hopkins University/SAIS
Douglas Feith, Feith and Zell Associates
Robert Loewenberg, President, Institute for Advanced Strategic
and Political Studies
Jonathan Torop, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
David Wurmser, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies
Meyrav Wurmser, Johns Hopkins University
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